User:Jean-Jacques Georges/drafts/Mihailovic

Dragoljub "Draža" Mihailović, also written Mihailovich, Mihajlovic, Mihajlovich, Mihailovitch or Mahailovic among other transcriptions (Cyrillic script: Драгољуб "Дража" Михаиловић; also known as "Чича Дража" or "Čiča Draža", meaning "uncle Draža"; April 27, 1893 - July 17, 1946) was a officer in the Kingdom of Serbia's army, then in the Royal Yugoslav Army, who took part in the two Balkan Wars, and later in World War I and World War II. After the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis Powers, he founded a resistance movement known colloquially as the Chetniks, considered to have been the first resistance group in Nazi-occupied Europe. Mihailović was then made a General and named Minister of war of King Peter II's government in exile. The Chetnik organization, initially supported by the United Kingdom, soon found itself in conflict with the Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito. Part of the various Chetnik groups gradually fought more against the Communist-led Partisans than against the Axis occupiers, some of them becoming auxiliary militias for the Italian and German troops, with Mihailović occasionally condoning their collaboration as a mean to defeat the communists. The Allies came to consider that Mihailović and the Chetniks were at best ineffectual, and shifted their support to the Partisans.

After the war, Mihailović was captured, tried and convicted of high treason and war crimes by the Communist Yugoslav authorities, and was consequently executed by firing squad. The role of Mihailović during the war is disputed : while some authors claim that he was an unsung resistance hero, ultimately betrayed by the Allies , others concentrate on the accusations of collaboration against him  , and others give a nuanced version of his actions. His place in History remains controversial.

Early life and military career
Born in Ivanjica, Kingdom of Serbia, Mihailović was the son of a Court clerk. Orphaned at seven, he was raised by his paternal uncle in Belgrade. Both his uncles were military officers and he himself joined the Serbian military academy in October 1910. He fought as a cadet in the Balkan Wars 1912–1913. At the end of the First Balkan War, he was awarded the Silver Medal of valor. At the end of the Second Balkan War, during which he mainly led operations along the Albanian border, he was given rank of Second Lieutenant as the top soldier in his class, ranked sixth at the Serbian military academy. He served in World War I and together with the Serbian Army marched through Albania in 1915 during the long retreat. He later received several decorations for his achievements on the Salonica front. He was appointed to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' Royal guard but had to leave his position in 1920 after taking part in a public argument between Communist and nationalist sympathizers. He was affected to Skopje. In 1921, he was admitted to the Superior Military Academy of Belgrade. In 1923, having finished his studies, he was promoted as an assistant to the military staff, along with the fifteen other best alumni of his promotion. In 1930, he was made a Lieutenant Colonel : that same year, he spent three months in Paris, France, following classes at the École Militaire. Some authors have asserted that he met and befriended Charles de Gaulle during his stay, although there is no proof of this. He was appointed in 1935 in Sofia, as a military attaché to the Kingdom of Bulgaria. On september 6, 1935, he achieved the rank of Colonel. Mihailović then came in contact with members of Zveno and considered taking part in a plot aiming to provoke Boris III's abdication and set up an alliance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. But, being untrained as a spy, he was soon identified by Bulgarian authorities and asked to leave the country. He was then appointed as an attaché in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

His military career almost came to an abrupt end in 1937, when he submitted a report strongly criticizing the Yugoslav Royal Army's organization. Among his most important proposals were the idea of dividing the Yugoslav Royal Army along national lines, into (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), and the use of mobile Chetnik units along the borders. Milan Nedić, Minister of the Army, was incensed by Mihailović's report and sentenced him to 30 days imprisonment. Afterwards, Mihailović was appointed as professor to Belgrade's staff college. World War II found Colonel Mihailović occupying a minor position of assistant to chief of staff of the Second Army. In the last years before World War II, he was stationed in Celje, Slovenia (then Drava Banovina). In April 1941, he was chief of staff of the Yugoslav Second Army in northern Bosnia

World War II
Following the invasion of Yugoslavia and the country's defeat by Germany in April 1941, a small group of officers and soldiers led by Mihailović escaped in hope of finding Yugoslav army units still fighting in the mountains. Mihailović planned to establish an underground intelligence movement and establish contact with the Allies, though it is unclear if he initially envisioned to start an actual armed resistance movement.

Formation of the Chetniks
For the time being, Mihailović established a small nucleus of officers with an armed guard, which he called the "Command of Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army". After arriving at Ravna Gora, Serbia on May 8, 1941, he realized that his group of seven officers and twenty four non-commissioned officers and soldiers was the only one. . He began to draw up lists of conscripts and reservists for possible use. His men at Ravna Gora were joined by a group of civilians, mainly intellectuals of the Serb cultural club, who took charge of propaganda.

