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Famine relief
On improving the supply of bread to workers and students in Ukraine. Seal and signature of the Secretary of the Central Committee, Joseph Stalin.
 * 1) Starting from April, reduce by 14 thousand tons the offset of bread from the garnets collection in the supply plan of Ukraine, bringing to 10 thousand tons per month instead of 24 thousand tons in March.
 * 2) Oblige the Central Committee of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) Ukraine should supplement the bread fund from centralized sources in the amount of 14 thousand tons per month to improve the supply of students and small cities, as well as small enterprises in large cities, primarily in the city of Kiev.


 * 112/95. – Об улучшении снабжения хлебом рабочих и студентов на Украине.
 * Начиная с апреля уменьшить на 14 тысяч тонн зачёт хлеба из гарнцевого сбора в план снабжения Украины, доведя до 10 тысяч тонн в месяц вместо 24 тысяч тонн в марте.
 * Обязать Центральный Комитет Коммунистической Партии (большевиков) Украины дополнить фонд хлеба из централизованных источников в количестве 14 тысяч тонн в месяц обратить на улучшение снабжения студентов и мелких городов, а также мелких предприятий в крупных городах, в первую очередь в городе Киеве.


 * [печать] СЕКРЕТАРЬ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОГО КОМИТЕТА [подпись]

176ди,лс.ас.

May 16, 1932: From the minutes No. 100 of the Politburo meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (bolsheviks) “On bread for Leningrad and the South of Ukraine”:
 * To release 35,000,000 kilograms of wheat located in Ukrainian ports for the needs of Ukraine's supply.
 * To release 30,000,000 kilograms of wheat in Leningrad, for export to the mills that supply flour to Leningrad and Moscow.
 * Of the 49,140,000 kilograms of bread purchased in Persia, 32,760,000 kilograms should be delivered to Transcaucasia; the remaining 16,380,000 kilograms should be delivered to Moscow.

February 22, 1933: From the minutes No. 57 of the meeting of the Bureau of the Kiev regional Committee of the Communist party of the (bolsheviks) of Ukraine “On the elimination of food difficulties in collective farms, hotbeds of acute malnutrition and facts of hunger”:

To begin immediate elimination of hotbeds of extreme exhaustion among collective farmers and individual farmers on the basis of acute malnutrition in order to eliminate all cases of swelling by March 5 and to raise to their feet all who have become completely incapacitated from exhaustion. For this:
 * 1) All those who are edema or lying down from exhaustion – both children and adults – should be placed in specially designed and adapted rooms within 48 hours, and food should be provided for them for the period necessary to eliminate the painful state of the body, without allowing them to be left at home in this state;
 * 2) In the affected villages, organize the compulsory organization of hot breakfasts in schools with the attachment of all preschool children in a state of exhaustion to schools, organizing special nutritional points for them;
 * 3) Persons in a state of extreme exhaustion and brought into a working condition, should be provided with work on collective farms, state farms, timber farms, providing them with appropriate assistance in advance;
 * 4) Immediately inform the regional committee: a) the number of villages where this assistance will be organized; b) the number of people who need help; c) the availability of resources from the funds of the district and collective farms, which are needed and can be allocated for this purpose from February 25 to April 1;
 * 5) The regional committee categorically proposes to eliminate all the phenomena of edema and extreme exhaustion by March 5;
 * 6) In view of the presence of cases of squandering of collective farm funds, especially in the form of continuing public catering on collective farms and handing them over to the so-called permanent staff of the collective farm, the regional committee warns that all cases of expenditure of collective farm resources that are not provided for by this resolution and not reported by the regional committee will be regarded as actions directed against socialist property, and will be punished in the strictest order on the basis of this law;
 * 7) In view of the presence of constant attempts by the enemies to use these facts against collective farm construction, the district party committees carry out systematic explanatory work, revealing the real reasons that led to the facts of the famine;
 * 8) To directly manage the matter of aid, to organize in the regions special commissions chaired by the chairman of the district executive committee, consisting of: the head of the district department of the Joint State Political Directorate, the district health department, a representative of the district committee of the Communist KSM and society “Friends of children”.

