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Source material support for the article "The Pathfinder Force."

Chorlton

 * The PFF began working with Oboe in August 1942 when they were placed into service with 109 Squadron. The Mosquito was chosen as the aircraft to carry the device because its very high ceiling allowed the use of a direct line of sight system at a greater distance over the continent. The PFF was trying to perfect the Oboe as a navigational aid and blind bombing system. The device was used against the enemy for the first time on the night of 20//21 December, when six Oboe equipped Mosquitos attempted to bomb the power station at Lutterade, a small Dutch town close to the German border.



Currie
"Although aircrews referred to him familiarly as "Butch" Harris, he was in fact distanced from us by such far echelons of rank and station that he was a figure more of imagination than reality. Uninhibited by any bounds of truth, we were able to ascribe to him any characteristic that our spirits needed. It pleased us to think of him as utterly callous, indifferent to suffering, and unconcerned about our fate. There was a paradoxical comfort in serving such a dread commander: no grievance, no complaint, no criticism could possibly affect him. You might as well complain to Jupiter that the rain was wet."
 * Description of bomber crews view of Harris
 * Currie, Jack. Lancaster Target Manchester: Crécy Publishing Ltd. (1997)[1977].

Maynard

 * Maynard p=56 describes the Augsburg raid.
 * MAN U-boat diesel engine plant a target of great interest to the Royal Navy.


 * Hoped that the new aircraft could not only evade defenses and could hit the target hard in the high visibility of a spring afternoon.
 * The aircraft would return in the safety of darkness.
 * Only five aircraft returned.
 * U-boat engine production continued without noticeable disruption.
 * Nettleton received the Victoria Cross.
 * The heavy losses and poor results added to the pressure being applied by the Air Ministry to initiate a Target Finding Force.

Hastings

 * Hastings, Max Bomber Command Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, (2013).



Murray

 * Murray p=128 describes Circus offensive and German counters.
 * Murray p=129 describes the Augsburg raid.
 * Low level, deep penetration attack on the MAN works in Augsburg.

Periodical sources

 * Patrick Dorehill, Nettleton’s Flight Engineer and Number 2, commented that with the Lancaster’s 10 machine guns, he believed they would be able to deal with any fighter attacks.
 * In 2012, Patrick Dorehill, at 90 years of age, was the sole survivor of the Augsburg raid.
 * After the raid was over, 49 of the 85 crewmen sent out on the mission were listed as missing in action.
 * Dorehill received the DFC for his part in the raid.
 * Nettleton was determined to carry on to the target. Rightly so in Dorehill’s estimation.
 * After the raid Nettleton’s crew were given 3 days leave to try to deal with the losses.
 * The following week Nettleton took his crew to Docksfed(?) to try to work out evasion tactics that could be used by the Lancaster in case of fighter attack, but no satisfactory solution came of it.

Where do we see this

 * first use of the Bomber Stream was against Cologne.(?)
 * purpose of the bomber stream was to bring the bombers through defended airspace in a concentration to overwhelm the defenses. The bomber stream made the boxes and the Kammhuber Line obsolete, as the bombers were no longer so spread out.(Nuremberg author?)


 * fear of search lights over the target. (This by another BC pilot interviewed but not on this short list)
 * Pathfinder Navigational Training Unit at RAF Gransden Lodge on the 10th April 1943. Two months later on the 17th June 1943 the unit moved to Upwood, and an air party was established at Warboys.
 * Empire Training Schools in Canada and Rhodesia(mentioned by Mahaddie as a main source of PFF crews)
 * 8 Group Met Flight 1409 Mosquitos at Oakington, April 1943

