User:Esdrasbarnevelt/Operation Bagration

Operation Bagration (Oперация Багратион, Operatsiya Bagration) was the codename for the Soviet Belorussian Offensive during World War II, which cleared German forces from the Belorussian SSR and eastern Poland between 22 June, 1944 and 19 August, 1944.

This action resulted in the almost complete destruction of the German Army Group Centre and three of its component armies: Fourth Army, Third Panzer Army and Ninth Army. The Soviet armies directly involved in Operation Bagration were the 1st Baltic Front under Hovhannes Bagramyan, the 1st Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Colonel-General G.F. Zakharov, and the 3rd Belorussian Front commanded by Colonel-General Ivan Chernyakhovsky. This battle was possibly the single greatest defeat for the German Army (Wehrmacht Heer) during the war.

The operation was named after 18th–19th century Georgian Prince Pyotr Bagration, general of the Russian army who received a mortal wound at the Battle of Borodino.

Background
Army Group Centre had previously proved a tough nut to crack as the Soviet defeat in Operation Mars had shown. But by June 1944, despite shortening its front line, it had been exposed following the crushing of Army Group South in the battles that followed the Battle of Kursk, the Liberation of Kiev and the Liberation of the Crimea in the late summer, autumn and winter of 1943–44 — the so-called third period of the Great Patriotic War. Operation Suvorov had seen Army Group Centre itself forced to retreat westwards from Smolensk during the autumn of 1943.

By the middle of June 1944 the distance that the Western Allies from the Cotentin Peninsula and the Soviets from the Vitebsk Gate to Berlin was just over 650 miles for the former and just under 750 for the latter, so for the Third Reich the strategic threats were about the same. Hitler underestimated the threat posed by Soviet troops facing Army Group Centre and had redeployed one third of Army Group Centre's artillery, half their tank destroyers and 88% of their tanks to the Southern front where the German high command expected the next major Soviet offensive.

Bagration, in combination with the neighbouring Lvov-Sandomierz Operation launched a few weeks later in Ukraine, allowed the Soviet Union to recapture practically all the territories within its 1941 borders, advance into German East Prussia, and reach the outskirts of Warsaw after gaining control of Poland east of the Vistula river.

The battle has been described as the triumph of the Soviet theory of "the operational art"—because of the complete co-ordination of all front movements and signals traffic to fool the enemy about the target of the offensive. Despite the huge forces involved, Soviet front commanders left their opposite numbers completely confused about the main axis of attack until too late.

The Maskirovka campaign
The Russian word maskirovka literally means 'camouflaging' in English, but has broader application in military use, and during WWII was used by the Soviet commanders to describe a broad range of measures to create deception with the goal of inflicting surprise on the Wehrmacht forces.

The Oberkommando des Heeres expected the Soviets to launch a major Eastern Front offensive in the summer of 1944. The scenarios examined included attacks towards the Baltic against Army Group North, an offensive against Army Group Centre through the Belorussian SSR towards Warsaw, and an attack on Army Group North Ukraine towards the Carpathians. It was decided that the first two possibilities were unlikely, since there was easily defensible terrain in these sectors.

Stavka had in fact decided on an offensive against Army Group Centre: a pincer movement which would punch through German lines and close on Minsk, liberating large swathes of territory and trapping much of Army Group Centre in a huge encirclement reminiscent of those achieved by German forces at the start of Operation Barbarossa, three years earlier. In order to maximise the chances of success, a major campaign of deception — maskirovka — was undertaken to convince the German High Command that the summer offensive would, in fact, be in the south against Army Group North Ukraine. False concentrations of forces were created, and German reconnaissance flights selectively allowed into Soviet airspace to photograph them; radio silence was imposed to frustrate the intelligence efforts of Fremde Heere Ost.

Though at corps level, several German commanders noted concerns about increased Soviet activity opposite Army Group Centre, German forces were transferred southwards to Army Group North Ukraine throughout the summer, in order to meet an attack there. This left Army Group Centre dangerously weakened, as Stavka had intended.

Operations Rail War and Concert
The first phase of Operation Bagration involved the many partisan formations in the Belorussian SSR, which were instructed to restart their campaigns of targeting railways and communications behind German lines. From 19 June, large numbers of explosive charges were placed on rail tracks, and though many were cleared, they had a significant disruptive effect. The partisans would also be used to mop up encircled German forces once the breakthrough and exploitation phases of the operation were completed.



