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= Gambia Coup of 1994 =

Coup
On July 22nd, 1994, a group of junior army officers staged a protest to demand increased salaries - taking advantage of the fact that the Gambian National Army (GNA) partook in a join-military exercise with the United States. The protest-turned-coup was initially staged by discontented lieutenants and junior officers of the Gambian National Army including Sabally, Singhatet, Basiru Barrow, Alhaji Kanteh, and Alpha Kinteh. However, Kanteg and Kinteh withdrew from the plans on the basis of their belief that the timing wasn't right for the protest. Following their withdrawal, Hydara and Jammeh, who went on to rule Gambia following the coup, were brought into the plans. While this protest was initially peaceful in nature - it seemed to President Jawara a revival of the much more violent and bloodier attempted coup of 1981 and he fled the nation before even allowing the junior officers to express their sentiments and make their demands. It was later discovered that President Jawara fled to the dock at Banjul, where American warships offered protection and transportation .Many international leaders, including Great Britain, the previous colonial leader of Gambia, suggested that the mutiny would only last days and that the Jawara regime would be reinstated shortly thereafter. This mutiny, with Jawara having fled the country, left a vacuum of power in which the Coup Organizers filled with the creation of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), which went on to serve as the ruling government of Gambia until 1996, when a citizen-ruled party replaced it

Discontent in the Gambia
Despite the spontaneity of the mutiny-turned-coup, having been only planned the night before, discontent with the government had been a growing sentiment among the Gambian public since the attempted coup of 1981. Chief among these complaints were the decreasing legitimacy of the government, its lack of accountability and its corruption and ineffectiveness.

Declining Legitimacy
Following the 1992 election, in which the People's Progressive Party maintained a comfortable 58.2% of the votes, there was a sharp decline in the legitimacy of the PPP. First, it was believed that the party no longer reflected the preferences of the voters because it had become comfortable with its hold on power. This sentiment was especially present amongst the youngest age bracket of voters, who felt severely underrepresented in the Gambian government. Secondly, following the reveal of a scandal involving three high-ranking government officials in late 1993, it became apparent that Jawara regime was complacent with this corruption - given their reluctance to take action against these three men. Eventually, in June 1994 a commission was established to investigate the scandal - in attempts to recover the trust of the people - but the results of the investigation were not released in time to save the Jawara regime.

The ineffectiveness of the government also became a chief complaint among Gambians leading up to the coup of 1994. Following the inability of the Assets Management and Recovery Commission (AMRC) to recover debts, the blame was placed on the Jawara regime. This accusation was not entirely unfounded, many political elites resisted the efforts of the AMRC to collect their debts - most likely due to their own debts that would eventually be collected. Soon after the implementation of the AFPRC, an investigation was launched to investigate the corruption and mismanagement of the government under Jawara which unveiled "considerable evidence of corruption and maladministration".

21 July 1998
While anti-Jawara sentiments had been building for months, the spark that set off the flames of the coup can be traced to 21 July 1998.

Effects of the Coup of 1994
Having served as the President of Gambia since its independence in 1965, the ousting of Jawara left a considerable impact on the political landscape of the Gambia. Particularly, it marked a transition from a democracy to a militaristic regime. This transition came at the height of the the third wave of democratization - a period beginning in 1974 and lasting into the 90's in which many countries began the transition to democratic regimes - making the Gambia a paradox to the Third Wave of Democratization. Despite this, the Gambia is thought to have been "transformed..from the backwards State is was under Sir Jawara to the rapidly developing state it is today".

Immediate Effects[edit]
The coup itself came with very little public or military resistance - a stark contrast from the much more violent and bloody attempted coup of 1981. Jammeh also made an announcement that he would be dedicated to improving the transparency, integrity and accountability of the Gambian government - some of the chief complaints of those participating in the coup. These acts during and immediately following the coup were instrumental in Jammeh's goal to legitimize the newly instituted government and the ruling PPP (People's Progressive Party (The Gambia)) once again. Further, the AFPRC also implemented starker restrictions on the press, which had considerable liberties under the Jawara regime, in order to control the news sources that might ignite opposition sentiments. These restrictions led to the eventual imprisonment and exile of multiple Gambian journalists.