The Nuremberg Raid

 * South African talk on Nuremberg raid
 * At the outset of the war France asked Britain not to bomb any land targets in Germany as the French felt it was more likely that they would feel the retaliation.
 * Harris nicknamed "Bomber" Haris by the press, but he did not go by this and was not called this in the RAF. His close associates in command called him "Berte", but the rank and file called him "Butch" Harris.
 * Following the night of operations carried out 7/8 November 1941 where 400 aircraft were sent out and 36 were lost, a 9% loss rate, the Air Marshals directed Bomber Command to conserve its forces, and long range missions over Germany ceased.
 * air of amateurism and individuality to the pilots of Bomber command. If a mission was assigned each pilot picked his own route to the target. Each picked his own altitude (anywhere from 8 to 20,000 feet) and his own time to release bombs.
 * Marking techniques
 * German night fighters inflicted two-thirds of Bomber Command's mission losses during the Battle of Berlin.
 * Typical bomb mission described

Ashworth: RAF Bomber Command 1936 to 1968

 * 109 Squadron had been working with a new navigational aid, Oboe, since the Pathfinders formed in August 1942.
 * The device would prove to be an effective aid once it became operational. With it crews could bomb targets accurate with no visual fix.
 * Two stations would transmit a signal. They gave the crews a point from which they were 10 minutes ETA from the target. Crews were given three pieces of information prior to each mission: a geographical target 10 minutes flying distance from the actual target (this would be the switching on point), an ETA and a two letter code. A listening watch was commenced, and when they heard their two letter code they switched on their Oboe. The Oboe device would pick up a signal from two transmitting stations, while attempting to keep on the "Bailey Beam". The the curved course of the aircraft along the beam was called the "Bailey Beam". The pilot would follow the Bailey Beam from the switching on point to the target. If the pilot was to the left of the Bailey Beam he would hear dots transmitted to his headphones. If he was to the right of the beam he would hear dashes. By using these tones he could keep on the beam. When he reached the target the transmissions of one station intercepted the transmissions from the second station, tones stopped completely, and the bomb aimer was to release the marker flares. The limitation was that the system could only manage a small number of aircraft. For this reason Oboe was only fitted to Mosquito marker aircraft. It was first put to operational use in December. By the end of the month they had managed to hit the Krupps Works twice, and on 31 December two Mosquitos marking for 8 PFF Lancasters dropped all their bombs on the target city of Duseldorf in conditions which prevented any visaul landmarks. Clean up phrasing.
 * The navigational aides used for a raid were named after the birth places of PFF staff.

Bennett and the Pathfinders 1

 * Failed attack on Berlin 7 November 1941.
 * aircraft losses in 1941: 181 lost in 1st quarter, 561 by the end of the 2nd quarter, and 1,170 by the end of the 3rd quarter.
 * Bennett shot down on the Tirpitz raid.
 * argument on how best to improve BC: raid leaders in the squadrons vs a Target Finding Force.
 * many crews were relieved that the burden of finding the target was removed from their shoulders.
 * when Harris took command of Bomber Command in February 1942 he was taking over a dispirited force.
 * RAF concerned their technology might be discovered in a wreck and countermeasures found. An H2S set was lost on the first raid. January 1943, but the German's did not seem to recognize what it was.
 * Oboe, and the "cat" and "mouse" sets.
 * Harris takes over BC 22 February 1942, replacing Richard Peirse who had replaced Cyril Newall
 * The force itself was in jeopardy. Something had to be done to make it more effective.
 * The Butt report reviewed aerial photographs to evaluate the accuracy of bombing, released 18 August 1941.


