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Zionism is the movement for a "Jewish Homeland" in Palestine. 'Palestinian Arabs' refers to the indigenous population of Palestine, which developed into the Palestinian people. In 1948 Zionism succeeded in creating the State of Israel. Israel's War of Independence also resulted in an exodus of around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs, which the Palestinians refer to as al Nakba, the disaster.

Introduction
Gorny investigated the ideological characteristics of the Jewish-Arab confrontation in his book 'Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948'. He says two ideological questions were important. The first was whether the Palestinian Arabs were part of a greater Arab nation or constituted a separate Palestinian national entity. The second was to what extend Zionism could base its demands on historical rights. Zionism's aim 'to construct in Palestine a distinct Jewish national society' meant that it also honoured certain principles that affected its attitude towards the Arabs. Gorny distinghuishes the 'desire for territorial concentration of the Jewish people in Palestine', the 'desire to create a Jewish majority in Palestine', the 'belief that exclusive employment of Jewish labour was the precondition for an independent Jewish society', and the 'renaissance of Hebrew culture [as] a pre-condition for the rebirth of the nation'.

Gorny also distinguishes several important developments that had their bearing on the confrontation and the Zionists' attitude. Up to 1917 Zionism was tolerated as a national movement in the Ottoman Empire. After 1917 Palestine became a Mandate administrated by the British, and the right of the Jewish people to a national homeland in Palestine was recognised by the British and the League of Nations. In 1948 the state of Israel was established. Simultaneously the Palestine problem became an ever more important subject for Jews, Arabs and the international community. During this period the demographic balance changed from 1 Jew in every 23 inhabitants in 1880 to 1 Jew in every 3 inhabitants in 1947 (see table). Finally Gorny says the uneven pace of Westernization gave the Jewish society a technological and organizational advantage. Jewish society was mainly urban, Arab society mainly rural.

In his book 'Zionism and the Palestinians' Flapan distinguishes six basic concepts of Zionism's policy toward the Arabs: '(1) gradual build-up of an economic and military potential as the basis for achievement of political aims, (2) alliance with a great power external to the Middle East; (3) non-recognition of the existence of a Palestine national entity; (4) Zionism's civilising mission in an undeveloped area; (5) economic, social and cultural segregation as prerequisites for the renaissance of Jewish national life; (6) the concept of 'peace form strength'.'

Finkelstein says the 'strategic consensus [in the Zionist movement] on the Arab Question was remarkable'. This consensus was informed by three premises: (1) 'the Zionist movement should neither expect, nor seek the acquiescence of the Palestinain Arabs'; (2) 'the success of the Zionist enterprise was dependent on the support of one (or more) Great Power(s)'; (3) the Palestine conflict should be resolved within the framework of a regional alliance subordinate to the interests of the Great Power(s)'.

In line with earlier promisses by Ben-Gurion Israel's Declaration of Independence states that '[Israel] will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex.'

The right to the Land
Israel's Declaration of Independence states 'In [1897] the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.' and further on 'we, [the signatories] by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel.' This illustrates Zionism's claim of a historic right as a people to the Land of Israel.

All three tendencies within Zionism's consensus, political, labour and cultural Zionism, demanded a Jewish majority. Adherents of political Zionism argued that national bonds were the most important bonds linking individuals. They argued that "Jews constituted an 'alien' presence amidst states 'belonging' to other, numerically preponderant, nationalities." They proposed to remedy this by forming a state with a Jewish majority. According to Finkelstein labour Zionism added to this that a Jewish state was the only way to amend the deficit of Jewish laborers in the Diaspora and to create a healthy class structure among Jews. Cultural Zionism wanted to counter the danger of assimilation and loss of Jewish culture. To them a Jewish majority would ensure a apiritual center for the 'unbridled spiritual renaissance of the Jewish people'.