At the commencement of the offensive, the Soviets had committed approximately 1,700,000 combat and support troops, approximately 24,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 4,080 tanks and assault guns and 6,334 aircraft. German strength at the outset was approximately 800,000 combat and support troops, 9,500 artillery pieces, but only 553 tanks and assault guns and 839 aircraft. In particular, Army Group Centre was seriously short of mobile reserves: the demotorized 14th Infantry Division was the only substantial reserve formation available, though the 20th Panzer Division was positioned in the south near Bobruisk and the understrength Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle was also held in reserve. The relatively static lines in Belorussia had, however, enabled the Germans to construct extensive field fortifications, with multiple trench lines to a depth of several kilometres and heavily mined defensive belts.

Wehrmacht

 * Army Group Centre (Field-Marshal Ernst Busch to June 28; then Field Marshal Walter Model)
 * Third Panzer Army (Colonel-General Georg-Hans Reinhardt)
 * IX Corps (General Rolf Wuthmann)
 * LIII Corps (General Friedrich Gollwitzer)
 * VI Corps (General Georg Pfeiffer to June 28)
 * Reserve: 14th Infantry Division
 * Fourth Army (General Kurt von Tippelskirch)
 * XXVII Corps (General Paul Völckers)
 * XXXIX Panzer Corps (General Robert Martinek to June 28; then Lieutenant-General Otto Schünemann to June 29)
 * XII Corps (General Vincenz Müller)
 * Reserve: Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle, 286th Security Division
 * Ninth Army (General Hans Jordan to June 27; then General Nikolaus von Vormann)
 * XXXV Corps (Lieutenant-General Kurt-Jürgen Freiherr von Lützow)
 * XXXXI Panzer Corps (Lieutenant-General Edmund Hoffmeister)
 * LV Corps (General Friedrich Herrlein)
 * Reserve: 20th Panzer Division, 707th Infantry Division
 * Second Army (Colonel-General Walter Weiss)

Second Army was not involved in the first or second phases of the German defence, being positioned south of the main axis of Soviet operations.

Red Army
Two special representatives to Stavka were appointed to coordinate the operations of the Fronts involved: Alexander Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov.
 * 1st Baltic Front (General Hovhannes Bagramyan)
 * 4th Shock Army
 * 6th Guards Army
 * 43rd Army
 * 3rd Air Army
 * 3rd Belorussian Front (General Ivan Chernyakhovsky)
 * 11th Guards Army (General Kuzma Galitsky)
 * 5th Army
 * 39th Army
 * 31st Army
 * 5th Guards Tank Army (General Pavel Rotmistrov)
 * 1st Air Army
 * Cavalry-mechanised group under command of Lieutenant-General Nikolai Oslikovksy, including 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps
 * 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel-General Gyorgy Zakharov)
 * 33rd Army (Lieutenant-General Vasily Kryuchenkin)
 * 49th Army (Lieutenant-General Ivan Grishin)
 * 50th Army (Lieutenant-General Ivan Boldin)
 * 4th Air Army
 * 1st Belorussian Front (Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky)
 * 3rd Army (General Alexander Gorbatov)
 * 28th Army
 * 48th Army
 * 65th Army (General Pavel Batov)
 * 16th Air Army
 * Cavalry-mechanised group under command of Lieutenant-General Pliev, including 1st Mechanised Corps, 4th Guards Cavalry Corps

The 1st Belorussian Front was particularly large, and included further units which were only committed during the following Lublin-Brest Offensive.

The battle - first phase
Operation Bagration began on 22 June 1944, the same calendar day on which the Germans had previously invaded Russia in 1941, with probing attacks throughout the German lines. The main offensive began in the early morning of 23 June, with an artillery bombardment of unprecedented scale against the defensive works. Within hours, some sectors of the German defences were in danger of being breached.

Vitebsk-Orsha Offensive Operation
The operation was conducted by the 1st Baltic Front and 3rd Belorussian Front against the positions of Army Group Centre's northern army, Third Panzer Army, and the northern flank of Fourth Army.

In the north, the 1st Baltic Front pushed the IX corps over the Dvina, while encircling the LIII Corps in the city of Vitebsk by June 25. To the south, the 3rd Belorussian Front drove through the VI Corps, shattering it. Vitebsk was taken by 27 June, the entire LIII Corps of 30,000 men being destroyed.

The 3rd Belorussian Front simltaneously opened operations against the XXVII Corps holding Orsha and the main Moscow - Minsk road. Despite a tenacious German defence, Orsha was liberated by 26 June, and the 3rd Belorussian Front's mechanised forces were able to penetrate far into the German rear, reaching the Berezina River by 28 June.