 * Original name was Target Finder Force, Harris changed it to the PFF to stress that it was a navigational aide
 * Harris’ relationship with the Group and Squadron commanders was such that they knew he had argued his best for them.
 * timing was key. Evasive maneuvers went on all the time, they did not drone on in a straight line, but flew a weave. If under attack by flak they would do more extensive evasions which would cost time. Extensive evasions might throw off the timing, and timing was key.   You had to drop your marker on time. If late you could not drop.
 * development of master bomber
 * Hamish Mahaddie called Bennett's horse-thief.
 * Hamish's shame at Saarlouis instead of Saarbrücken.
 * he was the irrepressible Scot. He helped recruit crews to the PFF.
 * Mahaddie left no doubt that to be admitted to the PFF was the greatest accolade available to an airman. Mahaddie was known as Bennett’s horse thief.
 * markers
 * unit badge was unique in RAF history.
 * joining the PFF came after a first tour, and the hitch was 45 missions instead of 30. Bennett intended signing up to go with an automatic promotion but this did not occur.
 * Harris visits the PFF at Wyton for the first visit to a PFF squadron.
 * The PFF squadrons originally were under 3 Group. They were based at 3 nearby airfields: Wyton, Warboys,
 * Later they became 8 Group

Bennett and the Pathfinders 2

 * Harris known as "Bert" to his friends. Known as "Butch"
 * Bennett's unexpected support.
 * Fireworks, flairs, Target Indicators
 * Wanganui, Parramatta, Newhaven
 * 100 Group ECM
 * creep back problem
 * PFF would take novice aviators to its force, particularly out of the Empire Training schools, however they had to be above average aviators.
 * A Royal warrant was issued to entitle the wearing of the golden eagle of the PFF badge to Pathfinder crews
 * Bennett insisted that all aircrew on staff be flying missions moderately frequently, stating the only VCs the PFF would earn would be posthumous.
 * Bennett in his Beaufighter over Germany. Mahaddie mentions it in his intro as well.
 * importance of timing on a raid: early arrival means you have to dowdle over the target, the most defended place to be, and arriving late is doing no good at all
 * Ju 88 S1 developed to address the Mosquito problem.
 * SN2 radar placed on the Ju 88 was proof to window. Bomber Command losses went up alarmingly.
 * The Mosquito and Bennett's Light Night Strike Force.
 * Peenemünde raid.
 * Ralph Cochrane Bennett argument.
 * many night-fighters victories were over wandering stragglers and late arrivals.
 * concern by RAF over Oboe jamming.
 * Bennett concerned that the PFF being broken.
 * 23 November 1943 the Stirlings were retired.
 * fog over England was a major danger, took its toll.
 * Bennett flies in fog.
 * Mosquitos proceeded the main force, dropping window.
 * Introduction of long range night fighters to accompany the bomber stream.
 * Long nights of winter allowed the time in darkness for Bomber Command to reach deep into Germany. November 1943 Harris commenced on what he hoped would be a war winning campaign of the Battle of Berlin.
 * Berlin's saving grace was that it would not burn.
 * January 1944 was a very bad period for Harris and Bomber Command.
 * FIDO was a device Bennett was quick to adopt. His field at (?) was first to use it.
 * Part of the load on a Lancaster was a 4,000 pound block buster. This made the arcraft sluggish. Often the crews dumped the block buster and carried the rest of the load to the target. PFF crews heard the explosions well short of the target.{sfn|Maynard|1996|pp=154-155}}
 * Campaign against Berlin, showed heavy losses in 1 Jan 1944 and 2 Jan 1944.

Hugh Parrott: Oral History, IWM

 * Bennett was well liked by the crews. Though he knew it all, the truth was he did know it all. Excellent navigator, a pilot as well. He had high expectations.