According to Finkelstein "the mainstream Zionist movement never doubted its 'historical right' to impose a Jewish state through the 'Right of Return' on the indigenous Arab population of Palestine", and in fact claimed for the Jewish people a prevalent right to Israel, their historical homeland, and acceded the Arabs only rights as incidental residents. . Zionism justified this with two 'facts': the bond of the Jewish nation with Palestine, as derived from its history, was unique, while the Arabs of Palestine were part of the Arab nation and therefore had no special bond with Palestine. Therefore the Jews had a preemptive right to Palestine. For example Aaron David Gordon, whose teachings formed the main intellectual inspiration of the labor leaders, wrote in 1921:"'For Eretz Israel, we have a charter that has been valid until now and that will always be valid, and that is the Bible [... including the Gospels and the New Testament ...] It all came from us; it was created among us. [...] And what did the Arabs produce in all the years they lived in the country? Such creations, or even the creation of the Bible alone, give us a perpetual right over the land in which we were so creative, especially since the people that came after us did not create such works in this country, or did not create anything at all.'" According to Sternhell 'The founders accepted this point of view. This was the ultimate Zionist argument'.

Gorny says leaders from various branches of Zionism claimed such a prevalent right: The dissident Zionists in Brit-Shalom and Ihud thought different. Hugo Bergmann wrote in 1929: "our opponents [in mainstream Zionism] hold different views. When they speak of Palestine, of our country, they mean 'our country', that is to say 'not their country' [... this belief is based on the concept that in a State] one people, among the people residing there, should be granted the majority right." , and Ernst Simon held that the historical right "is binding on us rather than on the Arabs" and therefore an agreement with the Arabs is necesarry.
 * The cultural Zionist Ahad Ha'am 'saw the historical rights of the Jews as outweighing the Arabs' residential rights in Palestine'.
 * Herzl's companion Max Nordau, a political Zionist, declared that Palestine was the 'legal and historical inheritance' of the Jewish nation, and that the Palestinian Arabs had only 'possession rights'.
 * Ben Gurion, labour Zionism's most important leader, held that the Jewish people had a superior right to Palestine, that Palestine was important to the Jews as a nation and to the Arabs as individuals, and hence the right of the Jewish people to concentrate in Palestine, a right which was not due to the Arabs.
 * ZeevJabotinsky, leader of the more radical revisionist Zionists, held that since Palestine was only a very small part of the Land held by the Arab nation, "requisition of an area of land from a nation with large stretches of territory, in order to make a home for a wandering people is an act of justice, and if the land-owning nation does not wish to cede it (and this is completely natural) it must be compelled".

According to Anita Shapira in the early 1940s young Jews came to believe that "[t]he land was theirs, theirs alone. This feeling was accompanied by a fierce sense of possessiveness, of joyous anticipation of the fight for it". For the Zionist movement this land, Eretz Israel, incorporated Palestine, Transjordan, the Golan height and the southern part of Lebanon. Ben-Gurion said he wanted to "concentrate the masses of our people in this country and its environs." At the Biltmore Conference in 1942 he formulated the Zionists' demand 'not as a Jewish state in Palestine but as Palestine as a Jewish state'. The Biltmore Program, adopted at that conference by various Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish organizations, called for "Palestine [to] be established as a Jewish Commonwealth".

'Conquest of Labour' and economic separation
The struggle for 'Jewish labour', for Jews to employ only Jews, signified the victory of Jewish labour in creating a new society. This struggle was constantly pushed by the leaders of the second Aliyah (1904-1914), who founded labour Zionism and in the 1930s became the leaders of the Zionist movement. Shortly after his arrival in Palestine in 1906 Ben-Gurion noted that a moshava, a private Jewish aggricultural settlement, employed Arabs as guards. He asked himself: "Was it conceivable that here too we should be deep in Galuth (exile), hiring strangers to guard our property and protect our lives?" . Soon Ben-Gurion and his companions managed to amend this situation. According to Teveth in these early years Ben-Gurion developed the concept of 'Avodah Ivrit', or 'Jewish labour'.

The leaders of the second Aliyah agreed that Jewish labour was vital for the national revival process as they were convinced that Jews should 'redeem' themselves by building with their own hands a new type of Jewish society. They also thought the use of Arab labour could create a typical colonial society, exploiting cheap, unorganised indiginous labour, and would hamper further Jewish immigration. Finally they considered manual labour a good therapy for Jews as individuals and as a people. In Ben-Gurion's opinion Jewish labour was "not a means but a sublime end", the Jew had to be transformed and made creative.

In 1907 Ben-Gurion called for Jewish labour on lands owned by the Jewish National Fund. There were difficulties here, because Arabs were prepared to work long hours for very low wages, and most Jewish immigrants preferred to settle in the cities. In this context occured the development of the concept of the Kibbutz, 'the co-operative settlement based on self-labour and motivated by Zionist ideals'. In a summary made in 1956 Ben-Gurion said the Kibuutz movement was not started because of some socialist theory, but as an effective way to "guarantee Jewish labour".

