User:GregJackP/United States v. Bryant

United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a federal law which provided that a conviction in an American Indian tribal court that complied with the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) did not violate a defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

Violence Against Women Act
In 2005, Congress enacted, as part of the Violence Against Women Act reauthorization, a provision in the United States Code that provided that persons arrested for domestic violence in "Indian Country" would be subjected to enhanced penalties if they were a habitual offender with two or more prior convictions in federal, state, or tribal court. Congress had found that American Indian women were 2.5 times as likely to be the victim of rape or sexual assault than a woman in the general population, and are the victims of domestic battery almost 3 times as often. At the time of passage, tribal courts could only try American Indians and the maximum sentence was one year in jail.

Indian Civil Rights Act
The Indian Civil Rights Act was first enacted in 1968 to signal an end to the Indian termination policy and the beginning of the tribal self-determination period, and to provide some of the protections of the Bill of Rights to American Indians. The major provisions of the ICRA was to provide certain procedural rights in tribal courts, including most of the protections of the Bill of Rights with the exception of the right to counsel unless facing a potential sentence of over one year.

Facts of the case
Michael Bryant, Jr. is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and lived on the reservation in southeastern Montana. He had been arrested and convicted in tribal court at least five times for domestic assault, and had served several sentences of under one year each. In tribal courts however, defendants are not entitled to legal counsel as they would be in State or Federal court under the Sixth Amendment as Indian tribes are not subject to the Bill of Rights. Thus, although Bryant was indigent, he was not appointed counsel in the tribal court proceedings and he did not seek habeas corpus redress under the ICRA.

In February 2011, Bryant assaulted his live-in girlfriend again, pulling her by the hair, striking her and kicking her. Within three months, he assaulted yet another live-in girlfriend, and admitted to choking her until she was almost unconscious. Based on those arrests, a federal grand jury indicted Bryant for two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender.

District and Court of Appeals actions
Bryant, represented by appointed counsel in the U.S. District Court, moved to dismiss the indictment. The District Court denied the motion, and Bryant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal. Bryant was then sentenced to 42 months in prison on each charge, followed by 3 years of supervised release. The sentences were to be served concurrently.

Bryant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. Bryant argued that had his convictions been in state or federal court, they would not be valid for use because of the lack of legal counsel. Bryant did not argue that his lack of counsel invalidated the tribal court conviction, but that it did make the conviction unsuitable for use in a subsequent federal prosecution. The United States argued that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to tribal courts, and that the convictions were valid for use in federal court. The prosecution argued that the 1994 Supreme Court decision in Nichols v. United States supported its position. The government relied on the technically validity of the tribal court convictions to support their use in the current case.

The Ninth Circuit panel held that while the tribal court convictions were valid, since the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the tribes, the convictions could not be used as the predicate offenses since Bryant did not have a right to legal counsel. Applying their earlier decision in United States v. Ant, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction and directed that the indictment be dismissed. The panel distinguished Nichols, noting that Nichols did not deal with imprisonment, but was only punished by a fine.

After a request for a rehearing en banc was denied, the United States then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal due to the circuit split created by the Ninth Circuit's opinion.

Arguments
The United States was represented at oral arguments by Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Assistant to the Solicitor General. Bryant was represented by Steven C. Babcock, Assistant Federal Public Defender.

Opinion of the Court
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court. Justice Ginsburg first noted that Bryant did not argue that the tribal court convictions were invalid due to the lack of legal counsel, but urged that those convictions be considered as if they had been entered by a state or federal court. Justice Ginsburg noted that enhancement statutes only punish the current crime, not previous offenses, and that he was provided with legal counsel in the current case. She also noted that Bryant conceded that had his prior convictions been punished by fine only, the prior convictions would be unquestionably admissible for enhancement. Bryant's due process claim was similarly dismissed, noting that the ICRA provides due process, as does the availability of habeas corpus review in federal court under the ICRA.

Concurrence
Justice Clarence Thomas, in addition to joining the majority opinion, issued a concurring opinion. He first notes that the Court's precedence requires that earlier, uncounselled convictions be allowed, so he joined the majority opinion. He then notes that there are three issues in this case: 1) that a Sixth Amendment violation will generally bar the use of a conviction for enhancement; 2) that tribal sovereignty allows a tribe to prosecute in proceedings that do not follow the Constitution; and 3) Congress can punish assaults by one Indian on another on Indian land.