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MOP UP DUTY AND ITS EFFECT ON CLOSERS
On May 28, 2016, David Robertson, the closer for the Chicago White Sox gets set to pitch the bottom of the ninth inning against the division rival Kansas City Royals in the middle of a three-game series. Coming into the game, the White Sox were in a serious slump with a 4–12 record in their past 16 games. Nonetheless, at 27–22 overall they were still leading the American League Central Division by a half-game over the Cleveland Indians, one game over the Royals, and two games over the Detroit Tigers. The White Sox were looking to capture their first division title since 2008, and had been playing well in part due to their strong bullpen, led by Robertson and setup men Nate Jones, Dan Jennings, and Zach Duke. Their pitching staff at the time had only allowed 178 runs through 49 games (3.63 per game); ranked second fewest in the American League.



The White Sox held a comfortable 7–1 lead on the Royals when manager Robin Ventura called upon Robertson to seal the game in a non-save situation. Robertson, a full-time closer since 2014 with a miniscule 0.96 ERA on season, imploded by allowing six earned runs (four hits, two walks) while retiring only two batters. The Royals ultimately completed a historic comeback with an 8–7 walk-off victory by scoring seven runs in the bottom of the ninth inning.

A few remarkable facts on the aftermath of the Royals’ improbable win:
 * 1) It was the biggest ninth-inning comeback in team history
 * 2) Since the 2010 season, MLB teams are now 5–2,810 when trailing by six runs entering the bottom of the ninth
 * 3) After Paulo Orlando struck out versus Robertson to lead off the bottom of the ninth, the Royals’ win probability for the game was at 0.1% (1000 to 1)
 * 4) Robertson’s ERA jumped from 0.96 to 3.72
 * 5) The White Sox are 25–35 after the loss (as of August 5), second worst in the American League, and all but assured of missing the postseason for the eighth consecutive year

While it was a fun and exciting victory for the Royals, the loss had a negative effect on the White Sox, who were already struggling. There were multiple factors that contributed to the loss, but one major questionable decision was Robin Ventura inserting David Robertson in a seemingly blowout game or a non-save situation. Closers are often the best relievers on the team and they normally pitch in high leverage situations with a chance to earn a save for their respective teams. The simplest way to define a save is when the closer comes in to pitch the last inning of a game with his team leading by three runs or less, and completes the win. So what was Ventura's reasoning for calling upon his best reliever? Why didn't he use a lesser talented/inexperienced pitcher to finish the game instead?

One could argue that Robertson hadn't pitched since May 23 (4 days of rest) and needed some game action. The counter argument to that is Robertson could always throw a bullpen session or a simulated inning at the team's leisure. Did Ventura make the wrong decision that has been proven over and over again with easily accessible data? In other words, do closers put up less effective numbers when pitching in non-save situations?

The table below displays the statistics of all the closers who converted at least 25 saves during the 2015 MLB regular season with their respective numbers in save situations versus non-save situations.

Source: baseballreference.com Glossary: SS: Save Situation; NSS: Non-Save Situation; ERA: Earned Run Average; WHIP: Walk + Hits / Innings Pitched; OPS: On-Base Plus Slugging (Against)

From the accumulated data, 17 of the 24 qualified closers (71%) had an increase in ERA when pitching in non-save situations, 18 of 24 (75%) had an increase in WHIP, and 19 of 24 (79%) had an increase in OPS against. Only four pitchers, Miller, Ramos, Gregerson, and interestingly Robertson performed better across all three categories when pitching in mop up duty while 15 pitchers performed worse across the board.



Arguments can be made that Ventura's decision was based on Robertson's good track record in low leverage games. Yet the statistics prove that there is a high chance of poorer performance when closers are thrown into games that are pretty much decided, whether their team is on the winning side or losing side. Unfortunately, Robertson fell victim to this and cost his team a game they should have won. There is also a mental aspect with closers in that they care more about pitching in games that "count." The closer is considered a glamorous role in baseball and they are paid handsomely for their effectiveness in converting saves. In a blowout game, closers might lose their focus as well as their edge, the adrenaline is not there and their pitches are not as sharp. Why not let a young pitcher who has yet to establish himself in the Major Leagues pitch in a low leverage spot and learn the ropes? One exception I will make is that in a tied game, which is a high leverage situation, closers should be inserted despite technically pitching in a "non-save" situation. Otherwise, closers and elite setup men should be "saved" for high leveraging games where a single run either way could be the difference between going to the playoffs or watching at home.

Robin Ventura learned a valuable session on May 28, 2016 and hopefully other managers will follow suit. They will need to realize that in non-save situations (excluding ties), it's actually better to insert your worst or most inexperienced pitcher rather than your shutdown closer.