User:III.V.MDCCLXX/Ratlines (World War II aftermath)

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The ratlines (German: Rattenlinien) were systems of escape routes for German Nazis and other fascists fleeing Europe from 1945 onwards in the aftermath of World War II. These escape routes mainly led toward havens in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, though also in Paraguay, Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia, as well as the United States, Canada, Australia, Spain, and Switzerland.

There were two primary routes: the first went from Germany to Spain, then Argentina; the second from Germany to Rome, then Genoa, then South America. The two routes developed independently but eventually came together. The ratlines were supported by some clergy of the Catholic Church. Starting in 1947, some U.S. Intelligence officers utilized existing ratlines to move certain Nazi strategists and scientists.

While reputable scholars unanimously consider Nazi leader Adolf Hitler to have died by suicide in Berlin on 30 April 1945, various conspiracy theories claim that he survived the war and fled to Argentina.

Spanish foundations[edit]
The origins of the first ratlines are connected to various developments in Vatican-Argentine relations before and during World War II. As early as 1942, Roman Cardinal Luigi Maglione – at the behest of Pope Pius XII – contacted an ambassador of Argentina regarding that country's willingness to generously accept European Catholic immigrants in a timely manner, allowing them to live and work. German priest Anton Weber, the head of Rome's Society of Saint Raphael, traveled to Portugal with intentions to continue to Argentina, to lay the groundwork for Catholic immigration.

Catholic leaders cooperated and worked with the Nazis in order to fight the common enemy of Bolshevism. By 1944, ratline activity centered in Francoist Spain was conducted to facilitate the escape of Nazis. Among the primary organizers were Charles Lescat, a French member of Action Française – an organization suppressed by Pope Pius XI and rehabilitated by Pius XII – and Pierre Daye, a Belgian with contacts in the Spanish government. Lescat and Daye were the first to flee Europe with the help of Argentine cardinal Antonio Caggiano.

By 1946, there were hundreds of war criminals in Spain, as well as thousands of former Nazis and fascists. According to then-United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Vatican cooperation in turning over these "asylum-seekers" was "negligible". Historian Michael Phayer argues that Pius XII was primarily focused on fighting communism and would prefer "fascist war criminals [sail] to the New World rather than [rot] in POW camps". Unlike the Vatican emigration operation in Italy which centered on Vatican City, the Spanish ratlines – though fostered by the Vatican – were relatively independent of the Vatican Emigration Bureau's hierarchy.

Bishop Hudal's involvement[edit]
Austrian Catholic bishop Alois Hudal, a Nazi sympathizer, was rector of the Pontificio Istituto Teutonico Santa Maria dell'Anima in Rome, a seminary for Austrian and German priests, and "Spiritual Director of the German People resident in Italy". After the end of the war in Italy, Hudal became active in ministering to German-speaking prisoners of war and internees then held in camps throughout Italy. In December 1944, Hudal was given the job to take charge of assisting in helping give pontifical assistance to refugees.

Hudal used this position to aid the escape of wanted Nazi war criminals, including Franz Stangl, commanding officer of Treblinka; Gustav Wagner, commanding officer of Sobibor; Alois Brunner, responsible for the Drancy internment camp near Paris and in charge of deportations in Slovakia to German concentration camps; Erich Priebke, who was responsible for the Ardeatine Massacre; and Adolf Eichmann—a fact in which he was later unashamedly open. Some of these wanted men were being held in internment camps; generally lacking identity papers, they would be enrolled in camp registers under false names. Other Nazis hid in Italy and sought Hudal out after learning about his role in assisting escapes.