In order to dissociate his forces from the rival Chetnik group led by Kosta Pećanac, who actually started collaborating with the Germans, Mihailović and his followers also identified themselves as the "Ravna Gora movement". Most of 1941 was spent consolidating the scattered army remnants elsewhere and raising new forces. The stated goal of the Chetniks was the liberation of the country from the occupying armies including mainly the forces of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Ustaše fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia. On June 19, a clandestine Chetnik courier reached Istanbul, whence royalist Yugoslaves relayed the information to their principals that a colonel Mihailović seemed to start a resistance movement against the Axis. In August, Mihailović set up a civilian advisory body, the Central National Commitee, including Serbian nationalist political leaders like Dragiša Vasić and Stevan Moljević. He also received the help of various officers from the rest of Yugoslavia, like the Slovene officer Rudolf Perinhek, who came to report the about the situation in Montenegro. Mihailović sent him back to Montenegro with written authorization to organize units there, and with oral approvals for other officers like Đjorđje Lasić and Pavle Đurišić. He only gave vague and contradictory orders to Perinhek, mentioning the need to put off civil strife and to "remove enemies". Mihailović gathered men and weapons in the easily defensible Serbian mountains, waiting for an Allied landing in the Balkans, upon which he could attack any Germans or Italians from behind. Mihailović discouraged sabotage due to German reprisals (such as more than 3,000 killed in Kraljevo and Kragujevac) unless some great gain could be accomplished; instead, he favored delayed sabotage that could not easily be traced. Mihailović established radio contact with the British in September 1941 : his first radio message was received on September 13 by King Peter's government in exile, announcing that the remnants of the Yugoslav Army were continuing resistance in the mountains. Even though Mihailović initially asked for discreet support, propaganda from the British and from the Yugoslav government in exile quickly began to exalt his feats. The creation of a resistance movement in occupied Europe was received as a morale booster. On November 15, the BBC announced that Mihailović was the commander of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, which became the Chetniks' official name.

Though Mihailović's who were initially the first to go underground, and had had defensive encounters with the Germans, reprisals and the tales of the massacres in the Independent State of Croatia made them reluctant to go immediately into armed struggle, except agains the Ustaše at the border. In the meantime, following the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia led by Tito also went into action and called in July for an insurrection against the occupiers, setting up their armed force which came to be known as the Partisans. At the end of August, Chetniks and Partisans both came into action, sometimes jointly despite their mutual diffidence, capturing prisoners.

Conflicts with Axis troops and Partisans
Mihailović's popularity soon grew in Serbia, surpassing the Partisans' : yet, he soon realized that his men did not have the means to protect the civilians in Serbia against German reprisals. On September 19, Tito met with Mihailović in order to negotiate an alliance between Partisans and Chetniks, but they failed to reach an agreement. Tito was in favor of a joint full-scale offensive, while Mihailović considered a general uprising to be premature and dangerous, as he deemed it would trigger reprisals. At the end of September, the Germans launched a massive offensive against Partisans and Chetniks. A joint British-Yugoslav intelligence mission, quickly assembled by the Special Operations Executive and led by Captain D. T. Hudson, arrived in Serbia just as the uprising was beginning to fail, and came first to Mihailović's headquarters and then to the Partisans' a month later. Tito and Mihailović met again on October 27 1941 in the town of Brajići near Ravna Gora in a final attempt to achieve an understanding, but found consensus only on secondary issues. . A few days later, the Chetniks and the Partisans came in open conflict : on November 1, the Chetniks attacked the Partisans' headquarters at Užice, but were beaten back. His troops decimated in Serbia by the clashes with both Germans and Partisans, not receiving sufficient weapons and ammunitions from the British, Mihailović found himself in a desperate situation. His representatives in Belgrade tried to extract weapons from the Germans to fight the Partisans, informing them that the Colonel was ready to "place himself and his men at their disposal for fighting communism" On November 11, a meeting, organized through one of Mihailović's representatives in Belgrade, took place between the Chetnik leader and an Abwehr official, though it remains controversial if the intitiative came from ther Germans, from Mihailović himself, or from his liaison officer in Belgrade. It appears that Mihailović offered to cease activities in the towns and along the major communication lines, but ultimately no agreement was reached at the time due to German demands for the complete surrender of the Chetniks. After the negotiations, an attempt was made by the Germans to arrest Mihailović. Mihailović's negotiations with the Germans were carefully kept secret from the Yugoslav government-in-exile, as well as from the British and their representative Captain T.J. Hudson. On November 25, the final phase of the German offensive against Chetniks and Partisans began. Tito and Mihailović had one last phone conversation : Tito announced that he would defend his positions, while Mihailović said that he would disperse. Faced with the impact of the German offensive, Mihailović decided to temporarily disband most of his forces and keep only a small staff. The remnants of his Chetniks retreated to the hills of Ravna Gora, but were under German attack throughout December.

Reorganizing the movement
Mihailović himself was on the run. He closed down his radio transmitter on December 5 in order not to give the Germans hints of his whereabouts. Determined to put Mihailović out of the way, the Germans launched Operation Mihailović on December 6 and 7, with the objective of capturing Mihailović and his Ravna Gora headquarters and to disperse the last Chetnik detachments. Mihailović narrowly avoided capture. On December 10, a bounty was put on his head. Having finally thrown off his pursuers and reunited with his staff, he kept a limited number of men with himself as he retreated in the area of the Rudnik mountain, for the next three months, until he went south and eventually to Italian-occupied Montenegro in May 1942. Considering that the failure of the premature uprising had proved him right, he sought to go back to his original plan of organizing a network of resistance and wait for an Allied landing. While he was unable to take action, left without troops under his direct command and pursued by Axis forces, Allied propaganda and the media hailed him as the new resistance hero, and built him up as the leader of a non-existent all-Yugoslav resistance (Allied propaganda around Mihailović in the following months was such that a movie titled Chetniks! The Fighting Guerrillas, starring Philip Dorn as a fictionalized and idealized Mihailović, was released in 1943 in the United States). On December 7, the BBC announced his promotion as Brigade general. Mihailović did not resume radio transmissions with the Allies before January 1942. On January 11, he was promoted as "Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Forces" of the government in exile.