Mogilev Offensive Operation
The primary aim of the Mogilev Offensive, and of the 2nd Belorussian Front, was to pin down the majority of Fourth Army while the developing Vitebsk-Orsha and Bobruysk Offensives encircled it. The 2nd Belorussian Front's units attacked on 23 June, aiming to force crossings of the Dnepr against two of Army Group Centre's strongest corps, the XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Corps.

The Dnepr was crossed by the 49th Army by 27 June, and by 28 June it had encircled and taken the town of Mogilev. The XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Corps began to fall back towards the Berezina River under heavy air attack, but were retreating into a trap.

Bobruysk Offensive Operation
The Bobruysk Offensive was opened by 1st Belorussian Front on 23 June, but it suffered heavy losses attempting to penetrate the defences of Ninth Army. Rokossovsky ordered additional bombing and artillery preparation, and launched further attacks the next day.

The 3rd Army broke through in the north of the sector, trapping the German XXXV Corps against the Berezina. The 65th Army then broke through the XXXXI Panzer Corps to the south; by 27 June the two German corps were encircled in a pocket east of Bobruysk under constant aerial bombardment.

Some elements of Ninth Army managed to break out of Bobruysk on 28 June, but up to 70,000 troops were killed or taken prisoner. The 1st Belorussian Front's forces liberated Bobruysk on 29 June after intense street fighting.

Second phase
The second phase of Operation Bagration involved the entire operation's most significant single objective: the retaking of Minsk, capital of the Belorussian SSR. It would also complete the large-scale encirclement and destruction, set up by the first phase, of much of Army Group Centre.

Minsk Offensive Operation
From 28 June, the main exploitation units of the 3rd Belorussian Front (the 5th Guards Tank Army and an attached cavalry-mechanised group) began to push on to secure crossings of the Berezina, followed by the 11th Guards Army. In the south, exploitation forces of the 1st Belorussian Front began to close the lower pincer of the trap developing around the German Fourth Army.

The Germans rushed the 5th Panzer Division into Belorussia to cover the approaches to Minsk, while the units of Fourth Army began to withdraw over the Berezina crossings, where they were pounded by heavy air bombardment.

After forcing crossings of the Berezina, Soviet forces closed on Minsk. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was the first to break into the city in the early hours of 3 July; fighting erupted in the centre, which was finally cleared of German rearguards by the following day. The 5th Guards Tank Army and 65th Army closed the encirclement to the west of Minsk, trapping the entire German Fourth Army, and much of the remnants of Ninth Army.

Over the next few days, the pocket east of Minsk was reduced: only a fraction of the 100,000 troops in it escaped. Minsk had been liberated, and Army Group Centre utterly destroyed, in possibly the greatest single defeat suffered by the Wehrmacht in the whole war.

Polotsk Offensive Operation
The Polotsk Offensive had the dual objective of taking Polotsk itself, and of screening the northern flank of the main Minsk Offensive against a possible German counter-offensive from Army Group North.

The 1st Baltic Front succesfully pursued the retreating remnants of Third Panzer Army back towards Polotsk, which was reached by 1 July. German forces attempted to organise a defence using rear-area support units and several divisions hurriedly transferred from Army Group North.

Units of the 1st Baltic Front's 4th Shock Army and 6th Guards Army fought their way into the city over the next few days, and succesfully cleared it of German forces by 4 July.

Third phase
As German resistance had almost completely collapsed, Soviet forces were ordered to push on as far as possible beyond the original objective of Minsk, and new objectives were issued by Stavka. This resulted in a third phase of offensive operations, which should be regarded as a further part of Operation Bagration.

Field-Marshal Walter Model, who had taken over command of Army Group Centre on 28 June when Ernst Busch was sacked, hoped to reestablish a defensive line running through Lida using what was left of Third Panzer, Fourth and Ninth Armies along with new reinforcements.

Schaulyai Offensive Operation
The Schaulyai Offensive covered the operations of the 1st Baltic Front between 5th July and 31 July against the remnants of Third Panzer Army; its main objective was the Lithuanian city of Šiauliai.

The 43rd, 51st, and 2nd Guards Armies attacked towards Riga on the Baltic coast with 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps attached. By 31 July, the coast on the Gulf of Riga had been reached. 6th Guards Army covered Riga and the extended flank of the penetration towards the north.

A hurriedly-organised German counter-attack managed to restore the severed connection between the remnants of Army Group Centre and Army Group North. During August, the Germans attempted to retake Šiauliai in Operation Doppelkopf and Operation Cäsar, but failed.

Vilnus Offensive Operation
The Vilnus Offensive was conducted by units of the 3rd Belorussian Front subsequent to their completion of the Minsk Offensive; they were opposed by the remnants of Third Panzer and Fourth Armies.

