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Idaho
On February 19th, 1917, the criminal syndicalism bill was introduced into the Idaho Legislature with an anti-IWW speech introduction by Senator W.G. Walker.

Businesses which stood to lose the most at the hands of IWW, including lumber and mining interests, lobbied for the statute’s enactment. In March 1917, the Idaho state government enacted the statute. The Idaho criminal syndicalism bill served as a prototype for many other similar bills passed in various state legislatures in the following four years.

Initially, the rhetoric behind criminal syndicalism laws appealed strictly to business interests. After the United States entered the World War I, then Governor of Idaho Moses Alexander instilled nationalism rhetoric into the public discourse of the law, referring to the IWW’s opposition against United States’ participation in WWI.

In 1925, the Idaho legislature enacted a bill which outlawed non-violent attempts of sabotage; ”work done in an improper manner, slack work, waste of property, and loitering at work” became illegal acts. The organized labor opposed the amendment because the expanded definition of sabotage might be applied against recognized trade union practices.

Several Supreme Court verdicts later limited the applicability of criminal syndicalism laws in Idaho, and criminal syndicalism laws in Idaho became a dead issue.

California
Criminal syndicalism in California was defined as "any doctrine or precept advocating . . . the commission of crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of force and violence . . . as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.” Knowingly associating oneself with a group which advocates, teaches, or aids and abed criminal syndicalism could also lead to criminal liability under the California statute.

Violators could be punished by up to fourteen years in jail.

The bill’s enactment came after a series of events undermining IWW’s public image.

On July 22, 1916, a bomb exploded in the Preparedness Day parade in San Francisco. It led to the arrests of Warren K. Billings and Thomas J. Mooney – both of whom were associated with militant labor movement – and two others. The San Francisco public responded with an uproar.

Fresno and Riverside agricultural strikes took place in 1917, months preceding the California criminal syndicalism bill’s first introduction.

The first attempt of inducting the criminal syndicalism bill into the California law took place in 1917. The bill was a copy of the Idaho statute. Legislators found the term “sabotage” in the bill ambiguous and did not pass the bill.

In the same year, the federal government increased crackdowns against IWW on suspicion of the organization’s financial ties with foreign hostiles. The Department of Justice conducted raids on IWW headquarters across the country, including bases in San Francisco, Los Angeles and Fresno.

In addition to the protests, IWW was accused of sabotaging Fresno famers by burning hay stacks and covering raisins with dirt. The Department of Justice opened its Fresno branch in response. California State Federation of Labor also issued a condemnation of IWW. These events coincided with the bombing of the governor’s residence at Sacramento, which led to arrests of IWW members. The press began to pose a negative attitude towards IWW.

From 1917-19, tension between capital and labor grew. Strikes and IWW activities in key wartime industries increased. The California public invoked a patriotic sentiment and saw IWW as an enemy.

In January 1919, Senator William Kehoe made the second introduction of the criminal syndicalism bill in California. The introduction came five days after the trial of the Governor’s residence bombing, possibly to drown out opposition to the bill.

Governor William Stephens recommended measures to check IWW propaganda in the bill. Legislators included his proposed amendment in the final bill.

The proposed bill would outlaw labor organization which conduct strikes or boycotts with the intent of changing industrial ownership or control or causing any political change.

Representatives of organized labor, while supportive of the bill’s intent to reduce IWW influences, believed the bill could be used to imprison labor leaders should strikes or boycotts be used in industrial disputes. Labor leaders proposed an amendment which defined the punishable offense more definitely. The amendment failed to pass.

Governor Stephens signed the bill containing his proposed clause into law on April 30, 1919.

Constitutionality
Some argued that criminal syndicalism laws violated the United States Constitution.

In Whitney v. California, Anita Whitney’s lawyers argued that the law failed to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt. The majority Supreme Court decision rejected the claim on the basis that the statute in the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties…”

Whitney’s lawyers also argued that the California criminal syndicalism laws violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The law explicitly prohibited the use of violence to bring about change to industrial ownership, but not the use of violence to maintain the status quo. The Supreme Court rejected this claim on the basis that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was not a class legislation. “(The act) affects all alike, no matter what their business associations or callings, who come within its terms and do the things prohibited," wrote Justice Sanford in the majority opinion.

Whitney’s lawyers also argued that the California criminal syndicalism laws violated one’s freedom of speech. The Supreme Court used its previous ruling on Gitlow v. New York as a basis of ruling on this case. It maintained that states had power to identify and prohibit certain forms of expression that posed general dangers to the community and rejected the argument set forth by Whitney’s lawyers.

Justice Sanford applied the bad tendency test in his ruling. He opined that “utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow” were abuses of one’s freedom of speech, and that states may punish these actions.

Justice Brandeis wrote in his concurrence, "The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State." Brandeis argued that the government can prohibit speech advocating violent revolution only if the speech in question creates a clear and imminent danger of serious injury to the state in the particular circumstances of the state.