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The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought near the settlement of Prokhorovka, 54 mi southeast of Kursk, on the Eastern Front during the Second World War as part of the Battle of Kursk in the Soviet Union. Principally, the Wehrmacht's II SS Panzer Corps clashed with the Red Army's 5th Guards Tank Army. It is regarded as one of the largest tank battles in military history.

On 5 July 1943 the Wehrmacht launched Operation Citadel. The aim was to envelop and destroy the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient (also known as the Kursk bulge), in hopes of retaining the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. The operation was conducted by three German armies striking in a pincer movement. The 9th Army attacked the northern side of the Kursk salient. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf attacked the southern side. Stavka (Soviet High Command) had prior intelligence of the German intentions, provided in part by the British. The Soviets therefore prepared a defence in depth with their "fronts" (army groups) along the routes of the planned German attack in order to wear down the Wehrmacht before eventually going on the offensive. The Voronezh Front was tasked with the defence of the southern side of the salient and the Central Front the defence of the northern side, while the Steppe Front was held as the strategic reserve.

At Prokhorovka, the Red Army committed the Steppe Front in order to stem the advance of the 4th Panzer Army, resulting in a titanic clash of armour just outside the settlement on 12 July 1943. The battle raged across a stretch of land ranging in an arc of 20 km to the west and south of Prokhorovka. The Red Army succeeded in stopping the Germans from capturing Prokhorovka and breaking through the third defensive belt to achieve operational freedom.

Subsequently, all German forces were withdrawn from the Prokhorovka sector. Both sides suffered heavy losses in the battle. While the Soviets lost more men and materiel than the Germans, they were better able to replace their losses due to their immense reserves of manpower and resources. Afterwards, the Red Army was able to take the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, and kept it for the rest of the war.

Background
In the winter of 1942–1943 the 6th Army and elements of the 4th Panzer Army were encircled and destroyed by the Soviets during the Battle of Stalingrad. The subsequent Soviet winter offensives, starting with Operation Little Saturn, threatened the positions of Army Group A, Army Group Don and Army Group B (from south to north respectively). These operations led to the liberation of most of the Caucasus from German occupation at a cost of only 70,000 Soviet casualties. By mid February 1943 the Red Army's advance had become overstretched. Erich von Manstein (commander of Army Group South) recognized this and organised an improvised counteroffensive which resulted in the Third Battle of Kharkov. Mobile German forces, headed by the SS Panzer Corps, pinched off the flanks of the Soviet spearhead and destroyed them. The German victory had enabled the Wehrmacht forces to recapture Kharkov on 14–15 March 1943 and drive the Red Army back over the northern Don River.



The SS Panzer Corps subsequently recaptured Belgorod to the north of Kharkov on 18 March but was stalled by the appearance of Soviet forces that had been rushed from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod. Combat operations ceased by the end of March due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa (the thaw and "mud season" which made mobile operations virtually impossible) and the exhaustion of the Wehrmacht. This state of exhaustion was also mirrored in the Red Army. The OKH (German Army Supreme Command) selected the Kursk salient for their next major offensive, code named Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel). According to some contemporary military historians, the operation envisioned a blitzkrieg, but some other military historians and many of the German participants, including von Manstein, made no mention of blitzkrieg in their characterization of the operation. Citadel envisioned a double envelopment with pincers originating from the bases of the salient and directed at Kursk which would surround the majority of the Soviet defenders and seal off the salient. The 9th Army (commanded by Walter Model), subordinate to Army Group Center (commanded by Günther von Kluge), would administer the attack on the northern face of the salient and drive southwards to Kursk. Simultaneously, the 4th Panzer Army (commanded by Hermann Hoth) and Army Detachment Kempf (commanded by Werner Kempf), both subordinate to Army Group South (commanded by Erich von Manstein), would deliver the attack on the southern face of the salient and drive northwards to Kursk. The western face of the salient was to be kept in check by the 2nd Army (commanded by Walter Weiß), subordinate to Army Group Center. The offensive was initially intended to win back the strategic initiative in the Eastern Front, but over the course of the preparatory period for the offensive, many German senior officers abandoned this ambitious aim for the modest goal of decimating Soviet armour and reserves in order to force a stalemate in the Eastern Front. It was hoped that this would allow Germany the freedom to deal with the Allied threat elsewhere.

Through both domestic and foreign intelligence, Stavka learned of the German offensive plans for the summer of 1943, and consequently decided on a defence in depth aimed at wearing down the German spearheads by forcing them to break through multiple lines of heavily fortified positions. After the German offensive had withered, the Soviet strategic reserves would then be released to counterattack and destroy the weakened enemy.

Detailed knowledge of the German offensive by the Soviets as well as German postponement of their offensive due to concerns over general preparations and delay in the arrival of new weapons – in particular, the Tiger I tanks, Panther tanks and the Ferdinand tank destroyers – enabled the Soviets to thoroughly prepare six defensive belts, 130–150 kilometres deep, on each shoulder of the salient. The first three belts were the main belts (officially known as Army belts). They were more intensely fortified and defended than the three successive rear belts (officially known as Front belts). The Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky, defended the northern face. The Steppe Front, commanded by Ivan Konev, was held as the strategic reserve. The Soviet Strategic Defence of Kursk, unlike that of Moscow in 1941, would not occur along the entire front, but was rather concentrated along the expected routes of the German attack.

German advance leading up to Prokhorovka
(5–9 July)

When the German offensive came on 5 July 1943, contrary to the hopes of German commanders, it immediately failed to dislocate Soviet forces. Everywhere, the Germans were met with fierce resistance in a battlefield infested with defensive constructions. In the southern salient, the primary attacking formations of the 4th Panzer Army were the XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps, west to east, respectively. The right flank of the 4th Panzer Army – more specifically the right flank of II SS Panzer Corps – was to be covered by III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf.

