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John Mitchell Finnis, AC, KC (Hon), FBA (born 28 July 1940) is an Australian legal philosopher, jurist and scholar specializing in jurisprudence and moral philosophy. He is the Biolchini Family Professor of Law, emeritus, at Notre Dame Law School and a Permanent Senior Distinguished Research Fellow at Notre Dame's de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture. He was Professor of Law & Legal Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1989 to 2010, where he is now professor emeritus. He acted as a constitutional adviser to successive Australian Commonwealth governments in constitutional matters and bilateral relations with the United Kingdom.

His academic focus is in the areas of jurisprudence, political theory, and constitutional law, while his practice at the English Bar saw him in cases at the High Court and at the Court of Appeal. He is a member of Gray's Inn. He was appointed an honorary Queen's Counsel in 2017. In 2019 he was appointed a Companion of the Order of Australia (AC), Australia's highest civilian award.

Contents

 * 1Early life and education
 * 2Career
 * 3Publications
 * 3.1Books
 * 3.2Articles
 * 3.3Video lectures
 * 4References

Early life and education
Finnis was educated at St. Peter's College, Adelaide and the University of Adelaide, where he was a member of St. Mark's College. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) degree there, winning a Rhodes scholarship to University College, Oxford, in 1962, where he obtained his Doctor of Philosophy degree under L.A. Hart with a thesis on the concept of judicial power, with reference to Australian federal constitutional law. Also in 1962, Finnis converted to Roman Catholicism.

Finnis was a friend of Aung San Suu Kyi, also an Oxford graduate; and, in 1989, Finnis nominated her for the Nobel Peace Prize. Aung San Suu Kyi won the prize but did not receive it until June 2012, when she recalled how her late husband, Michael Aris, had visited her under house arrest and brought her the news "that a friend, John Finnis" had nominated her for the prize.

Publications
Finnis is an author of several philosophical works. His best known work is Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980, 2011), a seminal contribution to the philosophy of law and a restatement of natural law doctrine. For Finnis there are eight basic goods; life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability of friendship, practical reasonableness, religion and marriage. His Fundamentals of Ethics collect six Carroll Lectures Finnis delivered at Georgetown University in 1982. He has published five collections of essays: Reason in Action, Intention and Identity , Human Rights and Common Good , Philosophy of Law , Religion and Public Reasons. In addition, he has published a book on Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Theory and a book on Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism, with Joseph Boyle and Germain Grisez.

Intellectual Contributions
Finnis contributes to the philosophy of knowledge, metaphysics, legal theory, and morality. He is an original interpreter of Aristotle and Aquinas, and counts Germain Grisez as a major influence and collaborator.

Following Aquinas, he argues that the basic goods are apprehended immediately by the intellect, responding to the guidance of the will (to which they are attracted). Moral propositions then follow from reflection on those basic goods. "Ought" does not follow from "is", since the first principles of practical reason are not deduced logically but are understood immediately by the intellect. Morality is a consequence of reflecting on the basic goods as a whole and their implications for human flourishing. Finnis dismisses David Hume's identification of morality as sentiment of sympathy leading to approbation or disapprobation, by noting that Hume expected such sentiments to be recognised and agreed to by others. Thus, Hume's morality is based on reasonableness rather than sympathy, notwithstanding "Hume's formal and vigorous protestations to the contrary". Finnis identifies reasonableness with the disinterested and impartial perspective which seeks to understand what is best for everyone at a certain point in time. Finnis further notes that Lugwig Wiggenstein "wavers on one of the central matters in issue in his mediations", since propositions of empirical fact are not necessarily true. Finnis defends the self-evidence of truth using formal logic by appealing to "retorsive arguments".

