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= Trust game = The Trust Game, originally designed by Berg et al. (1995) and otherwise called “the investment game, ” is the experiment of choice to measure trust in economic decisions. Their study mainly considers the role of trust in a two-person exchange and explores its possible affecting factors. The result demonstrates that trust is an economic primitive because reciprocity does occur during the study. Since trust is not intrinsically part of mainstream economics, the success of this experiment proves primacy of trust is problematic for basic assumptions of standard economics.

Description
When people lack experience, the difference in confidence between the two institutions is imperceptible. However, in the limited game, individuals' degree of trust declines with experience, but it remains constant in the indefinite game. Furthermore, trust decreases during the course of the repeated game, independent of experience or institution, but it starts to rise again when new connections start. Results from other finitely repeated games with the possibility of cooperative activity are consistent with the drop-over rounds and the reset at the beginning of new connections.

Furthermore,  Trustor strategies in the finite game encompass a variety of behaviors, such as endgame, naive, and punishment behaviors. This leads to just one strategy for the endless game. This tactic takes into account the duration of any future relationships; if the Trustee proves to be unreliable, it threatens to cease trusting altogether.

Moreover, for both player types in both institutions, tactics develop in a way that favors the best possible response. Trust stays high in the indefinite game when the future is taken into account, while it declines in the limited game when the future is not taken into account.

The reciprocity of trust games is the average proportion returned in the Trust Game, which assesses trustworthiness, commonly referred to as altruism and reciprocity, is predictive of the amount sent, which assesses profit-seeking and expected reciprocity. Moreover，the degree of reciprocity in the Trust Game predicts the degree of reciprocity in the Public Good Game.

Explanations
Game Process Description

There are two parties of participants that are anonymously paired, and one party is in Room A and the other in Room B. The first players in Room A, are told that they must send some amount of their $10 show-up money to an anonymous second player in Room B, though the amount sent may be zero. The first player is also informed that whatever he sends will be tripled by the experimenter. So, when the first player chooses a value, the experimenter will take it, triple it, and give that money to the second player. Subjects in Room B then decide how much of the tripled money to keep and how much to send back to their counterparts, even if that amount is zero.

Predict Results

Under standard economic assumptions, the first players in Room A will send nothing and the second players will send nothing back, which is the Nash equilibrium for this game.

Actual Results

In the original Berg et al. experiment, thirty out of thirty-two game trials resulted in a violation of the results predicted by standard economic theory. In these thirty cases, the first players sent money that averaged slightly over fifty percent of their original endowment.

The results of the second players, in response to the non-zero transfers of the first players, were more varied in the above experiments. In the Berg et al. experiment, the amount reciprocated heavily depended on the level of social information the experimenters gave the second player about the first. However, no matter what information the experimenters gave, the average amount returned to the first player by the second was in excess of the amount originally sent.

In the experiment, the actual results of both the first and second players differed sharply from those results predicted under the standard economic assumption of pure self-interest.

Applications
The trust game has become a well-established approach among scientific disciplines to study social behaviors, including trust and cooperation. It has been applied to other areas as a tool to measure trust among people. The Trust Game for Couples (TGC) was developed as an interactive tool to measure trust behavior between partners, involving costly behavior and monetary consequences. The trust between partners is measured by how willing the participants are to give financial investment in their romantic partner's attitude towards their relationship. It is found that the trust measured in TGC correlates with participants’ self-reported feelings of trust, satisfaction, and relationship closeness in this relationship, which indicates that TGC can be used as a new behavioral tool to assess trust in a dyadic relationship.

In addition to an assessment tool, the trust game is referred to in computational models that contain mutual trust relationships. In digital and virtual environments, trust has emerged as a major issue in processing online transactions. Game models are also proposed to study the evolution of stable strategies of many stakeholders and observe the cooperative behavior of multiple stakeholders. To further solve key problems of mutual trust and collaboration in cloud computing, a trust prediction game model is brought forth which is made up of the supervisor and a cloud service provider (CSP).

Apart from lab studies, the trust game can potentially solve social issues. For example, how the trust game could help foster cooperation between the upstream and downstream nations in the Nile Basin, addressing escalating hostility and mistrust due to Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Eastern Nile Basin situation was modeled as a multi-round, modified the trust game with non-binding bargains among participants, and the findings imply that a reliable integrative, cooperative framework may be used to achieve the "win for all" situation.

Some social studies also revealed an interesting relationship between socially desirable responses and behavior-contingent incentives. In a study examining the effectiveness of anonymity in the trust game, it was found that when indirect questioning was used to increase the ambiguity of responses, levels of trust declined. This suggests that trust levels may be particularly sensitive to changes in people's anonymity but not always be affected by financial incentives.

== Extensive Experiments/Examples of Trust Game == Repeated Trust Game

Several facts affect trust. For example, Bohnet et al. (2001) find that different probabilities of contract enforcement lead to different trust, and lower and higher probabilities of contract enforcement cause more trust. In addition, Fehr and Ga ̈chter (2002) research found that adding rewards reduces the incentive for people to reciprocate.

In the experiment from the evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game (JimEngle-Warnick, 2004), they examined a one-round trust game and an indefinite trust game to understand how trust works in players.

Game Rules:


 * 1) Player1 is assigned $40 dollars, player1 can give away all or none of their$40 dollars to player2.
 * 2) Player1 has the right to give none, then the game ends.
 * 3) If player1 chooses to send all of theirmoney, then player2 will receive $40x2, and player2 has the right to give away their$60 dollars to player1 or none.
 * 4) Go and forth 1-3 steps between players.

In this examination, they found that under finite rounds of the trust game, in this experiment, they played 5 rounds with the same players, trust behavior may or may not occur. However, in an indefinite game, players play 7 rounds of games.

When players are inexperienced, at the beginning of the game, on this game mechanism, the finite and indefinite game did not affect the initial level of trust. But when players gradually understand how the mechanism works, the aggregate efficiency of each diverges as subjects gain experience. In both finite and infinite rounds, players tend to end the game rather than continue the.

Examples of Trust Game


 * Trust Game in Economics, there is not only trustworthiness behavior need to measure but social capital

Research indicates that the more individual trusts another, the more they trade with one another. Trust between people is an important component of barganing, influencing micro- and macro-economics. In order to evaluate trust, several researchers used different approaches, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) questionnaire as a measurement of trust.

In Dean S. Karlan’s research (2005), he designed a trust game to approach the concept of trust behavior in an economic environment. This research mainly focused on how to evaluate trustworthiness by operating a trust game and the objective measurement of social capital.

In this research, the trust game was designed in the following steps:


 * 1) Everyone gets three Nuevos soles.
 * 2) Everyone was randomly paired with another player and assigned as A and B.
 * 3) Individuals paired with each other should not communicate with each other, only observation is allowed.
 * 4) Player A has the opportunity to give player B X number of Nuevos coins where X ∈ [0,3]. If player A gives 0 coins, then the game ends. If player A gives more than 0 coins, then the game administrator matches the amount passed. On the other hand, player B could pass back any number of coins to player A, ending the game.

Behavioral Determinants of the games

For instance, attending the same church also indicates trustworthiness between players. If two people reported attending the same church,, player A gives 20% more to player B.

This research demonstrates that even though behavior in the Trust Game might correlate intuitively with other measures of social capital, using it as a measure of social capital alone deserves further research, with particular attention paid to the motives behind Players’ actions. In his research, he suggests that in games, the trustworthiness of the players and the measurement index in the General Social Survey have a positive correlation.