Around 1920 Ben-Gurion began to call for Jewish labour in the entire economy, and labour Zionism started striving for an absolute segregation of the Jewish and Arab national communities. In this way 'Jews and Arabs [...] would live in separate settlements and work in separate economies'. Ben-Gurion used the 1929 riots and the 1936 general strike as opportunities to further enforce his drive for Jewish labour. In 1930 the Hope Simpson Report blamed the Jewish labour policy for the grave unemployment in the Arab sector. According to Flapan in 1933 the Histadrut launched its first campaign to remove Arab workers form the cities. In many cases the removal of Arab workers 'took the form of ugly scenes of violence'. Reports of this in the Jewish and Arab press 'created an atmosphere of unprecedented tension'. According to Flapan this forceful eviction of Arab workers and the 'acrimonious propaganda' which accompanied the operation amplified Arab hostility and ultimately precipitated the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936.

In 1947 the UN Special Commission on Palestine summarised the situation: "The economic life presents the complex phenomenon of two distinctive economies - one Jewish and one Arab, closely involved with one another and yet in essential features separate. [...] Apart from a small number of experts, no Jewish workers are employed in Arab undertakings and apart from citrus groves, very few Arabs are employed in Jewish enterprises [...] Government service, the Potash company and the oil refinery are almost the only places where Arab and Jews meet as co-workers in the same organization. [...] There are considerable differences between the rates of wage for Arab and Jewish workers in similar occupations."

During Ottoman times (1882-1917)
Zionist leaders and advocates followed conditions in the land of Israel closely and travelled there regularly. Their concern, however, was entirely with the future of Jewish settlement. The future of the land's Arab inhabitants concerned them as little as the welfare of the Jews concerned Arab leaders. During the movement's formative stages, zionist negotiators with stronger political powers (such as the British) corresponded enthusiastically while remaining silent about the inhabitants of Palestine, who numbered just under half a million during the late nineteenth century.

According to Anita Shapira, among nineteenth and early twentieth century Zionists, 'The Arabs in Palestine were viewed as one more of the many misfortunes present in Palestine, like the Ottoman authorities, the climate, difficulties of adjustment, [...] [T]he Zionist organization did not discuss this issue during that period and did not formulate a political line on it. Yet at that particular juncture in the movement such deliberations [...] had about the same importance as the learned disputations customarily held in the courtyards of Hassidic rebbes regarding what would happen after the coming of the messiah.'

What thought Zionists did give to Arab national rights was perhaps typified by this passage by Israel Zangwill, written just after the first World War: 'The Arabs should recognize that the road of renewed national glory lies through Baghdad, Damascus and Mecca, and all the vast territories freed for them from the Turks and be content. [...] The powers that freed them have surely the right to ask them not to grudge the petty strip (Israel) necessary for the renaissance of a still more down-trodden people.' Thus from the beginning Zionists saw the Arab residents of Palestine as part of a larger Arab nation.

Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects or as Moslems and, when they concerned themselves with Zionists, they generally assumed the movement (whose objectives they feared) would fail. After the Young Turk revolution in 1908, Arab Nationalism grew rapidly in the area and most Arab Nationalists regarded Zionism as a threat, although a minority perceived Zionism as providing a path to modernity.

During the early British Mandate (1917-1936)
Most Zionists were Europeans, and although Jews were generally less racist then the average European of the time (Jews were prominent in fighting racism around the world), European-Jewish public opinion generally reflected attitudes of the European societies in which they lived, which at this time was highly prejudiced.

One issue fatally divided Arab and Jew in Palestine: immigration. Jews could not compromise over immigration as for them Palestine was intended as a haven from persecution, particularly after the rise of the Nazis. The Arabs for their part could not compromise on immigration because to do so would effectively end their majority in Palestine. Each side distrusted and feared the other's long-term ambitions.