On 5 July, the III Panzer Corps had difficulty crossing the Northern Donets River due to obstinate Soviet resistance, but eventually made it through by morning of 6 July. The crossing was immediately followed by an attack with about 300 operational tanks of the III Panzer Corps, and supported by Corp Raus, on the first Soviet defensive belt. This attack ran head on into Soviet counterattacks against the bridgeheads by the 24th and 25th Guards Rifle Corps, the 213th and 111th Rifle Divisions, and also several tank brigades and regiments. By the end of 6 July, although the III Panzer Corps had perforated the first defensive belt, it still failed to break free from it into the second defensive belt due to the stout resistance and relentless counterattacks of the Soviet defenders. The sluggish advance of the III Panzer Corps rendered the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army dangerously exposed.

On the dawn of 5 July, the three divisions of the elite II SS Panzer Corps (commanded by Paul Hausser) – 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (commanded by Theodor Wisch), 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich (commanded by Walter Krüger) and 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf (commanded by Hermann Prieß) – struck against the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps (of the 6th Guards Army). The corps was led by 42 Tigers; in total, nearly 494 tanks and assault guns attacked across a seven and half mile front. Totenkopf advanced as the right wing of the attack; Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler advanced as the left wing and Das Reich moved in between. By the end of 5 July, Das Reich and Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had both penetrated the Soviet first defensive belt and reached the outer perimeter of the second belt; whereas, Totenkopf was tied down well behind the other two by fierce Soviet resistance, leaving the right flank of Das Reich exposed. On the left wing of 4th Panzer Army, by the end of 6 July, the XLVIII Panzer Corps had smashed past the first defensive belt and in certain sectors had speared deep into the second defensive belt.

By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, save three rifle divisions under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the German attack. But also ominous on 6 July was the situation along the Oboyan axis where only the second defensive belt now stood between the 4th Panzer Army and its breakthrough to achieve operational freedom in the Soviet rear. This was because in this axis, unlike in other axes with a fully occupied third defensive belt, the third belt and beyond were not yet sufficiently manned and the Voronezh Front had already exhausted its capability to reinforce any of its hard-pressed sectors.

Nikolai Vatutin devised a remedial plan for the developing crisis, which in a nutshell was to shift the weight of his local counterattacks to the flanks of the 4th Panzer Army. However, formations from elsewhere were needed to accomplish this. Therefore, the plan was presented to Stavka on the evening of 6 July with requests to send reinforcements to the Voronezh Front. Stavka on that same evening ordered the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies (both from the Steppe Front) as well as the 2nd Tank Corps (from the Southwestern Front) to reinforce the Voronezh Front. Ivan Konev objected to this premature piecemeal commitment of the strategic reserve, but a personal call from Joseph Stalin silenced his complaints. The 10th Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5th Guards Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of its parent army, arriving at Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July. The 2nd Tank Corps arrived at Korocha (25 miles southeast of Prokhorovka) by morning of 8 July. Georgiy Zhukov (the Soviet Deputy Supreme Commander) in the opening hours of 7 July ordered the 17th Air Army – the air fleet serving the Southwestern Front – to support the 2nd Air Army in serving the Voronezh Front.

By the morning of 8 July, Totenkopf was already being relieved by the arrival of the 167th Infantry Division (from XLVIII Panzer Corps). Totenkopf redeployed to the centre of II SS Panzer Corps with Das Reich and Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler now becoming the right and left wings respectively. Das Reich guarded the northern half of the wide right flank of the corps, while the 167th Infantry Division took over the flank duties from Totenkopf for the southern half. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, early that morning, stormed and captured Bolshie Maiachki. It subsequently clashed with the 31st Tank Corps. Simultaneously Totenkopf, after forcing the 237th Tank Brigade (of the 31st Tank Corps) to withdraw, secured Greznoye, less than 3 mi south of the Psel River (also known as Psyol River).

As the II SS Panzer Corps made its advance on early 8 July, Vatutin unleashed a wave of armoured counterattacks. The 31st Tank Corps' attack had already been preempted by the German attack early that morning. Later that morning, the 10th Tank Corps stormed the spearhead units of the II SS Panzer Corps. Later in the afternoon, the 2nd Tank Corps joined the attack. Although these attacks were intended to be concerted, in practice due to poor coordination, they turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks which the Germans crushed. Also as part of the Soviet counterattack, that afternoon the 5th Guards Tank Corps clattered into the right flank of the II SS Panzer Corps held by Das Reich, but it was defeated. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest around the village of Gostishchevo (10 mi north of Belgorod), prepared to swarm the positions held by the 167th Infantry Division but was detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialized. It was subsequently decimated by German Henschel Hs 129B ground-attack aircraft armed with MK 103 anti-tank guns and at least 50 tanks were destroyed. This marked the first time in military history an attacking tank formation had been defeated by air power alone. The Soviet armoured counterattacks on 8 July were a fiasco. Nevertheless, they succeeded in stalling the advance of the II SS Panzer Corps for the rest of the day by forcing Totenkopf and Das Reich onto the defensive.

By the end of 8 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had advanced about 15 to 20 mi and speared through the heavily fortified Soviet first and second defensive belts. But this was still short of the expectations of the German commanders, as the II SS Panzer Corps according to the Citadel plan should have penetrated the first two belts and be on their way to Prokhorovka by the end of the first day (5 July).

By the end of 9 July, Totenkopf had reached the southern banks of the Psel River; Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had captured Sukho Solotino, linking up with the 11th Panzer Division (of XLVIII Panzer Corps) and thus consolidated the front of the 4th Panzer Army. Nevertheless, the slow progress of the III Panzer Corps still rendered the right flank of the advancing II SS Panzer Corps precarious, and this meant that Das Reich had to continue guarding that flank. In fact, the vanguard units of the III Panzer Corps were still about 9 to 12 km south of Prokhorovka on 12 July.

