User:Gunbirddriver/Analysis of Citadel

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Operation Citadel has undergone extensive analyis. Two major military studies were conducted shortly after the battle, and military historians have conducted many more since. The first study was the Red Army General Staff Study completed in 1944. The U.S. Army also conducted a group of studies in the years immediately following the war. The U.S. studies were completed by German staff officers being held in captivity. Both the Red Army study and the US Army study were conducted with an eye toward mobile operations, and the implications that the battle held in terms of predicting how a potential Soviet-United States conflict might be fought.

The topic has also been of great interest to military historians, and extensive analysis and opinion on the battle has been generated.

Analysis of northern assault
A number of factors explain the 9th Army's lack of progress. Soviet forewarning of the German plans and their heavy defensive preparations were the major factors. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovsky had prepared in depth defenses along the likely avenues of the German attack. His 13th Army was positioned at the center of the German attack, had been heavily reinforced and was supplemented with extra anti-tank gun units. The strongest defensive positions in the salient had been constructed along its frontage.

Model was required to conduct the battle with an eye toward his back. He and Kluge were well aware of the build-up of Soviet forces to the east and north which were there in preparation for an attack upon the Orel salient. Model's forces did not have as many tanks as had been supplied to Manstein in the south. His decision to withhold his panzer divisions in the attack is the most significant reason for the poor penetration of the northern pincer. In doing so he kept his armour in position to take advantage of any breakthrough that could be made with his assault teams, and at the same time held them in position to respond to a Soviet attack upon his flank. He placed his most powerful corps, Gruppe "Esebeck" made up of the 2nd Panzer Division and 10th Panzer Grenadier Division, in reserve.

When German armour was committed it was done so in a piecemeal fashion rather than in strength, and often without sufficient infantry support. The combination of Soviet defensive planning and inadequate concentration of force by the attackers led to the attack being stalled with very little penetration.

Analysis of southern assault
In the southern assault the German forces made significantly greater progress and maintained their offensvie capability. Red Army minefields and artillery were successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans allowed their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.

As in the north, the frontage width and penetrational depth of the attack dropped as the attack proceeded.

Overall
Though the location, plan of attack and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased, while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased. By the end of the war he was attempting to make tactical decisions on battlefields of which he had no direct knowledge. The German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted to stubbornly hold on to every inch of ground that had been captured, with little understanding of the benefits of a mobile defence, nor regard to the loss of life in his army. His attempts to manage the day-to-day operations were increasingly limiting as Germany's conflict expanded into a three-front war. The opposite was true for Stalin. Throughout the Kursk campaign he trusted the judgment of his commanders, and upon these plans justified on the battlefield he came to trust their military judgment more and more. He stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions. The Red Army gained more freedom of action and became more and more fluid as the war continued.

Military historian opinions
Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser made the following points for reasons that Operation Citadel was a failure for the Wehrmacht:
 * The Soviets had numerical superiority. Frieser points out that the biggest problem of facing the German command was their shortage of infantry. The German's had placed as much resources as they could gleen into the offensive formations.  Subsequently they had no operational reserve.  The Red Army, on the other hand, had significant tactical reserves available all along their frontage, and in addition had an entire front (Steppe Front) as an operational reserve. Frieser stated the Red Army's numberical superiority in tanks, with over twice as many available as the Wehrmacht, had less influence on the outcome of the battle.
 * Repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to turn the bulge around Kursk into an enormous fortress. Senior officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared and low on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The overlap with the Allied invasion of Sicily made Hitler's date for the attack the "most adverse possible".

James Corum states a prevalent myth about the Luftwaffe and its blitzkrieg operations is that it had a doctrine of terror bombing, in which civilians were deliberately targeted in order to break the will or aid the collapse of an enemy. After the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and of Rotterdam in 1940, it was commonly assumed that terror bombing was a part of Luftwaffe doctrine. During the interwar period the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the concept of terror bombing, and confined the air arm's use to battlefield support of interdiction operations. "The vital industries and transportation centers that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. Civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of the attacking the vital war industries- and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale-was ruled as acceptable."

Corum continues: General Walther Wever compiled a doctrine known as The Conduct of the Aerial War. This document, which the Luftwaffe adopted, rejected Giulio Douhet's theory of terror bombing. Terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist. Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe's main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces. The bombings of Guernica, Rotterdam and Warsaw were tactical missions in support of military operations and were not intended as strategic terror attacks.

J. P. Harris states that most Luftwaffe leaders from Goering through the general staff believed as did their counterparts in Britain and the United States that strategic bombing was the chief mission of the air force and that given such a role, the Luftwaffe would win the next war and that: "Nearly all lectures concerned the strategic uses of airpower; virtually none discussed tactical co-operation with the Army. Similarly in the military journals, emphasis centred on 'strategic’ bombing. The prestigious Militärwissenschaftliche Rundeschau, the War Ministry's journal, which was founded in 1936, published a number of theoretical pieces on future developments in air warfare. Nearly all discussed the use of strategic airpower, some emphasising that aspect of air warfare to the exclusion of others. One author commented that European military powers were increasingly making the bomber force the heart of their airpower. The manoeuvrability and technical capability of the next generation of bombers would be ’as unstoppable as the flight of a shell."

The Luftwaffe did end up with an air force consisting mainly of relatively short-range aircraft, but this does not prove that the German air force was solely interested in ’tactical’ bombing. It happened because the German aircraft industry lacked the experience to build a long-range bomber fleet quickly, and because Hitler was insistent on the very rapid creation of a numerically large force. It is also significant that Germany's position in the centre of Europe to a large extent obviated the need to make a clear distinction between bombers suitable only for ’tactical’ and those necessary for strategic purposes in the early stages of a likely future war.

Blitzkrieg warfare and Operation Citadel
Controversy exists over whether or not the German offenive should be characterized as a blitzkrieg. Some historians take this view, including Clark, Glantz and H.P. Willmott. They believe Operation Citadel was planned to be a blitzkrieg style of attack. Other historians consider only the southern attack to be a blitzkrieg style attack. The battle from their viewpoint is characterized as a failed blitzkrieg. Soviet commander Konev concurs with this view, calling Citadel "the death of the blitzkrieg". Most commentators, however, including participants who wrote about the battle after the war, do not characterize the planning or execution of the attack as a blitzkrieg style attack. These include Theodor Busse, Erhard Raus, Friedrich Fangohr, Peter von der Groeben, Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein. Said von Mellenthin "The German command was committing exactly the same error as in the previouos year. Then we attacked the city of Stalingrad, now we were to attack the fortress of Kursk.  In both cases the German Army threw away all its advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own chosing." In addition, a great number of military historians do not view the battle as a blitzkrieg, including, but not limited, to Healy, Nipe, Newton, Brand and Kasdorf. Of them all, the most striking commentary came from Heinz Guderian, the most prominent of Germany's "tank men", who strongly opposed the operation on the grounds that it violated his principles for the use of armour. Guderian predicted the offensive could only achieve a limited result, at a cost too great to justify the effort, saying "The great commitment would certainly not bring equivalent gains." The course of events proved him to be correct.''