Although the establishment of a Jewish majority or a Jewish state in Palestine was fundamentally at odds with the aspirations of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, Zionists did not doubt their right to establish a Jewish majority in Palestine. Zionists justified this by referring to the 'unique' historical bond of the Jewish nation with Palestine, while the Arabs of Palestine were part of the Arab nation and therefore had no special bond with Palestine. Many Zionists claimed a 'preemptive right' to Palestine, the Jews had a right as a Nation, the Arabs only as individuals. Aaron David Gordon wrote in 1921: "'For Eretz Israel, we have a charter that has been valid until now and that will always be valid, and that is the Bible [... including the Gospels and the New Testament ...] It all came from us; it was created among us. [...] And what did the Arabs produce in all the years they lived in the country? Such creations, or even the creation of the Bible alone, give us a perpetual right over the land in which we were so creative, especially since the people that came after us did not create such works in this country, or did not create anything at all.'"

According to Flapan one of the basic concepts of mainstream Zionism with regard to the Arab Palestinians was economic, social and cultural segregation as a means to create a Jewish national life. Especially the struggle for "100 per cent of Jewish labour" in the Jewish sector of the economy occupied the energies of the labour movement for most of the Mandatory years and contributed more than any other factor to the territorial, economic and social separation between Jews and Arabs.'

Weizmann
In Chaim Weizmann's view Palestine was a Jewish and not an Arab country, however Weizmann believed that the state had to be based on justice and on an accommodation with the Arabs.

In 1918, Weizmann toured Palestine as head of the Zionist Commission and met with Arab and Palestinian-Arab leaders, including the future mufti al-Husseini. He preferred to negotiate a political solution primarily with the British, and sometimes with non-Palestinian Arabs, but he opposed negotiating with the Palestinians themselves. . According to Reinharz, he focused his efforts on the Pan-Arab leadership of the Hussein family because they were (initially) willing to reach an accomodation in return for Zionist support while he failed to reach any understanding with Palestinian Arab leaders.

Weizmann rejected the idea that population transfer of Palestinians to other Arab countries was immoral (Under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Turks and Greeks had agreed a mutual transfer arrangement). According to Flapan this idea was in the back of his mind, although he didn't say this in public. In 1930 he did however urge the British to consider transfer of Palestinians to Transjordan.

According to Flapan Weizmann preferred to negotiate a political solution primarily with the British, and sometimes with non-Palestinian Arabs, but he opposed negotiating a solution with the Palestinians themselves. In the early 1920s he came out vehemently against the attempts of Dr. Judah L. Magnes to mediate with the Arabs. Magnes' proposal included a Palestinian state to be established with proportional voting. Wiezmann was vehemently opposed to the setting up of representative institutions in Palestine.

Jabotinsky
Vladimir Jabotinsky, the leader of the Revisionist Zionists, thought the Arabs were completely irrelevant to the question of Zionism except as enemies. In his view the conflict with the Arabs was natural and inevitable and could not be solved until the Zionists could face the Arabs with an 'iron wall' of Jewish power.

Ben-Gurion
In public, Ben-Gurion upheld the official position of his party that denied the necessity of force in achieving Zionist goals. Unlike Weizmann, Ben-Gurion did have a realistic view of the strong attachment of Arab Palestinians to the Palestinian soil. In 1938 he said: 'In our political argument abroad we minimize Arab opposition to us. But let us not ignore the truth among ourselves. [...] A people which fights against [what it conceives as] the usurpation of its land will not tire so easily.' According to Flapan Ben-Gurions assesment of Arab feelings led him to an even more militant line on the need to build up Jewish military strength: 'I believe in our power, in our power which will grow, and if it will grow agreement will come...'.

During the pre-statehood period in Palestine, Ben-Gurion represented the mainstream Jewish establishment and was known as a moderate. He was strongly opposed to the Revisionist Zionist movement led by Ze'ev Jabotinsky and his successor Menachem Begin.

In the epilogue of 'Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs' Teveth evaluates Ben-Gurion's policy towards the Arabs up to 1936 as follows: "A careful comparison of Ben-Gurion's public and private positions leads inexorably to the conclusion that this twenty-year denial of the conflict was a calculated tactic, born of pragmatism rather than profundity of conviction. The idea that Jews and Arabs could reconcile their differences through class solidarity, a notion he championed between 1919 and 1929, was a delaying tactic. Once the Yishuv had gained strength, Ben-Gurion abandoned it. The belief in a compromise solution, which Ben-Gurion professed for the seven years between 1929 and 1936, was also a tactic, designed to win continued British support for Zionism. The only genuine convictions that underlay Ben-Gurion's approach to the Arab question were two: that the support of the power that rules Palestine was more important to Zionism than any agreement with the Arabs, and that the Arbas would reconcile themselves to the Jewish presence only after they conceded their inability to destroy it."