In response to the stream of Soviet troops and armour of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies pouring toward Prokhorovka, and given that the III Panzer Corps was still lagging far behind to cover the right flank of 4th Panzer Army, on the late-afternoon of 9 July the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to redeploy eastward, away from Oboyan, and attack Prokhorovka as soon as possible before the Soviet reinforcements completed their deployment. However, the order to attack the Soviet reserves massing at Prokhorovka was not incidental, but had always been part of the Citadel plan, although the plan originally envision the III Panzer Corps and elements of XLVIII Panzer Corps joining in the attack on Prokhorovka.

In a meeting on 9 July, attended by Kluge, Model and the corps commanders of the 9th Army, it was concluded that an immediate breakthrough against the Central Front was unlikely. The decision, therefore, was to maintain pressure and inflict heavy casualties on the Central Front to prevent it from reinforcing the Voronezh Front. Hence, the success of Citadel now almost entirely depended on 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf achieving a breakthrough in the south, racing to Kursk, and if possible, unhinging the Central Front.

Preliminary engagement
(10–11 July)

The II SS Panzer Corps reoriented itself eastward by redeploying 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler from the left wing to the centre, relinquishing the left wing to 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf. The corps' attack towards Prokhorovka began on 10 July before the reorientation was completed. The attack started with elements of Totenkopf crossing the Psel River in the opening hours of 10 July. The aim was to secure a bridgehead on the northern bank and clear Soviet units and artillery positions that would threaten the flanks of any German advance on Prokhorovka. The attack was repelled by the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) and 10th Tank Corps, and no bridgehead was established.

At 10:45, the attack was resumed, this time, by the entire corps, but terrible road conditions due to intermittent bursts of rain that persisted all day encumbered the German attack. Totenkopf again attacked across the Psel River towards the Soviet stronghold Hill 226.6. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler attacked through the road leading to Prokhorovka with orders to take the settlement before nightfall. To accomplish this, it had to dislodge defenders from the Soviet stronghold Hill 241.6 and the Komsomolets state farm (Совхоз Комсомолец, Sovkhoz Komsomolets) which were fortified by dug-in tanks of the 2nd Tank Corps. 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich covered the right flank of the corps.



By nightfall Totenkopf had established a tenable bridgehead and captured the southern slopes of Hill 226.6 but could not dislodge the Soviet defenders on the higher ground. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had advanced 4 miles, securing Hill 241.6 on its way, and was only 5 miles short of Prokhorovka by nightfall. On the right flank, Das Reich was met with local Soviet counterattacks by 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps which it repelled, and continued to successfully cover Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler's advance. Fierce local fighting continued through the night along the front line of the II SS Panzer corps. That overnight, the regiments of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich that had spent the day on the left and southern right flanks of the II SS Panzer Corps respectively, redeployed to the focal front of the II SS Panzer Corps as units from elsewhere took over the flank duties.

The bulk of the 5th Guards Tank Army began deploying around Prokhorovka on the night of 9 July, having travelled about 240 miles on forced march since the night of 6 July. The 5th Guards Army's 33rd Guards Rifle Corps joined on 10 July, while its 32nd Guards Rifle Corps had already began fanning out further westward to also block the XLVIII Panzer Corps, south of Oboyan. Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July indicated that defensive works were being constructed by German infantry all along the flanks of 4th Panzer Army and that German armoured formations could not be spotted on the flanks despite armoured counterattacks that should provoke their appearance. The Voronezh Front headquarters concluded that the Germans were out of reserves and were now at their limit. Hence, it was decided that a major counteroffensive was the next course of action for the Voronehz Front. Throughout 11 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army organized itself around Prokhorovka in preparation for the forthcoming massive counterattack.

At 05:00 11 July, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler resumed its attack toward Prokhorovka. It had to flush out Soviet resistance from October state farm (Совхоз Октябрьский, Sovkhoz Oktiabrskii) and Hill 252.2 which laid just adjacent to each other, 2 miles away from the settlement. The defensive positions were defended by the 2nd Tank Corps which had been reinforced overnight by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment (both of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps). Throughout the day intense intermittent bursts of rain and heavy wind hampered air operations as well as troop and tank movements. By noon, despite heavy Soviet artillery bombardment, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had bridged the enormous antitank ditch barricading Hill 252.2 and stormed the hill. After a brief but bloody battle the hill was captured at around 13:00. Fighting for October state farm continued until around 17:00, when it was also captured. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler did not advance any further that evening due to concerns of its exposed flanks which were now under increasing Soviet counterattacks by the 95th Guards Rifle Division (of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps) and remnants of 2nd Tank Corps.

On the morning of 11 July the panzergrenadiers of Totenkopf, lacking the support of tanks, failed to expand their bridgehead against the 31st Tank Corps and 95th Guards Rifle Division. Due to the overnight Soviet artillery barrage, the construction of tank-bridges over the Psel River was not completed until late morning. The tanks eventually crossed over and relieved the beleaguered panzergrenadiers, but owing to bad road condition due to the rain, they could not push out of the bridgehead. By the end of the day, most of Hill 226.6 was still under Soviet control. On the right wing, 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 183rd Rifle Division (of the 48th Rifle Corps) rebuffed Das Reich's attack toward Vinogradovka. Thus by the end of 11 July, Das Reich and Totenkopf were failing to adequately cover the flanks of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.

By the end of 11 July, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had speared deep into the third defensive belt and was only 2 miles short of Prokhorovka. The battle on 11 July decimated the defences of the 2nd Tank Corps and completed the depletion of its tank formations. The battle also disrupted the preparations made by the 5th Guards Tank Army for its forthcoming counteroffensive when some of its designated jump-off and artillery positions were overran by Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler that evening. Ominous for the Soviet forces at Prokhorovka, by the end of 11 July, the III Panzer Corps with its 100 tanks and assault guns had finally broken free of the second defensive belt and was heading for the third defensive belt occupied by 69th Army. The corps continued its advance throughout the night, and by morning of 12 July, its vanguard was only 12 miles south of Prokhorovka.

