User:Jazz Davis/sandbox

This will be the shared Sandbox for the article Davis v. United States (1994) TaLang (talk) 20:48, 15 February 2018 (UTC)

"Background" Edits based on Feedback

On October 2, 1988, victim Keith Shackleton was found beaten to death with a pool cue after refusing to pay a $30 bet to fellow sailor Robert L. Davis. A bloodstain on one of the pool cues in the recreation hall led Naval Investigative Service (NIS) agents to Davis. During questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” When asked by the interviewers to clarify his ambiguous request, Davis responded that he did not want counsel. After his conviction of murder, Davis tried to appeal, claiming that his right to counsel was declined. However, his conviction was affirmed when his request for counsel was reviewed, deemed ambiguous, and it was concluded that the NIS indeed clarify his intentions before continuing with questioning. Jazz Davis (talk) 02:34, 6 April 2018 (UTC)

Original Article Background: Davis, a member of the United States Navy, murdered another sailor when the victim refused to pay a $30 debt that was incurred by losing a game of pool. The victim was beaten to death with a pool cue. Only personally-owned pool cues could be taken from the pool hall and Davis owned two pool cues. Naval investigators found blood on Davis's pool cue and several people stated that they had heard Davis confess to the murder. Davis was taken into custody by Naval investigators and read his rights under Miranda. Davis confessed during the interrogation and then made an ambiguous request for an attorney by saying, "Maybe I should talk with an attorney." The investigators asked him if he did want one and he said, "No." Jazz Davis (talk) 23:37, 8 April 2018 (UTC)

"Related Cases" Edits based on Feedback

Davis’ case is not independent in legislative history. Many cases have dealt with ambiguous requests for counsel. Among these include Smith v. Illinois. Smith was arrested, understood his Miranda rights, and when asked if he wanted a lawyer, Smith responded yes. However, his request for counsel was deemed ambiguous because he continued to answer questions during the investigation before a lawyer was present, thus terminating his request. In the following case, State v. Demesme, defendant Warren Demesme’s request for counsel was declined when he asked “why don’t you just give me a lawyer, dog.” Under review, his statement was deemed ambiguous. In another case, People v. Krueger, Michael Krueuger claims investigators continued to question him after his request to counsel, thus violating his Miranda rights. His request “Maybe I ought to have an attorney,” was deemed ambiguous. Jazz Davis (talk) 02:34, 6 April 2018 (UTC) Jazz Davis (talk) 23:37, 8 April 2018 (UTC)

Reviewed "Opinion of the Court" Section after feedback provided:

According to the court, the interrogators opted for the clarification method. When Davis said “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”, the interrogators replied by saying that they will not violate his rights. If he wanted a lawyer, they would have stopped the interrogation. They wanted to clarify the intention behind his statement. When the interrogators asked for clarification, Davis answered that he was not asking for a lawyer. Therefore, the interrogators did not believe his request for counsel was ambiguous since Davis announced he was not requesting counsel in the first place.

Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor decided otherwise. She declared that the threshold of clarity approach was legally required for this case. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that an ambiguous and unclear request for counsel, such as David’s “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”, does not establish the right. The reasoning was that the defendant's rights under Edwards were not sufficiently requested with his utterance. The request for a lawyer must be clear and unambiguous. Justice O’Connor understands that fear, intimidation, and lack of linguistic and interrogation knowledge may affect the way the defendant requests a lawyer. However, she held that the Miranda Rights should be enough for the defendants to understand their right for counsel which lead to the decision that Davis’s request was ambiguous. Marimarst (talk) 03:24, 4 April 2018 (UTC)

Original Opinion of the Court from Article: The Supreme Court ruled that an ambiguous and unclear request for an attorney does not establish the right.

The reasoning was that the defendant's rights under Edwards were not sufficiently requested under these facts. The request for an attorney must be clear and unambiguous. Jazz Davis (talk) 23:37, 8 April 2018 (UTC)

Expand “Background” section draft:
On (insert date) Robert L. Davis, a member of the U.S Navy, was convicted of unpremeditated murder. The victim, Keith Shackleton, was found beaten to death with a pool cue after refusing to pay a $30 bet to Davis. A bloodstain on one of the pool cues in the recreation hall led Naval Investigative Service (NIS) agents to Davis. During questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” When asked by the interviewers to clarify his intentions, Davis responded, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.” Once he was convicted of the murder, Davis tried to appeal, claiming that his right to counsel was declined. However, his conviction was affirmed when his request for counsel was reviewed, deemed ambiguous, and it was concluded that the NIS indeed clarified his intentions before continuing with questioning. Intentions were clarified by the NIS by reminded Davis that he could either speak to counsel or remain silent, before taking a short break from questioning.