Finnis' writings evidence a concern to protect the individual from abuse by the institution. Using Plato's dialogue of the Gorgias, Finnis argues (against Habermas's discourse ethics) that silence is ethical and meaningful since it is a locus of reflection and inner deliberation. He further argues (against extant UK Law) that the courts must distinguish direct intention from unintended side-effects, and cannot impute an intention based simply on foreseeability. The person who blows up a plane to receive the insurance money thereby killing the pilot, may not have intended to kill the pilot even if the pilot's death was foreseeable. On the other hand, Finnis charges with moral and legal responsibility anyone who consents to doing something conditionally on something happening (preparatory intention) - as in the UK policy on nuclear deterrance which includes the possibility of targetting civil populations in the event of a nuclear attack on UK cities. Finnis interprets Veritatis Splendor as requiring the adoption by the moralist of the perspective of the acting person. The implication is that no act in intrinsically sinful, rather its sinfulness is a function of the acting person's intention, will or purpose. The traditional notion that means are intended in view of the end is thus rejected in favour of the distinction between intended ends (direct effect) and unintended side-effects (indirect effects). This explains, for example, the distinction between shooting out of a desire to kill the enemy or simply shooting to defend oneself. Finnis departs in several ways from Anscombe's understanding of intention.

Finnis notes that Aristotle's discussion of prudence (Phronesis) fails to offer ethical guidance because it is concerned with the selection of means, without reference to ends; yet, he notes that Aquinas' solution of this problem has often been misinterpreted. Prudence is concerned with both the deliberation about ends (basic goods) and the means of achieving them. However, deliberation among ends is also deliberation about means, since it is guided by the basic good of practical reasoning (i.e., being reasonable). Then, virtue is not only the outcome of synderesis but also requires an attraction towards the end and the selection of means. The choice of some basic goods may result in the detriment or even the suppression of others, provided that the latter is not directly intended. Following Aristotle, Finnis gives great importance to the basic good of friendship in his own deliberation because it involves disinterested love, which goes beyond a mere sense of obligation towards others, and is thus an ideal type of moral relations; however, this ideal remains imperfect unless it extends to friendship with God as a universalising principle. In Fundamentals of Ethics, Finnis defends the possibility of freedom, the positing of which already involves the exercise of freedom. More generally, any choice among basic goods must involve the exercise of freedom, since they are incommensurable. Choices of ends and means create vital commitments (through the expectation of consistency in future choices and actions) until such time as an incompatible choice is made (involving repentance from the previous choice). Choosing is then apprehended by the intellect not only as A or B but much like knowledge or understanding, as involving a choice of character.

Fundamentals of Ethics sets out the ontological and epistemological foundations of Finnis' work. This includes rejection of the notion that human goods result from human desires, in favour of the view that they are actualizations of, and participation in, basic values. "Epistemology is not the 'basics of ethics'" (p. 21), rather ethics is concerned with reasoning about basic goods as experienced by the individual. Finnis uses Robert Nozik's metaphor of the 'experience machine' to illustrate the fact that desires cannot guide ethics, since noone would choose a lifetime of pleasure over one of achievement. Finnis proposes that people are attracted to the basic goods in the search for "perfection", rather than Humean satisfaction. He rejects thin theories of the good which pretend to satisfy the needs of everyone, such as that provided by John Rawls. Finnis further rejects (against John Mackie, Thomas Nagel, and Philippa Foot) the arguments from queerness and naturalism that statements of value are projections of feelings and wants, so that they have no objective value. Decision-making

Finnis dismisses proportionalist arguments for decision making such as the notion of "choosing the lesser evil" and he notes that Aquinas never sought to resolve moral problems on those terms. In Essay 1997b, Finnis also dismisses utilitarianism (including arguments based on economic analysis) and its Kantian critique. Utilitarianism offers a technical solution (through maximisation of outcomes) that cannot support moral choices. Moral choices have to do with decisions about who one wants to be or become. By choosing not to become a murderer, Socrates shaped the World in the way he thought best - through a teaching that it is better to suffer wrong than do it. A game-theorist, a utilitarian, or a proportonalist would conclude that two murders is worse than one. In fact, any attempt to justify Socrates's choice through looking at foreseeable consequences, or by commensurating good with bad, or by comparing values with 'disvalues' fail. Kantian arguments also fail because they are concerned with logical reasoning and the avoidance of internal contradiction through universalization. But logic cannot explain moral choices. Neither can Kant's claim that 'nature's end' should be respected since by nature he meant the natural sciences. The key to moral decision-making lies in seeking integral human fultilment by promoting the basic goods. From this it follows that one must not intentionally to harm to others, or intend evil to achieve good, and that one must act fairly towards others.

