User:Ghulam Umar

General Ghulam Umar: The War Criminal of Bangladesh

Race: Pakistani Punjabi, Born in West Pakistan

General Ghulam Umar was held responsible for the Bangladesh debacle according to the Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report :

(i) That General Yahya Kina, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj Gen Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently tot he surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of Pakistan:

(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (i) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war.

http://www.ppp.org.pk/zab/hamoodrerehman.html http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?223028-Darling-8th-Dec-2013-Asad-Umar

Wrangling witnesses of Fall of Dhaka — by Khaled Ahmed

[In his interview with Iftikhar Ahmed of Goe TV] General Ghulam Umar was more upset than he should have been. His reference to his own piety was not appropriate. The first thing is to decide about coming to the programme. Once you decide to face it then be prepared to face the questions without getting hot under the collar.

For a long time, Pakistan was dominated by the opinion that East Pakistan separated from Pakistan because the Indians engineered it and finally invaded it to assist its agents there. Then in the period of freedom of expression under Prime Minister Junejo, people began to write the real story. Two opinions began to appear, as if in a clash. Even that period passed and now those who say that India broke Pakistan up are increasingly on the defensive. Even the generals have started disagreeing.

GEO TV (December 2005) in his Jawbadeh programme Iftikhar Ahmad grilled Major-General (retd) Ghulam Umar on the Fall of Dhaka. Gen Umar insisted that East Pakistan fell because of the secret plans of India, Mujib’s traitorous link-up with India, the Soviet Union and the United States, which did not send its naval fleet to save Pakistan.

In his book The White House and Pakistan (OUP), FS Aijazuddin informs us from official documents that President Nixon delivered an ultimatum to India that if it attacked West Pakistan the US will move against it. He made the threatening move on the sea to back it up. And the threat worked. There was no American commitment to save East Pakistan. There was also no similar Chinese commitment.

In his book, Gen ‘Tiger’ Niazi accused Gen Ghulam Umar of being in the inner circle of Yahya Khan and even of embezzling money, misappropriating Rs 600,000 and returning only Rs 300,000 when caught. Gen Umar denied the charge and said he could not answer the allegations when they cropped up because he was placed under house arrest by Bhutto for five and a half years.

The political factor has cropped up. Bhutto’s act of confining him and Zia’s favour to him marks him. But he is no longer closed to the ‘non-ideological’ causes. He wants the state to re-investigate causes other than India’s role. The fact is that the military officers have finally started telling their story and this causes clashes among them.

The charge against Gen Umar was that he had interfered to scuttle an agreement already arrived at between Yahya and Mujib before Umar arrived in Dhaka from Islamabad. He met with General Yahya, General Tikka Khan and General Khudadad in Dhaka where he convinced them not to agree on anything with Mujib and to start Operation Blitz.

General Umar vehemently denied the allegation. He said he knew nothing about Operation Blitz. Another accusation, according to Bangladeshi sources, was that Gen Umar together with Generals Gul Hasan and Tikka Khan had decided that Bengali intellectuals and journalists would be put to death.

Gen Umar denied it. He kept insisting that he was clean because of his religious background. He was from the family of Islamic scholars and ascetics (ulema and fuqara).

Gen Umar was more upset than he should have been. His reference to his own piety was not appropriate. The first thing is to decide about coming to the programme. Once you decide to face it then be prepared to face the questions without getting hot under the collar. Gen Umar gave a bad interview.

Gen Umar thought Gen Sher Ali, as information minister of Gen Yahya, was a great man because he campaigned to make Pakistan Islamic. He said he had proof that India had plotted the fall of East Pakistan together with Mujib and the Soviet Union with the presumed acquiescence of the United States.

He said Bhutto knew that he would not have absolute power over Pakistan as long as there was East Pakistan, so he got rid of East Pakistan. Bhutto also wanted to disgrace the Pakistan army.

Another weak part of Gen Umar’s defence. Sher Ali was a bit of a comic figure, impersonating Napoleon at night and doing Islam during the day. Sher Ali was a forerunner of General Zia, only he was more grotesquely unreal — a ‘nawab’ general gone Islamic. Another ‘nawab’ general Yaqub Khan was more gifted intellectually. He ducked out of East Pakistan.