“Related Cases” section draft:
Davis’ case is not independent in legislative history. Many cases have dealt with ambiguous requests for counsel. Among these include State v. Demesme. Defendant Warren Demesme’s request for counsel was declined when he asked “why don’t you just give me a lawyer, dog.” Under review, his statement was deemed ambiguous, and the AAVE meaning of “dog (dawg)” was misunderstood. In another case, People v. Krueger, Michael Krueuger claims investigators continued to question him after his request to counsel, thus violating his Miranda rights. His request “Maybe I ought to have an attorney,” was deemed ambiguous. Jazz Davis (talk) 02:01, 5 March 2018 (UTC)

"Opinion of the Court" section draft:
According to the court, the interrogators opted for the clarification method. When Davis said “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”, the interrogators replied by saying that they will not violate his rights. If he wants a lawyer, they will stop the interrogation. They wanted to clarify the intention behind his statement. When the interrogators asked for clarification, Davis answered that he was not asking for a lawyer. Therefore, the interrogators did not believe his request for counsel was ambiguous since Davis announced he was not requesting counsel in the first place.

Even though the interrogators had chosen the clarification method as their approach to decide whether a request for counsel was ambiguous or not, Justice O’Connor decided otherwise. He declared that the threshold of clarity approach was legally required for this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that an ambiguous and unclear request for an attorney, such as David’s “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”, does not establish the right. The reasoning was that the defendant's rights under Edwards were not sufficiently requested with his utterance. The request for an attorney must be clear and unambiguous.

Justice O’Connor understands that fear, intimidation and lack of linguistic and interrogation knowledge may affect the defendants direct request for a lawyer. However, he believes that the Miranda Rights are sufficient to surpass those external factors and that they give the interrogator enough power to understand they can request a lawyer and cease the interrogation whenever they want. Marimarst (talk) 23:42, 22 March 2018 (UTC)

== Linguistics of the Case section draft: - please note that this section WILL NOT be added to the Wiki mainspace, upon the advice of the Wiki editor assigned to this article TaLang (talk) 00:52, 4 April 2018 (UTC) == Linguist Robin Lakoff has identified a powerless speech style, which is most often used by people who are less educated and of low socioeconomic status. This speech style is characterized by indirect speech, hedging, confirmation-seeking, conditional statements, and the use of questions to make requests. Davis’ request for counsel, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”, matches this powerless speech style, with hedging (“Maybe”) and the use of a question to make a request. It is this use of powerless speech style which made Davis’ request for counsel potentially ambiguous.

Linguist Janet Ainsworth has identified three approaches through which courts decide whether suspects have requested their right to counsel. The first is the threshold of clarity, in which the request for counsel must be unambiguous and is interpreted literally by the courts. The second is the per se approach, where indirect requests, which may be ambiguous, are interpreted as valid requests for counsel. The third is the clarification approach, in which investigating officials request clarification for any potentially ambiguous request for counsel. In the Davis v. United States (1994) decision, Justice O'Connor, in writing the opinion of the court, adopted the threshold of clarity approach, while acknowledging that requesting clarification for ambiguous requests is good practice, but not legally required. TaLang (talk) 01:22, 20 March 2018 (UTC)

TaLang (talk) 18:16, 28 February 2018 (UTC)

The threshold of clarity approach is disadvantageous to those lesser educated and lower socioeconomic status people who use a powerless speech style, which can potentially make their requests for counsel sound ambiguous.

TaLang (talk) 00:52, 4 April 2018 (UTC)

Draft ends here TaLang (talk) 20:02, 22 March 2018 (UTC)