Bi-National support
A minority of Zionists, including the Socialist Zionist movement Hashomer Hatzair, sought to create a bi-national state. However, this approach was unpopular with both Arabs and Jews.

Zionist Para-Military Organizations
In response to Arab attacks under the Turks, the Zionists in Palestine established Hashomer (the Guardian), a self-defence organization. After the Jaffa Riots, an organization of Jewish Legion veterans was created, Haganah (Defence) to defend Jewish communities against rioters. In 1931, following the Revisionist Zionist departure from the Zionist Movement, a group of revisionists left Haganah and founded the Irgun Tzvai Leumi (National Military Organization), also known as Etzel.

During and after the 'Great Arab Revolt' (1936-1949)
The 1942 Zionist conference could not be held because of the war. Instead 600 Jewish leaders (not just Zionists) met in a hotel in the Biltmore Hotel in New York and adopted a statement known as the Biltmore Program. They agreed that when the war ended all Jewish organizations would fight to ensure free Jewish migration into Palestine.

The Biltmore Program called for "Palestine [to] be established as a Jewish Commonwealth". David Ben-Gurion, who dominated the conference, formulated the Zionists' demand 'not as a Jewish state in Palestine but as Palestine as a Jewish state'. It was significant in that all US Jewish organizations were now united in agreement on the need for a Jewish state in Palestine.

From the beginning of the forties the Zionist movement stopped paying attention to the 'Arab question'. The reason is that it was expected that any solution, whether a Jewish state in all of Palestine, partition, or an international protectorate, would have to be imposed on the Palestinian Arabs by force, because of their refusal to compromise. According to Teveth a war was 'made inevitable after the Biltmore Plan of 1942 declared Zionism's explicit aim to be a Jewish state, which the Arabs were determined to oppose by force.'

Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion had a realistic view of the strong attachment of Arab Palestinians to the Palestinian soil. In 1938 he said: 'In our political argument abroad we minimize Arab opposition to us. But let us not ignore the truth among ourselves. [...] A people which fights against the usurpation of its land will not tire so easily.' According to Flapan Ben-Gurions assesment of Arab feelings led him to an even more militant line on the need to build up Jewish military strength: 'I believe in our power, in our power which will grow, and if it will grow agreement will come...'.

The British 1939 White paper stipulated that Jewish immigration to Palestine was to be limited to 15,000 a year for the first five years, and would subsequently be contingent on Arab consent. After this Ben-Gurion changed his policy towards the British, stating: "Peace in Palestine is not the best situation for thwarting the policy of the white Paper". Ben-Gurion believed a peacefull solution with the Arabs had no chance and soon began preparing the Yishuv for war. According the Teveth 'through his campaign to mobilize the Yishuv in support of the British war effort, he strove to build the nucleus of a "Hebrew army", and his success in this endeavor later brought victory to Zionism in the struggle to establish a Jewish state.'

The "Transfer idea"
The "transfer idea" became popular in the 1980s when the State of Israel declassified documents pertaining to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War period and the so-called New Historians began publishing articles and books based on those documents. Proponents of this theory say that the driving force of the 1948 Palestinian exodus was the Zionist leaders' belief that a Jewish state could not survive with a strong Arab population and that a population transfer would be most beneficial.

The 'transfer idea' is invoked by authors like Khalidi to support their claim that the Yishuv followed an expulsion policy. Others such as Morris reject the idea that 'transfer' thinking lead to a deliberate expulsion policy but invoke the theory to explain why, when it occurred, transfer was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish population. Critics of the "transfer principle" theory cite public addresses by the contemporary Zionist leadership that preach co-existence with the Arabs. However some proponents of the "transfer principle" theory say that the real sentiments were only talked about behind closed doors.