March 13, 1933: Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the (bolsheviks) of Ukraine “On food aid”:
 * To allocate an additional 500,000 kilograms of confectionery products for the workers of these cities above the plan.
 * Distribute by region as follows:


 * Sunflower oil: Kyiv Oblast – 4,095 kilograms, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – 4,095 kilograms;
 * Canning: Kyiv Oblast – 35,000 cans, Vinnytsia Oblast – 15,000 cans, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – 30,000 cans, Kharkiv Oblast – 10,000 cans;
 * Flour: Kyiv Oblast – 450,000 kilograms, Vinnytsia Oblast – 150,000 kilograms, Kharkiv Oblast – 30,000 kilograms, Moldavian ASSR – 30,000 kilograms;
 * Sugar: Kyiv Oblast – 50,000 kilograms, Vinnytsia Oblast – 15,000 kilograms, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – 40,000 kilograms, Odessa Oblast – 30,000 kilograms, Moldavian ASSR – 5,000 kilograms, Kharkiv Oblast – 10,000 kilograms.
 * Cereal: Kyiv Oblast – 15,000 kilograms, Vinnytsia Oblast – 7,000 kilograms, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – 15,000 kilograms, Odessa Oblast – 10,000 kilograms, Moldavian ASSR – 3,000 kilograms;

June 15, 1933: Minutes No. 139 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (bolsheviks):

To release an additional 14,742,000 kilograms of rye to Ukraine SSR as foodstuffs, including:


 * Kyiv Oblast – 2,948,400 kilograms of rye;
 * Kharkiv Oblast – 2,948,400 kilograms of rye;
 * Chernihiv Oblast – 655,200 kilograms of rye;
 * Odessa Oblast – 2,457,000 kilograms of rye;
 * Vinnytsia Oblast – 2,948,400 kilograms of rye;
 * Dnipropetrovsk Oblast – 2,457,000 kilograms of rye;
 * Moldavian Autonomous SSR – 327,600 kilograms of rye;

Kulak terror and crimes
December 15, 1932: Special report of the Joint State Political Directorate on the disclosure of large-scale theft of flour from the mills of the All-Ukrainian Department of Agriculture: —

January 17, 1933: Special report of the Joint State Political Directorate on the disclosure of large-scale theft of bread in Kazakhstan: To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Stalin. Representatives of the Joint State Political Directorate for Kazakhstan uncovered large-scale organized theft of bread from the Zagotzerno system in the Kelessky, Karatassky and Bostandyk districts of Kazakhstan.
 * The investigation found that the organization had stolen 1,053,234 kilograms of bread. 81 people were arrested in the case, and 114,660 kilograms of stolen bread were found in their possession during the search. The rest of the stolen bread was sold through speculators, mainly in the city of Tashkent. The theft was organized by a group of kulaks who escaped from dekulakization and from the place of expulsion, in collusion with employees of the Zagotzerno system, led by the Manager of the Kelessky inter-regional office Simonov. For the purpose of theft, 10 false-artels of carters were organized from fugitive kulaks, allegedly to transport bread from the hinterlands to the station. In fact, all the bread sent was completely plundered.
 * To disguise the theft, the organization widely used various kinds of forged documents. So, kulaks, organizers of false-artels, received fictitious certificates of belonging to the poor from local village Soviet for bribes, as a result, false-artels acted under the banner of “poor”. Using the same certificates, kulak agents also infiltrated work in kolkhoz (collective farms) with a special assignment to steal forms of collective farm documents with stamps and seals. When stealing collective farm documents, the criminal organization drew up official contracts on behalf of the collective farms for the transportation of goods Zagotzerno. The employees of Zagotzerno who were part of the organization deliberately confused and did not keep records of the bread shipped and received at the station. Previously opened accounting books, as well as income and expense documents, were destroyed. It was widely practiced to draw up fictitious documents for write-off bread that was stolen.

The said case was heard by the Joint State Political Directorate Collegium. Of the total of 81 accused, 16 people were sentenced to death, the rest, in the majority, were sentenced to 10 years in a camp. &mdash; Deputy Chairman of the Joint State Political Directorate Prokofiev

Ferrous metallurgy
The 4,2 million tons of cast iron, the same amount of steel, and 3,5 million tons of rolled steel, which the Russian metallurgy produced before First World War, did not meet the metal needs of even the backward industry of Russian Empire.

The metallurgy sector suffered especially from the imperialist war and intervention. Already by the October Socialist Revolution, following the February Bourgeois Democratic Revolution, metallurgical production fell by 30%. As a result of the Russian Civil War, which captured the main metallurgical plants, the Urals and especially the South, cast iron smelting fell in 1920 by 2,7% of the pre-war time. In December 1920, at the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, describing the situation of ferrous metallurgy, Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin said: ''“In this respect, our situation is particularly difficult. We produce perhaps 6% of what was produced in the pre-war period. This is the ruin and poverty to which the imperialist and civil wars have reduced Russia.”''