In his memoirs, Hudal said of his actions, "I thank God that He [allowed me] to visit and comfort many victims in their prisons and concentration camps and to help them escape with false identity papers." He explained that in his eyes:"The Allies' War against Germany was not a crusade, but the rivalry of economic complexes for whose victory they had been fighting. This so-called business ... used catchwords like democracy, race, religious liberty and Christianity as a bait for the masses. All these experiences were the reason why I felt duty bound after 1945 to devote my whole charitable work mainly to former National Socialists and Fascists, especially to so-called 'war criminals'." According to Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Hudal was the first Catholic priest to dedicate himself to establishing escape routes. They claim that Hudal helped the Nazi fugitives with money, and more importantly with false identity documents from the Vatican Refugee Organisation (Pontificia Commissione di Assistenza). These Vatican papers were not full passports and thus were not enough to gain passage overseas. They were, rather, the first step in a paper trail—they could be used to obtain a displaced person passport from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which in turn could be used to apply for visas. In theory, the ICRC would perform background checks on passport applicants, but in practice, the word of a priest, especially a bishop would be good enough. According to statements collected by Austrian writer Gitta Sereny from a senior official of the Rome branch of the ICRC, Hudal also used his position as a bishop to request papers from the ICRC "made out according to his specifications". It is also believed that their was an active illicit trade in stolen and forged ICRC papers in Rome at the time.

According to declassified U.S. intelligence reports, Hudal was not the only cleric helping Nazi escapees at this time. In the "La Vista Report" declassified in 1984, Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) operative Vincent La Vista told how he had easily arranged for two bogus Hungarian refugees to get false ICRC documents with the help of a letter from a Father Joseph Gallov. Gallov, who ran a Vatican-sponsored charity for Hungarian refugees, asked no questions and wrote a letter to his "personal contact in the International Red Cross, who then issued the passports".

San Girolamo ratline[edit]
According to Aarons and Loftus, Hudal's private operation was small scale compared to what came later. The major Roman ratline was operated by a small but influential network of Croatian priests, members of the Franciscan order, led by Father Krunoslav Draganović, who organised a highly sophisticated chain with headquarters at the San Girolamo degli Illirici Seminary College in Rome, but with links from Austria to the final embarcation point at the port of Genoa. The ratline initially focused on aiding members of the Croatian Ustaše including its leader (or Poglavnik), Ante Pavelić.

Priests active in the chain included: Fr. Vilim Cecelja, former Deputy Military Vicar to the Ustaše, based in Austria where many Ustashe and Nazi refugees remained in hiding; Fr. Dragutin Kamber, based at San Girolamo; Fr. Dominik Mandić, an official Vatican representative at San Girolamo and also "General Economist" or treasurer of the Franciscan order, who used this position to put the Franciscan press at the ratline's disposal; and Monsignor Karlo Petranović, based in Genoa. Vilim would make contact with those hiding in Austria and help them cross the border to Italy; Kamber, Mandić and Draganović would find them lodgings, often in the monastery itself, while they arranged documentation; finally, Draganović would phone Petranović in Genoa with the number of required berths on ships leaving for South America (see below).

The operation of the Draganović ratline was an open secret among the intelligence and diplomatic communities in Rome. As early as August 1945, Allied commanders in Rome were asking questions about the use of San Girolamo as a "haven" for Ustaše.

A year later, a US State Department report of 12 July 1946 lists nine war criminals, including Albanians and Montenegrins as well as Croats, plus others "not actually sheltered in the Collegium Illiricum [i.e., San Girolamo degli Illirici] but who otherwise enjoy Church support and protection."