Hamish Mahaddi

 * Accuracy and timing were the be all and end all of Pathfinding.
 * Bennett and his use of Mosquitos.
 * Formation of the Pathfinder Force.
 * Bennett's achievements prior to the PFF.
 * Bennett took command on the PFF on 5 July 1942.
 * Force formed 15 August 1942.
 * Harris inherited a bankrupt concern.
 * Said Mahaddie, at the time Harris took command moral in crews was still high.
 * GEE helpful, but soon was jammed. It was particularly helpful for concentrating the bombers en route, and also for helping them to get back when weather and visibility was bad.
 * Pilots of note gone unnoticed: Danny Everett: KIA on 99th sortie when he took up a spare aircraft and failed to return, 7 March 1945. Alec Cranswick: 60 sorties in the Med, 147 total, KIA 5 July 1944.
 * Mahaddie charged a fee for giving a talk at the OTC, two tour expired instructors were due to the PFF for his talk.
 * Mahaddie brought to PFF, given brief by Bennett.
 * Mahaddie recruitment methods.
 * flying at 18,000 feet, he lost 10,000 feet of altitude after his aircraft was hit over Cologne.
 * Gibson was instructed to take the PFF course on the Mosquito. He did not, and ended up dying.
 * In Bomber Command a first tour was completed at 30 missions, after which aircrew received a period of rest. Returning for a second tour they would complete 20 more missions. After the second tour the pilot would then serve in a training squadron or work on staff or some other service. In 1942 an aircrew had about an even chance of surviving the first tour.an aircrew would survive 8 sorties. Throughout the war the average number of sorties flown before being lost never rose to more than 9.2 sorties. Flying with Bomber Command was a deadly dangerous undertaking.
 * Harris pushes to convert all Main Force squadron operate the Halifax and Lancaster, and the Wellington and Stirling were moved to other service. Bennett wanted to move PFF to Mosquito and Lancaster squadrons.
 * The intention was to get over the target, to reach it on time, and for the Main Force to pass, drop its bombs and move in all in a short period of time. Time over the target was kept to a minimum for the main force aircraft. Air discipline among Pathfinders was paramount: if there was any doubt that the plane was over the target then they did not drop their target indicators. Also if you were late you did not drop your target indicators.
 * There was no stipulation on the quality of the crews. The Groups naturally wanted to hold onto their best crews and made some use of their obligation to the PFF to off load crews with questionable records of effectiveness. Thus, the PFF was initially a motley collection of aircraft and crews. All the crews were experienced, some good crews some not. All four squadrons of the Pathfinder Force were flying different aircraft. Rarely did a Pathfinder raid have no results, but their first raid to Flensburg was one of them. They were using different aircraft in each group. The Stirling group had their aircraft modified to get them closer to the operational altitudes of the other three squadrons.


 * Butt Report -> Air Ministry -> TFF
 * basic problem with Bomber Command was navigation
 * bankrupt heavy casualties little results for their efforts and costs paid.
 * TFF opposed by the Group Commanders and Harris.
 * The Bomber Groups were instructed to send selected volunteer crews to one of their squadrons to be sent to form the PFF
 * Groups did initially select good crews, many 2nd tour or at the end of the 1st tour
 * average sortie life was 8 missions, never higher than 9.2
 * aircrew volunteering for PFF signed for 45 missions. Most stayed longer. Average was 60.
 * PFF gained the benefit of the commonwealth crews. Half the force was from outside the UK
 * accuracy and timing were the key


 * Bennett was referred to as Able-Oboe-Charlie.

Hamish Mahaddie: Oral History, IWM

 * Butt report was very generous to the bomber crews. 3% of weight within 5 miles of the aiming point, or 5% with in three miles.
 * Navy and Army argued at Whitehall on the chiefs of staff and said the that bombing campaign was useless and Bomber Command was useless, they wanted the support.

Leonard Cheshire

 * "The Halifax was temperamental. You learned to treat her with caution, but she wasn't really, we learned later, a safe aircraft. There was no margin of error when you got near to the stall. We suddenly became aware that nobody came back on three engines. I took the aircraft up and deliberately stalled her, and I found that you could not get out of the stall. The only way to get out of stall was to apply both opposite engines and both feet on one side of the rudder and use all your strength, and only then you just got out. So a man who had lost an engine while on ops had no chance.".
 * "I had begun to think it would be better to destroy your target on your one attack then to keep going back.
 * "There is an inherent problem in high level bombing. In order to bomb accurately you've got to see your aiming point, but you've got to see it 20 miles away. And you can't identify it in fact until you are over head."
 * 617 low level flying in formation at night under tree level. They had also learned to tuck their wings in behind one another.
 * Completed three tours and still wanted to get back into flying.
 * Taken off operations in July 1944.


