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Blitzkrieg

Blitzkrieg (German) Blitzkrieg (German, "lightning war") is a loanword of German origination describing a German method of warfare used in the early campaigns of the Second World War. It was a descriptive term which highlighted the sudden success of the German operations of the Second World War in contrast to the static battles fought during the First World War. It was characterized by the rapid penetration and disintegration of the defenders. The was achieved by a spearhead strong striking force of armour which created a break through in the enemy line. The forces then pushed on into the enemy's rear. The attacking force continues forward, driving deep into the enemies rear area, cutting off front line troops, disrupting supplies, and threatening or capturing command centers. The attack is closely supported by mechanized infantry formations and close air support. Success in the attack hinges upon selecting the right ground for mobile warfare, striking with powerful forces at the point of attack and, most importantly, striking with the element of surprise. Once a break has been achieved it is exploited by moving motorized forces through the breach, thereby maintaining the momentum of the attack. The speed of movement and rapidly changing position of the attacking forces generates fear and confusion in the mind of the defenders. By sustaining a high tempo of operations, a tremendous psychological pressure is exerted upon the mind of the defending commander. In a blitzkrieg, by striking faster and deeper then the defender has anticipated the attacking force creates an unbalance in the mind of the enemy. The result is panic in the defending soldiers and indecision in the mind of the defending commander.

Background

 * First World War: era of mass armies, positional warfare, trench warfare, the use of massed artillery for firepower, strength by numbers. The machine gun and barbed wire gave a ver great advantage to the defense.  This was true in the west, but in the east the large spaces still allowed the opportunity for maneauver.  At the close of the war, the tank and the mortar started to change this and break the advantage the defense held.
 * Lessons
 * Limitations of the German "storm trooper" infiltration assaults of 1918
 * The German Sturmtruppen tactics were devised to break the stalemate of trench warfare, and regain mobility into the battlefield. They made use of specially trained units to infiltrate the opponents position. Their method was to attack the weakest parts of an enemy's line, bypass his strongpoints, and allow the regular infantry would to deal with pockets of resistance.  They were successful, however the ability to exploit breaks in the line and cause a general collapse was lacking, as it took too long to move units up and through the breakthroughs, allowing the opponent to move reserves over to reinforce the position and create a new line behind the break to seal off the attack.  A general collapse could not be generated.
 * Influence of infiltration tactics on the panzer force development. Balck p. 19
 * Limitations in the Allied use of armour
 * Successes seen
 * Battle of Cambrai


 * Development of the "tank men"
 * Motor transport becomes a panzer force. G p. 24


 * Purpose of the panzer force
 * Decisive result    Guderian: Recalling the prolonged state of famine of the Central powers during WWI, we must find the means "to bring an armed conflict to a rapid and tolerable end." G  A.P.  p. 23
 * Defeat of a larger foe
 * Short term war
 * Plans to use an offensive strategy to fight a defensive war


 * Balck on Guderian and the development of the panzer arm
 * The decisive breathrough into modern military thinking came with Guderian, and it came not only in armour, but also in communication. Balck p. 17
 * Guderian was always in battles with everyone. Balck p. 17
 * Contributions
 * Five man tank crew, with a dedicated radio operator/gunner
 * Signal organization in the panzer division that allowed the commander to command the division from any unit in the division.
 * Forward control.
 * Covering fire to allow movement Balck p. 22

German offensive tactics

 * Hans von Seeckt war of maneuver with emphasis on combined arms tactics. C p. 140

The army that Germany went to war with in 1939 was largely Seeckt's creation. The tactics and operational concepts of the Wehrmacht were the work of Seeckt in the 1920s. In addition, the majority of the senior officers and many of the middle-ranking officers were men that Seeckt had chosen to retain in the Reichswehr. Seeckt created 57 different committees to study the last war to provide lessons learned for the next war. Seeckt stated: "It is absolutely necessary to put the experience of the war in a broad light and collect this experience while the impressions won on the battlefield are still fresh and a major portion of the experienced officers are still in leading positions". The result was the 1923 book Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms that outlined the combined arms tactics and operational ideas that went on to serve as the Wehrmacht's doctrine in the Second World War. Seeckt envisioned Germany winning the next war by a series of highly mobile operations featuring combined arms operations of artillery, infantry, armor, and air power working together to concentrate superior firepower to crush the enemy at crucial points. Seeing a significant role for air power in the next war, Seeckt kept a large number of officers in the Reichswehr who had experience in air combat. These officers formed the future officers corps of the Luffwaffe in the 1930s.