To the question that a recent book by Hussain Haqqani had also indicted him, Gen Umar said that he had no assets; he just could not be dishonest. To the accusation that the Hamudur Rehman Commission on the Fall of East Pakistan had also stated negative things about him, asking the state to indict him, he said he was ready to be tried in the court of law. He said he took no part in the intrigues in which other generals were involved. As for East Pakistan it was now Bangladesh and it did not rejoin India and was an Islamic state.

Gen Umar was reductionist about Islam in Bangladesh today. He presumed that Pakistanis no longer knew much about the state of Islamic terror in Bangladesh. He may have been right. Our minds are closed on Islam in that country. Today, an acceptance of the constitutional nomenclature of Islamic state for Bangladesh would be a shameful acceptance of Islam as terrorism.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C01%5C17%5Cstory_17-1-2006_pg3_3

In the 1971 polls, there was some back-stage funding of candidates by General Yahya Khan, General Ghulam Omar and others to make sure certain anti-establishment politicians were not elected (ala IJI-Mehran Bank) did happen. Maj Gen Ghulam Omar, father of PTI’s Asad Omar (former CEO Engro), who was the Secretary of Yahya Khan’s National Security Council, arranged funding for Muslim League Qayyum Faction so as to dent Bhutto’s position in West Pakistan. That did not result in much success. Gen Umar’s other glorious involvement in Operation Searchlight, Operationm Blitz and general role in 1971 can be read in many books on the subject.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/423391/fair-cec-unfair-polls/

Pakistan Military mind-set -Officer Corps thought-process about Defence

– by Hamid Hussain – Defence Journal Monthly 2002

Columnist Hamid Hussain explores the Pakistan military mind-set. [Courtesy – Defence Journal Monthly July 2002]

http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/july/martial.htm

Major General (r) Ghulam Omar (He was a close confidant of General Yahya Khan, secretary of National Security Council and a key member of the military regime in 1971) with all the hindsight in 1993 has this to say about 1971 crisis, “I swear by God that Pakistan was broken by Bhutto, Mujib, Indira, Soviet Union and America. It was a conspiracy hatched by all of them together”.— Interview of Major General (r) Ghulam Omar. Salasal, Jalees. Court Martial (Urdu). (Karachi: Al-Jalees Overseas Publishing, 1999), p. 169

…………

According to a senior intelligence officer, Yahya Khan had delegated N.A. Rizvi (Director Intelligence Bureau) to weaken Mujib in the East by funding Bhashani. Maj-General Ghulam Umar (Chief of National Security Council) collected funds from big businessmen and industrialists in the West to ‘cut Bhutto to size’ by financing Qayum Khan. Later, Bhutto as PM recovered some money from Rizvi and Gen. Umer was retired. (Rao Abdur Rasheed ‘Jo main ney dekha’ Atish Fishan Publications Lahore 1985 pp. 62-64).

Major General Abubakar Osman Mitha, the only Memon General of the Army reveals that in October/November 1970, in Karachi a leading businessman Mr Roshan Ali Bhimjee told him that DIB was asking for “political contributions” from the business community using foul and threatening language. Gen. Mitha informed Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan (Chief of Staff) in Rawalpindi to respond to the charges, none other than Gen. Ghulam Umar turned up in COS’s office. (“Unlikely Beginnings” OUP 2003 pp.328-329)

After the elections, Yahya gave a tongue-lashing to the DIB, Rizvi who had all along been reporting that no single party would gain an absolute majority (in the East). (Hasan Zaheer “The separation of East Pakistan” OUP 2000 p 130).

The minders in Rawalpindi often project that ‘the only free and fair elections’ in the history of Pakistan were held by a President-General, Yahya Khan. This is historically inaccurate. If the 1970 elections turned out to be fair, they were by default not by design. According to a senior intelligence officer, Yahya Khan had delegated N.A. Rizvi (Director Intelligence Bureau) to weaken Mujib in the East by funding Bhashani. Maj-General Ghulam Umar (Chief of National Security Council) collected funds from big businessmen and industrialists in the West to ‘cut Bhutto to size’ by financing Qayum Khan. Later, Bhutto as PM recovered some money from Rizvi and Gen. Umer was retired. (Rao Abdur Rasheed ‘Jo main ney dekha’ Atish Fishan Publications Lahore 1985 pp. 62-64).

