User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-Swiss support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war

Export Controls
I wish to make a statement about the defence manufacturer BMARC and the export of naval guns and ammunition to Iran, via Singapore, during the late 1980s. My statement is prompted by three questions asked by the hon. Member for Cunninghame, North (Mr. Wilson). The questions asked my Department when my Department was informed about allegations that Singapore was a conduit for arms exported by BMARC to Iran; which BMARC contracts were notified as being potentially in breach of export controls; and what assessment I had made of any breaches of export control by BMARC. In April, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Technology and I were not satisfied that we had sufficient information to answer those questions properly. It may also be helpful if I set out briefly the relevant corporate history of BMARC. BMARC was owned by the Swiss defence contractor Oerlikon until May 1988, when it was acquired by the United Kingdom firm, Astra. After Astra bought BMARC in May 1988, BMARC continued to manufacture equipment to meet orders from Oerlikon.

In order to answer the parliamentary questions, I commissioned detailed research into two aspects: first, the intelligence information available to the Government; and secondly, the export licensing history.

I shall now answer the question as to the intelligence available to the Government. In 1986, intelligence was obtained that Iran had concluded a contract with Oerlikon for the supply of weaponry and ammunition. The intelligence picture developed in 1987, when it was revealed that naval guns made by Oerlikon had been offered to Iran by a company in Singapore. In July and September 1988, two intelligence reports rounded out the picture by referring to naval guns and ammunition being supplied by Oerlikon through Singapore to Iran. Important detail in one of the 1988 reports was identical to some of that mentioned in the 1986 intelligence.I must emphasise that none of the intelligence reports mentioned BMARC.

As to the export licensing history, during the period 1986–88 BMARC, in relation to orders from Oerlikon that were enclosed with the licence forms, sought and obtained United Kingdom export licences for the export of similar naval guns and ammunition to Singapore. Two of those export licence applications by BMARC to Singapore, for naval guns in 1986, which were subsequently approved, referred to a project that had also been mentioned in the 1986 intelligence.

It is for customs to investigate breaches of export control. However, it does appear that there may be grounds for believing that the final destination of naval cannon made by BMARC could well have been Iran, given that intelligence reports during the period mentioned equipment similar to that for which BMARC secured export licences for Singapore.

The events that I have outlined occurred six to nine years ago. I have concluded, however, that connections should have been made between the intelligence reports naming Oerlikon and the BMARC licence applications made in support of orders from Oerlikon. It would not have been possible for officials in my Department to take account of the 1986 intelligence, as it had not been distributed to the Department of Trade and Industry. However, the DTI failed to make a connection between any export licence applications by BMARC and Oerlikon's trade with Iran mentioned in the 1988 intelligence, which was distributed to the DTI. I understand that the relevant intelligence has now been passed to customs, as the investigating authority. Arrangements for the distribution and handling of intelligence, both generally and in the DTI, have been substantially improved since 1988.I have had a check done on the number of applications by BMARC in the period 1986 to 1989 that enclosed the full supporting documentation, by which I mean end-user certificates, end-use statements or international import certificates. That showed that 36 per cent. of BMARC applications did not enclose the full supporting documentation, although I should add that the application form itself requires exporters to state the end user of the goods.

Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles
Includes both new equipment, and repair and ammunition to old equipment

Infantry equipment
Includes rifles, handheld rocket launchers like the RPG, useful against both tanks and buildings. Trying to decide if shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles should go here or to Air Defense.

Artillery
Includes multiple rocket launchers, medium and heavy mortars, and other weapons mounted on, or towed by, vehicles

Precision guided munitions for land warfare
Primarily anti-tank guided missiles

Land mines
Main discussion of mines here; naval mines cross-reference to this.

Manufacturing technology and critical materials
German and Swiss companies like Gildemeister, SHW, Schaublin, and Oerlikon were at the forefront of Iraq’s machine tool acquisition program. (p. 227)

Missile technology
A Forgemasters subsidiary contracted the Swiss steel company Von Roll to manufacture recoil cylinders, drum housing, and pivot gun sections for Project Babylon. Forgemasters also contracted Uldry Trading and Soceta delle Fucine for the project. All companies were aware of the country and the project they were supplying. (p. 108)

Nuclear warfare
"gas centrifuge technology from Switzerland "

Biological warfare
The Swiss socialist party named 48 Swiss companies that participated in the militarization program of Iraq through producing and exporting military material under the banner of dual-use technology. The company Shmiedemeccanica sold Iraq 50 Roland armored personnel carriers and over 100 training aircraft and aided in Iraq’s non-conventional weapons program. (p. 31)

The Lincolnshire Headquarters of the British Manufacture and Research Co. (BMARC), a company owned by the Swiss arms manufacturer Oerlikon Buhrle until its acquisition by Astra Holdings trained Iraqi and Iranian officers to use the Skyguard Air Defense System.