User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-Libyan support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war

Motivations for Policy
Soviet-bloc weapons were also exported to Iran via Syria, Libya, Romania and Poland- and directly from the Soviet Union). He cites U.S. estimates of Iran's arms imports over the 1979-83 period at $5,365 billion, viz:(emphasis) "$975 million from the Soviet Union, $1.2 billion from the US, $20 million from France, $140 million from the UK, $5 million from FRG, $150 million from Italy, $230 million from the PRC, $5 million from Rumania, $40 million from Poland... and $2.6 billion from unspecified "other" sources."

Military training and advice
A 1986 Central Intelligence Agency document refers to the sending of Libyan military advisors to Iran as opposed by unnamed Arab states. The sending of advisors was sufficiently probable that one of the options offerred was stating that the U.S. "reserves the right to prevent Libyan officers from traveling to Iran if we believe it is in support of terrorism."

Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles
As of 1981, the CIA reported Iran's infantry-heavy forces were receiving artillery and tanks from Libya.

Infantry equipment
Includes rifles, handheld rocket launchers like the RPG, useful against both tanks and buildings. Trying to decide if shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles should go here or to Air Defense.

Artillery
Includes multiple rocket launchers, medium and heavy mortars, and other weapons mounted on, or towed by, vehicles

Precision guided munitions for land warfare
Primarily anti-tank guided missiles

Naval warfare
That the Soviets were willing do so selectively, as when they a proposed shipment of advanced naval mines from Libya to Iran, saying "opposed the unauthorized transfer of their military technology to a third country" indicates that some exports were tolerated. "After American officials told Moscow of the deal, Soviet officials said they opposed the unauthorized transfer of their military technology to a third country and informed the United States that they had made this policy known to Tripoli," according to Administration officials.

Air warfare
rumors abound that the Air Force has several hundred MiG-19 and MiG-21 types, provided by China, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. Most of these are said to be Chinese F-6s (improved MiG-19 clones).

Reliable sources say that Iran signed a $1.45 billion oil-for-arms agreement with China in March 1984, with deliveries starting April 1985, and that speaker of the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) Hashemi Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati were in Beijing more recently to negotiate further agreements. Additionally, Iran signed a $133.3 million agreement with East Germany in May 1985, trading oil for "technical assistance," while Revolutionary Guards commanders and Iranian pilots reportedly have received training in East Germany and Bulgaria.

The Chinese firmly deny having any arms deal "with Iran or anybody else," but, while Iranian diplomats will not confirm reports of a Chinese arms deal, they also refuse to deny them. One Iranian spokesman used the preposterous dodge that Iran leaves all official comment on trade with China to the Chinese.

Whatever the denials, Chinese T-59/69 tanks are showing up in Iranian units, but there is no sign of any F-6s yet. Iraq, however, has broken diplomatic relations with both Libya and North Korea for supplying weapons, including aircraft, to Iran. That Iraq has not broken with China too, may have something to do with the fact that Iraq buys Chinese small arms and T-54/55, MiG-19, and MiG-21 clones.

The absence of Iranian F-6s from the battlefields can easily be explained by a lack of trained pilots (hence, the training in East Germany and Bulgaria). If Iran really has these Chinese MiG-19 copies, they should not be sneered at, even though the original design is thirty-two-years old. With Chinese improvements, the F-6 has outstanding dogfight maneuverability, and its 30-mm NR-30 guns have more than twice the kinetic energy of the Aden or DEFA of similar caliber. It carries the Atoll air-to-air missile, while two 551-pound bombs or weapons pods make it extremely effective in the ground-support role.

Still, this plane (particularly when flown and maintained by Iranians) is not about to wrest air superiority from Iraq's MiG-23s, MiG-25s, and Mirage F-s. Iran's Air Force, unable to seriously contest Iraq's recent massive bombing of Iranian cities, has been virtually out of the war this year.

Missile technology
Iran's drive to deploy ballistic missiles and to acquire long-range strike aircraft is part of an effort to fill gaps in its arsenal demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War.

Iraq's air and missile forces launched wide-ranging attacks on strategic targets in Iran at a time when Iran lacked the ability to respond in kind. Iran's air force had little capability to hit strategic targets, while the country only acquired ballistic missiles in limited numbers. Subsequently, Iran also noted the political impact of Iraq's 'Scud' attacks during the Gulf War.