On the night of 11 July, the 294 tanks and assault guns of Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps prepared to deal with the Soviet armour massed at Prokhorovka. Across the front line, over 600 tanks and self-propelled guns of Pavel Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army – particularly the 18th and 29th Tank Corps together with the majority of the tank units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps – prepared to conduct a massive attack on the enemy poised just outside the settlement. The amassed Soviet armour were further bolstered by the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps and elements of the 48th Rifle Corps.

German plans for main engagement on 12 July


On evening of 11 July, Paul Hausser produced orders for 12 July. Totenkopf was ordered to capture Hill 226.6 and advance northeast along the Psel to outflank Prokhorovka, and thereby cover the left flank of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was ordered to send some reinforcements to Totenkopf to enable it to accomplish its tasks. It was also ordered to nudge forward and secure Lamki (also known as Iamki or Jamki or Yamki) and Storozhevoe, and then stay on the defensive until Totenkopf captures Hill 226.6, after which it could resume its drive to Prokhorovka. Meanwhile, Das Reich was ordered to attack west and secure Vinogradovka and Belenikhino, and then head toward Prokhorovka in order to screen Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler's right flank.

Hans Seidemann ordered the VIII Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) to concentrate their effort on the advance of the II SS Panzer Corps. The attack by the XLVIII Panzer Corps further west was to be given only sporadic support by two wings – Jagdgeschwader 3 and Jagdgeschwader 52.

Soviet plans for the main engagement on 12 July
On 11 July, Vatutin ordered the armies of the Voronehz Front, including its reinforcements from the Steppe Front, to launch a concerted counteroffensive against all of Manstein's forces in the southern salient on 12 July. This counteroffensive was the southern counterpart of the Soviet offensive – Operation Kutuzov – against the German-held Orel sector, north of the Kursk salient. The 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army, 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army were ordered to attack 4th Panzer Army. The 7th Guards Army was ordered to attack Army Detachment Kempf. The 69th Army, now reinforced with ten anti-tank regiments, was to check the advance of III Panzer Corps.

As part of this counteroffensive, the 2nd Guards, 2nd, 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army were ordered to attack and destroy German forces outside Prokhorovka. The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps was held as reserve north of Prokhorovka, although two of its four brigades – that is, the 11th and 12th Tank Brigades – were sent south to support the 69th Army. The 5th Guards Tank Army was to be supported by the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army and elements of the 48 Rifle Corps of the 69th Army. The 5th Guards Tank Army was further reinforced by five artillery regiments, one artillery brigade and one artillery division. The line between the 29th Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps was guarded by the depleted 2nd Tank Corps, which was now reinforced by the bulk of 10th Anti-tank Artillery Brigade.

The Soviets enormously overestimated the numbers of Ferdinands and Tigers possessed by the II SS Panzer Corps. As a result, Rotmistrov ordered his tankers to charge German armour at high speed. This was expected to neutralize the superior range and firepower of the 88 mm guns wielded by the Tigers and Ferdinands by giving the more manoeuvrable T-34s some advantage in the close-quarter fighting. Such tactics carried the risk of disrupting the arrangement and coordination of the Soviet tank formations, and would prove counterproductive if they end up charging into adequately manoeuvrable German tanks like the Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs.

Vatutin focused the effort of the Red Air Force on the XLVIII Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps.

Opposing forces
There is no clear unanimity on the geographical limit of the battlefield nor the duration of the battle among historians. Therefore the strength and disposition of the opposing forces attributed to the battle by various sources often vary. The constituents of the opposing forces differ depending on the quantity of land space and duration that is chosen to be attributed to the battle. Historians often attribute the battle to varying periods of duration between 9 and 17 July.

Many historians consider the battle to include, on the German side, the entire II SS Panzer Corps, and on the Soviet side, formations from the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, and supported by depleted formations from the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps, and also some formations of the 1st Tank Army if 10–12 July is considered. Some narrow it down to just 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler against the 29th and 18th Tank Corps supported by units from 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. Some expand it to include the II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps against the 69th Army, 5th Guards Tank Army and 5th Guards Army. Moreover, some historians inflate it to include the whole 4th Panzer Army against the corps and armies of the Voronezh Front – augmented with formations from the Steppe Front – which conveys it as a titanic armoured engagement of some 2000 armoured fighting vehicles.

It is important to note that operational (or serviceable) tank strength of a unit fluctuates for a variety of reasons: temporary losses due to damage, permanent losses due to destruction, returns from repair shops, attachment or subordination of other tank units to the unit, new tank deliveries or replacements and employment of captured enemy tanks. Therefore, knowledge of the changes in operational tank strength alone does not give a complete picture of the tank losses incurred by a unit. Also, serviceable tank strength reported by a unit will fluctuate from hour to hour, and hence it is common for reports issued late at night to have higher operational tank strength than one issued earlier in the evening or the day, since during the night more tanks are expected to be returned from the repair shop to the unit than are taken out of action; but discrepancies arising from such causes are often small. Another major problem with ascertaining tank strength is the discrepancy between different reports issued by the staffs of different units or offices, and this is often due to different methodologies followed for the compilation of data or the lack of administrative jurisdiction over certain subunits of a formation. Discrepancies arising from such causes can some times be large.

German
The German forces involved in the battlefield of Prokhorovka were primarily from the three Waffen-SS divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps – 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich, and 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf. The III Panzer Corps, sometimes included as a participant of the battle, linked up with the right wing of the II SS Panzer Corps on 15 July and fought alongside it thereafter.