In February 1947, CIC Special Agent Robert Clayton Mudd reported ten members of Pavelić's Ustaše cabinet living either in San Girolamo or in the Vatican itself. Mudd had infiltrated an agent into the monastery and confirmed that it was "honeycombed with cells of Ustashe operatives" guarded by "armed youths". Mudd reported:"It was further established that these Croats travel back and forth from the Vatican several times a week in a car with a chauffeur whose license plate bears the two initials CD, 'Corpo Diplomatico'. It issues forth from the Vatican and discharges its passengers inside the Monastery of San Geronimo. Subject to diplomatic immunity it is impossible to stop the car and discover who are its passengers."Mudd's conclusion was the following:"DRAGANOVIC's sponsorship of these Croat Ustashes definitely links him up with the plan of the Vatican to shield these ex-Ustasha nationalists until such time as they are able to procure for them the proper documents to enable them to go to South America. The Vatican, undoubtedly banking on the strong anti-Communist feelings of these men, is endeavoring to infiltrate them into South America in any way possible to counteract the spread of Red doctrine. It has been reliably reported, for example that Dr. VRANCIC has already gone to South America and that Ante PAVELIC and General KREN are scheduled for an early departure to South America through Spain. All these operations are said to have been negotiated by DRAGANOVIC because of his influence in the Vatican."The existence of Draganović's ratline has been supported by a highly respected historian of Vatican diplomacy, Fr. Robert Graham: "I've no doubt that Draganović was extremely active in syphoning off his Croatian Ustashe friends." Graham claimed that Draganović's ratline was approved by the Vatican: "Just because he's a priest doesn't mean he represents the Vatican. It was his own operation." At the same time, there were four occasions in which the Vatican did intervene on behalf of interned Ustasha prisoners. The Secretariat of State asked the UK and US governments to release Croatian POWs from British internment camps in Italy.[citation needed]

Argentine ratlines [edit]
See also: Juan Perón § Jewish and German communities of Argentina In early May 1945, amid Germany's surrender at the end of World War II in Europe, the commander of German U-boat U-977 (then sailing in Europe) decided to flee to Argentina rather than give up. The sub reportedly reached Mar del Plata, Buenos Aires Province, on 17 August 1945, before being captured by the U.S. Navy that September. The crew was accused of transporting escaped Nazi officers.

After the War the President of Argentina, Juan Perón spoke at the Nuremburg Trials, he believed the trials to be a disgrace, and they would become a lesson to humanity. He believed the people of Argentina would believe the trials to be a unworthy process for the victors (allies) who behaved like they weren't yet victorious. Perón believed the Allied forces deserved to loose the war.

The final period of German immigration to Argentina occurred between 1946 and 1950 when President Juan Perón ordered the creation of a ratline for prominent Nazis, collaborators and other fascists from Europe. Perón was given assistance by institutions and organizations, such as the Argentinian Government, the Vatican, and the Swiss authorities; who gave aid through a secret office organized by agents of Perón. These services set up by Perón, helped Nazi war criminals escape. When Henrich Himmler and his secret service arrived in Argentina in 1944, they arrived with the goal of creating an escape route. This operation was relocated to Buenos Aries in 1946, where its base of operations was the Presidential Palace. The operation spread its routes and connection to places stretching as far as Italy, and Scandinavia. These connections later helped to aid Belgian and French war criminals.

In his 2002 book, The Real Odessa, Argentine researcher Uki Goñi used new access to the country's archives to show that Argentine diplomats and intelligence officers had, on Perón's instructions, vigorously encouraged Nazi and fascist war criminals to make their home in Argentina. According to Goñi, the Argentines not only collaborated with Draganović's ratline, they set up further ratlines of their own running through Scandinavia, Switzerland and Belgium.

According to Goñi, Argentina's first move into Nazi smuggling was in January 1946, when Argentine bishop Antonio Caggiano, leader of the Argentine chapter of Catholic Action, flew with another bishop, Agustín Barrére, to Rome where Caggiano was due to be anointed Cardinal. In Rome the Argentine bishops met with French Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, where they passed on a message (recorded in Argentina's diplomatic archives) that the Argentinian Government were expecting to except French persons with political attitudes that, through the latest war, would subject them to harsh measures and private revenge.

Over the spring of 1946, a number of French war criminals, fascists and Vichy officials made it from Italy to Argentina in the same way; they were issued passports by the Rome ICRC office, which were then stamped with Argentine tourist visas. (The need for health certificates and return tickets was waived on Caggiano's recommendation.) The first documented case of a French war criminal arriving in Buenos Aires was Émile Dewoitine, who was later sentenced in absentia to 20 years of hard labor.