Some of Mihailović's men crossed to Bosnia to fight the Ustaše, while most abandoned the struggle. About 2-3000 of Mihailović's men actually enlisted as a new kind of auxiliary "legal" Chetniks sanctioned by the Nedić regime. According to historian Stevan K.Pavlowitch, there is no evidence that Mihailović ordered this personally, but there are some indications that he approved : the legalization allowed his men to have a salary and an alibi provided by the collaborationist administration, while it provided the Nedić regime with more men to fight the communists. Mihailović also considered that he could, using this method infiltrate the Nedić administration, which was soon fraught with sympathizers of his "Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland". While this arrangement was different than all-out collaboration like Kosta Pećanac's, it caused much confusion over who and what the Chetniks were. Mihailović was still considered by the Allies, the Germans and the local population as the main resistance leader in Yugoslavia. As the conflict evolved, Mihailović's organization devoted particular attention to penetrating the Serbian State Guard and ensuring the allegiance of "legalized" Chetniks. Mihailović apparently considered for a time to become "legalized" himself : historian Jozo Tomasevich reports that, while still in hiding, Mihailović met Nedić's interior minister Milan Aćimović in March 1942. Aćimović reported to the Germans that Mihailović had proposed to put himself at the disposal of the Serbian government "for the struggle against the communists", but the Germans flatly refused.

In Montenegro, after an initial uprising against the Italian-backed government, the Chetniks had reached a modus vivendi with the Italians, who played up divisions between communist and non-communist Montenegrins. Mihailović had no control over the situation, nor on local Chetnik leaders Bajo Stanisic and Pavle Đurišić. In December, an impatient Đurišić tried to meet Mihailović to get instructions. His goal was to extract vengeance, not only against Ustaše and communists, but also against "Turks" (muslims). He could only meet Perinhek, who told him that the uprising had failed and that Mihailović was possibly dead. Đurišić nevertheless came back to his headquarters, claiming to have met Mihailović and to have received a formal appointment. The order had actually been signed by Perinhek, but Đurišić had Mihailović's signature transferred to it. He also came back with a lenghty order allegedly signed by Mihailović, and directing him to eliminate both communists and muslims. The instruction has been attributed to Mihailović himself, but Stevan K.Pavlowitch considers that Đurišić may also have forged this document The order's text included this section : "The mission of our units is: The struggle for the freedom of all of our people under the scepter of His Majesty, the King Peter II; The creation of Greater Yugoslavia, and within it Greater Serbia, ethnically clean within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, and Bačka; The struggle for the incorporation into our social structure of those non-liberated Slovenian territories under Italy and Germany (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, and Kaernten), as well as Bulgaria and Northern Albania with Skadar; The cleansing of all national minorities and anti-state elements from state territory; The creation of direct common borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandžak, and the Muslim and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina; The punishment of all Ustashas and Muslims who have mercilessly destroyed our people in these tragic days; The settlement of the areas cleansed of national minorities and anti-state elements by Montenegrins (to be considered are poor, nationally patriotic, and honest families). There may be no collaboration with the communists [the Partisans], as they are fighting against the Dynasty and in favor of socialist revolution. Albanians, Muslims, and Ustaše are to be treated in accordance with their merit for the horrendous crimes against our population, i.e., they are to be turned over to the People's Court. The Croats living on the territory under Italian occupation are to be treated based on their disposition at the given moment.".

The Serbian government of Milan Nedić publicly summoned Mihailović and other officers to surrender, then arrested their relatives, including Mihailović's wife. As the Germans intensified his efforts to capture him, Mihailović left Serbia for Montenegro in May, with his staff but without any troops. He appointed Miroslav Trifunović as commander in Serbia and headed for Sandžak. He tried to organize the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (as he increasingly avoided to use the term Chetniks), extending his contacts in the Independent State of Croatia to notables of the Croatian Peasant Party and of the muslim community. He designated a number of regional commanders and appointed delegates, but had little grip over local actors. Moreover, the task of reorganizing an "army", even a secret army, was a formidable one in Yugoslavia's situation. From May 1942, his radio communications were decoded by the Germans. While his organisation infiltrated the Serbian collaborationist administration, it was soon also infiltrated by agents of all sorts. Moreover, most of the Chetnik local commanders behaved like local warlords, with Mihailović, whom they recognized as nominal leader, being only a symbolic authority figure.

