User:Gunbirddriver/Marc Mitscher


 * How the Japanese Did It, Hanyok, Robert Naval History Magazine December 2009 - excellent article about deception techniques that were used to hide the location of the Kido Butai

Marc Mitscher
Mitscher's raids: Kwajalein and Majuro 1 January 1944, Wotje and Taroa, Covered assault on Roi and Namur 1 February 1944, 16-17 February raid on Turk, 21 February attacked Marianas air bases.

Mitscher's directive for carrier operations: issued May 1944, titled FastCar TFI-1.

The fleet had recently completed operations in the Gilbert Islands, taking Tarawa in a bloody and costly invasion in the process. This mission was done for the purpose of providing a land base for aircraft to support naval operations against the next objective, the Marshall Islands. The idea that land-based air support was necessary to successfully conduct an amphibious operation was traditional doctrine. The Marshalls would be the first key step for the Navy's march across the Pacific to reach Japan. Mitscher's objective was to weaken Japanese air defenses in the Marshalls and limit their capability of flying in reinforcements, in preparation for a U.S. invasion of the Marshalls, code named Operation Flintlock. Intelligence estimates of the Japanese defenders of the Marshall Islands believed they had approximately 150 aircraft at their disposal. Two days before the intended landings Mitscher's task force groups approached to within 150 mi of the Marshalls and launched their airstrike groups, fighters first to soften up the defenders, followed by bombers to destroy supplies and crater the defender's airfields. It was thought it would take two days to attain air superiority. Though the Japanese battled briskly, they lost control of the skies over the Marshall Islands by noon of the first day. What came next was an aerial bombardment of the Japanese defenses, followed by a naval bombardment from the big guns of Spruance's surface force. The two days of destruction saved a great many of the lives of the Marines that were landed. The Japanese are estimated to have lost 155 aircraft. Mitscher's task force lost 57 aircraft, from which 31 pilots and 32 crewmen were lost. The manner in which the fast carrier task force operated established a pattern for future Pacific operations. In his summary report for the month of January, Admiral Nimitz commented it was "typical of what may be expected in the future."

Next, Mitscher led Task Force 58 in a raid against Truk, Satawan and Ponape (February 17–18). This was a big step up. The idea of purposely sailing into the range of a major Japanese naval and air base brought great unease to Mitscher's airmen. Said one: "They announced our destination over the loudspeaker once we were underway. It was Truk. I nearly jumped overboard." But Mitscher felt confident they could succeed. As tactical commander of the striking force, he developed techniques that would help give his airmen the edge of surprise. In Operation Hailstone, Mitscher's forces approached Truk from behind a weather front to launch a daybreak raid that caught many of the defenders off guard. The airmen brought devastation to the heavily defended base, destroying 72 aircraft on the ground and another 56 in the air, while a great number of auxiliary vessels and three warships were sunk in the lagoon. Chuckling over the pre-raid fears, Mitscher commented, "All I knew about Truk was what I'd read in the National Geographic."

Through the spring of 1944 Task Force 58 conducted a series of raids on Japanese air bases across the Western Pacific, first in the Mariana and Palau Islands, followed by a raid against Japanese bases in the Hollandia area. These raids demonstrated that the air power of Task Force 58 was powerful enough to overwhelm the air defenses of not just a single island airbase, or several bases on an island, but the airbases of several island groups at one time. The long-held naval rule that fleet operations could not be conducted in the face of land-based air power was brushed aside.

Mitscher's style as military commander
Though reserved and quiet he possessed natural authority. His small frame belied the authority he carried. He could check a man with a single question, or a raised eyebrow. He was intolerant of incompetence and would relieve officers that were not making the grade, but was lenient with what he would consider honest mistakes.
 * When assigned to ComAirSol he brought a change in attitude, from dogged defense to offense Taylor p. xxiv
 * He believed that harsh discipline ruined more men than it made. He was not forgetful of the abuse he took at the Naval Academy. He believed pilots could not be handled with rigid discipline as what made for a good pilot was an independence that inflexible discipline destroyed.  And yet he demanded rigid "air discipline" and would break a man who violated it.  Taylor p. 242  See rescue of the airmen in the bay at Chichi Jima Taylor p. 243