 * RAF interview of Cheshire.

Don Bennett: Oral History, IWM

 * The reasons the oppose PFF: the best crews were too valuable, and putting them in front, where they were most susceptible. The other was taking away the best trained and most experienced was a tremendous loss to the squadrons, especially taking away the squadron commanders.


 * The H2S sets were made at PFF on breadboards. 10 cm magnetron short pulse, with return read on a cathode ray tube.
 * Oboe was a responder system, a delay of known duration, and return signal used to measure the distance, to 65 feet over the Ruhr.
 * Sets not made by industry.
 * Bennett reviews the Mosquito. Bennett demands them. Air Ministry opposes, made arguments for against opposition. Countered every point of opposition.
 * "There's no such thing as an expert to Montgomery except Montgomery. And you could put that in your pipe and smoke it."
 * Losses of Battle of Berlin 150% of his force.
 * Losses of the pathfinders overall was slightly less then the losses of the main force.

RAF Pathfinders
RAF Pathfinders Archive
 * Master Bomber would circle and give a running commentary
 * There were back up Master Bombers, Deputy Master Bomber, had to circle and hang around in case the Master Bomber was shot down.


 * Red flairs, followed by TIs, then greens to define the target area.
 * Fish pond was a PBI(?)
 * three star fixes would make a cocked hat, and you could use that to confirm where you were, but you never had time.
 * took the shot, and then combined it with something you knew, like a river, and you would use your position line and look where it crossed the river, but you never had time as you were rarely flying straight. You were spoofing, might come in from the east.
 * Leading would be two or three primary blind markers, followed by illuminators dropping flairs who would criss-cross across the target and illuminate the whole thing, followed by backers up, who would drop reds or greens, followed by main force following 5 minutes behind, Master Bomber would dictate which markers need to be "topped up", and direct the bombing till the whole place was swamped.
 * route markers, but bomber stream might be a mile north or south
 * Don Bennett a good pilot and the world's greatest navigator
 * after 6 trips they would earn a golden eagle, were given certificates at the end of the war.

Parfit, Ken J (Oral history)
Dresden fire storm, Dresden, Cologne
 * Master bomber almost always in a Mosquito.
 * How did navigation differ with the PFF. Instead of using an air plot, where you would go in still air based on your air speed, but you were never there because the wind was blowing, enter the wind vector, and determine your ground position (dead reckoning). For the PFF this was supplemented by the electronic devices. You would use a track plot, you would receive information from your "set operator" who would choose between GEE, H2S, whatever, he would choose what was working best.
 * you were trying to do 12 minute fixing, so the set operator would give you a GEE fix or whatever, and he would plot it on an identical chart, and give the navigator the longitude and latitude of the fix. The set operator was actually a 1st navigator, but he was experienced, on his second tour, who would read the sets.
 * bomb aimer would drop flairs visually if he could see the ground. The navigator used timing from the last known position
 * at least once or maybe twice the MB asked the Main Force to orbit, and then used a backer-up to place a new marker, then adjust the bomb target off that.
 * technique was worked up by Don Bennett.
 * conned by search lights, few into flak, engine fire, extinguished by diving, one piece came right in through his flight desk. Gunner was hit. Another occasion was a daylight raid to Bordeaux, flying parallel to another aircraft, on bombing run had to fly straight and level, watched his friend's plane hit and disappear into a ball of smoke. Flak hit the bomb load.
 * early on Bomber Command was taking great losses and not achieving a great deal, but was keeping up the morale of the British people. Giving them back what they deserved. Targets were obliterated. After the war took ground crews at low level on tours of the Ruhr, Hamburg.


