User:Jaydavidmartin/Destined For War

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? is a 2017 book by American political scientist Graham T. Allison analyzing the Thucydides Trap and how it relates to an emerging China rivaling the influence of the United States. Allison pays particular focus to the possibility of war between China and the United States.

In the book, Allison catalogs the rapid economic growth of China as well as its rising political, military, and scientific influence; examines several historical examples of the "Thucydides Trap" (a trend towards war when an emerging power begins to rival a ruling power) to elucidate lessons that can be applied to current US-China relations; and explores the likelihood of war between China and the United States, as well as ways in which it can be prevented.

The book received significant coverage in the media, with praise and criticism coming from both the political right and left. It has also influenced a number of politicians, notably paramount leader of China Xi Jinping and former president of the United States Barack Obama.

The rise of China
Allison devotes part one of his book to cataloging the rapid economic growth and expanding political, scientific, and military influence of China. He notes first and foremost that since 1980 China has had exceptionally fast economic growth, averaging 10% annual growth between 1980 and 2017—a jump in gross domestic product from from less than US$300 billion to US$11 trillion. He notes that, in terms of purchasing power parity, China has already displaced the United States as the world's largest national economy, and goes on to quote the first prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, who says: "The size of China's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world."

Allison further contends that China's growing economic and political clout is resulting in permanent shifts in the international balance of power. He notes that China has become one of the world's largest creditors and the largest financier of international development projects, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative, and has sought to supplant preexisting international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (which were shaped largely by the United States) with its own set of institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS. Allison says of this: "Largess, economic imperialism—call it what you will. The fact is that China's economic network is spreading across the globe, altering the international balance of power in a way that causes even longtime US allies in Asia to tilt form the US toward China."

Lessons from history
In part two of the book, Allison analyzes several historical cases of the "Thucydides Trap"—a trend towards war when an emerging power begins to rival the influence of a preexisting great power. In chapter 2, he looks at the Peloponnesian War, in which he contends that the rising power of Athens relative to Sparta in the 5th century BC led to the Peloponnesian War. In chapter 3, he briefly looks at five more examples: the Pacific War, the ____, the Franco-Prussian War, the Anglo-Dutch Wars, and the Italian Wars. In chapter 4, he examines World War I, which he contends is a case of the Thucydides trap in which a growing Germany rivaled the British empire.

Athens vs. Sparta
In chapter two, Allison recounts what he considers to be the first instance of the Thucydides Trap: the Peloponnesian War, waged between a rising Athens and a then-dominant Sparta. This is also the war from which the "Thucydides Trap" is named, as the term comes from the ancient Athenian historian Thucydides, who detailed the Peloponnesian War in his famous work History of the Peloponnesian War. In particular, the term—which denotes a tendency towards war when a rising power threatens the supremacy of an existing ruling power—comes from a quote within Thucydides' History that reads: "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable".

In his analysis, Allison emphasizes the three drivers towards the war that Thucydides posited: interests, fear, and honor. 'Interests' refers to the desire for the survival of the state and the maintenance of its sovereignty. Sparta, in Allison's telling, felt its sovereignty threatened by Athens' "relentless expansion", which encroached on Sparta's allies. 'Fear' refers to the subjective and often inflated analysis of risks or abilities. According to Allison, "ruling powers' fear often fuel misperceptions and exaggerate dangers, as rising powers' self-confidence stimulates unrealistic expectations about what is possible and encourages risk-taking". He relates this to the Peloponnesian War by noting that Sparta became fearful of Athens' expanding empire, while Athens tirelessly expanded and demanded large gold royalties from its colonies. 'Honor' refers to a state's "convictions about the recognition and respect it is due". He relates this to Athens' sense of "entitlement" that it should be afforded far greater sway over Greece after its successes in the Greco-Persian Wars.