Major General Abubakar Osman Mitha, the only Memon General of the Army reveals that in October/November 1970, in Karachi a leading businessman Mr Roshan Ali Bhimjee told him that DIB was asking for “political contributions” from the business community using foul and threatening language. Gen. Mitha informed Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan (Chief of Staff) in Rawalpindi to respond to the charges, none other than Gen. Ghulam Umar turned up in COS’s office. (“Unlikely Beginnings” OUP 2003 pp.328-329)

http://letusbuildpakistan.blogspot.co.uk/2009/03/hamid-mir-who-broke-pakistan.html

Hamood-ur-Rehaman Commission recommended punishment of scores of Pakistan military officers responsible for Fall of Dhaka including General Ghulam Umar

– by WASEEM ALTAF

Army’s role in splintering Pakistan was largely ignored by successive governments. Bhutto personally ordered that each and every copy of the Hamood ur Rehman Report be burnt. A copy of the final report was however saved, which was leaked and published in India Today in August 2000. Gen. Musharraf said calls for generals to be tried were not fair.

The Report: AFTER THE fall of Dacca, eight days later, on Dec 24, 1971, the then President of Pakistan Mr.Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up the War Inquiry Commission, commonly known as the Hamood-ur-Rehaman Commission. It examined 213 witnesses, mostly Pakistani army officers, hundreds of classified documents and army signals between East and West Pakistan. The final report was submitted in November 1974, detailing how political, administrative, military, and moral failings were responsible for the surrender in East Pakistan.

The Findings: The report said: “The process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the armed forces was set in motion by their involvement in martial law duties in 1958 that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact intensified when martial law was imposed once again in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan.”

“Due to corruption arising out of the performance of martial law duties, lust for wine and woman, and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war, “the commission observed.

According to the commission, these perversions led to the army brass willfully subverting public life in Pakistan. “In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs, both for bringing some of the political parties and the elected members of National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on March 3, 1971.

“A fully civil government could not be formed in East Pakistan as had been announced by the ex-President. Dr. Malik an old man and politician had a weak personality. He could not annoy, the Martial Law Administrator (Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi) also because of the unsettled conditions obtaining in the Wing. Gen Niazi, on the other hand, cherished and liked power, but did not have the breadth of vision or ability to understand political implications. He did not display much respect for the civilian Governor; the Army virtually continued to control civil administration”.

“The installation of a civilian governor in September 1971 was merely to hoodwink public opinion at home and abroad. Poor Dr. Malik and his ministers were figureheads only.

Real decisions in all important matters still lay with the army. In the first picture of the new Cabinet. Maj. Gen Farman Ali was prominently visible sitting on the right side of the Governor, although he was not a member of the Cabinet.”

The rot began at the very top from the East Pakistan army’s commander, Lt-General A.A.K.Niazi, who the commission said acquired a “notorious reputation for sexual immorality and indulgence in the smuggling of paan from East to West Pakistan”. The inevitable consequence was that “he failed to inspire respect and confidence in the minds of his subordinates with absolute absence of leadership qualities and determination; he also encouraged laxity in discipline and moral standards among the officers and men under his command”.

The Recommendations: The Commission recommended Public Trial of the following Officers: (1) General Yahya Khan, Former Commander-in-chief (2) General Abdul Hamid Khan, ex Chief of Staff to the President (3) Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, ex PSO to the President (4) Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan ex Chief of General Staff (5) Maj. Gen. Ghulam Umar ex Second-in -Command of NSC (6) Maj Gen A O Mitha ex Deputy Corps Commander (7) Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, ex Commander 1 Corps (8) Maj Gen Abid Zahid, ex GOC 15 Div (9) Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, ex GOC 18 Div

http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.co.uk/2010/12/hamood-ur-rehaman-commission.html

An Army Insider’s Honest Expose of Atrocities in East Pakistan Debacle MARCH 3, 2008 (A review from a book written by an insider close to power in 1971)