Group proposal with professor's notes:
In this section, we would like to briefly explain Janet Ainsworth’s three approaches and Robin Lakoff’s powerless speech style. We will explain what Ainsworth’s approaches are (threshold of clarity, per se, and clarification) and that in Davis v. United States (1994), the court adopted the clarification approach. We will also explain what Lakoff’s powerless speech style entails and who is more likely to use this style. We will then explain that it is through powerless speech style markers that Davis’ request for counsel could be read as ambiguous (he hedged with “maybe” and made his request in the form of a yes/no (polar) question rather than a statement). This ties into the socioeconomic groups which are most likely to be denied counsel, on a basis of their powerless speech style and the court’s preferred threshold of clarity approach. Note from professor on this section – go ahead and work on this section, but please don't be surprised if a Wikipedia editor suggests modifying or eliminating the section in favor of a different organizational structure. The problem is, linguistics is our particular frame for understanding this case, but not everyone reading about the case needs to understand the linguistic perspective. This section is too brief, considering the importance that this case has for current cases of denied requests for counsel. We would like to read the opinions of the court from this case in their original form (the primary sources) and expand this section to include more details about the arguments as to why the court found Davis’ request for counsel to be ambiguous (beyond the linguistic approach detailed in our proposed “Linguistics of the Case” section) and why this supposed ambiguity meant that his request for counsel could in fact be rejected. This section is arguably more detailed than the “Opinion of the Court” section, but we believe it still insufficiently explains the details of the case, not even including Davis’ full name. We would like to read the official court documents from this case (the primary sources) and expand this section to include more details such as Davis’ full name, the full name of the victim, and other salient details of the case. This also ties in to our proposed “Linguistics of the Case” section, as in this section it currently states that the investigators did follow Ainsworth’s clarification approach. That the court would later reject this in favor of the threshold of clarity is confusing when presented without further explanation. In this section, we would like to briefly mention similar court cases, such as State v. Demesme, People v. Krueger, and People v. Kendrick in order for readers to understand that the rejected request for counsel in Davis v. United States (1994) is not an isolated case. We would like to show that courts classifying requests for counsel as ambiguous is common in the United States court system. TaLang (talk) 20:07, 26 February 2018 (UTC)
 * Add “Linguistics of the Case” section (this bullet point will be completed by Talia Lang)
 * Expand “Opinion of the Court” section (this bullet point will be completed by Marimar Suarez)
 * Expand “Background” section (this bullet point will be completed by Jazmyn Dupuis)
 * Add a “Related Cases” section (this bullet point will be completed by Jazmyn Dupuis)

These are the sources we all found for our article - do you guys think that we need more, or are these good for our group bibliography, at least for a start? Solan, L. & Tiersma, P. (2005). Speaking of crime: The language of criminal justice. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ISBN: 978-0226767932 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-1949.ZO.html https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=6835&context=jclc TaLang (talk) 02:54, 27 February 2018 (UTC)

By reading what I wrote and what Talia wrote, there seems to be a misconception as to what time of ambiguity approach the interrogators chose. In the source I read it says the clarification approach and in the one Talia read it mentions that it was the threshold approach. I believe that when we all look for more references, we'll be able to have more clear information as to the correct approach. I guess this is why the case is controversial. Marimarst (talk) 19:05, 28 February 2018 (UTC) If you look at the Cornell source (at the bottom of this page), Justice O'Connor's opinion of the court says, "the suspect must unambiguously request counsel". The way I see it, O'Connor is accepting the threshold approach but acknowledging that asking for clarification can be helpful, but isn't necessary under the law. TaLang (talk) 20:26, 19 March 2018 (UTC)

Opinion of the Court section draft:
In 1993, the United States Court of Military Appeals recognized that there are three approaches courts have developed to determine whether a suspects’ request for a lawyer is ambiguous or not. The approach is that the interrogation has to stop at the moment the defendant mentions the need for counsel. The second one is defining a threshold of clarity to determine if the request was ambiguous. If the request does not meet the requirements, it is classified as ambiguous. Finally, the third one holds that the interrogation must stop whenever the defendant mentions the need for counsel, but the interrogators can ask preceding questions to clarify if the defendant wants a lawyer. According to the court, the interrogators opted for the third option. When Davis said “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer”, the interrogators replied by saying that they will not violate his rights. If he wants a lawyer, they will stop the interrogation. They wanted to clarify the intention behind his statement. When the interrogators asked for clarification, Davis answered that he was not asking for a lawyer.

Due to these events, the Supreme Court ruled that an ambiguous and unclear request for an attorney does not establish the right. The reasoning was that the defendant's rights under Edwards were not sufficiently requested under these facts. The request for an attorney must be clear and unambiguous.

Justice O’Connor understands that fear, intimidation and lack of linguistic and interrogation knowledge may affect the interrogators direct request for a lawyer. However, he believes that the Miranda Rights are sufficient to underscore those external factors and that they give the interrogator enough power to understand they can request a lawyer and cease the interrogation whenever they want. Marimarst (talk) 19:00, 28 February 2018 (UTC)