Leadership
Mitscher's command style was one of few words: a raised eyebrow was all he needed to indicate he was not pleased with the effort of one of his officers. He was not patient with incompetent personal, yet he was forgiving of "honest" mistakes, and would allow airmen a second chance when other officers would have given up on them. He placed tremendous value on his pilots and had great respect for the risks they were willing to accept in attacking the enemy. He was devoted to them, and made a great effort to recover as many downed aircrew as possible. He hated to loose a man, either a drift at sea or captured by the Japanese. Even though recovery rates were high, he was always deeply distressed that the numbers of rescued airmen were not higher.


 * Mitscher had a knack for predicting the weather, and his own judgements were better than those of the aerologists assigned to him. Potter p. 186

Personality
Mitscher was a quiet man. Taciturn, he rarely spoke. He relaxed by reading inexpensive murder mysteries, and would always have one with him. Though he appeared distant and severe to those that did not know him, in truth he had a very dry sense of humor. Captain Burke had come from destroyers, and it was no secret that he preferred a fighting command than his new role as chief of staff to Mitscher. Once when a destroyer came alongside to refuel off the ample bunkers of the carrier, Admiral Mitscher said wryly to a marine standing by "Secure Captain Burke until that destroyer casts off." The rare times when he would join in conversation it would be about fishing.
 * He characteristically would sit on a wing of the bridge overlooking the flight deck, in a swivel chair always facing the stern. He said you'd have to be a fool to want the wind to blowing in your face all day.
 * He had no desire for publicity or noteriety. He shunned public-information officers and would not have them on his staff.  He wrote a memorandum to the newsmen: "There are more interesting things to write about aboard an aircraft carrier than an admiral." Taylor p. 242
 * He was partial to a large, floppy cap, which some thought looked ridiculous on him.
 * He had Burke destroy all his personal papers. He did not want people going through them and use them to criticise others.  Potter p. 291

Relations toward superior officers

 * Mitscher had tactical control of Task Force 58, and operated the Task Group. Strategic control was held by Spruance or Halsey.  Once a decision was made Mitscher would not question it, but followed the direction of his superior officers without complaint, even though he may disagree with the decision.  This is well examplified by the two last major naval battles in the war: Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Naval aviation tactics
The change in the use of carriers from single or paired carriers with support vessels to task groups of three or four carriers was a Mistcher idea, which he instigated for the purpose of concentrating the air groups for a better defense of the carriers. Offensively, Mitscher trained his airgroups to engage in air attacks that were intended to have a maximum destructive force upon the enemy with the least amount of loss to his aviators. He sought attacks that were perfectly coordinated, perfectly timed. In a typical Mitscher style attack fighter aircraft would come in first, strafing the ships to suppress their defensive anti-aircraft fire, that is kill or wound the anti-aircraft gun crews. Then bombing and torpedo runs would be executed, preferable simultaneously. The attack would be completed in a few moments. Then the airgroups would leave, as suddenly as they had arrived. The result: Mitscher's airgroups would inflict a great deal of damage, while suffering only light casualties to the aircrews. Before most other officers in the high command of the U.S. Navy, Mitscher understood the potential of sudden, destructive power that his airgroups represented.


 * The change in carrier fighting from raids to dominating the area of operations followed the attack of the Marianas in February 1944. Quote "WE HAVE BEEN SIGHTED BY THE ENEMY X WE WILL FIGHT OUR WAY IN". Taylor p. 186. Quote "I don't give a damn now if they do spot me.  I can go anywhere and nobody can stop me."  188-189