KARACHI, March 25: The East Pakistan tragedy was not just a failure of the military establishment of the day but also the abysmal collapse of civil society in West Pakistan. Launched at midnight, 25 March 1971, the military action went on for nine long months without eliciting any concerted protest from the West Pakistani public and political leadership. The few low voices raised against the military action were too feeble to make the army change the suicidal course it had set itself, leading to an ignominious military defeat and the breakup of the country. Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqi, who headed the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) and was Press Advisor to Army Chief General Yahya Khan, was clearly in the thick of things. Therefore, his book ‘East Pakistan: The Endgame — An Onlooker’s Journal 1969-1971′ will be of interest to those wishing to penetrate the historical veil that has subsequently been draped over the more unsavory events of that era. The author had the unique advantage of observing the tragedy as it unfolded. As the ISPR chief, he interacted with the national press and a cross-section of public and political leadership in both wings. In his description and appraisal of the various dramatis personae, he acts as an impartial observer. Apart from the fresh light the book sheds on the traumatic episode, the simplicity and candor of the narrative adds much to its readability. Thus, the book may well contribute towards the much-needed bridge building between Pakistan and Bangladesh. “In 1971, Pakistan was torn into two, its eastern half declaring itself the independent nation of Bangladesh. While the broader details of this debacle have since become comprehensible, historians are still trying to glean a few remaining facts from the myths and half-truths that continue to linger some 33 years later. From the start, the author makes it clear that the book is based on his diaries and other sources that he had personal access to as the ISPR chief. He also admits to have “scrupulously avoided” relying on any subsequent books or other published material that relates to the events. As a result, the reader is presented with a first-hand account of those fateful days. The narrative begins in February 1969 when President Ayub Khan, besieged by street agitation, sought to negotiate his way out by calling for a Round Table Conference (RTC). However, as Siddiqi explains, Yahya had already started plotting against his boss. Unknown to most people at the time, the army chief secretly met the East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rehman and asked him not to relent on his demands. In fact, as Siddiqi points out, Yahya went as far as to tell Mujib that “he could go ahead with his anti-Ayub campaign without any let or hindrance from the army.” Siddiqi also reveals that a week before the RTC, he was ordered by General Ghulam Umar to secretly prepare an advance draft for Yahya’s address to the nation as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Two days later, Yahya flatly refused Ayub’s direct request for the army to come to the aid of the civil government.

http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/?p=221

An Army Insider’s Honest Expose of Atrocities in East Pakistan Debacle last updated by Webmaster on MARCH 3, 2008 in GENOCIDE AND SYSTEMATIC MASS RAPES (A review from a book written by an insider close to power in 1971)

KARACHI, March 25: The East Pakistan tragedy was not just a failure of the military establishment of the day but also the abysmal collapse of civil society in West Pakistan. Launched at midnight, 25 March 1971, the military action went on for nine long months without eliciting any concerted protest from the West Pakistani public and political leadership.

The few low voices raised against the military action were too feeble to make the army change the suicidal course it had set itself, leading to an ignominious military defeat and the breakup of the country.

Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqi, who headed the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) and was Press Advisor to Army Chief General Yahya Khan, was clearly in the thick of things. Therefore, his book ‘East Pakistan: The Endgame — An Onlooker’s Journal 1969-1971’ will be of interest to those wishing to penetrate the historical veil that has subsequently been draped over the more unsavory events of that era.

The author had the unique advantage of observing the tragedy as it unfolded. As the ISPR chief, he interacted with the national press and a cross-section of public and political leadership in both wings. In his description and appraisal of the various dramatis personae, he acts as an impartial observer.

Apart from the fresh light the book sheds on the traumatic episode, the simplicity and candor of the narrative adds much to its readability. Thus, the book may well contribute towards the much-needed bridge building between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

“In 1971, Pakistan was torn into two, its eastern half declaring itself the independent nation of Bangladesh. While the broader details of this debacle have since become comprehensible, historians are still trying to glean a few remaining facts from the myths and half-truths that continue to linger some 33 years later.

