User:Hog Farm/Book review/Chancellorsville




 * By Hog Farm

Having previously read some of Stephen W. Sears' work, and finding it both readable and informative, when I wanted to read a book on the Battle of Chancellorsville, I turned to Chancellorsville. The book follows the Union Army of the Potomac from Joseph Hooker taking command through its offensive against Robert E. Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, until Hooker's retreat from Chancellorsville in failure.

Having never read a full-length work covering Chancellorsville, I found the work, on its face, to be a very informative work on how the campaign and battle unfolded. The whole story of the campaign is presented: Hooker taking over a dejected and demoralized army after his fellow officers refused to continue to fight under his predecessor any longer, Lee's chronic supply problems leading him to detach some of his best troops out of easy supporting distance, Hooker's fine move across the Rappahannock to catch Lee by surprise, an abortive Union cavalry raid, Lee dividing his army in the face of superior, a Confederate flank attack that's still taught in some military courses, and the brutal disjointed slugfest that the battle devolved into after Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded and Hooker suffered a concussion from a porch pillar. Sears provides a clear, complete, and extremely readable overview of the campaign.

However, Chancellorsville does not do as good of a job at explaining why the campaign unfolded as it did. Sears paints an image of a Joe Hooker who was betrayed by incompetent subordinates and an untimely injury. What Sears doesn't mention is that many of the gravest Union errors at least partially have to be blamed on Hooker himself. The Union plan of battle relied on a cavalry raid to cut Confederate supplies and communications; this failed miserably due to the incompetence of George Stoneman, the raid's commander. Since Hooker personally appointed Stoneman to lead the raid, he must bear at least some of the blame for its failure. Likewise, a diversionary expedition that evolved into a critical part of Hooker's strategy late in the campaign failed because of the sluggishness of its commander, who is best known today for his ironic last words. Again, Hooker must take some of the blame for personally placing a commander who was known to struggle in independent command in such a role. Much has been made of the rout of the XI Corps by Jackson; again, it should be questioned as to why Hooker allowed his flank to be held by his least reliable unit and why he failed to ensure that XI Corps' problematic commander obeyed orders to protect his flank. Sears also downplays the results of Hooker's ordering the abandonment of a strong artillery position known as Hazel Grove, from which Confederate artillery later shredded the Union lines.

While Chancellorsville is a highly informative and readable work, its themes of downplaying the failures of Joe Hooker presents a thesis that doesn't line up with a more critical and honest evaluation of the Union general's handling of his army command opportunity.