According to German archival data – reports issued by the staff of the 4th Panzer Army just days before the start of Operation Citadel – the II SS Panzer Corps had 494 operational tanks and assault guns, of which over 90% were still operational on morning of 5 July. These include command tanks – tank-variants designated Befehlswagen or Bef.Wg and designed principally to accommodate command duties. According to the archival data, for the evening of 11 July, the serviceable armour-strength of the corps was 294 tanks and assault guns – of which 15 were Tigers. It was distributed among the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Divisions as follows: 77, 95, and 122 tanks and assault guns respectively. The following evening on 12 July, the figures for the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division were not reported, but the strength for the remaining two divisions were 103 and 121 operational tanks and assault guns respectively. For the evening of 13 July, records indicate 70, 107, and 74 operational tanks and assault guns respectively (total of 251). For the evening 14 July: 78, 115, and 73 operational tanks and assault guns respectively (total of 266). For the evening of 15 July, 85, 99, and 77 respectively (total of 261). For the evening 16 July: 96, 103, and 93 respectively (total of 292). By the end of the battle on 16 July, the II SS Panzer corps had almost the same number of serviceable tanks it had in the beginning of the battle.

The strength in armour of the III Panzer Corps for 11 to 13 July in general is often rounded off to be about 100 tanks and assault guns. For the morning of 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf's staff reported 116 operational tanks and assault guns for III Panzer Corps, excluding the armour strength of its 228th Assault Gun Battalion which was not reported. The strength reported for that assault gun battalion the following morning on 12 July was 19 assault guns; but the strength for some other units of the III Panzer Corps were not reported that morning. Ultimately, the III Panzer Corps could not have fielded more than 135 tanks and assault guns on 12 July.

German air power in the southern Kursk salient amounted to the VIII Fliegerkorps (8th Air Corps) of Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4). According to a US Air Force study issued in 1967, the 8th Air Corps had about 1,100 aircraft on 1 July 1943. According to the WWII military aviation expert, Christer Bergström, the air corps had 966 operational aircraft on its order of battle on 5 July 1943. Moreover, losses from attrition had been relatively low during the first week of Operation Citadel. However, over the course of the Citadel offensive, the Luftwaffe's chronic shortage of fuel, lubricants and spare parts seriously hampered serviceability of available aircraft.

Military historian Walter Scott Dunn stated that the II SS Panzer Corps had begun the Citadel offensive with 456 tanks and 137 assault guns, including only 35 Tiger I tanks. He also speculates that a further brigade – 10th Panzer Brigade – may have reinforced the II SS Panzer Corps on 11 July, although he admits that German military archives make no mention of its involvement in the battlefield of Prokhorovka. According to Dunn, 10th Panzer Brigade had been created on 23 June 1943 as a training unit for new Tigers and their crew, and it had 45 Tiger tanks. If this unit is included in the order of battle of II SS Panzer Corps, this would amount to a strength of 70 Tigers. He concludes that the total number of operational tanks and assault guns available to II SS Panzer Corps on 11 July was "much less than 400", even if counting 70 Tigers.

Several historians, both Soviet and Western alike, as well as accounts by Soviet senior officers, have estimated that the Germans possessed 500–900 tanks at Prokhorovka, including Ferdinands. These claims cannot be true because all of the Ferdinands were in the northern face of the Kursk salient with 9th Army and the II SS Panzer Corps did not even have that many tanks at the start of Operation Citadel.

Soviet
On the Soviet side the main armoured formation involved was the 5th Guards Tank Army. Prior to the engagement on 12 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army fielded 793 tanks and 37–57 self-propelled guns for a total of 830–850 main AFVs. Contrary to claims in some accounts of the battle, Soviet tank formations were not made up almost entirely of T-34s. Although the T-34 medium tank was superior to the T-70 light tank in mobility, protection and firepower, its production by 1943 was not enough to satisfy demand. Also not all of the tank formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army fought near Prokhorovka. Some were sent south to meet III Panzer Corps. Contrary to claims in some accounts of the battle, no SU-152 self-propelled guns were fielded by the Voronehz or Steppe Fronts, at least, as of 1 July 1943.

A study by the historians Zetterling and Frankson, estimated Soviet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army directly facing the II SS Panzer just prior to the main engagement on 12 July at approximately 616 tanks and self-propelled guns. If adding Soviet armour facing the III Panzer Corps, then the figure goes up to a maximum of 870. This estimate excludes the 1447th Self-propelled Gun Regiment of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps due to uncertainties with the context of its reported strength of 16 self-propelled guns.

Soviet aviation supporting the Voronezh Front amounted to the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. The 2nd Air Army, despite bitter losses in the past week, could muster 472 operational aircraft. The 17th Air Army had also suffered heavy losses but could still field about 300 operational aircraft.

Main engagement
(12 July)



Not all forces in the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army were committed to the offensive at Prokhorovka. On the overnight of 11–12 July an assault by the panzer regiment of the 6th Panzer Division put the III Panzer Corps across the Northern Donets at Rzhawes (also known as Rzhavets). This action jeopardized Rotmistrov’s entire plan by threatening the flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Early in morning of 12 July, Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to send reinforcements to Soviet forces facing the III Panzer Corps. He organized a task force – Group Trufanov – under the command of his deputy, General K. G. Trufanov. Group Trufanov consisted of the 26th Tank Brigade (of 2nd Guards Tank Corps), the 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized Brigades (of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps) and the 53rd Guards Tank Regiment (a reserve unit of the 5th Guards Tank Army). More units from other armies joined the group on its way south. Thus Rotmistrov had redeployed more than half of his reserves before the battle of Prokhorovka began, and therefore had less reserve units available to feed into the offensive or exploit any breakthrough.