Tehran's political and military leaderships are now firmly convinced of the need to deploy long-range strike aircraft and to have a large arsenal of long-range missiles. Iran is engaged in a major drive to enhance its capabilities in these areas.

The War of the Cities

Iraq first used FROG 7 rockets against Iranian military concentrations and border towns in the opening weeks of the Iran-Iraq War. This pushed Iran to search for weapons to respond in kind and Iran's acquisition of artillery rockets laid the basis for its future missile programme. The missile war escalated in the mid-1980s when Iraq's air force and 'Scuds' struck at Iranian cities and pushed the Islamic Republic to look for a comparable response. Iran obtained 'Scud Bs' from Syria, Libya and possibly North Korea and used them against major cities including Baghdad and Basra. During this first war of the cities, Iran's strategic depth prevented Iraq's missiles from reaching major targets such as Tehran. By 1988, however, Iraq had developed its extended range 'Scud', the al-Hussein, and took Iran by surprise with its strikes on key urban conurbations. In the spring of 1988, Iraq launched up to 200 SSMs against Tehran, Qom and Isfahan. Although only 2000 people were killed in these attacks, they caused panic in the populace and hundreds of thousands fled the cities.

Iran's Rocketry

Iran's initial efforts in the field of rocketry involved manufacturing unguided battlefield rockets. This programme went ahead with Chinese help and Iran now has a well-established manufacturing base in this field. Most of these weapons are copies or modifications of Chinese rockets. One of the earliest was the 240 mm Oghab, a copy of the Chinese Type 83 artillery rocket. This 34-40 km range rocket has a circular error probable (CEP) of over 1000 m and can carry a warhead of up to 300 kg. Three rockets are carried on and launched from Mercedes-Benz trucks. Around 300 were fired during the war against Iraq and they appear to have been of limited effectiveness.

Another rocket is the Nazeat, or Iran-130, which appears to be of indigenous design. This is a 355 mm solid fuel rocket with a 150 kg warhead and maximum range of 120-130 km. It reportedly performed poorly during the Iran-Iraq War but may have been improved since. The Iranian Defence Industries Organization reportedly offered the system for sale to foreign customers in 1993. There are also indications that the term Nazeat applies to a family of short-range rockets, including the 40 km range Raad.

A third rocket, the Shahin 2, has been developed and deployed since 1988. This is smaller than the Nazeat and has a range of 20 km. It can be equipped with a 180 kg warhead, a submunition warhead or a chemical warhead.

Another family of rockets is the Mushak range. These can reach from 120-200 km and were used during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq War to hit border towns and military installations. The Fajr 3 is another local product with a range of 45 km. In addition, a 200 km range rocket designated Iran-200 has been identified.

Missile Programmes

Iran realizes the range and accuracy limitations of unguided rockets and has put a major effort into acquiring a ballistic missile capability. This effort has proceeded along parallel tracks: the purchase of missiles and launchers and the setting up of an assembly and manufacturing capability. Iran's efforts in this latter area appear to have been remarkably unsuccessful, despite 1985 and 1989 technology transfer agreements with North Korea, and the country remains reliant on foreign suppliers. This is not a comfortable situation for a regime that has found itself cut off from reliable sources of hardware since its inception.

Iran began the Iran-Iraq War with no SSM capability but managed to import SS-1 'Scud Bs' (R-17Es) in 1985 from Libya and in 1986 from Syria. The Revolutionary Guard Corps, which took charge of the weapons, used them against Iraq between 1985 and 1988.

After the revolution, from the early to mid-1980s, the Iranians were far more conservative about foreign dependence, so they focused more on internal production. A Military Industries Organization of the Ministry of Defense had been formed in 1969, but as given new authority, as the Defense Industries Organization, in 1981. According to Globalsecurity, the DIO was, at the least, using Soviet designs as a basis for their own work; Iran said it hd manufactured an undisclosed number of Oghab rockets, by 1987 (i.e., still during the Iran-Iraq War) that were derived from Soviet-made Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles provided to Iran by Libya. Includes special items like Bull's "Supergun"