The task of restoring ferrous metallurgy turned out to be extremely difficult than other industries. The recovery process can be seen from the following figures of metal smelting by year:

Cast iron smelting only surpassed the pre-war level in 1929. Meanwhile, the reconstructed and new automobile, tractor, machine-building plants, developing transport, mechanized agriculture – have shown an enormous demand for metal. The backlog of metallurgy threatened the industrialization of the Soviet Union.

In this regard, the accelerated deployment of ferrous metallurgy was given exceptional attention. Capital investment in ferrous metallurgy increases from year to year: 1930 – 361,000,000 rubles, 1931 – 846,000,000 rubles, 1932 – 1,857,000,000 rubles. In the operation of existing plants in 1932 joined the global giants as Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, Novokuznetsk Iron and Steel Plant, Azovstal iron and steel works, Zaporizhstal and others. Reconstruction of existing factories is underway. The estimated cost of all new metallurgical plants and plants undergoing deep reconstruction under construction is about 4,500,000,000 rubles.

Non-ferrous extractive metallurgy
Smelting of non-ferrous metals in the Russian Empire was at an extremely low level. Many non-ferrous metals were either not produced at all, or were smelted in negligible quantities. Metals and ores that were not produced in the Russian Empire include: aluminum, nickel, tin, antimony, electrolytic zinc, lead, tungsten, scheelite, lithium, molybdenum.

During the Civil War and the first period of the liberal New Economic Policy, the production of non-ferrous metals completely stopped. This was especially facilitated by the fact that most of the factories and ore mines were located in the North Caucasus, Armenia, the Urals, Kazakhstan, Siberia, where for a number of years the petty democratic bourgeoisie and landlord bourgeoisie ruled. After the end of the Civil War (October 25, 1922), the proletariat had to raise these factories and ore mines from the abyss of severe destruction and decline.

Only from 1924 the production of non-ferrous metals began to rise. In 1922, the Soviet Government was able to issue only 800,000 rubles for the restoration and repair of factories and ore mines of non-ferrous extractive metallurgy. In 1923, capital investments in non-ferrous extractive metallurgy amounted to 3,400,000 rubles. In 1924 – 8,700,000 rubles. In 1925 – 14,700,000 rubles. In 1926 – 26,900,000 rubles, and in 1927 – 31,600,000 rubles. From October 1928 to January 1932, 367,046,000 rubles were spent on the construction of new ones and on the reconstruction and expansion of existing non-ferrous extractive metallurgy factories and ore mines.

These capital investments quickly affected the growth of non-ferrous metal production. Since 1926, the smelting of copper, lead, zinc shows a sharp shift and reaches the following dimensions (in tons):

In terms of copper production already in 1929, the highest level of smelting in the Russian Empire was surpassed, namely in 1912, when 34,100 tons of copper were smelted. In terms of lead, smelting in 1928 was more than twice the maximum smelting in 1913, when 1,608 tons of lead were produced, and in 1932 lead production increased >23 times compared to 1913. In 1929, the output of zinc exceeded the maximum pre-war smelting of 1912 by 51%, and in 1932 it increased >9 times.

The above investments, along with the costs of 1932 of 555,000,000 rubles, create a production basis for the production of non-ferrous metals that were not at all produced in the Russian Empire. In May 14, 1932, two aluminum industrial complexes were commissioned: Volkhov industrial complex (Russian SFSR) with a capacity of the 1st phase in 6,000 tons of aluminum per year; and Zaporozhye industrial complex (Ukrainian SSR) with a capacity of the 1st phase in 20,000 tons of aluminum per year.

The capital construction plan of 1932 provides for the construction of the 2nd phases of these industrial complexes. The capacity of the Volkhov industrial complex should be increased to 15,000 tons of aluminum per year, and the capacity of the Zaporozhye industrial complex to 40,000 tons of aluminum per year.

In 1932, the Ufaley nickel plant (Russian SFSR) with a capacity of the 1st phase in 3,000 tons of nickel per year, was built and put into operation. On August 2, 1933, the Ufaley nickel plant produced the first pure matte for the first time.