However, he also rejects attacks on utilitarianism based a multiplicity of worldviews or perspectives, since such perspectives prioritise facts over truth, attention to evidence, and insight, reducing the basis for social cooperation to sub-rational motivaitons, such as lust, terror, self-preference or inertia.

In his book on Finnis' student Neil Gorsuch while at Oxford University, John Greenya has described Finnis's views by stating: "Some of John Finnis's views are very controversial. For example, in defending his long-held position against same-sex marriage and same-sex coupling, he once compared them to bestiality."

Philosopher Stephen Buckle sees Finnis's list of proposed basic goods as plausible, but notes that "Finnis's account becomes more controversial when he goes on to specify the basic requirements of practical reasonableness". He sees Finnis's requirement that practical reason requires "respect for every basic value in every act" as intended both to rule out consequentialism in ethics and also to support the moral viewpoint of the Catholic Church on a range of contentious issues, including contraception and masturbation, which in his view undermines its plausibility.

Finnis's work on natural law ethics has been a source of controversy in both neo-Thomist and analytical circles. Craig Paterson sees his work as interesting because it challenges a key assumption of both neo-Thomist and analytical philosophy: the idea that a natural law ethics must be based upon an attempt to derive normative (or "ought") statements from descriptive (or "is") statements.

According to Andrew Sullivan, Finnis has articulated "an intelligible and subtle account of homosexuality" based on the new natural law, a less biologically-based version of natural law theory. Finnis argues that the state should deter public approval of homosexual behaviour while refusing to persecute individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation, basing this position not on the claim that homosexual sex is unnatural but on the idea that it cannot involve the union of procreation and emotional commitment that heterosexual sex can, and is therefore an assault on heterosexual union. Sullivan believes that such a conservative position is vulnerable to criticism on its own terms, since the stability of existing families is better served by the acceptance of those homosexuals who are part of them. Other scholars, such as Stephen Macedo and Michael J. Perry, have also criticised Finnis's views.

He has supervised several doctoral students including Neil Gorsuch, Justice Susan Kenny of the Federal Court of Australia, Robert P. George of Princeton University, and John Keown of Georgetown University. In 2013 George and Keown summarised some of Finnis's media work as "He has, for example, debated embryo research with Mary Warnock on BBC's Newsnight and with Jonathan Glover in the Channel 4 Debate; discussed euthanasia with a leading Dutch euthanasiast on the same channel's After Dark, and written on eugenic abortion in The Sunday Telegraph".

In the 2019 Queen's Birthday Honours for Australia, Finnis was appointed a Companion in the General Division of the Order of Australia, the country's highest civilian honour, for his eminent service as a jurist and legal scholar.

Books[edit]
In May 2011, Oxford University Press published a five-volume collection of essays by John Finnis and a second edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights. Their release was marked by an all-day conference at the Notre Dame Law School on 9 September 2011.


 * Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; 2nd ed., 2011. ISBN 9780199599134.
 * Fundamentals of Ethics, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983. ISBN 978-0878404087.
 * Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism, with J. M. Boyle Jr. and Germain Grisez, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. ISBN 978-0198247913.
 * Natural Law, 2 vols (as editor), New York: New York University Press, 1991. ISBN 978-0814726037 and ISBN 978-0814726044.
 * Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991. ISBN 978-0813207452.
 * Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. ISBN 978-0198780854.
 * The Collected Essays of John Finnis, 5 vols, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. ISBN 9780199689934.

Articles[edit]

 * Aquinas' Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy
 * The Profound Injustice of Justice Posner on Marriage
 * Natural Law: The Classical Tradition PDF (Internet Archive)
 * The Priority of Persons PDF
 * The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations PDF
 * Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation" PDF
 * Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation" PDF

Video lectures[edit]

 * God and Man
 * Religious Liberty

References[edit]

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 * 4) ^ Notre Dame Faculty Page for John Finnis
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 * 10) ^ Video on YouTube
 * 11) ^ Stephen Buckle, "Natural Law" in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell Publishers, 1997, ch. 13, p. 171.
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 * 13) ^ Sullivan, Andrew. Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality. Picador: London, 1996. pp. 98–99
 * 14) ^ Stein, Edward, The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation. Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 356
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