 * blue, green, red or yellow light. Master Bomber arrived 2 minutes after the primary markers, 30 second lee way, 5 minutes later came the secondary markers, who would drop different colored markers, master bomber would guide main force based on where these markings fell.

Anderson, Ian Gilliland (Oral history)

 * excellent source, great descriptions - you will have to hear this whole thing again. It will be well worth it.
 * Bomber Command did not do formation flying.
 * Master Bomber might spend 20 to 30 minutes over the target.
 * Fighters were far more dangerous to the bombers than flak.
 * Germans used smoke screen and would put up flares of their own.

3 Group

 * The Butt report released 18 August 1941
 * Oral history

Article: Pathfinder Story

 * Timing was critical to survival. Large numbers of aircraft could not be allowed to straggle across enemy territory when the route and target had become known.
 * Initially dead reckoning, aided by radio bearings and occasional visual pinpointing were the basis of position keeping. Celestial navigation (astro fixes) were little used because 1. bad weather, 2. the danger of flying straight and level to get a fix 3. most navigators had a minimal skill at this.
 * the PFF faced greater risks, being at the spearhead of the attack, and they tended to be over the target longer, and at times they had to work at lower altitudes.
 * the PFF had a PFF Navigational Training Unit.
 * as accuracy of bombing and marking improved, and bomb loads increased, BC could achieve with 200 aircraft what it previously required 500 aircraft. Only the largest cities necessitated a full force effort, thus 2 or 3 targets could be attacked a night, increasing the demands on the PFF.
 * the aim of Bennett was to be able to attack a target regardless of the weather.
 * No. 5 Group operated separately, and subsequently one Mosquito and two Lancaster squadrons were pulled out of 8 Group to target for 5 Group.
 * Paramatta ground marking using H2S marking
 * Newhaven included illumination with flares
 * Wanganui sky marking with flares
 * If Oboe used it was said to be "musical"





Murray: Strategy for defeat: the Luftwaffe

 * Luftwaffe night fighter strength weakened by Goring pressing them into service in the daylight battle against the [Eighth Air Force]].
 * Luftwaffe changed its tactics to get night fighters into the bomber stream, intercepting over the north sea if possible.
 * Battle of the boffins.
 * Harris lost the Battle of Berlin.
 * Williamson Murray Strategy for defeat: the Luftwaffe

Lest We Forget
Lest We Forget: April 17, 1942.
 * Nettleton returned to South Africa and joined the training ship General Botha in 1930 as a cadet, until 1933. (At the age of 13 he joined the crew of a training ship?) On leaving the General Botha, John Nettleton became 3rd Officer on the "Mattawin" of the Elder Dempster Canadian-South African Line. After 18 months at sea. Nettleton returned to Cape Town where he became an apprentice engineer to the Divisional Council, Cape Town. In the Autumn of 1938, John Nettleton visited England on holiday, decided to join the Royal Air Force, was accepted without Latin, took his Mother home, then returned to the U.K..


 * The raid was timed to allow the attacking Lancasters the last light of a fading day before striking. With the raid completed, the aircraft would climb into the welcome cover of increasing darkness for the long flight home.

44 Squadron Memorium

 * After a week of low-flying practice, 12 Lancasters, six each from Nos 44 and 97 Squadrons, took off during the afternoon of April 17 1942. Leading the first formation was 25-year-old Squadron Leader John Nettleton from South Africa. Pat Dorehill, a Rhodesian, aged 20, flew as Nettleton’s 2nd pilot; it was his 16th operation. The audacious raid, the first of its type flown by the RAF, involved a round trip of some 1,250 miles, mostly over enemy territory.


 * Pat admitted that witnessing his colleagues crashing around him affected him, but his sense of duty took over and after three days’ leave he returned to train as a Lancaster captain. Nettleton was awarded the Victoria Cross and all his crew were decorated; Pat was awarded an immediate DFC. A year later, Nettleton was posted as missing in action on a raid to Italy.