At around 03:15 Totenkopf came under attack from a battalion-strength Soviet infantry that was unsupported by armour. At around 04:00, Rotmistrov joined the 29th Corps' commanding staff at their forward post, which was situated on a small hill overlooking the field south of Prokhorovka. At around 05:00 on 12 July, elements of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler's 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment began a limited offensive action toward Storozhevoe and Lamki. By 06:00 Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler's headquarters were receiving reports from the front line of the ominous throb of the massed Soviet tank engines and their exhaust fumes. Between 6:00 and 6:15, as the rest of Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was just starting the day's offensive, the Soviets launched an artillery barrage. At 06:30, as the Soviet artillery fell silent, Rotmistrov radioed the code words "Stal! Stal! Stal!" ("Steel, Steel, Steel!"), and the Soviet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army began their advance.

Five Soviet armoured brigades advanced toward the positions of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich, with sixty to sixty five T-34s and T-70s in each brigade. The Soviet tanks carried riflemen of the 9th Guards Airborne Division as tank desant. Rudolf von Ribbentrop, commander of a company subordinate to Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, recalled being surprised by the sheer scale of the Soviet armoured onslaught. Around 500 tanks and self-propelled guns, organized as two echelons that numbered around 430 for the first echelon and 70 for the second, were committed into the Soviet attack against the II SS Panzer Corps in successive waves. Heeding Rotmistrov's orders, the Soviet tanks advanced toward the German tanks at high speed, firing as they went. The bulk of the attacking soviet armour – the 29th and 18th Tank Corps – numbering about 400 T-34s and T-70s, were concentrated on just Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the armour-depleted 2nd Tank Corps attacked Das Reich. Totenkopf faced off the heavily depleted 31st Tank Corps which was supported by the heavily depleted 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) and the fresh 95th Guards Rifle Division (of the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps). The remaining units of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps that were not transferred to Group Trufanov were held as reserve. Over the course of the battle, the 29th Tank Corps penetrated Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler at several places. These penetrations were often promptly pinched off by German armour and artillery.

A contest for the airspace over the battlefield ensued at the same time. The II SS Panzer Corps reported "very strong enemy air activity... at 07:10." For the first time the Red Air Force flew more sorties than the Luftwaffe in the Kursk salient, with the 17th and 2nd Air Armies flying 893 sorties against the VIII Fliegerkorps's 654 sorties in the southern salient. However, most of the Soviet sorties flown that day had been against the XLVIII Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps. Furthermore, the Soviet air-to-ground communication system failed in the opening hours of 12 July. Eventually, the Luftwaffe gained the upper hand over the Prokhorovka battlefield on morning of 12 July. Formations of Stukas, Fw 190 fighter-bombers and Hs 129 ground-attack aircraft equipped with BK 37 anti-tank cannons hung over the Soviet formations and added to the Soviet losses. The 31st Tank Brigade (of the 29th Tank Corps) reported: "We suffered heavy losses in tanks through enemy artillery and aircraft. At 10:30 our tanks reached the Komsomolets state farm, but due to continuous air attacks, they were unable to advance any further and shifted to the defence." The tank brigade also reported: "our own air cover was fully absent until 13:00." The 5th Guards Tank Army reported: "the enemy's aircraft literally hung above our combat formations throughout the entire battle, while our own aircraft, and particularly the fighter aviation, was totally insufficient."

By the end of the day, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had made no territorial gains but it was not defeated. To its left, Totenkopf had been able to capture Hill 226.6 and advance along the Psel, reaching 5 miles northwest of Prokhorovka. It was, therefore, poised to outflank Soviet forces around the settlement. Das Reich was unable to undertake its planned attack as it was forced onto the defensive by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps.

Charging German tank-units at high speed resulted in a disastrous slaughter of Soviet armour. As it turned out, the Germans had far few Tigers than was estimated by Soviets. Therefore, disorganized and moving too fast, the Soviet tanks were easily outmanoeuvred by the German tanks. Moreover, Soviet tanks firing while moving at high speed resulted in inaccurate fire. By the end of the day the 5th Guards Tank Army losses precluded any further offensive action. Rotmistrov ordered the remnant of his forces to prepare for defence.

After main engagement
(13–17 July)

On Vatutin's orders promulgated on the night of 12 July, the Soviet forces facing the II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps switched to a defensive stance for 13 July. The 1st Tank, 6th Guards Armies and the 32nd Guard Rifle Corps (of the 5th Guards Army) were to continue their attack on the XLVIII Panzer Corps. The Red Air Force was to continue focusing its effort on the III Panzer Corps. Orders promulgated by the II SS Panzer Corps' commanding staff for 13 July required Totenkopf to consolidate its gains made the previous day and then attack across the Psel into the northwestern flank of Soviet forces around Prokhorovka. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was to strengthen its front line and coordinate its attack on Prokhorovka from the south with Totenkopf's attack from the northwest. Das Reich was tasked with consolidating and strengthening its front line and also to prepare for an offensive operation to link up with the III Panzer Corps.

On the morning of 13 July, the Soviets launched a reconnaissance-in-force against Totenkopf. By afternoon this action had developed into local counterattacks by the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, primarily focused on Totenkopf's left flank. These Soviet attacks preoccupied Totenkopf and prevented it from attacking Prokhorovka. At around noon, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was given new orders to attack toward Psel River, to the west of Prokhorovka, in order to consolidate its front line with Totenkopf's. This attack ran straight into the fortified positions – which included dug-in tanks – of the 18th, 29th Tank Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, and therefore stalled. That afternoon, Totenkopf was ordered to abandon the narrow and now exposed salient it occupied and return to tenable positions closer to the Psel River. By nightfall, despite fierce Soviet attempts to cut off and encircle the bulk of the division, the withdrawal was successfully completed. Totenkopf gave up about half the territory it had gained on 12 July.