The idea that 'transfer ideology' contributed to the exodus was first brought up by several Palestinian authors, and supported by Erskine Childers in his 1971 article, "The wordless wish". In 1961 Walid Khalidi referred to the transfer idea to support his idea that the Yishuv followed an expulsion policy in April and May 1948. In 1980, historian Benny Morris became in the 1980s the most well-known advocate of the existence of the 'transfer idea'. According to Morris, while not discounting other reasons for the exodus, the 'transfer principle' theory suggests that this prevalent 'attitude of transfer' is what made it easy for the Jewish population to accept it and for local Haganah and IDF commanders to resort to various means of expelling the Arab population. In his article published in the Journal of Palestine Studies in 1998, Morris wrote: "'The nexus between thought and action was not so much a matter of 'predetermination' and preplanning as of a mind-set that accepted transfer as a legitimate solution. Once that 'transfer' got under way, of its own accord, in late 1947-early 1948 (Arabs fled mainly out of fear of bombs and bullets), the Zionist leadership, guided by Ben-Gurion, was predisposed to nudge the process along, occasionally with the help of expulsions. The initial refugee trickle turned into a flood tide during April-July 1948.'"

He also notes that the attempt to achieve a demographic shift through aliyah (Jewish immigration to the land of Israel) had not been successful. As a result, some Zionist leaders adopted the transfer of a large Arab population as the only viable solution. Morris also points out that "[if] Zionist support for 'Transfer' really is 'unambiguous'; the connection between that support and what actually happened during the war is far more tenuous than Arabs propagandists will allow" (Morris, p.6).

To this he adds that "From April 1948, Ben-Gurion is projecting a message of transfer. There is no explicit order of his in writing, there is no orderly comprehensive policy, but there is an atmosphere of [population] transfer. The transfer idea is in the air. The entire leadership understands that this is the idea. The officer corps understands what is required of them. Under Ben-Gurion, a consensus of transfer is created."

Origins of the ‘Transfer Idea’
Morris concludes that the idea of transfer was not, in 1947-1949, a new one. He writes:

"Many if not most of Zionism's mainstream leaders expressed at least passing support for the idea of transfer during the movement's first decades. True, as the subject was sensitive they did not often or usually state this in public."

Other authors, including Palestinian writers and Israeli New Historians, have also described this attitude as a prevalent notion in Zionist thinking and as a major factor in the exodus. Israeli historian and former diplomat Shlomo Ben-Ami wrote:

"The debate about whether or not the mass exodus of Palestinians was the result of a Zionist design or the inevitable concomitant of war should not ignore the ideological constructs that motivated the Zionist enterprise. The philosophy of transfer was not a marginal, esoteric article in the mindset and thinking of the main leaders of the Yishuv. These ideological constructs provided a legitimate environment for commanders in the field actively to encourage the eviction of the local population even when no precise orders to that effect were issued by the political leaders."

From the beginning Zionism ignored the Palestinians as a nation but chose to see the Palestinian Arabs as part of the larger Arab nation.

The Peel Commission's plan and the Yishuv's reaction
The idea of population transfer was briefly placed on the Mandate's political agenda in 1937 by the Peel Commission. The commission recommended that Britain should withdraw from Palestine and that the land be partitioned between Jews and Arabs. It called for a "transfer of land and an exchange of population", including the removal of 250,000 Palestinian Arabs from what would become the Jewish state, along the lines of the mutual population exchange between the Turkish and Greek populations after the Greco-Turkish War of 1922. According to the plan 'in the last resort' the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish part would be compulsory. The transfer would be voluntary in as far as Arab leaders were required to agree with it, but after that it would be almost inevitable that it would have to be forced upon the population.

Heavy Zionist lobbying had been necessary for the Peel commission to propose this 'in the last resort' compulsory transfer. Shertok, Weizmann and Ben-Gurion had travelled to London to talk it over, not only with members of the commission, but also with numerous politicians and officials whom the commission would be likely to consult.

This solution was embraced by Zionist leaders. Since they craved all of Palestine they did not like the partition part, but they did like the transfer part and were inclined to accept the partition part only under the condition of the transfer part. Ben-Gurion wrote:


 * [A]nd [nothing] greater than this has been done for our case in our time [than Peel proposing transfer]. […] And we did not propose this - the Royal Commission […] did […] and we must grab hold of this conclusion [i.e, recommendation] as we grabbed hold of the Balfour Declaration, even more than that - as we grabbed hold of Zionism itself we must cleave to this conclusion, with all our strength and will and faith.