Under the leadership of Seeckt the Reichswehr became isolated from politics, and was a “state within the state”. Reichswehr officers were forbidden to participate in political activity. This was most clearly illustrated by Seeckt's role during the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. During the Kapp Putsch of March 1920, Seeckt disobyed orders from the Defence Minister Gustav Noske, the Chancellor Gustav Bauer and the Reich President Friedrich Ebert to suppress the putsch, claiming "There can be no question of sending the Reichwehr to fight these people". Under the Weimar constitution the President was the Supreme Commander in Chief, thus Seeckt was under his authority. However his reluctance to use the power of the army to support the president was in accordance with his position of keeping the military out of the political affairs of the state. Some argue that Seeckt's refusal to act was insubordinate and in violation of his Reichswehreid oath to defend the republic.

Seeckt's remark to the leaders of the republic, that "Reichswehr do not fire on Reichswehr", was controversial. His reserved attitude towards Weimar Republic is illustrated by a brief conversation held with President Ebert. When Ebert asked where the Reichswehr stood, von Seeckt answered “The Reichswehr stands behind me”. When asked if the Reichswehr was reliable, Seeckt answered: “I do not know if it is reliable, but it obeys my orders!”.

In laying out his treatise on the development German maneuver warfare in his book "The Roots of Blitzkrieg", James Corum states “The tactics of Blitzkrieg warfare in the era between 1939 and 1941 originated in the military doctrine and training of the 1920s.” (Corum p. x) He goes on to say: “The tactics of the 1939 and 1940 campaigns were, for the most part, developed in the early 1920s” (Corum p. xii)
 * Reichswehr manual: Army Regulation 487 (Leadership and Battle) stressed many of the themes of mobile war that the panzertruppe made use of when they developed their arm of the service.  Coburn p. 39, p. 87
 * Only offense can win a decisive victory C p. 87
 * Deep penetration C  p. 87
 * General von Seeckt turned tank training and development over to the Inspectorate of Motor Troops. Though initially primarily concerned with the delivery of supplies, its role was soon expanded. C. p 137
 * Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger Der Kampfwagenkrieg C p. 139  https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_von_Eimannsberger
 * Joachim Stulpnagel
 * Oswald Lutz
 * Junior officers such as Guderian and Ritter von Thoma were assigned to the motor troops.C. p 137

On Seeckt:
 * Officer corps reduced from 34,000 in 1918 to 4,000 by January 1921. (C p.78)  Allies attempted to prevent Germany from devolping a pool of officers by requiring 25 year commitments and only allowing a small percentage to withdraw early.  120 to 180 officer candidates were accepted each year.  Only the top 10 to 15% f scores made the grade into the officer corps.  The best line officers were used for instruction, while the brightest and most educated were guided toward the General Staff. p. 80
 * Few officers wrote on grand strategy, politics or economics of warfare C p. 87. This is commented on by LH as a liability that made the German officer corps less able to access the situation globally (LH p. ), and is commented on by Guderian when he comments on Hitler's methods of argument with his commanders by referring (incorrectly) to the economic necessity of their capturing and holding certain areas.  G p.
 * Officers were trained in a broad number of techinical aspects, including motor transport and air. C p. 83
 * von Schieflin's book on the battle of Cannae This type of training phased out by 1926  p. 84
 * Reichswehr officers were forbidden to participate in political activity. C p. 87

The Panzertruppe's adoption, application and magnification of Seeckt's tactics

 * Reichswehr manual
 * Technical developments:
 * Mobility of tracted vehicles: "A tank's motor is as much a weapon as its gun." Guderian p.
 * Armour plating protected the crew from artillery and machinegun fire, allowing them to move through fields of fire of defenders and destroy obsticles by direct fire.
 * Radio: it allowed commanders to control the mobile units.
 * Battles again became fluid, thus the commander had to be forward near the point of contact. Thus, forward control was a primary feature of German armoured warfare, and was in sharp contrast to the British.