In sum, Allison concludes that: "As Athens grew more powerful and Sparta grew more anxious, the two countries chose paths that made it increasingly difficult to avoid war. As the stakes rose, Athenian assertiveness swelled into hubris; Spartan insecurity festered into paranoia...Proximate crises into Corcyra and Megara brought to a head pressures that had been building for decades. Thus Thucydides's Trap claimed its first victims. In spite of great statesmen and wise voices...the shifting balance of power led both sides to conclude that violence was the least bad option available. And the war came."

Five wars
In chapter 3, Allison recounts how a Harvard University study he led determined that in the 16 historical instances of a rising power rivaling a ruling power, 12 of them ended in war. He briefly examines five such cases:a rising Imperial Japan against the United States in World War II; Imperial Japan against Russia and China in ____; the dominant Second French Empire against the rising Kingdom of Prussia in the Franco-Prussian War; a rising England against the Dutch Republic in the Anglo-Dutch Wars; and the Kingdom of France against the Hapsburgs in the Italian Wars. Each of these, he claims, demonstrates "the basic contours of the [Thucydides Trap]", as well as demonstrate what he calls the "rising power syndrome" ("a rising state's enhanced sense of itself, its interests, and its entitlement to recognition and respect") and the "ruling power syndrome" ("the established power exhibiting an enlarged sense of fear and insecurity as it faces intimations of 'decline'").
 * The Pacific War: The Pacific War, fought between a rising Japanese Empire and an internationally powerful United States, is in Allison's telling an example of how contests between rising and ruling powers "often intensifies competition over scarce resources", which can lead to war. He recounts how sanctions imposed by the United States on Japan, peaking with the 1941 oil embargo, led Japanese leaders to approve a preemptive "knockout blow" at Pearl Harbor to ensure their supply of resources.
 * The Russo-Japanese War: Imperial Japan versus Russia and China:
 * The Franco-Prussian War: Allison considers the Franco-Prussian war, fought between the powerful Second French Empire and the rising North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia, is an example of "exploitation of the ruling power syndrome". He recounts how Otto von Bismarck manipulated French insecurities about the rising power of Prussia to coax them into a war the Prussians were able to decisively win.
 * The Anglo-Dutch Wars: The Anglo-Dutch Wars, fought between a then-dominant Dutch Republic and a rising England, are what Allison considers a case-study in the need to carefully manage the adjustment of existing arrangements, institutions, and relationships to "reflect a shifting balance of power". He calls this "transitional friction"—the discomfort that comes from a rising power believing institutions are not changing quickly enough to accommodate it, and a ruling power's belief that the rising state is "overreaching in demanding more rapid adjustments".
 * The Italian Wars: The Italian Wars between the Kingdom of France and the Hapsburg-led Holy Roman Empire is, according to Allison, an example of both the risks and rewards of furthering alliances to shift the balance of power. He recounts how King of France Francis I's establishment of the Franco-Ottoman alliance and the seeking of assistance from King Charles I of England to provide a bulwark against the growing power of the Habsburgs led to intermittent war. Allison says of this, "as states become more deeply concerned with preserving their credibility, they may take on new allies that end up hurting more than helping".

Britain vs. Germany
Allison devotes chapter 4 to analyzing World War I, in which a rising Germany threatened the then-dominant British Empire. In his view, tensions arose as Germany experienced "rapid, almost dizzying development in a very short time", but "saw its path to global greatness blocked by what it considered an unjust and covetous incumbent (Britain)". He recounts how, as with the United States and China in the present, Britain saw its dominance slip away to a more populous power as its share of global exports and manufacturing output plummeted, overtaken by German (and American) manufacturing. Britain also became increasingly worried as German electrical, petrochemical, and other scientific and technological industries began to surpass its own, and was particularly anxious about the German naval buildup, which led to the Anglo-German naval arms race. Germany, meanwhile, felt "shortchanged" as it overtook its rivals in these areas but lacked an expansive empire (like the British) or continental dominance (like the Americans). Allison comments that "During this era many other countries, including Japan, Italy, the United States, and even Belgium, set out on an imperial path...[but Germany had] the strong sense that because it had come late to the table during the rapid partitioning of the globe, it had been cheated out of its rightful due".