 * After joining 44 Squadron, Pat Dorehill flew his first operation on August 31 1941. Over the next few weeks he attacked German capital ships in Brest and dropped mines in the entrances of German-held ports.


 * At the end of the year, the Squadron became the first to be equipped with the four-engine Lancaster, and Dorehill flew that aircraft for the first time on 6th January 1942. On the night of 3rd March, flying with Nettleton, he flew on the Lancaster’s first operation of the war, dropping mines in the seas around Heligoland.


 * After the Augsburg raid, Pat was given his own Lancaster and crew and they attacked Bremen on the third ‘Thousand Bomber’ raid. They also attacked industrial cities in the Ruhr. After more than 30 operations he was rested and spent the next 18 months as an instructor at a heavy bomber training unit.


 * Dorehill returned to No 44 (Rhodesia) Squadron in December 1943 just as the main phase of the Battle of Berlin commenced. This was at the height of Bomber Command’s strategic bombing offensive when losses were at their greatest. Pat attacked Berlin seven times.

No. 44 (Rhodesia) Squadron Association.


 * After the Augsburg raid, Pat was given his own Lancaster and crew and they attacked Bremen on the third ‘Thousand Bomber’ raid. They also attacked industrial cities in the Ruhr. After more than 30 operations he was rested and spent the next 18 months as an instructor at a heavy bomber training unit.

Insight RAF Waddington
The Story of The Augsburg Raid; 17th April 1942.


 * On Christmas Eve 1941, RAF Waddington’s 44 Squadron received a Christmas present: the first of the new Avro Lancasters, which would replace its aging and inadequate Handley Page Hampdens. The new aircraft was welcomed by air and ground crews alike.


 * The 44 Squadron formation would be led by 25 year old Squadron Leader John Nettleton from South Africa, an experienced pilot who had carried out fifteen operational sorties thus far in his first combat tour.
 * Nettleton was a former merchant seaman who had joined the RAF in 1938.
 * 97 Squadron would be led by 23 year old Squadron Leader John Sherwood. Commissioned into the RAF in 1937, he had been awarded the DFC during his first tour and also held a bar after a daylight raid on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest.


 * In 44’s formation, Nettleton led the first vic of three, whilst the second vic was led by Flight Lieutenant Nick Sandford, who always wore pyjamas under his flying gear. The wingmen for both vic leaders held a cluster of DFMs. Unfortunately, space does not allow each man who took part in the raid to be named but each aircraft carried a crew of seven, who had vital roles to play and who all took the same risks.
 * Sherwood led the first vic for 97 Squadron. On his right wing was Eric Rodley. Before going out to the aircraft, he had seen other crewmen getting hold of extra armour plate to protect the parts of their body that they considered most vital! Improvising, Rodley quickly grabbed his steel helmet and placed it on the pilot’s seat before settling down. He spent the entire flight rocking gently on his upturned tin helmet.