 * With the arrival of the tank the attacker was given a great advantage over the defense. Balck p. It was people like Guderian who developed the means by which to exploit it.
 * Guderian was the key figure in the Wehrmacht in the development of the panzerwaffe.
 * Rommel
 * "In Germany the elements of modern armoured warfare had already crystallized into a doctrine before the war - thanks mainly to the work of General Guderian - and had found practical expression in the organization and training of armoured formations.
 * Balck
 * "The decisive breakthrough into modern military thinking came with Guderian, and it consisted not only of a breakthrough in armour weapons, but also a breakthrough in the communications weapon. As an aside, Guderian was constanly involed in battles with everybody else.  He was very hard to get along with, and it's a tribute to the German Army, as well as to Guderian's own remarkable abilities, that he was able to rise as high as he did within the German Army."  Balck p. 17
 * von Manteufel
 * "If Guderian was not always successful in carrying out his theories everywhere during the war, it was due to the struggle against the mistrust of so many elderly officers who knew nothing, or little, about tanks. He was the creator and master-teacher of our Armoured Forces - and I lay particular stress on the word 'master'."
 * Freiherr von Geyr
 * "Sixty per cent of what the German Panzer Forces became was due to him. Ambitious, brave, a heart for his soldiers, who liked and trusted him; rash as a man, quick in decisions, strict with officers, real personality, therefore many enemies. Blunt, even to Hitler. As a trainer - good; thorough; progressive. If you suggest revolutionary ideas, he will say in 95 per cent of cases, 'Yes', at once."
 * von Mellenthin
 * "Our panzer tactics had been evolved by General Guderian during the prewar years, but Rommel thoroughly understood Guderian's principles and adapted them to desert conditions" p. 55
 * von Luck
 * "In the middle of February we were transferred to Dernau on the Ahr, hence practically in to the western front. Rommel visited every unit. He told us that he was proud to be permitted to lead a panzer division. Guderian too came to inspect and talk to us. 'You are the cavalry' he told us. 'Your job is to break through and keep going.'"


 * Design of the new weapon


 * Two tank types requested: light tank with a armour piercing gun in the turret and two machine guns, and a medium tank with the same set up, but carrying a larger gun. p. 27
 * Crew of five. The turret had to be larger, to house a gunner, loader and commander all in the turret, with the commander sitting above the gunner with an all round view through a cupola p. 28
 * A wireless operated sat in the hull of the tank for communication with command. This man also fired the hull machine gun.  In addition, all tank men wore larynx microphones for inter-crew communication.  p. 28



Guderian's keys to the use of armoured formations

 * Key elements as described in Achtung-Panzer!
 * Deploying armour in masse. The key weapon in the attack is the tanks themselves.
 * selecting suitable terrain
 * attack with the advantage of surprise. To this end the tank men did not desire their attacks to be preceded by an artillery barrage.  It was felt this would tip their hand and allow the defenders time to move mobile formations of troops behind the point of attack, thus blocking the opportunity to break through and exploit.


 * To that could be added:
 * Stike at a weak point
 * Break through to be followed by deep penetration to disrupt command, communication and supplies LH p. 90, M p.
 * Support of the advancing forces
 * Use of air assets to deliever high explosives at strong points, essentially acting as a mobile artillery
 * Use of air assets to deliever fuel and ammunition supplies to the most advanced units
 * Use of paratroop forces


 * Command elements in blitzkrieg warfare
 * Radio communication: between tanks, commander, air elements
 * Forward control by the commander G p. 32
 * Luftwaffe officers with the forward combat elements

Design of the panzer force

 * Design of the armoured forces
 * Panzer companies, then battalions, then regiments, then whole panzerdivisions.  In the late thirties Guderian pushed for the future development of Panzer Corps, and ultimately even whole Panzer Armys.


 * Design of the German tank to answer the command and control issues expected G p. 27
 * Panzer III main battle tank was the preferred weapon of the early panzer force.