Activities in Montenegro and Serbia
In April 1942 Mihailović, still hiding in Serbia, resumed contact with British envoy Hudson, who was also able to resume his radio transmission to Allied headquarters in Cairo, using Mihailović's transmitter. In May, the British resumed their help to the Chetniks. Mihailović left for Montenegro, arriving there on the first on June. He established his headquarters there and, on June 10, was formally appointed as Chief of staff of the Supreme command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland. The Partisans, in the meantime, insisted to the Soviets that Mihailović was a traitor and a collaborator, and should be condemned as such. The Soviets initially saw no need for it, and their propaganda  kept supporting Mihailović. Eventually, on July 6 1942, the station Radio Free Yugoslavia, located in the Comintern building in Moscow, broadcast a resolution from Yugoslav "patriots" in Montenegro and Bosnia labeling Mihailović a collaborator.

In Montenegro, Mihailović had found a complex situation, with local Chetnik leaders Stanišić and Đurišić having reached arrangements with the Italians, and cooperating with them against the communist-led Partisans. At his 1946 trial, he claimed that he had known nothing about the situation before actually arriving in Montenegro, and had had to accept the situation as he found it. While Stanišić and Đurišić recognized Mihailović at least as a moral leader, but pretty much conducted their own policy. Mihailović complained the Italian intelligence was more aware than himself of what his commanders were doing. He tried to make the best of the situation, and accepted the appointment of Blažo Đukanović as the figurehead commander of "nationalist forces" in Montenegro. While Mihailović approved the destruction of communist forces, he aimed to exploit the connections of Chetniks commanders with the Italians to get food, arms and ammunition in the expectation of an Allied landing. On 1 December, Pavle Đurišić organised a "Youth conference" of Chetnik units at Šahovići. At the Chetnik congress, which according to Stevan K.Pavlowitch expressed "extremism and intolerance", nationalist claims were made on parts of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Italy, while the resolutions posited the restoration of a monarchy with a period of transitional Chetnik dictatorship. Mihailović and Đukanović did not attend the event, which was entirely dominated by Đurišić, but they sent representatives.

In the Independent State of Croatia, Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, a leader of pre-world war II Chetnik organizations, commanded the Chetniks in Dalmatia, Lika, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He led a "nationalist" resistance against Partisans and Ustaše and aknowledged Mihailović as formal leader, but acted on his own, with his troops being used by the Italians as the local Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (MVAC). Italian commander Mario Roatta aimed to spare Italian lives, but also to counter Ustaše and Germans, to undermine Mihailović's authority among the Chetniks by playing up local leaders, and to have possible links with Mihailović and the Allies in case the Axis lost the war. Chetniks, led by Dobroslav Jevđević, came from Montenegro to help Bosnia's Serb population against the Ustaše : they murdered and pillaged in Foča until the Italians intervened in August. Help was also asked to the Italians by Chetniks, for protection agains the Ustaše's retributions. On 22 July, Mihailović met with Trifunović-Birčanin, Jevđević, and his newly-appointed delegate in Herzegovina Petar Baćović. The meeting was supposedly secret, but was known to Italian intelligence : Mihailović gave no precise orders but expressed his confidence in both his subordinates, adding, according to Italian reports, that he was waiting for help from the Allies to start a real guerilla campaign, in order to spare Serb lives. Summoned by Roatta upon their return, Trifunović-Birčanin and Jevđević assured the italian commander that Mihailović was merely a "moral head" and that they would not attack Italians, even if he should give such an order.

Having become more and more concerned with domestic enemies, Mihailović concentrated from Montenegro on directing operations, in the various parts of Yugoslavia, mostly against Partisans, but also against Ustaše and Dimitrije Ljotić's Serbian Volunteer Corps. During the summer and autumn of 1942, Mihailović's organization undertook a serie of sabotages. In September and December, Mihailović's actions damaged the Serbian railway system seriously : the Allies gave him credit for inconveniencing Axis forces and contributing to their successes in Africa. Early in September 1942, Mihailović called through leaflets and clandestine radio transmitters from civil disobedience against the collaborationist Serbian regime of Milan Nedić : fighting resulted between Chetniks and followers of the Nedić regime. The Germans, whom the Serbian administration had called for help against Mihailović, responded to Nedić's request and to the sabotages with mass terror, and attacked the Chetniks in late 1942 and early 1943. Thousands of arrests were made and during December, 1600 Chetnik combatants were killed in German reprisals. This brought to an abrupt end much of the anti-German action Mihailović had been conducting since the summer. Mihailović then reverted to his previous strategy of avoiding open conflict and waiting for an Allied landing. In late autumn 1942, the Yugoslav government-in-exile became concerned about the rumors of collaboration and sent a message to Mihailović, who answered that he permitted no coollaboration with the Italians.

Mihailović had great difficulties controlling his local commanders, who often did not have radio contacts and relied on couriers to communicate. He was, however, apparently actually aware that many Chetnik groups were committing crimes against civilians and acts of ethnic cleansing : according to Stevan K.Pavlowitch, Pavle Đurišić proudly reported to Mihailović that he had destroyed muslim villages, in retribution against acts committed by muslim militias. While Mihailović apparently did not order such acts himself, and disapproved of them, he also failed to take any action against them, being dependent on various armed groups whose policy he could neither denounce nor condone. He also hid the situation from the British and the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile. Many terror acts were committed by Chetnik groups against their various enemies, real or perceived, reaching a peak between October 1942 and February 1943.