Aviation pioneer Flight of the Nancys
 * Navy Bureau of Aeronautics assisted Rear Admiral William Moffett in the struggle to keep Naval Air Arm in existence, from the criticism of General Billy Mitchell, who was pressing for a single service that would have sole control of military aircraft. Taylor pp. 72-73
 * Mitscher was one of a handful of flag rank officers in the Pacific fleet that was a true naval aviator. (Others: Admiral Jack Towers, Pat Bellinger, Ken Whiting, Mel Pride) In contrast to Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey and McCain, Mitscher became a naval aviator early in his career and was central to the development of carrier air power in the inter-war years.
 * He understood the importance of his pilots believing they had a fighting chance to be resued if they were shot down. He knew they did not fear being killed in combat, but did fear being left adrift on the ocean, or worse captured by the Japanese.  Taylor p. 243
 * He always would have the pilots off the carrier he was aboard report to the flag after their missions so he could ask them about conditions. Taylor p. 245
 * When he was relieved by McCain in October of 1944, he tried to leave the Lexington with as little notice as possible and arranged to be taken off before dawn. Hugh Winters, Lexington's airgroup commander, found out and passed the word to his pilots, nearly all of whom gathered on her hanger deck at 0400 to see him off. Potter pp. 216-217
 * He would not challenge superior officers, and would accept their decisions though his own judgement told him the contrary. This is well exemplified at the Battle of the Phillipine Sea, where he wanted to move TF 58 in position to attack the Japanese fleet but was ordered to hold position to protect the landings, and in the Battle of Leyte Gulf when he did not want to sail north to chase Ozawa's decoy fleet.
 * Reserve junior Lieutenant Charles Sims, Japanese language specialist and cryptoanalyst, conduit of Pacific Fleet Intelligence officer. Potter p.138-139
 * Z Plan Potter pp. 140-141
 * On Waldron Taylor p. xxiii

In 1919 Mitscher spent time adrift at sea waiting for rescue, believed the best would come from giving his aviators a chance, made great efforts t recover downed pilots, how many aircraft lost *had* to be immediately followed with how many aircrew were recovered, had a sense for weather, a sense for running the task force air group, would not question a superior, mistrustful of Burke but warmed to him over time, dry sense of humor, well loved by his crews, good-bye from TF 58 - aviators came out to see him off. Did not like reports or paper work of planning, perhaps most valuable commander to the campaign, aviators debriefed in flag plot, reworded success (Vraine), refrained from criticizing his superiors (Spruance at Philipine Sea, Halsey at Leyte) Halsey quote, Truk raid proved FCTF could challange the airspace over the most heavily defended targets (big change in thinking), quote: "I don't care if they spot me, they can't stop me", "Son, you could have put it in the drink" "Marine, secure Captain Burke till that destroyer casts off"

Formation of Task Force 58 p. 169 Task Force 58 general make up. p. 170 Mitscher realizes he can take Task Force 58 whereever he chooses. "I don't give a damn now if they do spot me. I can go anywhere and nobody can stop me.  If I go in and destroy all their aircraft, their damned island is no good to them anyhow." p. 188-189 Use of stroms to mask the approach of Task Force 58. p.186(?)

Mitscher article
Mitscher's next objective was to weaken Japanese capability to reinforce the air defenses. The change in carrier fighting from raids to dominating the area of operations followed the attack of the Marianas in February 1944. Marianas and Palaus February and April Potter pp.122-127

Quote "WE HAVE BEEN SIGHTED BY THE ENEMY X WE WILL FIGHT OUR WAY IN"

Hollandia area April 21 - 24 Potter pp. 129-132

Truk, Satawan and Ponape April 29 - May 1

This meant Mitscher's fliers would have to challenge the Japanese stronghold of Truk. This was a big step up. The idea of purposely sailing into the range of a major Japanese naval and air base brought great unease to Mitscher's airmen. Said one: "They announced our destination over the loudspeaker once we were underway. It was Truk.  I nearly jumped overboard." But Mitscher felt confident they could succeed. As tactical commander of the striking force, he developed techniques that would help give his airmen the edge of surprise. In Operation Hailstone, Mitscher's forces approached Truk from behind a weather front to launch a daybreak raid that caught many of the defenders off guard. The airmen brought devastation to the heavily defended base, destroying 72 aircraft on the ground and another 56 in the air, while a great number of auxillary vessels and three warships were sunk in the lagoon. Chuckling over the pre-raid fears, Mitscher commented "All I knew about Truk was what I'd read in the National Geographic." The long held naval rule that fleet operations could not be conducted in the face of land based air power was being re-written.

Official U.S. Navy Photograph (80-G-K-3816) now in the collections of the U.S. National Archives.