Ben-Gurion saw partition only as an intermediate stage in the establishment of the Jewish state. He accepted it 'on the basis of the assumption that after we build up a strong force following the establishment of the state, we will abolish the partition of the country and we will expand to the whole Land of Israel'

However, while Ben-Gurion was in favor of the Peel plan, he and other Zionist leaders considered it important that it be publicized as a British plan and not a Zionist plan. To this end, Morris quotes Moshe Sharett, director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, who said (during a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive on 7 May 1944 to consider the British Labour Party Executive's resolution supporting transfer):"Transfer could be the crowning achievements, the final stage in the development of [our] policy, but certainly not the point of departure. By [speaking publicly and prematurely] we could mobilizing vast forces against the matter and cause it to fail, in advance. […] What will happen once the Jewish state is established - it is very possible that the result will be the transfer of Arabs''."

All of the other members of the JAE present, including Yitzhak Gruenbaum (later Israel's first interior minister), Eliahu Dobkin (director of the immigration department), Eliezer Kaplan (Israel's first finance minister), Dov Joseph (later Israel's justice minister) and Werner David Senator (a Hebrew University executive) spoke favorably of the transfer principle.

At the twentieth Zionist Congress, held in Zurich in August 1937, the plan was discussed and rejected on the ground that a larger part of Palestine should be assigned to them. The 'in the last resort' compulsory transfer was accepted as morally just by a majority although many doubted its feasibility. Partition however was not acceptable for many. For instance Ussishkin, head of the Jewish National Fund, said:

"The Arab people have immense areas of land at their disposal; our people have nothing except a grave's plot. We demand that our inheritance, Palestine, be returned to us, and if there is no room for Arabs, they have the opportunity of going to Iraq"

The immediately succeeding Woodhead Commission, called to "examine the Peel Commission plan in detail and to recommend an actual partition plan" effectively removed the idea of transfer from the options under consideration by the British, and the 1939 White Paper proposed a complete end to immigration.

According to Masalha 'the defeat of the partition plan in no way diminished the determination of the Ben-Gurion camp […] to continue working for the removal of the native population' In November 1937 a Population Transfer Committee was appointed to investigate the practicalities of transfer. It discussed details of the costs, specific places for relocation of the Palestinians, and the order in which they should be transferred. In view of the need for land it concluded that the rural population should be transferred before the townspeople, and that a village by village manner would be best. In June 1938 Ben-Gurion summed up the mood in the JAE: 'I support compulsory transfer. I do not see anything immoral in it'. Regarding the unwillingness of the British to implement it, land expropriation was seen as a major mechanism to precipitate a Palestinian exodus. Also the remaining Palestinians should not be left with substantial landholdings.

The ‘Transfer Idea’ during 1947 - 1949
In early November 1947, some weeks before the UN partition resolution, the Jewish Agency Executive decided that it would be best to deny Israeli citizenship to as many Arabs as possible. As Ben-Gurion explained, in the event of hostilities, if the Arabs also held citizenship of the Arab state it would be possible to expel them as resident aliens, which was better than imprisoning them.

In Flapan's view, with the proclamation of the birth of Israel and the Arab governments' invasion into the new state, those Arabs who had remained in Israel after 15 May were viewed as "a security problem," a potential fifth column, even though they had not participated in the war and had stayed in Israel hoping to live in peace and equality, as promised in the Declaration of Independence. In the opinion of the author, that document had not altered Ben-Gurion's overall conception: once the Arab areas he considered vital to the constitution of the new state had been brought under Israeli control, there still remained the problem of their inhabitants.

According to Flapan "Ben-Gurion appointed what became known as the transfer committee, composed of Weitz, Danin, and Zalman Lipshitz, a cartographer. At the basis of its recommendations, presented to Ben-Gurion in October 1948, was the idea that the number of Arabs should not amount to more than 15 percent of Israel's total population, which at that time meant about 100,000".

In the view of Flapan records are available from archives and diaries which while not revealing a specific plan or precise orders for expulsion, they provide overwhelming circumstantial evidence to show that a design was being implemented by the Haganah, and later by the IDF, to reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish state to a minimum and to make use of most of their lands, properties, and habitats to absorb the masses of Jewish immigrants.

According to Ben-Gurion's biographer, Michael Bar-Zohar, "the appeals of the Arabs to stay, Golda's mission, and other similar gestures were the result of political considerations, but they did not reflect [Ben-Gurion's] basic stand. In internal discussions, in instructions to his people, the 'old man' demonstrated a clear stand: it was better that the smallest possible number of Arabs remain within the area of the state".