Relations with the British
On November 15 1942, Captain Hudson cabled to Cairo that the situation was problematic, that opportunities for large-scale sabotage were not exploited because of Mihailović's willingness to avoid reprisals and that, while waiting for an Allied landing and victory, the Chetnik leader might come to "any sound understanding with either Italians or Germans which he believed might serve his purposes without compromising him", in order to defeat the communists. In December, Major Peter Boughey, a member of SOE's London staff, insisted to Zivan Knežević, member of the Yugoslav cabinet, that Mihailović was a Quisling, who was openly collaborating with the Italians. The Foreign Office called Boughey's declarations a "blundering" but the British were worried about the situation and Mihailović's inactivity. A British senior officer, Colonel S. W. Bailey, was then sent to Mihailović and was parachuted in Montenegro on Christmas day. His mission was to gather information and to see if Mihailović had carried out necessary sabotages against railroads. During the following months, the British's efforts concentrated to have Mihailović stop Chetnik collaboration with Axis forces and perform the expected actions against the occupiers, but they were not succesful.

In January 1943, the SOE reported to Churchill that Mihailović's subordinate commanders had made local arrangements with Italian authorities, although there was no evidence that Mihailović himself had ever dealt with the Germans. The report concluded that, while aid to Mihailović was as necessary as ever, it would be advisable to extend assistance to other resistance groups and to try and reunite the Chetniks and the Partisans. British liaison officers reported in February that Mihailović had "at no time" been in touch with the Germans, but that his forces had been in some instances aiding the Italians against the Partisans (the report was simultaneous with the Third anti-Partisan Offensive). Bailey reported that Mihailović was increasingly dissatisfied with the insufficient help he was receiving from the British. Mihailović's movement had been so inflated by British propaganda that the liaison officers found the reality decidedly below expectations.

On January 3 1943, just before the battle of the Neretva, an Axis conference was held in Rome, attended by German commander Alexander Löhr, representatives of the Independent State of Croatia, and by Dobroslav Jevđević who, this time, collaborated openly with the Axis forces against the Partisans, and had gone to the conference without Mihailović's knowledge. Mihailović disapproved of Jevđević's presence and reportedly sent him an angry message, but his actions were limited to announcing that Jevđević's military award would be withdrawn.

On February 28 1943, in Bailey's presence, Mihailović addressed his troops in Lipovo. Bailey reported that Mihailović had expressed his bitterness over "perfidious Albion" who expected the Serbs to fight to the last drop of blood without giving them any means to do so, had said that the Serbs were completely friendless, that the British were holding King Peter II and his government as virtual prisoners, and that he would keep accepting help from the Italians as long as it would give him the means to annihilate the Partisans. Also according to Bailey's report, he added that his enemies were the Ustaše, the Partisans, the Croats and the Muslims and that only after dealing with them would he turn to the Germans and the Italians.

While defenders of Mihailović have argued that Bailey had mistranslated the speech, and may have even done so intentionally , the effect on the British was disastrous and marked the beginning of the end for British-Chetnik cooperation. The British officially protested to the Yugoslav government-in-exile, and demanded explanations regarding Mihailović's attitude and collaboration with the Italians. Mihailović answered to his government that he had had no meetings with Italian generals and that Jevđević had no command to do so. The British announced that they would send him more abundant supplies. Also in early 1943, the tone of the BBC broadcasts became more and more favorable to the Partisans, describing them as the only resistance movement in Yugoslavia - Bailey complained to the Foreign Office that his position with Mihailović was being prejudiced by this - and occasionally attributing to them resistance acts actually undertaken by the Chetniks. The Foreign Office protested and the BBC apologized, but the line did not really change.

Defeat in the battle of the Neretva
During the battle of the Neretva, the Italians heavily supported the Chetniks in the hope that they would deal a fatal blow to the Partisans. The Germans disapproved of this collaboration, about which Hitler personally wrote to Mussolini. At the end of February, shortly after his speech, Mihailović himself joined his troops in Herzegovina near the Neretva in order to try and salvage the situation. The Partisans nevertheless defeated the opposing Chetniks troops, who were in a state of disarray, and managed to go across the Neretva. In March, the Partisans negociated a truce with Axis forces in order to gain some time and use it to defeat the Chetniks. While Ribbentrop and Hitler finally overruled the orders of their subordinates and forbade any such contacts, the Partisans benefited from this brief truce, during which Italian support for the Chetniks was suspended, and which allowed Tito's forces to deal a severe blow to Mihailović's troops.

In May, the German intelligence service also tried to establish a contact with Mihailović to see if an alliance against the Partisans was possible. In Kolašin, they met with a Chetnik officer, who did not introduce himself. They assumed to have met Mihailović himself, but the man was possibly not the general, whom Bailey reported to be in another area at the same period. The German command, however, reacted strongly against any attempt at "negociating with the enemy".

The Germans then turned to their next operation, code-named Schwarz, and attacked the Montenegrin Chetniks. Pavle Đurišić appears to have suggested to Mihailović a short-term cooperation with the Germans against the Partisans, something Mihailović refused. Đurišić ended up defenfing his headquarters of Kolašin against the Partisans. On 14 May, the Germans entered Kolašin and captured Đurišić, while Mihailović escaped.

