User:Jameson.dimaio/Civilian oversight

Article Draft
'''Civilian oversight over militaries, mainly used in democratic governments, puts the power to take military action in the hands of a civilian leader or legislative agency. Civilian oversight of the military or state security forces is a key component of good governance'''. '''Giving power to the civilian component of the government over what a the military can do and how much it can spend the money given allows for the democratic process to be protected from abuse. Military legitimacy and effectiveness can be achieved if a country links democratic accountability to military professionalism. Security is a fundamentally political good provided by the state because it is based on a series of bargains about who will have power, how they may keep it, and how they may exercise it legitimately. Security is therefore not simply a matter of technology and materiel, nor is it reducible to the mere existence of capable military units. Rather, security requires the existence of a capable military controlled by empowered state actors, themselves accountable to the law and the population. Since in democratic societies there is public pressure towards transparency and public participation in all issue areas, and since democracy and liberalization/democratization have become major elements in the international normative order that even non-democratic states have to refer to, there is a pressure towards the democratization of security politics and of the armed forces themselves.'''

Definition and scope
Dr. Kuehn's evaluation of the consensus on civilian oversight in the military is as follows:"'A hierarchical relationship in which civilians make decisions that are binding for society as a whole, with the military responsible for advising on and implementing those decisions that have been delegated to them by the civilian decision makers. Consequently, the degree of civilian control depends on the degree to which civilians have the authority to make socially binding decisions, as well as sufficient oversight  to ensure that the military fulfils its delegated functions in the way that the civilians want (Welch 1976; Agüero 1995; Alagappa 2001; Feaver 2003). Accordingly, civilian control can be understood as that distribution of authority and oversight under which civilians are able to autonomously decide on all relevant political decision‐making matters, can delegate and repeal the delegation of political decision‐making and implementation to the military, and can oversee and direct the making and implementation of those decisions that they have delegated to the military.' "

Change In Political Attitude
The new trend shows that parliamentary oversight committees have existed only in the last two decades, revealing that the “parliamentarization” of the oversight of intelligence services started very late both in new and old democracies. Where scandals and new laws have out of a necessity to control problematic programs made civilian oversight a requirement over national security and law enforcement.

International
'''Internationally, in the developed world most democratic countries contain a well established civil-military relationship. While most new democracies have had to work towards establishing the same kind of relationship to avoid civil-military conflict:'''"'From a humanitarian perspective, civilian control increases the probability that militaries will operate with respect for the population because it increases accountability to that population. Democratically accountable civilian control is also associated with more prudent internal uses of armed force. Militaries with excessive autonomy from the state—or with largely party- or identity-based lines of authority—often engage in corruption or coerce the population with impunity. But shortcuts to civilian control can also undermine security. Coup-proofing efforts, for example, can empower civilians but make the military less professional and effective. Civilians need to have the capacity to manage the military closely and in ways that do not implicate the military in domestic politics. Competent civilian controllers in an empowered Ministry of Defense (MoD) also serve coordination and centralization functions, saving NGOs from having to conduct separate negotiations with different military commands and allowing them to work more effectively with the government. Thus, both the existence and the quality of civilian control of the military have direct impacts on the safety of the population and the success of humanitarian activities.'"