User:Fadix/Armenian genocide denial

Armenian genocide denial, also called Armenian genocide revisionism, is the term which refers to the rejection of the thesis, that what Armenians faced during the last years of the Ottoman Empire constitute genocide. It is also used to refer to what is considered as the minimization the tragedy.

Ottoman Empire
There is no clear established date, as to when the thesis rejecting the position that the Ottoman Armenians were intentionally destroyed, various works suggest that what is termed as denial just followed the measures taken against the Armenians during World War I, which were, according to Ottoman authorities, preventive and administrative in nature. While the Ittihadist party denied charges of extermination by the allies and the United States, according to German records, the Ottoman authorities did not deny to their own allies, that they were attempting to destroy the Armenian population.

The first massive series of Ottoman publication destinated to external consumption, was really engaged in 1916. (1a) In 1919, various publications followed, it is believed by some that the reason was to prevent a harsh peace Treaty. 1b) This followed with the Martial Court, when accused tried to defend themselves by denying the crimes they have committed, and when admitting, were simply answering that they were only following orders.

Ottoman allies
The denial, also, was not restricted to the Ottoman Empire, few German officials in particular did minimise the suffering of the Armenians, and even justified the decision taken against them, even though, German records abounded with reports accusing the Ottoman to exterminate the Armenians. The most cited among them, was German General Major Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf, while Bronsart tried to justify the measures taken by Ottoman authorities, and according to some, diminish them, he accepted behind closed doors and justified the destruction of the Armenians by the following remarks.

“Namely, the Armenian is just like the Jew, a parasite outside the confines of his homeland, sucking off the marrow of the people of the host country. Year after year they abandon their native land—just like the Polish Jews who migrate to Germany—to engage in usurious activities. Hence the hatred which, in a medieval form, has unleashed itself against them as an unpleasant people, entailing their murder.” (A. A. Bonn. Goppert Papers (Nachlass), vol. VI, file 5 (files 1-Cool, p. 4, February 10,1919).

In public on the other hand, he was not as straight, and in various occasions accused the Armenians of being responsible of their own tragedy, by also, justifying the decision to evacuate the Armenians.

United States
While, mostly Turkish nationals were the deniers, some in the allied camp, did also minimize the tragedy. Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the U.S. High Commissioner who replaced Abram Elkus as ambassador in late 1919 is one of the most cited denier. While Bristol was in no position to revise what was reported by the two other ambassadors who preceded him, it is claimed that he tried to bare access to the media, of recent cites of massacres and forced some to change their versions. Christopher Simpson writes:

“It was better for the United States, … [Bristol] contended, to jettison support for the Armenian republic as soon as possible, stabilize U.S. relations with the emerging Turkish government, and to enlist Kemal's support in gaining access to the oil fields of the former Ottoman Empire.”

Mark Prentiss, an American industrial engineer, while claiming to have witnessed with his colleagues the Turks burning Smyrna, changed his version accusing the other side and finally writing a manuscript sent to Bristol.

U.S. retired Admiral William Colby Chester joined Admiral Mark Bristol as a leading public spokesman for reconciliation with Turkey. William Colby Chester, who, sponsored by the New York Chamber of Commerce and aided by favourable contacts in Turkey made during service there ten years earlier, returned to Istanbul in January 1908 and was offered, a variety of concessions for works, railways, harbours, minerals, and oil development in Ottoman Turkey.(1) Later, on April 10, 1923, the Angora Government awarded him almost three thousand miles of railway, together with valuable rights to the exploitation of the mineral resources of Anatolia.(2)

Chester wrote an article which was published in New York Times monthly magazine Current History September 1922 issue, which was accusing Armenians to be the principle causes of the ‘trouble.’ On the October issue of the same magazine, George R. Montgomery answered to Admiral Colby’s article, with an text titled: “The massacres of Armenians in 1915: A refutation, from authentic sources, of the allegation that the Turks were not guilty of wholescale slaughter of the Armenians – Testimony of German and Turkish eyewitnesses of the crime.” Chester son engaged in his fathers business followed with an article in February.

Chester concession ended up being a failure, and Bristol attempts had limited success, mainly after Allen Dulles, the State Department’s Near East Division chief (who later became CIA director) answer to Bristol, after requesting to not bring the Armenian question to light, writing:

“Our task would be simple if the reports of the atrocities could be declared untrue or even exaggerated but the evidence, alas, is irrefutable and the Secretary of State wants to avoid giving the impression that while the United States is willing to intervene actively to protect its commercial interests, it is not willing to move on behalf of the Christian minorities.”

Bristol with such a failure is reported saying to a Turkish reporter:

"the massacres of the Armenians have made a spot which is difficult to eradicate. You ought not to have done such things, yes, you ought not to have done it."

Finally, Bristol cases can be resumed, with his remarks:

"the most barbarous acts of the regime in power at the time of the Armenian massacres,… the cruelties practiced upon the Armenians by Turks acting under official orders, and in pursuance of a deliberate official policy there can be no adequate excuse."

Psychology of denial
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