In late May, after regaining control of most of Montenegro, the Italians turned their efforts against the Chetniks, at least against Mihailović's forces, and put a reward of half a million lire for the capture of Mihailović, and one million for the capture of Tito.

Allied support shifts
In April and May 1943, the British sent a mission to the Partisans and strengthened their mission to the Chetniks. Major Jasper Rootham, one of the liaison officers to the Chetniks, reported that engagements between Chetniks and Germans did occur, but were invariably started by German attacks. During the summer, the British sent supplies to both Chetniks and Partisans.

Mihailović returned to Serbia and his movement rapidly recovered its dominance in the region. Receiving more weapons from the British, he undertook a serie of actions and sabotages, disarmed Serbian State Guard detachments and skirmished with Bulgarian troops, though he generally avoided the Germans, considering that his troops were not yet strong enough. In Serbia, his organization controlled the mountains where the occupation troops were absent. The collaborationist serbian administration was largely infiltrated by his men, many Serbian State Guard troops being actually sympathetic to the "Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland". After the defeat on the Neretva, Mihailović tried to improve his organization. Dragiša Vasić, the movement's ideologue who had opposed the Italian connection and clashed with Mihailović, left the supreme command. Mihailović tried to extend his contacts to Croats and traditional parties, and to revitalise his contacts in Slovenia. The United States sent liaison officers to join Bailey's mission with Mihailovic, while also sending men to Tito. The Germans, in the meantime, became worried with the Partisans' growing strength and made local arrangements with Chetniks groups, though not with Mihailović himself. According to Walter R. Roberts, there is "little doubt" that Mihailović was aware of these arrangements and that he might have regarded them as the lesser of two evils, his primary aim being to defeat the Partisans.

From the beginning of 1943, British impatience with Mihailović grew. From the decrypts of German wireless messages, Churchill and his government concluded that the Chetniks' collaboration with the Italians went beyond what was acceptable and that the Partisans were doing the most severe damage to the Axis.

With Italy's withdrawal in September 1943, the Chetniks in Montenegro found themselved under attack by both the Germans and the Partisans, who took control of large parts of Montenegrin territory, including the former "Chetnik capital" of Kolašin. Pavle Đurišić, having escaped from a German camp in Galicia, found his way to Yugoslavia, was captured again, and was then asked by collaborationist prime minister Milan Nedić to form a Montenegrin Volunteer Corps against the Partisans. He was pledged to Nedić, but also made a secret allegiance to Mihailović. Both Mihailović and Đurišić expected a landing by the Western Allies : in Serbia, Mihailović was considered the representative of the victorious Allies. In the chaotic situation created by Italian surrender, several Chetnik leaders overtly collaborated with the Germans against the reinforced Partisans : approached by an Abwehr agent, Dobroslav Jevđević offered the services of about 5,000 men. Momčilo Đujić also went to the Germans for cover against Ustaše and Partisans, although he was distrusted. In October 1943, Mihailovic, at the Allies' request, agreed to undertake two sabotage operations, which had the effect of making him even more of a wanted man and forced him, according to British reports, to change his headquarters frequently.

By November and December 1943, the Germans had realized that Tito was their most dangerous opponent : German representative Hermann Neubacher managed to conclude secret arrangements with four of Mihailović's commanders. There were cessation of hostilities for periods of five to ten weeks. The Germans interpreted this as a sign of weakness from the Mihailović movement : the truces were kept secret, but came in the knowledge of the British through decrypts. There is no evidence that Mihailović had been involved or approved, though British Military Intelligence found it possible that he was "conniving".

The British were more and more concerned about the fact that the Chetniks were more willing to fight Partisans than Axis troops. At the third Moscow Conference in october 1943, Anthony Eden expressed impatience about Mihailović's lack of action. The report of Fitzroy MacLean, liaison officer to the Partisans, achieved to convince Churchill that Tito's forces were the most reliable resistance group. The report of Charles Armstrong, liaison officer to Mihailović, arrived too late for Anthony Eden to take it to the Tehran Conference in late November 1943, though Stevan K.Pavlowitch thinks that it would probably been insufficient to change Churchill's mind. At Tehran, Churchill argued in favor of the Partisans, while Joseph Stalin expressed limited interest but agreed that they should receive the greatest possible support.

On December 10, Churchill met King Peter II in London and told him that he possessed irrefutable proofs of Mihailović's collaboration with the enemy and that Mihailović should be eliminated from the Yugoslav cabinet. Also in early December, Mihailovic was asked to undertake an important sabotage mission against railways, which was later interpreted as a "final opportunity" to redeem himself. However, possibly not realizing how Allied policy had evolved, he failed to give the go-ahead. On January 12 1944, the SOE in Cairo sent a report to the Foreign Office, saying that Mihailović's commanders had collaborated with Germans and Italians, and that Mihailović himself had condoned and in certain cases approved their actions. This hastened the British's decision to withdraw their thirty liaison officers to Mihailović. The mission was effectively withdrawn in Spring. In April, one month before leaving, liaison officer Armstrong noted that Mihailović had been mostly active in propaganda against the Axis, that he had missed numerous occasions for sabotage in the last six or eight months and that the efforts of many Chetnik leaders to follow Mihailović's orders for inactivity had evolved in non-agression pacts with Axis troops, although the mission had no evidence of collaboration with the enemy.