 * F/L David Penman led the second vic of three. On his right was 22 year old WO Tom Mycock, who had already won a DFC over Brest. FO Ernest Alfred Deverill, who had been an apprentice at the Halton RAF ground crew training school was on the left wing. He had flown over a hundred operational sorties, mostly in Coastal Command, and had won the DFM for bringing back a damaged Hudson with a dead gunner and a wounded second pilot, after an attack by three Me 109s.
 * Both Squadrons proceeded independently to the rendezvous point at Selsey Bill on the afternoon of 17 April. From there the two formations crossed the English Channel and flew into France east of Caen at 1645 hrs. Nettleton led his crews down to twenty to thirty feet, so low that they had to ease the aircraft up to clear trees in their path.
 * In Sherwood’s aircraft, it was thought that Nettleton was taking them north of track. The two formations planned to separate near the target and attack independently but Sherwood decided to follow his navigator’s advice now and the two formations began to separate, eventually losing sight of each other.
 * 44 Squadron’s flight path took them close to the Luftwaffe airfield at Beaumont-le-Roger. Warrant Officer Hubert Crum’s Lancaster flew along the perimeter track as three German fighters were landing. The Lancaster crews hoped they had not been seen, but when the 109s stopped their descent, retracted their wheels, and climbed away from the airfield, it was obvious they had been spotted.
 * In the rear vic, Warrant Officer Joe Beckett’s crew was the first to die. Hit by a hail of cannon shells, the aircraft became a mass of flames, dived into a clump of trees and disintegrated. Then Crum’s fuselage was ripped apart by cannon fire. With two gunners wounded and his port wing in flames, Crum jettisoned his bombs and crash landed straight ahead. Nick Sandford flew under high tension wires trying to dodge an attack by three fighters. He was unsuccessful and, with all four engines on fire, his Lancaster crashed and exploded in a giant fireball with the loss of all the crew.
 * With every gun on Sgt ‘Dusty’ Rhodes’ Lancaster jammed, they were unable to fight back when attacked by two 109s. Both port engines erupted in flames, the fire spreading instantly to the starboard motors. The Lancaster reared up, stalled and crashed vertically in flames with no survivors. Finally, FO ‘Ginger’ Garwell’s starboard wing was shredded by bullets during an attack, but the aircraft was able to continue.


 * Only Nettleton and Garwell flew on across France. Further south, 97 Squadron continued unmolested. Once south of Paris, the formations turned for the final leg to Augsburg.


 * Nettleton and Garwell were first to attack. They approached from south then made their bomb run from the east. The factory showed up clearly but they immediately met light flak. Both Lancasters were hit repeatedly. Nettleton climbed to drop his bombs then started evasive action. Garwell followed but, after dropping his bombs, the Lancaster was hit. The fuselage aft of the cockpit was like an open furnace. Garwell crash-landed the Lancaster; he and three of his crew survived, but the other three crewmembers died.

Other sources

 * Overy, Richard Bomber Command
 * Pye, Gerry Homage to Comrades  Can I use SOS?
 * best summation available is from the Luftwaffee: British Pathfinder Operations as at March 1944, Issued by Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab Ic/Fremde, Luftwaffen West
 * can be found in Hamish, pp. 150 - 158
 * Mahaddie, T.G. Hamish: the Memoirs of Group Captain T.G. Mahaddie DSO, DFC, AFC, CZMC, CENG, FRAeS.  London: Ian Allan (1989).
 * Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab Ic/Fremde, Luftwaffen West British Pathfinder Operations as at March 1944 (Luftwaffee appraisal reported in Hamish, pp. 150 - 158)


 * Article on the Condor Legion

For Augsburg raid article

 * One of Rodley’s gunners saw Sherwood crash in a “flaming chrysanthemum”.

For Nettleton article

 * Following the war the government of Southern Rhodesia named a new school (above) after Nettleton - Nettleton Junior School in the suburb of Braeside in Salisbury (now Harare).
 * December of 1938, Nettleton was commissioned as an acting Pilot Officer in the Royal Air Force.
 * He was made an acting Flight Lieutenant in June of 1941.
 * By December of 1941 he was an Acting Squadron Leader.
 * Squadron Leader John Dering Nettleton was born on the 28th June, 1917, at Nongoma, Natal, South Africa, and was the grandson of Admiral A. T. D. Nettleton, Paymaster-in-Chief, R.N. In the family tradition, his father also being a naval captain, he applied to join the Royal Navy at Dartmouth. For the Royal Navy, his Latin was not up to scratch, and he failed the entrance examination. This extraordinary demand for academic excellence in the peace-time British forces was fully endorsed in the summer of 1936.

Image gallery Pathfinder Force
The following images may have some use in the article:

Crew images
Needed: Mid Upper Gunner and Navigator.

Casualties

 * Flak damaged Lancaster