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Arellano v Mcdonough, 598 U. S. ____ (2023), is a United States Supreme Court decision holding that 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) isn’t amenable to equitable tolling.

Background
Section 5110 in title 38 of the U.S. code governs the procedures by which a veteran may receive compensation for service-caused disability. Section 5110(a)(1) provides that veterans be awarded compensations from the time their application was received, and not earlier, unless ‘specifically provided otherwise’ in the following provisions. The code then enumerates 16 exceptions for the general rule. One of the exceptions is 5110(b)(1) which states that “the effective date of an award… shall be the day following the date of the veteran’s discharge or release if application… is received within one year from such date.”

Adolfo Arellano served in the U.S. navy from 1977 to 1981. Resulting from his time in service, Arellano suffered prolonged psychiatric problems such as schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder. In 2011 he applied for disability benefits, and was awarded benefits with the date of his application as the effective date of the benefits. Arellano, represented by his brother, appealed to the Veterans Court arguing that the one-year deadline of 5110(b)(1) should be equitably tolled to allow Arelllano to receive retroactive benefits back to the date of his discharge. That is because Arellano’s mental disabilities purportedly prevented him from applying for benefits within a year of his discharge.

The Veterans Court dismissed Arellano’s claim for equitable tolling. Following an appeal, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims did the same, holding that Andrews, an earlier Federal Circuit decision, already rejected equitable tolling as applied to 5110. Arellano then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which dismissed his claim, splitting 6-6 on the rationale for. Half the court thought it right to leave Andrews as is, the other half sought to overrule Andrews, but deny equitable tolling in Arellano’s case. Arellano petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, the petition was granted on February 22, 2022, arguments were heard on Oct 4, 2022 and the opinion of the court was delivered on Jan 23, 2023.

Arguments
The issue argued by the sides was whether ‘Irwin’s presumption’, as articulated in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, applies to 5110(b)(1). Irwin’s presumption grants that equitable tolling is assumed in statutes of limitations unless rebutted in the text of the statute itself.

Petitioner argued that 5110(b)(1) is a statute of limitations for the purpose of equitable tolling. Drawing on precedent, petitioners objected to any formalistic or rigid definition of ‘statute of limitations’, instead insisting on a more laxed functional test. In petitioners opinion “This deadline operates like a statute of limitations by encouraging service-disabled veterans to promptly apply for retroactive benefits or else lose that right forever”.

Respondent disputed petitioner’s framing of precedent, mainly contending that loss of entitlement is essential to equitable limitation periods. Respondent distinguished other recognized statutes of limitations, where entitlement is triggered by a ‘violation’ of a law and is lost entirely when a fixed period of time passes. Those are in contrast with 5110(b)(1) which doesn’t commence at the ‘violation’ of anything, and doesn’t limit by time the potency of a veteran's claim. Respondent argued that isolating 5110(b)(1) as a separate claim for retroactive benefits, doesn’t comport with its non-separateness in the application procedure. Veternas are not asked to file two seperate claims for retrospective and prospective benefits, rather they may invoke (b)(1) for a grace-period which will result in a single award and a single earlier effective date. For these reasons, respondents argued, 5110(b)(1) doesn’t function as a statute of limitations.

Respondents further argued that even if Irwin’s presumption would apply in 5110(b)(1), it would be rebutted by the text and structure of 5110. Section 5110 is headed with a default rule regarding the effective date of the award. The section explicitly states that the date “shall not be earlier” “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in” the relevant chapter. The section then enumerates detailed exceptions to the general rule. The language of (a)(1) and the specificity and detail of the exceptions, respondent claimed, prove congress’s intent for the exceptions to be exclusive, and rule out equitable tolling.

On top of that respondent added, the equitable nature of some of the exceptions, suggests congress has already taken equitable considerations into account, and no more are warranted. In particular, respondent pointed out subsection (b)(4), which gives the same one-year grace-period to an almost identical case : a “veteran who is permanently and totally disabled and who is prevented by a disability from applying for a disability pension”.

Petitioner opined that no rebutting was present in the text or structure of 5110. Respondent's structural argument ignored the nexus requirement put forth in TRW Inc. v. Andrews, i.e, that in order for exceptions to rebut equitable tolling, they must relate to the specific limitations period at issue and be rendered superfluous by tolling. 5110 lists exceptions related to other veteran’s benefits, none of which are related to the time limit in (b)(1) for retroactive benefits, and none of which render tolling in (b)(1) superfluous.

Petitioner argued further, even if it were accepted that Congress provided equitable exceptions elsewhere in 5110, “that only strengthens the Irwin presumption for 5110(b)(1) because, unlike in those other subsections, Congress chose to remain silent for 5110(b)(1), which is exactly what we would expect Congress to do if they wanted the general rule of equitable tolling to apply”. Similarly petitioner cited Young v. United States, which held that presence of equity in a scheme “supplements rather than displaces principles of equitable tolling”.

Supreme Court
The opinion of the court was authored by Justice Barrett, and fully joined by all members of the court. The court didn’t tend to the question of whether 5110(b)(1) is a statute of limitations or not, but rather found equitable tolling rebutted even if it was. With emphasis on the “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise” clause, the court concluded that the chapter’s provisions are an exhaustive list of exceptions to the regular rule. Therefore additional exceptions, like the application of equitable tolling, would defy the statute's intent. This determination is strengthened, according to the court, by the character of the provisions, which set detailed instructions for particular situations in which benefits qualify for an earlier date. Moreover, these limits are not barely set in terms of time, but also mention the amount of recovery due, suggesting congress’ interest in capping retroactive benefits.

In response to Arellano’s structural counter-claims, the court asserted that (b)(1) could not be understood independently of (a)(1), and so it may not be analyzed separately for exceptions. And with regards to Arellano’s insistence that (b)(4) help rather than weakens his case, the court responded that presence of equity in a scheme “supplements rather than displaces principles of equitable tolling” only “where equity would not otherwise have permitted [the exception]... Here, however, §5110(b)(4) does not authorize tolling that equity would not otherwise have allowed. If anything, its conditional and narrow applicability limits tolling that might otherwise have occurred”.