Blitzkrieg as a psychological weapon

 * Affect of blitzkrieg tactics on opposing commanders
 * Affect of blitzkrieg tactics on inexperienced troop formations.

France

 * New vs old thinking
 * Conventional tendency to check the mobile force. Experience showed that the risk was offset by confusion in the mind of the enemy.
 * General Georges: "Crediting our enemies with our own procedure, we had imagined that they would not attempt the passage of the Meuse until after they had brought up ample artillery. The five or six days necessary for that would have easily given us time to reinforce out own dispositions."
 * To the advantage of strategic penetration along the line of least resistance was added the advantage of tactical defense.


 * A decisive result was achieved over the French without ever having to engage and degrade the bulk of the French army. The result was achieved without substantial loss of life for either side.


 * France was subdued in seven weeks.
 * Poland defeated in a month. Denmark and Luxembourg hours. Netherlands 5 days. Belgium 3 weeks. France was forced out in 7 weeks.
 * The Blitzkrieg victory in France was achieved with very low casualties... for both sides! The victory in France cost Germany 45,000 killed and missing, which though is significant on an individual basis, is a trifling number compared to the losses suffered in the war against France 1914-1918. More surprising still is that this complete victory came while only costing the French 90,000 killed and missing.
 * Gamelin "It was a remarkable maneuver. It was a perfect utilization of circumstances. It showed troops and a command who knew how to maneuver, who were organized to operate quickly - as tanks, aircraft and wireless permitted them to do.  It is perhaps the first time that a battle has been won which became decisive without having had to engage the bulk of the forces."
 * Lewin: Those military critics who are inclined to be contemptuous of the performance of the French in the summer of 1940 might well consider how the British response to Rommel’s attack in the spring of 1941 provides a classic case of what can happen when inexperienced troops are unexpectedly exposed to a Blitzkrieg. A chain reaction occurs. Surprise breeds shock, shock breeds disorganization and loss of morale; these breed unnecessary errors and the sum is a disaster.  Lewin p. 37

Conflicts between the tank men and their commanders

 * Conflict between the tank men and the conservative officers in the Reichswehr
 * Ludwig Beck
 * Franz Halder


 * Adolf Hitler
 * Early support of innovators. Distrust of general officer corps.  View of victory through annihilation of the enemy. This is markedly different than the view of a commander such as Rommel, who much preferred taking prisoners than killing his adversaries.  The taking of prisoners was seen as an essential aspect to achieving success.  If one man will surrender than the whole position might surrender.  Surprise, threaten, bluff and then accept capitulation were keys to how he operated, both in the Great War and in the Second World War.
 * Hitler desired to win by the crushing of the enemy. This is not at all what the panzer men were looking for, for the costs would be too great for Germany to sustain them, and it was a senseless waste of life, both German and foreign.
 * Battles of annihilation Battle of Cannae.


 * Bock agreed with the envelopment efforts to surround and destroy the Soviet Army LH p. 179
 * Guderian strongly disagreed. LH p. 180

The Blitzkrieg method is set aside

 * Envelopment battle model - goal was different: to destroy enemy formations.
 * Kessel or boiler
 * vernichtungsschlacht or battle of annihilation


 * The invasion of Russia

The decline of Blitzkrieg operations

 * Africa
 * Russia
 * Western theater


 * Responses on the part of the defenders
 * Remain calm, ignore the threat of the deep driving units, be patient
 * Hold the shoulders of the penetration
 * Defense in depth
 * Counter-attack against the flanks of the attacker


 * Operational changes limiting the attackers
 * Loss of air superiority, and the threat the enemy air units were to the panzer forces. The result was that the attacker was no longer able to assemble and attack in force at the point of the attack.  Rommel explains Young p.
 * "British air superiority threw to the winds all our operational and tactical rules because they no longer applied... there was no answer to the problem of dealing with the enemy air superiority."