From the start, the author makes it clear that the book is based on his diaries and other sources that he had personal access to as the ISPR chief. He also admits to have “scrupulously avoided” relying on any subsequent books or other published material that relates to the events. As a result, the reader is presented with a first-hand account of those fateful days.

The narrative begins in February 1969 when President Ayub Khan, besieged by street agitation, sought to negotiate his way out by calling for a Round Table Conference (RTC). However, as Siddiqi explains, Yahya had already started plotting against his boss. Unknown to most people at the time, the army chief secretly met the East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rehman and asked him not to relent on his demands. In fact, as Siddiqi points out, Yahya went as far as to tell Mujib that “he could go ahead with his anti-Ayub campaign without any let or hindrance from the army.”

Siddiqi also reveals that a week before the RTC, he was ordered by General Ghulam Umar to secretly prepare an advance draft for Yahya’s address to the nation as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Two days later, Yahya flatly refused Ayub’s direct request for the army to come to the aid of the civil government.

According to Siddiqi, Yahya made it abundantly clear to his superior that it was either complete martial law under his own control or nothing. And Ayub knew then that his days were numbered. Following his refusal to help Ayub quell the violent civic unrest, Siddiqi discloses how Yahya cunningly enlisted the support of his old drinking buddy interior minister Admiral AR Khan, who persisted in presenting highly pessimistic daily briefs to further undermine the president.

When Siddiqi confronted General Pirzada with these peculiar goings-on, he was politely told to hush up. The dice had been cast and within a month Ayub departed from the scene after handing over power to Yahya.

Following the takeover, Siddiqi claims that Yahya was quick to reveal his true intentions and confided to some of his senior officers: “Gentlemen, we must be prepared to rule this unfortunate country for the next 14 years or so.”

Soon, Yahya announced general elections after being convinced by the intelligence agencies that they would result in a split vote and a fractious National Assembly, making it impossible for the new government to fulfil the stipulation of an approved constitution within 120 days. This failure, the thinking went, would then lead to fresh elections while power would indefinitely remain in the army’s firm grip.

However, the election results could not have been farther from Yahya’s calculations. Badly let down by the intelligence agencies, Yahya decided to pursue a new course of action. His famous reference to Mujib as the future prime minister was in reality no more than “a calculated maneuver aimed at, first to set the military against Mujib, and second, to provoke the Pakistan Peoples Party.”

The worried generals then recruited Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to ensure that any chance of a compromise with Mujib would be non-existent. In fact, as Siddiqi informs us, General Umar even met many West Pakistani minority party leaders to actively dissuade them from attending the first National Assembly session at Dhaka. Not surprisingly, East Pakistan soon went on the boil in the face of such intransigence. And the army-controlled West Pakistani media retaliated by accusing East Pakistanis of treason.

We all know what followed. The army’s subjugation of East Pakistan resulted in untold misery for millions of innocent Pakistanis, the death of many thousands as well as the breakup of Jinnah’s original Pakistan. And as Siddiqi’s narrative makes apparent, all this happened so that the generals could maintain their hold on power. Since then, it has suited successive army generals to place the blame on Bhutto. But the pertinent question is: how many tanks, guns and soldiers did Bhutto have at his disposal? The answer, of course, is none.

Another fact the author emphasizes is the sheer profusion of war crimes inflicted on hapless Pakistani citizens by its own army. The reader comes across a devastated Major General Ansari telling Siddiqi that rape and brutality were widespread. The general also confesses to a complete breakdown in the “discipline of his junior officers [and that] there was little he could do to check their “atrocities.” If junior officers had run amok, one shudders to think what the less-educated jawans got up to.

Siddiqi also exposes the infamous General Niazi who shamelessly defended the rapists by declaring that: “You cannot expect a man to live, fight and die in East Pakistan and go to Jhelum for sex, would you?” Even 30-plus years later, the fact that most, if not all, of these perpetrators got away scot-free, can provoke tears of rage and shame.

Ultimately, ‘The End Game’ is a brave and honest book and Siddiqi should be commended for writing it, even if it took him all these years to muster the resolve. A must-read for anyone interested in Pakistan’s past.” – Courtesy Herald.

Credit: AK Zaman