Flapan quotes Ben-Gurion several times in order to prove this basic stand:


 * After the flight of the Arabs began Ben-Gurion himself wrote in his diary, "We must afford civic and human equality to every Arab who remains, [but, he insisted,] it is not our task to worry about the return of the Arabs".
 * On 11 May Ben-Gurion noted that he had given orders "for the destruction of Arab islands in Jewish population areas".
 * During the early years of the state, Ben-Gurion stated that "the Arabs cannot accept the existence of Israel. Those who accept it are not normal. The best solution for the Arabs in Israel is to go and live in the Arab states-in the framework of a peace treaty or transfer.".

Nur Masalha also gives several quotes of Ben-Gurion supporting it:
 * On 7 February 1948, commenting on the de-Arabisation of parts of Western Jerusalem he told the Mapai Council: 'What happened in Jerusalem […] is likely to happen in many parts of the country […] in six, eight or ten months of the campaign there will certainly be great changes in the composition of the population in the country.'
 * On 6 April he told the Zionist Actions Committee: 'We will not be able to win the war if we do not, during the war, populate upper and lower, eastern and western Galilee, the Negev and Jerusalem area […] I believe that war will also bring in its wake a great change in the distribution of the Arab population.'

Flapan considers that "hand in hand with measures to ensure the continued exodus of Arabs from Israel was a determination not to permit any of the refugees to return. He claims that all of the Zionist leaders (Ben-Gurion, Sharett, and Weizmann) agreed on this point".

Criticisms of the ‘Transfer Idea’
The 'transfer principle' theory was attacked by Efraim Karsh. Karsh argued that transferist thinking was a fringe philosophy within Zionism, and had no significant effect on expulsions. He gives two specific points of criticism:


 * Karsh cites evidence supporting the idea that Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) did not agree on transfer of Palestinian Arabs but rather had a much more tolerant vision of Arab-Jewish coexistence:
 * Ben-Gurion's at a JAE meeting in 1936: "We do not deny the right of the Arab inhabitants of the country, and we do not see this right as a hindrance to the realization of Zionism ."
 * Ben-Gurion to his party members:"In our state there will be non-Jews as well—and all of them will be equal citizens; equal in everything without any exception; that is: the state will be their state as well ."
 * in an October 1941 internal policy paper: "Jewish immigration and colonization in Palestine on a large scale can be carried out without displacing Arabs," and: "in a Jewish Palestine the position of the Arabs will not be worse than the position of the Jews themselves ."
 * explicit instructions of Israel Galili, the Haganah's commander-in-chief: "acknowledgement of the full rights, needs, and freedom of the Arabs in the Hebrew state without any discrimination, and a desire for coexistence on the basis of mutual freedom and dignity ."


 * According to Karsh there was never any Zionist attempt to inculcate the "transfer" idea in the hearts and minds of Jews. He could find no evidence of any press campaign, radio broadcasts, public rallies, or political gatherings, for none existed". Furthermore, in Karsh's opinion the idea of transfer was forced on the Zionist agenda by the British (in the recommendations of the 1937 Peel Royal Commission on Palestine) rather than being self-generated..

The arguments made by Karsh again came under attack by the New Historians. Morris criticises Karsh for his conclusions on the Jewish tolerant vision towards Palestinian Arabs, he claims that "the author [Karsh] reaches this conclusion by quoting extensively from a number of Ben-Gurion's speeches and memoranda. But Karsh appears unaware of the fact that politicians say different things to different audiences at different times and that what distinguishes good from bad historians is the ability to sort out the (heartfelt) wheat from the (propagandistic) chaff. Karsh also fails to take note of that fundamental rule that what statesmen, politicians, and generals do is far more telling Ben-Gurion was both more than what they say and a more certain indicator of devious and more their real desires and intentions". Morris claims that "it is true that Ben-Gurion did occasionally say that the Zionist movement must be careful not to go on public record in support of transfer, because doing so could cause the movement political harm, and occasionally expressed doubt whether the idea was practicable". Further critics of Karsh thesis include Nur Masalha, David Capitanchik and Husam Mohamad.

To this Katz adds that the "fabrication" that Jews were responsible for the Palestinian exodus "can probably most easily be seen in the simple circumstance that at the time the alleged cruel expulsion of Arabs by Zionists was in progress, it passed unnoticed. Foreign newspapermen who covered the war of 1948 on both sides did, indeed, write about the flight of the Arabs, but even those most hostile to the Jews saw nothing to suggest that it was not voluntary."