 * Following a failed counterattack at Chateau-Salins, Balck's first offensive in the west since 1940, Mellenthin commented on the problems of fighting in the west in the face of allied air superiority: "At first the attack of the 111th Panzer Brigade went well, but as soon as the sky cleared the jabos swarmed down on the panzers. American artillery kept up a heavy fire and their tanks put in a vigorous counterattack. The result was that the 111th Panzer Bridgade was virtually destroyed and at the end of the day was left with seven tanks and 80 men.  This was hardly a prominsing introductin to Army Group G.  It was clear that American air power put our panzers at a hopeless disadvantage, and that the normal principles of armoured warfare did not apply in this theater." p. 317
 * "The Ardennes offensive drives home the lesson that a large scale offensive by massed armour has no hope of success against an enemy who enjoys supreme command of the air." p. 342


 * Defense in depth (Rommel, when on the defensive, was a master at this as he understood how to thwart mobile attacks)
 * Lack of faith on the part of the attacker to advance without protecting the units flanks. The assignment of Rommel to the desert and the later removal of Guderian from command allowed more cautious views to pervade the army.
 * Lack of supplies, especially fuel, restricted the attacker.
 * Lack of infantry resulted in the panzer forces having to use their own panzergrenadiers for flank protection
 * Lack of air forces being able to project power in the area of attack.
 * Lack of artillery support

Notable commanding officers

 * Heinz Guderian
 * Erwin Rommel

Other commanders of note:
 * Hermann Balck
 * Hasso von Manteuffel
 * Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma
 * Erich von Manstein
 * Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist

Allied commanders to master mobile warfare

 * Russian
 * Georgiy Zhukov
 * Ivan Konev


 * Western Allies
 * George Patton

Etymology
Controversy exists over the etymology of the word "blitzkrieg". In the thousands of military journals produced in Germany between 1933 and 1939, the word is mentioned only once in two different papers. It was never used in the title of a military doctrine or handbook of the German army or air force. Research conducted at the German military historical institute at Freiburg found only two military articles from the 1930s in which it is employed. Both use the term simply to mean a swift strategic knockout. In English and other languages apart from German, the phrase had been used since the 1920s. William Fanning asserts the term was not used by German military theorists or by the German Army prior to 1939. Richard Holmes contends that the word was anglicized, not enter into widespread, popular usage western journalists used it to describe the early German offensive campaigns. Harris notes that it was the British who coined the phrase first, to describe the German successes in Poland. The German popular press did not use the word until later. Holmes also contends that no "coherent doctrine" or "unifying concept" can be applied to blitzkrieg. Heinz Guderian commented that it was a word coined by the Allies "as a result of the successes of our rapid campaigns". Harris wrote: "Blitzkrieg seems to have gained popularity as a piece of journalistic sensationalism – a buzz-word with which to label the spectacular early successes of the Germans in the Second World War. In the West it seems first to have been applied to the Polish campaign of September 1939 and was later attached to the Norwegian and Western campaigns of 1940, to the Balkan campaign of 1941, to some of the North African campaigns, and to the early stages of the attack on Russia, but most enduringly to the bombing campaign against Great Britain (especially London), which is still popularly known as the ’Blitz’." German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser disputes that the word was established through British journalism. He points to the word and its mention in two articles prior to 1939. However, he does accept the word only gained publicity through journalism. He notes that the British press were first to do this on 25 September 1939, but also points to the extensive use of the word by the German press in 1940 after the fall of France some nine months later.

For his part, Hitler, in a speech in November 1941, said "I have never used the word Blitzkrieg, because it is a very silly word". In early 1942 he dismissed it as 'Italian phraseology'.

Guderian
 * Difference of opinion : Germany unprepared for cold in Russia p. 151
 * Germany reviewed the invasions of Charles II of Sweden and Napoleon p.
 * Discusses the term "blitzkrieg" p. 461

von Luck
 * spoke several languages, including Russian
 * played the piano
 * Days of blitzkrieg are over.  p. 74, p. 76
 * Russians initially saw the Germans as liberators p. 70
 * Germany unprepared for cold in Russia p. 76. p. 79
 * Comparisons of German invasion to that of Napoleon p. 65, p. 79, p. 80
 * Blitzkrieg defeated in Russia p. 80

von Mellenthin
 * referenced Caulaincourt p. 233-234