In the meantime, Mihailović tried to improve the organization of his movement : on 25 January 1944, with the help of Živko Topalović, he organized in Ba, a village near Ravna Gora, a Chetnik meeting also meant to remove the shadow of the previous congress held in Montenegro. The congress was attended by 274 people, representing various parties, and aimed to be a reaction against the abritrary behaviour of some commanders : the organization of a new, democratic, possibly federal, Yugoslavia, was mentioned, though the proposals remained vague, and an appeal was even made the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to join. The Chetnik command structure was formally reorganized. Pavle Đurišić was still in charge of Montenegro and Momčilo Đujić of Dalmatia, but Dobroslav Jevđević was excluded. Germans and Bulgarians reacted to the congress by conducting in February an operation against the Chetniks in northern Serbia, killing 80 and capturing 913.

After May and the withdrawal of the British mission, Mihailović kept transmitting radio messages to the Allies and to his government, but no longer received replies. In July and August, he ordered the rescue of about 250 downed allied airmen. Several Yugoslavs were also evacuated, along with Topalović : they tried to raise more support abroad for Mihailović's movement, but this came too late to reverse allied policy. The United States also sent an intelligence mission to Mihailović in March, but withdrew it after Churchill advised Roosevelt that all support should go to Tito and that "complete chaos" would ensue if the Americans also backed Mihailović.

In July, Ivan Šubašić formed the new Yugoslav government in exile, which did not include Mihailović as Minister. Mihailović, however, remained the official chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army. On August 29, upon the recommandation of his government, King Peter II dissolved by royal decree the Supreme command, therefore abolishing Mihailović's post. On September 12, King Peter II broadcast a message from London, announcing the gist of August 29's decree and calling upon all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to "join the National Liberation Army under the leadership of Marshal Tito". He also proclaimed that he strongly condemned "the misuse of the name of the King and the authority of the Crown by which an attemps has been made to justify collaboration with the enemy". Though the King did not mention Mihailović, it was clear who he meant. According to his own account, Peter II had obtained after strenuous talks with the British not to say a word directly against Mihailović. The message had a devastating effect on the morale of the Chetniks. Many men left Mihailović after the broadcast; others remained out of loyalty to him.

Defeat in 1944-45
At the end of August 1944, the Soviet Union's Red Army arrived on the eastern borders of Yugoslavia. In early September, it invaded the Kingdom of Bulgaria and coerced it into turning against the Axis. Mihailović's Chetniks, meanwhile, were so badly armed to resist the Partisans' incursions in Serbia that some of Mihailović's officers, including Nikola Kalabić, met German officers to try and work out a meeting with Hermann Neubacher and obtain his support. Milan Nedić, in turn, apparently picked up the idea and suggested forming an army of united anti-communist forces : he arranged a secret meeting with Mihailović, which apparently took place around 20 August. From the existing accounts, they met in a dark room and Mihailović remained mostly silent, so Nedić was not even sure afterwards that he had actually met the real Mihailović. According to British official Stephen Clissold, Mihailović was initially very reluctant to go to the meeting, but was finally convinced by Kalabić. It appears that Nedić offered to obtain arms from the Germans, and to place his Serbian State Guard under Mihailović's command, possibly as part of an attempt to switch sides as Germany was losing the war. Neubacher favored the idea, but it was vetoed by Hitler, who saw this as an attempt to establish an "English fifth column" in Serbia. According to Stevan K.Pavlowitch, Mihailović, who was reportedly not enthusiastic about the proposal, and Nedić might have been trying to "exploit each other's predicaments", while Nedić may have considered letting Mihailović "take over". At the end of August, Mihailović also met an OSS mission, headed by Colonel Robert McDowell, who stayed with him until November.

As the Red Army approached, Mihailović thought that the outcome of war would depend on Turkey entering the conflict, followed at last by an Allied incursion in the Balkans. He called upon all Yugoslavs to remain faithful to the King, and claimed that Peter II had sent him a message telling him not to believe what he had heard on the radio about his dismissal. His troops started to break up outside Serbia in Mid-August, as he tried to reach to Muslim and Croat leaders for a national uprising. However, whatever his intentions, he proved to have little attraction for non-Serbs. Đurišić, while leading his Montenegrin volunteer corps, who were related on paper to Dimitrije Ljotić's forces, accepted once again Mihailović's command. Mihailović ordered a general mobilization on September 1 : his troops were engaged against the Germans and the Bulgarians, while also under attack by the Partisans. The Partisans penetrated on Chetnik territory, fighting a difficult battle and ultimately defeating Mihailović's main force by October. On 6 October, what was left of Nedić's troops openly joined Mihailović. In the meantinme, the Red Army initially found no Partisans while entering from Romania and Bulgaria : they briefly cooperated with the Chetniks against retreating Germans, before disarming the Chetniks. Mihailović sent a delegation to the Soviet command, but his representatives were ignored, and ultimately arrested. Mihailović's movement collapsed in Serbia under the attacks of Soviets, Partisans, Bulgarians and the fights with the retreating Germans. Still hoping for a landing by the Western Allies, he headed for Bosnia with his staff, McDowell and a force of a few hundreds. He set up a few Muslim units and appointed Croat Major Matija Parac as the head of an as yet non-existent Croatian Chetnik army. Nedić himself had fled to Austria : on 25 May 1945, he wrote to general Eisenhower, asserting that he had always been a secret ally of Mihailović.