Shortly after this, Argentinian Nazi smuggling became institutionalized, according to Goñi, when Perón's new government of February 1946 appointed anthropologist Santiago Peralta as Immigration Commissioner and, former Ribbentrop agent Ludwig Freude as his intelligence chief. Goñi argues that these two then set up a "rescue team" of secret service agents and immigration "advisors", many of whom were themselves European war-criminals, with Argentine citizenship and employment.

By 2020, a document had been found at the Buenos Aires Nazi headquarters detailing 12,000 Nazis in the country with accounts at the Credit Suisse investment bank in Zürich, Switzerland, reputedly included several people related to businesses blacklisted by the US and UK due to their Nazi support. Related investigations include the late 1990s Volcker Commission focusing on the acceptance of looted Nazi gold by Swiss banks, which asserted neutrality in WWII.

Finnish ratlines[edit]
Main article: Pro-German resistance movement in Finland

From 1944, there existed a network of extreme right-wing Finns and Nazis in Finland, founded by Sturmbannführer (Major) Alarich Bross. The original plan was for the network to engage in an armed struggle against the expected Soviet occupation. When that did not materialize, the most significant form of action the organisation undertook was to smuggle out those who wanted to leave the country to Germany and Sweden for various reasons. For this purpose, a safehouse network was built in Finland and the cover company "Great fishing cooperative" was established. In Finland, safehouse routes were provided by a 50–70-man maritime transport organization. In Sweden, the target was the small town of Härnösand in western Norrland. From Finland, the ships were driven to secret loading bays around the city, where the men of the organization were ready. Some of the smuggled men were delivered to Sweden from the north over the Tornio river. Access to Europe was opened through the Swedish safehouse network. Through the safehouse routes, the resistance movement transported Finnish Nazis and fascists, officers and intelligence personnel, Estonian and East Karelian refugees and German citizens out of the country. Hundreds of people were assisted in Sweden, including more than a hundred German prisoners of war who had fled the Finns. Transport to Germany took place after the September 1944 break in German submarines, smuggling hundreds of people. At the same time Organization ODESSA brought refugees from Germany to the Finnish coast, sometimes in several submarines at the same time. They were transported along the safe house route to Sweden and further from there.

U.S. intelligence involvement[edit]
See also: Operation Keelhaul and Operation Paperclip

According to a declassified U.S. Army intelligence report from 1950, by mid-1947 U.S. forces had begun to use Draganović's established network to evacuate "visitors who had been in the custody of the 430th CIC and completely processed in accordance with current directives and requirements, and whose continued residence in Austria constituted a security threat as well as a source of possible embarrassment to the Commanding General of USFA, since the Soviet Command had become aware that their presence in U.S. Zone of Austria and in some instances had requested the return of these persons to Soviet custody".[better source needed]

These were suspected war criminals from areas occupied by the Red Army which the U.S. was obliged to hand over for trial to the Soviets. The U.S. reputedly was reluctant to do so, partly due to a belief that fair trials could hardly be expected in the Soviet Union.[citation needed] The deal with Draganović involved getting the visitors to Rome: "Dragonovich [sic] handled all phases of the operation after the defectees arrived in Rome, such as the procurement of IRO Italian and South American documents, visas, stamps, arrangements for disposition, land or sea, and notification of resettlement committees in foreign lands."

ODESSA and the Gehlen Organization[edit]
Main article: ODESSA

The existence of Italian and Argentine ratlines has been only recently confirmed,[when?] mainly due to research in newly declassified archives.[citation needed] Until the work of Aarons and Loftus, and of Uki Goñi (2002), a common view was that ex-Nazis themselves, organized in secret networks, ran the escape routes alone. The most famous such network is ODESSA (Organization of former SS members), founded in 1946 according to Simon Wiesenthal, which included SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny and Sturmbannführer Alfred Naujocks and, in Argentina, Rodolfo Freude. Alois Brunner, former commandant of Drancy internment camp near Paris, escaped to Rome, then Syria, by ODESSA.