Allison identifies two "Thucydidean dynamics" that provoked World War I. The first was the naval arms race. Feeling threatened by an increasingly powerful German navy hours from the homeland, Britain began to "identif[y]...Berlin as its primary enemy". The second was a desire to prop up allies to ensure strength against multiple rival powers. This manifested in Germany's support of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne), to provide a bulwark against Russia.

Allison then compares the dynamics leading up to World War I with those today between the United States and China. He says, "like Germany, China feels it has been cheated out of its rightful place by nations that were strong when it was weak...meanwhile, like Britain, the United States jealously guards its primacy on the world stage, and is determined to resist Chinese attempts to revise the global political order".

A gathering storm
Part three is divided into four chapters. In the first, Allison contrasts the foreign policies of modern-day China with those of early nineteenth century America, when America was at a similar stage of development as China is today. In the second, he analyzes the goals of modern-day China under paramount leader Xi Jinping, and in particular emphasizes the 'Chinese Dream' of national rejuvenation. In the third, he revivifies Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory and compares Chinese and American civilizations. In the fourth,...

American hegemony
Allison devotes chapter five to analyzing America's aggressive expansion of power and influence in the early twentieth century, and asks the reader to imagine if present-day China were to behave as America did at its similar stage of development in the twentieth century. Allison focuses in particular on Theodore Roosevelt, who oversaw a significant expansion of US international influence and believed fervently in the righteousness of this expansion. He notes that America became heavily involved—often militarily—in Latin American affairs, and examines four events he considers particularly important to American power expansion: the Spanish-American War, enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, construction of the Panama Canal, and the Alaska boundary dispute.

Allison compares this to the modern day, saying "one can hear echoes" of the twentieth century belief in America's "duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are freed from their chains", which is now generally considered imperialist or even racist, in the modern day belief in America's duty to uphold the international liberal order". He also contrasts this with the foreign policy of modern China, saying that "the differences between Xi [Jinping] and TR (Theodore Roosevelt) are more striking than the similarities", and asks whether "if China were to become half as demanding now as the US was then, will American leaders today find a way to adapt?"

What Xi's China wants
Allison posits that the primary motivation of Xi Jinping, the paramount leader of China, is simple: to "Make China Great Again". In other words, Xi is "driven by an indomitable determination to reclaim past greatness". Allison outlines that the aims of this goal are:
 * 1) "Returning China to the predominance in Asia it enjoyed before the West intruded.
 * 2) Reestablishing control over the territories of 'greater China,' including not just Xinjiang and Tibet on the mainland, but also Hong Kong and Taiwan.
 * 3) Recovering its historic sphere of influence along its borders and in the adjacent seas so that others give it the deference great nations have always demanded.
 * 4) Commanding the respect of other great powers in the councils of the world."

Allison contends that these objectives emanate from a "civilizational creed" that "sees China as the center of the universe"—quite literally represented in the Chinese name for China:, which means "Middle Kingdom"—placing China as the central and dominant sphere of human affairs. He relates this to a longtime imperial Chinese foreign policy: the tributary system, in which the Confucian system of hierarchy extended to the political sphere, placing China as the natural center of civilization with other areas serving as vassals lower in the political hierarchy. He emphasizes that this policy sought to "maintain international hierarchy", placing China as the "apex of all meaningful human activity", but did not necessarily seek to expand its borders through military conquest, as was typical of Western powers.

He then discusses the effects of this thousands-year long creed abruptly ending in the first half of the nineteenth century, when Western powers and the Empire of Japan began to exert significant power over China through superior economic, industrial, and military might. This resulted in significant anti-imperialist sentiment in China, which felt shamed by a 'century of humiliation' and sought to reassert control over itself—and later reassert its preeminence in the region.