Operation Roland
Following the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily on the night of 9–10 July 1943, the violent counteroffensive by strong Soviet reserves in the southern shoulder of the Kursk salient on 12 July, and the Soviet Operation Kutuzov against the rear of Model's 9th Army on the same day, on 13 July, Adolf Hitler summoned Manstein and Kluge to the Wolfsschanze and ordered them to terminate Operation Citadel. Kluge welcomed the decision as that allowed him to withdraw the 9th Army from the Kursk salient to face Kutuzov. However, Manstein argued that, with his operational reserve – the XXIV Panzer Corps – en route to the front line and the III Panzer Corps about to join the II SS Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka, his forces were now on the verge of achieving a major breakthrough. Hitler summarily rejected his arguments. Manstein, therefore, proposed that his forces should at least destroy Soviet forces massed in the southern Kursk salient before Citadel was finally terminated, such that the Soviet fighting capacity in the sector could not be restored for the rest of the summer. Hitler agreed to postpone the termination of Citadel in the southern salient until Manstein's proposal was accomplished.

The plan for Operation Roland featured Das Reich attacking eastward to link up with III Panzer Corps which was attacking in a northwest direction, while Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Totenkopf stayed on the defensive. Once the link was achieved, which would result in the encirclement of all Soviet forces on the right flank of II SS Panzer Corps, the combined forces of both panzer corps would then attack Prokhorovka and destroy the remaining Soviet forces amassed there. The goal of the operation, as Manstein had assured Hitler in their meeting on 13 July, was to destroy Soviet armour and reserves massed in the southern sector of the Kursk salient and render them hors de combat for the rest of summer.

Operation Roland began on the dawn of 14 July 1943. On 14 July, to Manstein's chagrin, Hitler countermanded the XXIV Panzer Corps' deployment to the Kursk salient and sent them south to bolster the southern wing of Army Group South, which was anticipating an imminent Soviet offensive. On the afternoon of 15 July, the 7th Panzer Division finally made contact with Das Reich. However, the pincers failed to net the Soviet forces, which had hastily withdrawn before the envelopment sealed. Operation Roland failed to produce any decisive result. Following orders promulgated On the night of 15 July, Totenkopf began withdrawing from all of its remaining positions north of the Psel River, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler remained on defence and Das Reich switched to defense.

On 17 July the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts launched a massive offensive across the Mius and Donets Rivers against the southern wing of Army Group South – that is, the recreated 6th Army and 1st Panzer Army). Therefore on the early-afternoon of 17 July, Operation Roland was terminated with an order for the II SS Panzer Corps to begin withdrawing from the Prokhorovka sector back to Belgorod. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf had made preparations for the withdrawal ahead of time and had even began executing it as early as the evening of 16 July. Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler's armour was distributed between Das Reich and Totenkopf, and then the division was hastily redeployed to Italy. Das Reich and Totenkopf were dispatched south to meet the new Soviet offensive.

German
From German archival data for II SS Panzer Corps' medical staff, it is known that the corps sustained 2,672 casualties (killed, wounded, or missing) from 12 to 16 July (inclusively). If excluding the casualties incurred by the corps troops – personnel of units directly subordinate to the corps instead of through the divisions – then the figure is 2,661 casualties. For 12 July alone, 842 casualties (killed, wounded, or missing) are reported for the corps. From German archival data for III Panzer Corps, it is known that the corps sustained 8,489 casualties (WIA, MIA, KIA) in personnel from 5 to 20 July (inclusively). Also from German archival data for II SS Panzer Corps, it is known that 32.9% of the casualties from 5 to 20 July were incurred from 12 to 16 July. If it is assumed that the same percentage is applicable to the III Panzer Corps, then approximately 2790 casualties would be the estimated losses incurred by the III Panzer Corps from 12 to 16 July. However, not all units of the III Panzer Corps fought in the battle of Prokhorovka. Also, no unit of III Panzer Corps was in the immediate vicinity of Prokhorovka until Operation Roland.

Tank losses attributed to the Germans since the 1980s vary, and this is in part due to the Wehrmacht's methodology for counting and reporting equipment losses. Only equipment completely destroyed or abandoned to the enemy are counted as loss, and the rest are classified as under repair. And since the Germans controlled the battlefield of Prokhorovha right up till 17 July, they were able to recover most of their disabled armour and these were therefore not reported as losses. Some of these were so badly damaged they had to be shipped back to their manufacturer in Germany, and some permanently remained unrepaired. Damaged armoured vehicles expected to take more than two to three weeks to be repaired are usually classified as long-term damage. In a military operation, a piece of damaged equipment is essentially equivalent to a destroyed one for the duration of its non-serviceable state.

From German archival data for II SS Panzer Corps and 4th Panzer Army, it is known that the II SS Panzer Corps permanently lost 36 tanks and assault guns from 5 to 23 July (inclusively), of which 19 of those losses were incurred before 12 July. Hence the corps could not have permanently lost more than 17 tanks and assault guns from 12 to 23 July, nor through the duration of the battle of Prokhorovka.

Based on German archival data for Army Group South – from the Office of General Inspector for Armoured Forces – and for 4th Panzer Army, it is known that the III Panzer Corps permanently lost 37 tanks and assault guns from 11 to 20 July. Hence the corps could not have permanently lost more than 37 main armoured fighting vehicles during the battle of Prokhorovka. Also not all units of the III Panzer Corps fought in the battle of Prokhorovka.

For 12 July, German historian Karl Frieser, attributed 3–5 permanent tank losses to the II SS Panzer Corps. Three of those losses consist of two Panzer IVs and one Tiger from 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler The KOSAVE II study attributes 4 permanent tank losses to Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler for 12 July. Meanwhile, the study attributes a total of 6 permanent tank losses to the II SS Panzer Corps for 12 July. The KOSAVE II study does not consider the Panzer I, Panzer II, and German assault guns as tanks. For 12 July, 21st century WWII historians estimate the total losses (damaged or permanently destroyed) in tanks and assault guns for the II SS Panzer Corps to be between 60 and 90, and sometimes over 150.

