User:Jasonkwe/sandbox4

Peer adversary and near-peer adversary (as well as peer competitor/near-peer competitor and peer rival/near-peer rival) are terms used predominantly by the United States to refer to non-allied foreign countries with significant military power which might engage in a hostile conflict with the US on close to equal terms. These terms may be used within a framework that contrasts them with the terms peer adversary/rival, rogue state, and/or VEO (violent extremist organization). They are typically used in reference to China and Russia.

Overview
The US Department of Defense does not have a formal definition for "near-peer", though it can be informally defined by its relation to the term "peer adversary", which is described as "a nation or rival coalition with the motivation and capabilities to contest US interests on a global scale". Thus, a RAND paper defines a near-peer or "proto-peer" as "a state that is not yet a peer but has the potential to become one" while also further fleshing out the DoD's definition of peer adversary as "a state or collection of challengers with the power and motivation to confront the United States on a global scale in a sustained way and to a sufficient level where the ultimate outcome of a conflict is in doubt even if the United States marshals its resources in an effective and timely manner". However, even the definition of peer competitor is not agreed upon. Others have defined peer competitor to be a state which has the will and ability to "gain regional dominance in Europe or Asia" or confront the United States in a regional conflict, overcoming the United States' power projection capabilities in the region (rather than the DoD or RAND definition which specify contesting the US on a global scale).

These definitions do, however, typically agree upon the non-friendly relationship between the peer adversary/rival/competitor and the US. So, while they are typically used to describe China and Russia, they are not used to refer to powerful nations like the United Kingdom or France which are allied with the United States.

The terms peer and near-peer have been used in relation to the terms rogue state and violent extremist organization (VEO) along a gradient of power. Peer and near-peer are used for more powerful adversaries, like Russia and China, which could challenge the US; rogue state is used for militarily powerful Third World states which represent significant regional threats and has, at times, been applied to North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria; violent extremist organization is used for terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabaab, etc.

History
The first use of peer and near-peer emerged after the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there did not initially appear to be any nation or group which could realistically compete with the United States. The concept of peer/near-peer was envisioned but no countries were seen as being close to achieving the status at the time. As a result, much of the focus in the 1990s was on the threats posed by rogue states like Iraq, North Korea, Iran, etc. However, as the new millennium approached, thought had shifted back toward the threat of peer and near-peer threats. After 2001, though, American interests were mostly focused on the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, then the rise of ISIS. Only toward the latter 2010s did attention shift toward the emergence of Russia and China as peer/near-peer adversaries. Ukraine and the South China Sea (particularly Taiwan) were seen as likely locations for conflict. Warnings were raised that the US, which had been focused on COIN operations in the Middle East for the past two decades, would be ill-equipped to confront peer/near-peer threats in either of those regions.

The United States and its allies have identified multiple industries and technologies to improve upon to counter peer/near peer capabilities, including: night vision, multi-spectral signature reduction, ISR (including wide area motion imagery to provide persistent surveillance), bomber aircraft, UAVs and drone swarming technologies, microelectronics, cyber warfare, autonomous weapons, missile defense, directed energy weapons, and hypersonic propulsion. Counterproliferation efforts, like ITAR, have also been used to prevent sensitive technologies being accessed by hostile nations. Observers have also noted the importance of using these capabilities to counter the irregular warfare strategies and tactics used by specific peer/near-peer adversaries, like Russia's cyber warfare, China's economic warfare, and both Chinese information warfare and Russian disinformation.

Attention has also been paid to changes in training as commentators have remarked on the fact that for much of the 2000s and 2010s, the US was engaged in conflicts where they enjoyed complete air dominance. As a result, most use of JTACs, TACPs, and CCTs was in coordinating close air support. If fighting against a peer/near-peer, air dominance is not guaranteed and those specialists would have to utilize other skills which were infrequently used/practiced during the Global War on Terror. Changes would also need to be made to tactics, techniques, and procedures for using night vision as peer/near-peer adversaries have their own night vision capabilities.