Persons claiming to represent ODESSA claimed responsibility for the unsuccessful July 9, 1979, car bombing in France aimed at Nazi hunters Serge and Beate Klarsfeld.[citation needed] According to Paul Manning, "eventually, over 10,000 former German military made it to South America along escape routes ODESSA and Deutsche Hilfsverein..."

Simon Wiesenthal, who advised Frederick Forsyth on the early 1970s novel/film script The Odessa File which brought the name to public attention, also names other Nazi escape organizations such as Spinne ("Spider") and Sechsgestirn ("Constellation of Six"). Wiesenthal describes these immediately after the war as Nazi cells based in areas of Austria, where many Nazis had retreated and gone underground. Wiesenthal claimed that the ODESSA network shepherded escapees to the Catholic ratlines in Rome (although he mentions only Hudal, not Draganović); or through a second route through France and into Francoist Spain.

ODESSA was supported by the Gehlen Organization, which employed many former Nazi Party members, and was headed by Reinhard Gehlen, a former German Army intelligence officer employed post-war by the CIA. The Gehlen Organization became the nucleus of the BND German intelligence agency, directed by Reinhard Gehlen from its 1956 creation until 1968.[citation needed]

Adolf Hitlers Alleged Escape
In 2014, more than 700 FBI documents were opened to the public (as part of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act), showing that the US government had looked into, during the late 1940s and 1950s, reports of the possible escape of Adolf Hitler from Germany. Some leads reported that he did not committed suicide in Berlin but instead he fled Germany in 1945, and eventually made it to Argentina via Spain. These documents show man statements in which they name people and places involved in Hitler's alleged escape and journey from Germany to South America, including mentioning ratlines that were already in existence at this time. Some CIA documents contain reported sightings and a even a photograph of a man alleged to be Hitler in 1954. This claim was related to the photograph made by a self-proclaimed former German SS trooper named Phillip Citroen who believed Hitler was still alive, and that he had fled from Colombia, and was making his way to Argentina around January 1955. The CIA report shows that the contact who reported his conversations with Citroen, as well as the CIA station, were unable to provide enough intelligence to take a affirmative stance based on the provided information. The station chief's superiors told him that Much effort could be taken with even a remote possibility of finding and establishing solid evidence, but the investigation was dropped.

Ratline escapees[edit]
Some of the Nazis and war criminals who escaped using ratlines include:


 * Andrija Artuković, escaped to the United States; arrested in 1984 after decades of delay and extradited to SFR Yugoslavia in 1986, where he died in prison in 1988
 * Otto Skorzeny, escaped an internment camp in 1948 and fled to Spain in 1950; in 1953 moved to Egypt and served as a military advisor to Gamal Abdel Nasser; travelled between Spain and Argentina serving as an advisor to Juan Perón; allegedly worked for Mossad; died in Spain in 1975.
 * Ludolf von Alvensleben, fled to Argentina in 1946, sentenced to death in absentia, managed to avoid prosecution; died in 1970
 * Alois Brunner, fled to Syria in 1954; died around 2001
 * Herberts Cukurs, fled to Brazil in 1945, assassinated by Mossad in Uruguay in 1965.
 * Léon Degrelle, fled to Spain in 1945; founded the neo-Nazi organization CEDADE in 1966 while under protection by the Franco regime; died in Spain in 1994.
 * Adolf Eichmann, fled to Argentina in 1950; captured 1960; executed in Israel on 1 June 1962
 * Aribert Heim, disappeared in 1962; most likely died in Egypt in 1992
 * Aarne Kauhanen, fled to Venezuela in 1945; arrested 1947; died in mysterious circumstances in 1949
 * Olavi Karpalo, fled to Venezuela in 1945, died in 1988
 * Sándor Képíró, fled to Argentina, returned to Hungary in 1996. He stood trial for war crimes in Budapest in February 2011, before his death in September.
 * Josef Mengele, fled to Argentina in 1949, then to other countries; died in Brazil in 1979
 * Arvid Ojasti, fled to Norway in 1945, then Sweden, and finally Venezuela. In December 1963, he was shot and killed under unclear circumstances
 * Ante Pavelić, escaped to Argentina in 1948; died in Spain, in December 1959, of wounds sustained two years earlier in an assassination attempt
 * Erich Priebke, fled to Argentina in 1949; arrested in 1994; died in 2013
 * Walter Rauff, escaped to Chile; never captured; died in 1984
 * Eduard Roschmann, escaped to Argentina in 1948; fled to Paraguay to avoid extradition and died there in 1977
 * Hans-Ulrich Rudel, fled to Argentina in 1948; started the "Kameradenwerk", a relief organization for Nazi criminals that helped fugitives escape; died following a stroke in Rosenheim, Germany in 1982
 * Klaus Barbie, fled to Bolivia in 1951 with help from the United States, as he had been an agent of the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps since April 1947; captured in 1983; died in prison in France on September 23, 1991
 * Dinko Šakić, fled to Argentina in 1947, arrested in 1998 and extradited to Croatia. He was tried and found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, serving a 20-year sentence. He died in 2008.
 * Boris Smyslovsky, fled to Argentina in 1948 from Liechtenstein with the First Russian National Army. He returned to Liechtenstein in 1966, and died of natural causes in 1988.
 * Franz Stangl, fled to Brazil in 1951; arrested in 1967 and extradited to West Germany; died in 1971 of heart failure
 * Paavo Talvela, fled to Brazil in 1946, eventually returned to Finland.

References[edit]
Notes


 * 1) ^
 * 2) ^ Phayer 2008, p. 173.
 * 3) ^
 * 4) ^
 * 5) ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 46.
 * 6) ^ "History of the Italian Rat Line" (10 April 1950), document signed by "IB Operating Officer" Paul E. Lyon, 430th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Austria. Archived 2007-10-08 at the Wayback Machine, from the original, jasenovac-info.com; accessed 7 February 2023. - "During the summer of 1947 the undersigned received instructions from G-2, USFA, through Chief CIC, to establish a means of disposition for visitors who had been in the custody of the 430th CIC and completely processed in accordance with current directives and requirements, and whose continued residence in Austria constituted a security threat as well as a source of possible embarrassment to the Commanding General of USFA, since the Soviet Command had become aware that their presence in US Zone of Austria and in some instances had requested the return of these persons to Soviet custody."
 * 7) ^ Phayer 2008, pp. 173–79.
 * 8) ^ Jump up to:a b Phayer 2008, p. 179.
 * 9) ^ Phayer 2008, p. 180.
 * 10) ^ Jump up to:a b Phayer 2008, p. 182.
 * 11) ^ Jump up to:a b Phayer 2008, p. 183.
 * 12) ^ Phayer 2008, p. 187.
 * 13) ^ Phayer 2008, p. 188.
 * 14) ^ (Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 36)
 * 15) ^
 * 16) ^ Phayer 2000, p. 11.
 * 17) ^ Sereny 1983, p. 289.
 * 18) ^ Hudal, Römische Tagebücher (Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 37)
 * 19) ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, ch. 2.
 * 20) ^ Sereny 1983, pp. 316–17.
 * 21) ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, pp. 43–45.
 * 22) ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, ch. 5.
 * 23) ^
 * 24) ^
 * 25) ^
 * 26) ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 89.
 * 27) ^ Jump up to:a b "History of the Italian Rat Line" (10 April 1950), document signed by "IB Operating Officer" Paul E. Lyon, 430th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Austria. Archived 2007-10-08 at the Wayback Machine, from the original, jasenovac-info.com; accessed 4 August 2017.
 * 28) ^ Jump up to:a b From the 'Perón tapes' he recorded the year before his death, published in Yo, Juan Domingo Perón, Luca de Tena et al. (Goñi 2003, p. 100)
 * 29) ^ Paterson, Lawrence (2009) Black Flag: The Surrender of Germany's U-Boat Forces on Land and at Sea Seaforth Publishing ISBN 9781848320376
 * 30) ^ Goñi 2003, pp. 96–98.
 * 31) ^ Goñi 2003, ch. 8.
 * 32) ^
 * 33) ^
 * 34) ^
 * 35) ^ Jump up to:a b
 * 36) ^ Selk, Avi (20 May 2018) "Scientists say Hitler died in WWII. Tell that to ‘Adolf Schüttelmayor’ and the Nazi moon base." The Washington Post
 * 37) ^
 * 38) ^ Jump up to:a b Lappalainen, Niilo: Aselevon jälkeen. WSOY, 1997. ISBN 951-0-21813-8 . p. 111, 113–114
 * 39) ^ Alava, Ali: Gestapo Suomessa. Hämeenlinna: Arvi A.Karisto Osakeyhtiö, 1974. ISBN 951-23-0844-4.
 * 40) ^ Paul Manning, Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile Lyle Stuart, Inc. (1980); ISBN 0-8184-0309-8 (page 181)
 * 41) ^ Wiesenthal 1989.
 * 42) ^ George Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1989 - particularly chapter 6, "Odessa".
 * 43) ^