Allison then gives a brief overview of the life of Xi Jinping, who was born to a powerful Communist Party official who was purged during the Cultural Revolution, resulting in Xi being sent to the countryside to perform forced manual labor and in his half-sister hanging herself. These experiences, according to Allison, have significantly shaped Xi's outlook. Xi considers the era (in his own words) a "dystopian" one—but rather than reject the Communist Party, Allison contends that he became "redder than red", determined to "claw his way back to the top". Xi slowly climbed his way up the Communist Party ladder, ultimately becoming the successor to paramount leader Hu Jintao. However, against the design of the post-Mao Party, which sought to prevent the rise of autocrats, within two years of holding the presidency Xi had consolidated power within the party, purging rivals in an anti-corruption campaign and gaining the informal title of 'Chairman of Everything'.

Allison then discusses Xi Jinping's "ambitious" goals related to the "China Dream" of rejuvenating the nation, including its two Centennial goals, which in Xi's view requires "relegitimiz[ing] a strong Party to serve as the vanguard and guardian of the Chinese state", enforcing ideological conformity, and encouraging nationalistic pride. Allison places particular emphasis on this last point, arguing that Xi has rejected the Mao-era ideology of "subordinat[ing] being Chinese to a global (and decidedly Western) ideology" (Marxism-Leninism) in favor of renewing a sense of prideful national identity. He relates this back to the earlier Chinese views of China as the center of civilization, stating that "Xi is reinventing the Party as the twenty-first century successor of the imperial mandarins—the guardians of a proud civilization with a mandate to rule".

Allison concludes with a warning to America: "butt out". He cautions that America's position in Asia will become "untenable" and China will inevitably resume its place as the region's "historic superpower". He warns in particular of a potential military conflict around China, which he emphasizes is becomingly increasingly fraught for the United States as China builds up its military.

Clash of civilizations
Allison harkens back to Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory, which posits that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War era would be cultural differences—language, history, religions, customs, and institutions—rather than ideological, economic, or political differences. Huntington groups China and several other "Confucian" states into a single civilization, while the United States falls into Western civilization. Huntington argues that, unlike the predictions of people like Francis Fukuyama who believed the world was progressing towards universal values of liberal democracy, individualism, separation of church and state and free markets, civilizational differences would become more pronounced and would serve as the primary source of conflict.

As this relates directly to China, Huntington argued that there are five key differences between Western and Confucian civilization:
 * 1) Individualism versus Collectivism: That is, prioritizing individual rights over collective interests and having a general distrust of government versus prioritizing societal interests over individual rights and a greater degree of respect for authority.
 * 2) Multiculturalism versus Monoculturalism: That is, believing one's heredity does not define national belonging versus all people of a nation being united together as a single "race, blood, and culture" (Allison notes in particular that Chinese civilization views all Chinese-descended people, even those born abroad, as still fundamentally Chinese and even "in some sense" subject to the Chinese government, whereas western civilization has more fluid views of national loyalty).
 * 3) Universalism versus Civilizational Hierarchy: That is, believing certain values are universal and can/should be applied everywhere versus a belief that the Chinese civilization is the central civilization that all others are subordinate to (but those peripheral civilizations needn't necessarily adopt Chinese values).
 * 4) Interventionism versus Non-interventionism: Related to the point above, the belief in applying universal values everywhere versus the belief in non-interference in subordinate civilizations and in particular in demanding minimal foreign interference in Chinese civilization.
 * 5) Different scales of time: That is, Western civilizations—and particularly American civilization—prioritize present gains whereas Chinese civilization thinks of itself as a culture that evolves over millennia.