Units of Fourth Army, principally the 5th Panzer Division, attempted to hold the key rail junction of Molodechno, but it was taken by units of the 11th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps on 5 June. German forces continued a precipitate retreat, and Soviet forces reached Vilnius, held by units of the Third Panzer Army, by 7 July.

By 8 July, the city had been encircled, trapping the garrison, who were ordered to hold fast at all costs. Soviet forces then fought their way into the city in intense street-by-street fighting (alongside an Armia Krajowa uprising, Operation Ostra Brama). On 12 July, 6th Panzer Division counter-attacked and temporarily opened an escape corridor for the besieged troops, but the majority of them were lost when the city finally fell on 13 July (this phase of the operation is commonly known as the Battle of Vilnius).

Belostock Offensive Operation
The Belostock Offensive covered the operations of 2nd Belorussian Front between 5 July and 27 July, with the objective of the Polish city of Białystok.

The 40th and 41st Rifle Corps of 3rd Army, on the front's left wing, took Białystok by storm of 27 July, after two days of fighting.

Lublin-Brest Offensive Operation
The Lublin-Brest Offensive was carried out by Marshal Rokossovsky's 1st Belorussian Front between 18 July and 2 August, and developed the initial gains of Operation Bagration towards eastern Poland and the Vistula.

The 47th and 8th Guards Armies reached the Western Bug River by 21 July, and the latter reached the eastern bank of the Vistula by 25 July. Lublin was taken on the 24 July; the 2nd Tank Army was ordered to turn northward, towards Warsaw, to cut off the retreat of forces from Army Group Centre in the Brest area.

Brest was taken on 28 July and the Front's left wing seized bridgeheads over the Vistula by 2 August. This effectively completed the operation, the remainder of the summer being given over to defensive efforts against a series of German counter-attacks on the bridgeheads.

Kaunas Offensive Operation
The Kaunas Offensive covered the operations of Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front from 28 July to 28 August, towards the Lithuanian city of Kaunas, subsequent to their completion of the offensive against Vilnius.

Osovets Offensive Operation
This offensive covered the operations of 2nd Belorussian Front from 6 August to 14 August, after their completion of the Belostock Offensive, with the objective of the fortified area at Osowiec on one of the tributaries of the Narew River. The very large fortress complex there secured the approaches to East Prussia through the region's marshes.

German forces were able to stabilise their line of defence along the Narew, which they held until the East Prussian Operation of January 1945.

Aftermath
Compared to other battles, this was by far the greatest Soviet victory in numerical terms. The Red Army inflicted nearly four times as many losses on the Germans as they sustained, and liberated a vast amount of Soviet territory (whose population had suffered greatly under the brutal German occupation; the advancing Soviets found cities destroyed, villages depopulated, and much of the population killed or deported by the occupiers) in a span of 2 months. In order to show the outside world the magnitude of the victory, some 50,000 German prisoners, taken from the encirclement east of Minsk, were paraded through Moscow: even marching quickly and twenty abreast, they took three hours to pass. In a symbolic gesture the streets were washed down afterwards.

The German army never recovered from the matériel and manpower losses sustained during this time, having lost about a quarter of its Eastern Front manpower, similar to the percentage lost at Stalingrad (about 20 full divisions). These losses included many experienced troops, NCOs and officers, which at this stage of the war the Wehrmacht could not replace. A number of generals were also lost: 9 were killed, including 2 corps commanders; 22 captured, including 4 corps commanders; Major-General Hahn, commander of 197th Infantry Division disappeared on 24 June and Lieutenant-General Zutavern of 18th Panzergrenadier Division committed suicide.

Overall the near-total annihilation of Army Group Centre cost the Germans 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles. German losses are estimated at 300,000 dead, 250,000 wounded, and about 120,000 captured; overall casualties at 670,000.

Soviet losses were also substantial, with 60,000 killed, 110,000 wounded, and about 8,000 missing, with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.

The offensive cut off Army Group North and Army Group North Ukraine from each other, and weakened them as resources were diverted to the central sector. This forced both Army Groups to withdraw from Soviet territory much more quickly when faced with the following Soviet offensives in their sectors.

The final destruction of much of Army Group Centre around Minsk coincided with the destruction of many of the German army's strongest units in France in the Falaise pocket. On both eastern and western fronts, the subsequent Allied exploitation was slowed and halted by supply problems rather than German resistance. However, the Germans were able to transfer armoured units from the Italian front, where they could afford to give ground, to resist the Soviet advance near Warsaw.