For copper, Kalatinsky, Karabash and Korsak-Paysky combines are expanding. The Krasnouralsk combine is being completed, the Bashkir combine and the combines of the Transcaucasian State Trust of Non-ferrous Metals are being reconstructed. The Sredneuralskiy copper-smelting plant with an annual capacity of 50,000 tons and the Pribalkhash copper-smelting plant with an annual capacity of 175,000 tons are under construction. The construction of the Pyshminsky electrolytic plant (near Sverdlovsk, now Yekaterinburg) with an annual capacity of 100,000 tons of electrolytic copper is nearing completion.

For lead and zinc, the Chelyabinsk plant with a production capacity of 20,000 tons of zinc per year, the Konstantinovsky zinc plant and the Belovsky zinc plant are being completed. The Shymkent plant with a capacity of the 1st phase in 60,000 tons of lead per year is under construction. The Ridderovsky plant, Kemerovo plant and Nerchinsky plant are under construction. An electrolytic zinc plant is under construction in Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz).

Dairy
The dairy of the Russian Empire was mainly characterized by the fact that unproductive, kept in unacceptable conditions, dairy cattle were scattered between two and a half tens of millions of peasant farms with low marketability, which did not exceed 10‒15%. The dairy industry in the Russian Empire, despite the huge export of butter abroad, was represented in the form of 6,900 creameries and cheese-making handicraft factories with a capacity not exceeding 15‒20 tons of butter per year.

The Soviet Union came close to solving the cattle breeding problem by accelerating the deployment of large specialized state farms and collective farms. In less than two years, 600 large dairy, milk-and-butter and meat-and-milk state farms, 39,000 collective farm marketable dairy and meat-and-dairy farms, 600 suburban dairy farms in the consumer cooperation system were organized. By the beginning of 1932, 1,400,000 dairy cattle on state farms and 1,952,000 dairy cattle on collective farms were concentrated. In suburban farms of the consumer cooperation system, 170,000 cows were delivered.

In 1931, state farms delivered 10,9 thousand tons of butter. State farms of republican dairy trusts delivered about 100 thousand tons of whole milk, except for butter and cheese. According to incomplete data, about 300 thousand tons of milk were delivered to factories and plants by suburban farms of the consumer cooperation system. Collective farm commodity farms sold 623 thousand raw materials to the state in the form of whole milk, cheese and butter.

On average, the marketability of collective farms in the Soviet Union reached 76%, and in some regions it rose to >80%, which is 2‒3 times higher than the marketability of a common collective farm herd and 6‒7 times the marketability of a individual peasant farm. The amount of raw materials delivered by cattle breeding state farms, collective farm commodity farms and collective farms in 1931 amounted to about 53% of all planned procurement.

From a primitive dairy technique, dairy state farms and collective farm commodity farms are switching to cattle breeding based on the latest achievements of science: electric milking machines, automatic drinkers, etc. Crossbreeding is carried out on a wide scale with the maximum use of breeding producers, through the use of artificial insemination.

On the basis of the socialist reconstruction of cattle breeding, on the basis of the construction of large specialized dairy state farms and collective farms, a powerful dairy industry is being created.

Proletariat
The 9th Congress of Trade Unions in April 1932 stated that unemployment had been completely eliminated in the Soviet Union (except for natural unemployment), and 83% of industrial workers were transferred to a 7-hour working day. The average annual wage throughout the national economy increased from 1928 to 1931 by 56,8%. In 3 years, housing for 3 million people was built. In 17 most important industries, the average monthly wage increased from 1928 to 1931 from 70 rubles 90 kopeks to 96 rubles 15 kopeks, that is, by 35,3%. In 1932, the average monthly wage exceeded 100 rubles.

However, the domestic and cultural standard of living of the working class is not only that part of the wage that is given to the worker on hand, but also a socialized share of it. The growth of the socialized share of wages is evidenced by the following: in 1929, 14 rubles 50 kopeks per year were spent on enlightenment one worker, and in 1932 – 44 rubles 40 kopeks per year were spent. In 1929, 23 rubles 7 kopeks were spent on medical care for one worker, and in 1932 – 40 rubles 90 kopeks were spent.

Economic victory
Evidence of the feat of labor of the peasantry during the war years is the statistical information given in the table on the development of work-days, taken from the annual reports of collective farms:

The most important production task of the peasantry in the first years of the war was the maximum possible replacement of losses caused by the Nazi occupation. The issue of sown areas acquired particular importance in connection with the loss of huge land areas of the Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, Estonian SSR, Don and other regions.

Collective farmers actively participated in voluntary collections of material values, warm clothes, gifts, voluntary food donations to help the population liberated from occupation, the persons with disabilities, children, the evacuated population, workers and employees of defense enterprises.