Allison then begins his own consideration of the similarities and differences between American and Chinese civilization. He concludes that both America and China have "superiority complexes", seeing themselves as exceptional civilizations. He notes that these complexes differ in some ways, however, as America views itself as the "greatest" among many civilizations whereas China views itself as the rightful "center of the civilized universe", surrounded by peripheral societies. He argues that the latter belief evolved out of Confucianism, which puts hierarchy at the center of order, and the historical belief in the Mandate of Heaven, which held that the Chinese emperor stood at the pinnacle of the political hierarchy and maintained order over China and its tributary states. He highlights how Americans views government as a "necessary evil" that threatens liberty while China views government as a "necessary good" that maintains order. He contrasts how Americans and Chinese view political legitimacy, with Americans viewing legitimacy as derived from the consent of the governed through a system of liberal democracy whereas Chinese view legitimacy as derived from "performance" (that is, from how effective the government is). And he notes that the difference in time scales fundamentally alters each country's self-conception, with American seeing itself as an "American experiment" beginning with its birth in 1776 and subsequent rise, whereas China, as a millennia-old civilization with no clear birth, rise, and fall, sees itself as a "fixture"—"it always was; it always will be". Emanating from this, he contrasts the different ways the two countries view war, with Chinese seeking victory not in a decisive battle but through improved incremental maneuvers to gradually improve their position.

Allison concludes the chapter by analyzing how China views the United States. He says that there is essentially a consensus among Chinese leaders that America is pursuing a grand strategy which he calls the "five to's": "to isolate China, to contain China, to diminish China, to internally divide China, and to sabotage China's leadership". He concludes that because of the American belief in universalism, the Chinese Communist Party has gathered that the United States will never accept its legitimacy because China is not a liberal democracy, and furthermore that it will not willingly concede its status as the preeminent global power.

Reception
The book has been widely reviewed in both news media and academic journals. It has also had influence within both the US and Chinese governments, even garnering comment from current paramount leader of China Xi Jinping. According to David Ignatius, it has received mixed acceptance among US government officials and has been "nominally reject[ed]" by Chinese Communist Party officials.

The book has received a number of positive reviews. In The New York Times, Judith Shapiro called it a "fine book...with wide-ranging, erudite case studies that span human history". In The Wall Street Journal, Robert D. Kaplan calls it "a brief but far-reaching book in which potted history is incisively deployed", and says that "one of the many strengths of 'Destined for War' is the restoration of the late Samuel Huntington’s 'Clash of Civilizations' theory, disparaged in the mid-1990s but subliminally gaining force by the day". Kirkus Reviews calls it a "timely, reasoned treatise by a keen observer and historian". Noah Millman, writing in The American Conservative, says that it is an "essential book" which "does an excellent job elucidating how Chinese and American self-conceptions may incline us toward conflict", and says that the "Thucydides Trap", in Allison's hands, "becomes a paradigm case for understanding the dynamics of power transitions and how those transitions can lead to wars that leave both parties worse off than if they had come to terms". The South China Morning Post called Allison a "first-class academic with the instincts of a first-rate politician" who "depicts plausible scenarios of how conflicts between these two superpowers could break out". Mark Wilcox, writing in Military Review, the professional journal of the United States Army, says that the book is a "must read" that contributes to "an understanding of the contemporary operational environment", and praises Allison for "reminding us of the value of a historical perspective—not simply the embrace of specific historical analogies—in grappling with security dilemmas like the relationship between the United States and China". John F. Cooper, writing for the Association for Asian Studies, says that the book "may entitle Allison to join the ranks of Francis Fukuyama (The End of History) and Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations), who offer powerful templates, if not plausible theories, to help explain current international politics". He further praised the book for providing an "easily understandable formula to unwrap the foremost strategic issue that faces the world right now".

