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Philosophical and Theological work
The theologian Gary Dorrien has said about Griffin:"No one better represents the intellectual ambition of process theology than David Griffin. He has surpassed everyone in challenging the materialistic, atheistic modernism of the academy, and his work is prolific and wide-ranging to the point of being impossible to summarize."

Unsnarling the World-Knot
In his 1998 book, Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem, Griffin confronts what he says "has arguably been the central problem in modern philosophy since its inception in the seventeenth century," namely, the mind–body problem. Griffin attempts to resolve this problem in two ways, first by providing an exhaustive critique of contemporary discussions of the problem (e.g.,Thomas Nagel, John Searle, Galen Strawsen, Colin McGinn, Geoffrey Madell, Karl Popper, Jaegwon Kim, and Owen Flanagan ) and then providing an “alternative for 'fully naturalizing’ the mind' based upon the process metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.” Griffin's alternative rejects the metaphysical assumption shared by dualism and materialism that matter is insentient  arguing that this shared assumption about matter leads to apparently unresolvable problems such as how experience arose out of non-experiencing natural entities or how conscious experience can be described in physicalist terms. Griffin proposes instead that all genuine actual entities (i.e., not aggregates like rocks or chairs, etc. ) are events that have some degree of experience that includes both physical (objective) and mental (subjective) elements. This is a version of panpsychism but one in which consciousness is not central, rather consciousness “emerges in degrees of complexity from a rudimentary sentience that pervades the whole of nature.” The better term, according to Griffin, is “panexperientialism.”

Common sense beliefs
The notion of a class of "privileged" common sense beliefs, what Griffin calls "hard-core common sense" beliefs, was important to Griffin's thought at least since the mid-1980's and was always part of his understanding of what he calls "constructive postmodernism." By the end of the 1990s, however, "it was the centerpiece of his argument." According to Griffin, unlike most ordinary (i.e., soft-core) common sense beliefs which in fact "are theory-laden products of prior conceptual and cultural systems", "certain common presumptions are universally presupposed in practice even when they are denied in theory." Put otherwise, such hard-core common sense beliefs "cannot be denied verbally without self-contradiction." Examples of such beliefs are:"One assumes causality in the act of causing one's self or others to doubt causality; one uses one's freedom in the act of renouncing the idea of freedom; even professed solipsists assume an actual world when they drive a car or question the existence of others."While there have been historical precedents for Griffin's notion of hard-core common sense beliefs (e.g., Thomas Reid and Charles Peirce ), the root of Griffin's position is Whitehead's declaration in Process and Reality "that all thinking must bow to the presuppositions that are necessary 'for the regulation of our lives' and that all 'such presumptions are imperative in experience.'" Accordingly, for Griffin, "[t]he ultimate test of any philosophical position is whether it does justice to the hard-core ideas that are inevitably presupposed in practice by all human beings." Despite their philosophical importance, however, "precise formulations of hard-core ideas are always fallible" and so must "function not as a foundation upon which all other beliefs are to be built but as a compass telling us when we have gotten off course."

Parapsychology[edit | edit source]
Griffin wrote two books dealing with parapsychology: Parapsychology, Philosophy and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration and James and Whitehead on Life After Death. Griffin recognized that by taking parapsychology seriously, he was at odds with the majority of scientific discussions of parapsychology. For example, Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt, and Martin W. Lewis assert that, "The overwhelming majority of scientists consider parapsychology, by whatever name, to be pseudoscience." undefinedGriffin proposed that the explanation for this majority opinion lies in a shared late modern worldview, which assumes materialism and rejects action at a distance, rather than from fair and impartial examination of the evidence. According to Griffin, "Intellectuals who share this ... materialistic worldview more typically reject the evidence [for paranormal phenomenon] out of hand, either by refusing to examine it or by attacking the credibility of those reporting it ...". Parapsychology, if genuine, provides dramatic evidence against the late modern worldview; however, Griffin points out, besides parapsychology, materialistic atheism, when consistent, also "rules out not only a (nonmaterial) mind but also those things often called 'values,' such as truth, beauty, and goodness.". Griffin states that the evidence from parapsychology as well as the persistent belief in these other values have lead to a "growing realization that [the] late modern worldview is ... inadequate intellectually." His judgement was th at people should move to a postmodern worldview that can consistently and coherently recognize the possibility of paranormal events as well as the reality of intellectual, moral, and esthetic norms. Griffin argued that Whitehead's philosophy provides just such a postmodern philosophy.

Science and Religion
Griffin's discussion of the relation between science and religion is part of a larger, constructive postmodernism project which "aims toward 'a new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions." Underlying this project is the conviction, following Whitehead, that [a] chief role of philosophy is to harmonize worldviews. With this in mind, Griffin claims that the "harmony between science and religion can be achieved only 'by integrating them into a philosophical worldview.'" Griffin refers to Whitehead: "'Theology and science, Whitehead insists, cannot be sheltered from each other. Each must allow its doctrines to be modified in the light of the truths discovered by the other. The key to this mutual modification is the recognition that thinkers tend to formulate the truths they have seen in an 'over-assertive' way that implies 'an exclusion of complementary truths.''"Griffin goes on to say, "The reconciliation will involve a modification of either the scientific doctrine, or the religious one, or (often) both, so that neither excludes the truth expressed in the other."

Griffin argues that the currently dominant scientific worldview is historically contingent, showing that it emerged from a "three-cornered contest" between Aristotelian-Thomistic cosmology, various mechanical views, and various Neoplatonic-magical-spiritualist views. He argues that while the modern scientific worldview is often naively assumed to have "been derived inductively from the unbiased perception of empirical facts", the truth is more complex and more partisan:"'the legal-mechanical view won the battle of the worldviews because it seemed to support the social-political-economic status quo and thereby the interests of the wealthy and the powerful, whereas the worldview of the Neoplatonic-magical-spiritualist traditions seemed to threaten those interests'."Even though Griffin believes that the emergence of the modern scientific worldview was contingent upon historical choices and conditions, Griffin proposes that every great tradition, including science, "is based upon some deep insight into, some revelation about -- whichever language one prefers -- the nature of things." Griffin argues that "the universal truth offered by modernity, especially as represented by modern science, is the truth of ontological naturalism." Ontological naturalism according to Griffin, is, minimally, "the doctrine that there are no supernatural interventions into the world's most fundamental causal principles." Implicit in the doctrine, however, is the further antiauthoritarian insight, epistemic naturalism, "according to which all claims to truth are to be judged in terms of experience and reason."

Griffin believes that ontological naturalism in its minimalist form is a universal truth of science that religion must accept. However, naturalism as embodied in the dominant scientific worldview today includes other doctrines which he believes are not universal truths or fundamental to science. Three of these are: 1. sensationalism (the doctrine that our only perception is sense perception); 2. materialism (the doctrine that matter has no "inside", i.e., does not experience); 3. atheism (the doctrine that there is no meaningful concept of deity). If acceptance of ontological naturalism implies epistemic naturalism, then a consistent science must justify these three additional cosmological/metaphysical doctrines using reason and the testimony of experience, not just assume them and not just ignore alternatives, especially once the historical contingency of these doctrines is recognized. For example, Whitehead provides an alternative to each of the three "non-fundamental" modern doctrines, namely: 1. causal efficacy, our experience of the past in our present; 2. panexperientialism, the doctrine that all true (i.e., non-aggragate) natural entities have experience; and 3. a vision of a God whose activity is embedded in natural causation rather than suspending it.