From 5 to 8 July, the Luftwaffe logistics staff reported the loss of only 41 aircraft for the VIII Fliegerkorps. Although air losses for the period from 9 to 11 July are not certain, the Luftwaffe logistics staff reported only the loss of 28 aircraft for the VIII Fliegerkorps during this period. It is also known that around 220 aircraft were lost altogether on the southern face of the Kursk bulge between 5–31 July.

According to archival data for II SS Panzer Corps, 41 tanks and assault guns of the 1st and 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Divisions were classified as under long-term repair and another 67 damaged tanks and assault guns were under short-term repair on 12 July. According to the KOSAVE II study, for all German forces fighting in the southern Kursk salient, 89 tanks were damaged on 12 July. This excludes permanent losses and does not include Panzer Is, Panzer IIs or assault guns.

Pavel Rotmistrov estimated that the Germans lost 350–400 tanks, including 70 Tigers, and 3,500–10,000 men while fighting the 5th Guards Tank Army on 12 July. A Soviet General Staff study estimated German losses in battle of Prokhorovka from 12 to 16 July at 300 tanks, 20 assault guns, over 200 artillery guns, 500 motor vehicles and over 4,500 men.

Soviet
Reliable figures for personnel casualties of all Soviet formations involved in the battle of Prokhorovka are difficult to establish. But using Grigoriy Krivosheyev's figures for the Soviet casualties in the southern Kursk salient from 5 to 23 July (which is 143,950) and also crosschecking with Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris Soloviev's estimation of the casualties for the 5th Guards Tank Army for 5 to 23 July (which is 14,000), Zetterling and Frankson estimated the casualties for the 69th Army, 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies for 12 to 16 July as 18,940 (medical and irrecoverable casualties). For 12 July alone, WWII military aviation expert Christer Bergström estimates that Soviet losses in personnel at Prokhorovka may have been as high as 5,500.

A document prepared on 17 July 1943 by the 5th Guards Tank Army Headquarters summarized the combat losses incurred by the formation from 12 to 16 July (inclusively) for all of its 5 corps, as well as divisions, brigades and other smaller units directly subordinate to the army headquarters. The document reported the following irrevocable losses: 222 T-34s, 89 T-70s, 12 Churchill Tanks, 8 SU-122, 3 SU-76 and 240 support vehicles. The document also reports damaged vehicles still under repair as: 143 T-34s, 56 T-70s, 7 Churchill Tanks, 3 SU-122, 3 SU-76 and no figures for support vehicles. The document also reports personnel casualties as 2,940 killed in action, 3,510 wounded in action and 1,157 missing in action. This makes for a total of 334 irrevocable losses in tanks and self-propelled guns, 212 tanks and self-propelled guns still under repair, and a total of 7607 casualties.

Vehicle-losses attributed to the Soviets for the engagement on 12 July vary. According to the KOSAVE II study, the 2nd Guards, 18th, and 29th Tank Corps all together incurred 144 irrevocable tank losses on 12 July. The study does not consider self-propelled guns as tanks. Koltunov and Soloviev, placed the losses in armour of 5th Guards Tank Army for 12 July at about 300 (damaged or irrevocably lost) tanks and self-propelled guns. David Glantz and Jonathan House estimated that the 5th Guards Tank Army lost at least 400 (damaged or destroyed) of their 800-plus tanks in its attacks on 12 July. George Nipe puts the losses in armour (damaged or destroyed) incurred by the 5th Guards Tank Army while fighting II SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps on 12 July at 600–650.

Outcome
The violent attack by strong Soviet reserves in the southern Kursk salient and the need to break off the assault by the 9th Army on the northern Kursk salient due to Soviet Operation Kutuzov contributed to the decision of Hitler to finally terminate Operation Citadel. A major Soviet offensive on 17 July against the German Mius Front along the Mius river, south of Kharkov, necessitated the redeployment of units from the southern Kursk salient to face the new offensive. The OKW also had to withdraw some more units from the Eastern Front to face Allied forces in the Mediterranean theatre following the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily on the night of 9–10 July 1943.

The Battle of Prokhorovka was an operational failure for the Wehrmacht, although it was not an operational victory for the Soviets either. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives for 12 July. Regardless of the operational outcome, the battle is considered a limited tactical success for the Germans. Valeriy Zamulin (Russian historian and Director of Research at the Prokhorovka Battlefield Park Museum ), although admitting that neither side achieved their projected goals, insisted that in the wider perspective the Soviets "won the engagement at Prokhorovka, and successfully completed [their] defensive operation, having created the conditions for a decisive counteroffensive." Ultimately, there was no total German breakthrough at Prokhorovka or any other place in the Kursk salient, and the strategic initiative permanently swung to the Red Army with the end of Operation Citadel.

External links and further reading

 * Wilson, Alan. Kursk and Prokhorovka, July 1943 (maps) — Retrieved 13 June 2013.
 * Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943 (in Russian with English subtitles) — Retrieved 5 July 2013.
 * Michael J. Licari, The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality – Licari's Home Page — Retrieved 5 June 2013
 * George Nipe, Jr. Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory – Home Page — Retrieved 16 June 2013
 * Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis A detailed comparison of the statistics provided by several historians including: Walter Dunn (Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943), George Nipe (Decision in the Ukraine), David Glantz & Jonathan House (The Battle of Kursk), and the Soviet General Staff (The Battle for Kursk, 1943, translated and edited by David Glantz and Harold Orenstein). — Retrieved 13 June 2013
 * Олейников Г.А. Прохоровское сражение (июль 1943). – СПб.: Нестор, 1998 a comprehensive analysis (in Russian). — Retrieved 9 June 2013
 * Валерий Замулин. Прохоровка – неизвестное сражение великой войны. М.: АСТ: АСТ МОСКВА: ХРАНИТЕЛЬ, 2006 ISBN 5-17-039548-5 – Total description of Soviet and Germany troop movement based on Soviet and German archives (in Russian).