It has also received a number of mixed reviews. Several, in particular, have faulted Allison's methodology in categorizing cases of the Thucydides Trap. Lawrence Freedman, writing in Prism, the National Defense University's journal of complex operations, calls the book "lively, readable, and in some respects alarming" but contends that the "case studies deployed by Allison tell us very little of value", arguing that Allison has misappraised the causes of the Peloponnesian War and the First World War and doubting that "try[ing] to find lessons from 15th century Portugal and Spain, or 17th century England and the Dutch Republic" is likely to be fruitful. Writing in the Financial Times, Gideon Rachman calls Allison's work "an important new book", but says that Allison selectively concentrates on the strongest examples of the Thucydides Trap, ignoring other examples in which "some of the...parallels raised by Allison seem to fit the Thucydides’s trap model less closely". Kori Schake, writing in The Atlantic, asserts that "in order to have a large enough number of cases to write a political-science book, [Allison] created 'transitions' among great powers that didn’t withstand rigorous examination". Still, Schake says that the book "served the worthwhile purpose of drawing us all back to Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian Wars and sounding the alarm that U.S. policies designed to confront China risked accelerating American decline."

Other mixed reviews contest Allison's belief that war is "more likely than not". The Economist deemed "Mr Allison’s overall thesis...too gloomy", saying "China is a cautious superpower" and pointing to China's "[limited] appetite for military adventurism abroad". Gideon Rachman, writing in the Financial Times, wonders whether the advent of nuclear weapons has brought an end to the Thucydides trap by "making it unthinkably dangerous for a rising nation to go to war with an established power", and notes that neither of the two post-nuclear Thucydides Trap conflicts ended in war. Arjun Banerjee, Dan Moran, and Lawrence Freedman, writing in the International Journal of Nuclear Security, Providence, and Prism, respectively, similarly question whether the Thucydides Trap applies in a post-nuclear world defined by the "massive destructive potential of nuclear bombs". Banerjee also faults Allison for not appreciating how the US and China are "fairly pragmatic in terms of their military-related decision-making" and for ignoring that the world today is becoming multipolar rather than a simple contest between two superpowers. Freedman further criticizes Allison for ignoring that China's "main interest has always been its regional position, and if that is the case, then there are strong arguments for it to show patience, as its economic pull becomes progressively stronger."

Conversely, some reviewers have claimed that it is Allison's view that war is avoidable that is faulty. Crispin Rovere, writing in the Lowy Institute's publication The Interpreter, says that Allison misunderstands present-day nuclear dynamics, citing his belief that the lack of credibility of a nuclear strike against China (in contrast to the Cold War, when the Soviet Union could credibly fear a nuclear strike from the United States) in fact makes war more likely rather than less. He also says that while Allison "beautifully articulat[es] China’s perception of the rivalry", he is surprised by "just how US-centric Allison’s ideas are for how conflict might be avoided".

The book has also received a number of mostly negative reviews. Ian Buruma, writing in the New Yorker, called the book the "worst" in a series of recently published books on China and argues that Allison's "grasp of history appears to be rather shaky". He describes Allison's rhetoric around China's rise as "like a mixture of a Thomas Friedman column and a Maoist propaganda magazine", and faults him for neglecting "the many problems that could slow things down quite soon", including China's aging population, its significant ecological problems, a stubbornness in the Chinese Communist Party that makes "necessary" economic reforms more difficult, a stifling censorship regime that slows innovation, and China's inferior military and system of alliances. James Mann, writing in The Washington Post, says that the book "is extremely uneven, a hodgepodge of borrowed history, gee-whiz cliches about current China", though does say that Allison "occasionally...[has] some genuine insights". He notes in particular that:
 * "The primary defect of the book is that it is weakest in the chapters on China itself. The view of China that Allison conveys too often reflects the distant, top-down view of outside elites, in which the Chinese Communist Party is all-powerful, enjoys public support and is firmly in control of the country...Xi has also been portrayed as the most cunning and power-hungry of China’s princelings, more Machiavelli than Mandela. There are prominent China scholars in the United States whose work Allison might have consulted (Minxin Pei, David Shambaugh or Roderick MacFarquhar, for example), who possess a much greater sense of the limitations and the weaknesses of the Chinese Communist Party."