Bibliography


 * Sachslehner, Johannes (2019). Hitlers Mann im Vatikan: Bischof Alois Hudal. Ein dunkles Kapitel in der Geschichte der Kirche. Vienna-Graz: Molden, 2019. ISBN 978-3-222-15040-1.
 * Her account comes from testimony of Nazi war criminals helped by Hudal, such as Franz Stangl, Commandant of Treblinka extermination camp.
 * Wiesenthal, Simon (1989). Justice not Vengeance. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0802112781
 * Sachslehner, Johannes (2019). Hitlers Mann im Vatikan: Bischof Alois Hudal. Ein dunkles Kapitel in der Geschichte der Kirche. Vienna-Graz: Molden, 2019. ISBN 978-3-222-15040-1.
 * Her account comes from testimony of Nazi war criminals helped by Hudal, such as Franz Stangl, Commandant of Treblinka extermination camp.
 * Wiesenthal, Simon (1989). Justice not Vengeance. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0802112781
 * Wiesenthal, Simon (1989). Justice not Vengeance. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0802112781

Further reading[edit]

 * Birn, Ruth Bettina. Review of Goñi, Uki, Odessa: Die wahre Geschichte: Fluchthilfe für NS-Kriegsverbrecher and Schneppen, Heinz, Odessa und das Vierte Reich: Mythen der Zeitgeschichte. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. October, 2007.
 * Breitman, Richard; Goda, Norman J. W.; Naftali, Timothy; and Wolfe, Robert (2005). U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge University Press; ISBN 9780521617949.
 * Graham, Robert and Alvarez, David. (1998). Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage against the Vatican, 1939-1945. London: Frank Cass.
 * Loftus, John. (2010). America's Nazi Secret: An Insider's History. Waterwille: (Trine Day); ISBN 978-1936296040.
 * Simpson, Christopher (1988). Blowback: The First Full Account of America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Disastrous Effect on The cold war, Our Domestic and Foreign Policy. New York: (Grove/Atlantic); ISBN 978-0020449959.
 * Steinacher, Gerald (2006). The Cape of Last Hope: The Flight of Nazi War Criminals through Italy to South America, in Eisterer, Klaus and Günter Bischof (eds; 2006) Transatlantic Relations: Austria and Latin America in the 19th and 20th Century (Transatlantica 1), pp. 203–24. New Brunswick: Transatlantica.
 * Steinacher, Gerald (2012; P/B edition). Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice. Oxford University Press; ISBN 978-0199642458.