User:Gunbirddriver/Tarawa

This is a work page

Things missing:

 * general design of the Japanese on defence of the Central Pacific. Yogaki plan, unforseen weakening by rapid advance of allied forces up through the Solomons under the command of Halsey
 * original commander Rear Admiral Tomanari Saichiro, an engineer that over saw the construction of the defenses.
 * defense of the island was based on stopping the invaders on the beach. Barriers and mines completed on the south and western sides, not to the north lagoon side of the island.
 * island attacked for a week by the air force.
 * inner island defensive structures were meant to hold the men safe from bombardment, but were not designed to be fought from. It was not a defense in depth.  The structures worked well protecting the men from air and naval bombardment, but were difficult to defend and hard to escape from once the Marines were up close.
 * neither side quit understood the degree of difficulty they were facing. Did not anticipate the size of the invasion force.  For the Japanese, and invasion force of 2 to 3 thousand would be large.  The Marines brought the whole of the 2nd Marine division.  For there part, the Marines thought nothing could live through the bombardment.  If all the Japanese were above ground, that may have been true.  But they were not.
 * Loss of the communication lines isolated Shi from his command
 * defense of the pocket
 * lack of ammunition - ran low on 13 mm rounds
 * Adm Shibasaki was looking for resupply - signaled ship at sea in the predawn hours of the 20th, not realizing it was the invasion fleet off his shore.
 * commander Sugai, on seeing the size of the invasion force, burned his units flag at the start of the battle, symbolizing to his men that they would not leave the island. This would be their final battle.
 * Nimitz worried his invasion fleet and amphibious forces would be caught at anchor off the island. Was to make a quick strike, get in and get out.  Therefor could only bombard the island for three hours, plus could not carry

Battle of Tarawa
As night fell the Japanese defenders kept up a sporadic harassing fire. With their shallow laid communication lines destroyed and their commanding officer Rear Admiral Shibasaki killed, each unit was essentially acting on its own, and had been since the naval bombardment had lifted at 0900. The Marines brought a battery of 75 mm Pack Howitzers ashore, unpacked them and set them up for action for the next days fight, but the bulk of the second wave were unable to land. They spent the night without food or water, floating out in the lagoon in their LVTs. A number of Japanese marines slipped out in the night, swimming out to the Niminoa, a wrecked steamship lying west of the main pier, and to a number of the wrecked LVTs in the lagoon. They laid there in wait for morning, when they could fire upon the US forces from behind. The long night dragged on, but without leadership the Japanese were unable to coordinated for a counterattack against the toe hold the Marines held on the island. The feared counterattack never came. The Marines held a tenuous thin line on the beaches, and had suffered a great number of casualties. Of the 5,000 Marines landed on the first day, 1,500 were dead or wounded by days end.

As a number of large coastal guns were mounted to protect the approaches into the lagoon, an attack on the island was anticipated to come from the open waters of the western or southern beaches. The defensive plan was to stop the attackers at the water's edge. A great number of firing pits were built. In the islands interior large shelters were built to protect the garrison from shelling and bombardment. The interior

Constuction incomplete. 3,000 mines had yet to be laid.

The Japanese seized Tarawa and Makin from the British within the first three days after Pearl Harbor. Carlson's diversionary Makin Island raid in August 1942 caused the Japanese to realize their vulnerability in the Gilberts. Shortly after the raid, the 6th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force arrived in the islands. With them came Rear Admiral Tomanari Saichiro, a superb engineer, who directed the construction of sophisticated defensive positions on Betio. Saichiro's primary goal was to make Betio so formidable that an American assault would be stalled at the water's edge, allowing time for the other elements of the Yogaki Plan to destroy the landing force.

The Yogaki Plan ("Waylaying Attack") was the Japanese strategy to defend eastern Micronesia from an Allied invasion. Japanese commanders agreed to counterattack the invasion shipping with bombers, submarines, and elements of the main battle fleet. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet/Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPac/CinCPOA), took these capabilities seriously. Nimitz directed Spruance to "get the hell in and get the hell out!" Spruance in turn warned his subordinates to seize the target islands in the Gilberts "with lightning speed." This sense of urgency had a major influence on the Tarawa campaign.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the code name GALVANIC to the campaign to capture Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama in the Gilberts. The 2d Marine Division was assigned Tarawa and Apamama (a company-sized operation); the Army's 165th Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Infantry Division would tackle Makin.

Makin Island raid

Located about 2,400 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, Betio is the largest island in the Tarawa Atoll. The small, flat island lies at the southern most reach of the lagoon, and was home to the bulk of the Japanese defenders. Shaped roughly like a long, thin triangle, the tiny island is approximately two miles long and 800 yards wide at the widest. A long pier was constructed from the north shore from which cargo ships could be unloaded out past the shallows while allowing them to anchor in the protection of the lagoon. The northern coast of the island faces the shallow waters of the lagoon, while the southern and western sides face the deeper waters of the open ocean. As a number of large coastal guns were mounted to protect the approaches into the lagoon, an attack on the island was anticipated to come from the open waters of the western or southern beaches.

The eyes of the two veteran major generals are misty when they view the bodies of gallant Marines who were killed before they reached the seawall. Says Holland Smith, "You must have three or four hundred here, Julian." But the most stirring sight is the Marine who is leaning in death against the seawall, one arm still supported upright by the weight of his body. On top of the seawall, just beyond his upraised hand, lies a blue and white flag, a beach marker to tell succeeding waves where to land. Says Holland Smith, "How can men like that ever be defeated? This Marine's duty was to plant that flag on top of the seawall. He did his duty, though it cost him his life. Semper Fidelis meant more to him than just a catch phrase."

A shocked public got their first real look at the horrific fighting in the Pacific when the short documentary "With the Marines at Tarawa" began showing in 16,000 theatres throughout the country in December of 1943. Initially, President Franklin Roosevelt was reluctant to release the brutal footage to the public until Merritt Edson, the chief of staff of the 2nd Marine Division and a Medal of Honor recipient, offered him some advice. "Edson said to him very quietly," recounts Hamell, "he was a very soft spoken man although he was a killer in action. If we don't show these people these pictures now, all the telegrams are gonna be sent out during the course of this long war, will come as a surprise and they won't understand. This is our chance to show them. This is gonna be a tough, long haul."

Shortly afler the battle, the 2nd Marine Division and other assault elements left the island for Hawaii, leaving the 6th Marine Regiment behind to collect weapons from the battlefield and provide security for burial detail.