Now hoping for US support, Mihailović met a small British mission between the Neretva river and Dubrovnik, but realized that it wasn't the signal of the hoped-for landing. McDowell was evacuated on 1 November, and was instructed to offer Mihailović the opportunity to leave with him. Mihailović refused, as he wanted to remain until the expected change of Western Allied policy. During the next weeks, the British government also raised the possibility of evacuating Mihailović by arranging a "rescue and honorable detention", and discussed the matter with the United States. In the end, no action was taken. In January 1945, Mihailović tried to regroup his forces on the Ozren heights, planning Muslim, Croatian and Slovenian units. His troops were, however, decimated and worn out, some selling their weapons and ammunition, or pillaging the local population. Đurišić joined Mihailović, with his own depleted forces, and found out that Mihailović had no plan. Đurišić went his own way, and was killed on 12 April in a battle with the Ustaše.

On March 17 1945, Mihailović was visited in Bosnia by German emissary Stärker, who requested that Mihailović transmit to the Allied headquarters in Italy a secret German offer of capitulation. Mihailović transmitted the message, which was to be his last. Dimitrije Ljotić and several independent Chetnik leaders in Istria proposed the forming of a common anti-communist front in the north-western coast, which could be acceptable to the Western Allies. Mihailović was not in favor of such an heterogeneous gathering, but did not reject Ljotić's proposal entirely, since the littoral area would be a convenient place to meet the Western Allies, and to join Slovene anti-communists, while Germany's collapse might make an anti-communist alliance possible. He authorized the departure of all who wanted to go, but few Chetniks ultimately arrived on the coast, with many being decimated on their way by Ustaše, Partisans, sickness and hunger. On 13 April, Mihailović set out for northern Bosnia, on a 280 km-long march back to Serbia, aiming to start over a resistance movement, this time against the communists. His units were decimated by clashes with Ustaša, with Tito's forces, as well as dissension and typhus. On 10 May, they were under attack by the Yugoslav People's Army, successor to the Partisans. Mihailović managed to escape with 1,000 to 2,000 men, who gradually dispersed. Mihailović himself went into hiding in the mountains with a handful of men.

Capture, trial and execution
The communist Yugoslav authorities wanted to catch Mihailović alive in order to stage a full-scale political trial. He was finally caught on 13 March 1946. The elaborate circumstances of his capture were kept secret for sixteen years. According to one existing version, Mihailović was approached by men who were supposedly British agents offering him help and an evacuation by airplane. After hesitating, he boarded the airplane, only to discover that it was a trap set up by the OZNA. Another version, proposed by Tito's regime, is that he was betrayed by Nikola Kalabić, who revealed his place of hiding in exchange for leniency.

The trial of Draža Mihailović opened on 10 June 1946. His co-defendants were other prominent figures of the Chetnik movement as well as members of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, such as Slobodan Jovanović, who were tried in absentia, but also members of ZBOR and of the Nedić regime. The main prosecutor was Miloš Minić, later Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Yugoslav government. Mihailović appeared physically and intellectually weakened, possibly by torture. His answers were often incoherent. The Allied airmen he had rescued in 1944 were not allowed to testify in his favor. Mihailović evaded several questions by accusing some of his subordinates of incompetence and disregard of his orders. The trial shows, according to Jozo Tomasevich, that he had never firm and full control over his local commanders. A committee for the fair trial of General Mihailovic was set up in the United States, but to no avail. Mihailović is quoted as saying, in his final statement, "I wanted much; I began much; but the gale of the world carried away me and my work." .

Walter R. Roberts considers that the trial was "anything but a model of justice" and that "it is clear that Mihailović was not guilty of all, or even many, of the charges brought against him" though Tito would probably not have had a fair trial either, had Mihailović prevailed. Mihailović was convicted of high treason and war crimes, and executed 17 July 1946. He was executed together with nine other officers in Lisičiji Potok, about 200 meters from the former Royal Palace. His body was reportedly covered with lime and the position of his unmarked grave was kept secret.

Family
In 1920, Draža Mihailović married Jelica Branković : they had three children. One of his sons, Branko Mihailović, was a sympathizer of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and later supported the Partisans. His daughter, Gordana Mihailović, also sided with the Partisans : she spent most of the war in Belgrade and, after the Partisans took the city, spoke on the radio to denounce her father as a traitor. While Mihailović was in prison, his children did not come to see him, and only his wife visited him. In 2005, Gordana Mihailović personally came to accept her father's posthumous award in the United States. Another son, Vojislav Mihailović, fought alongside his father and was killed in battle in May 1945.

One of his grandchildren, Vojislav Mihailović, is a Serbian politician.

Legacy
Mihailović's role in history has been variously assessed. Jozo Tomasevich considers that one of the main causes of his defeat was his failure to grow in a professional, political or ideological sense as his responsabilities grew, making him unable to face both the exceptional circumstances of the war and the complex situation of the Chetniks. Stevan K.Pavlowitch also points out his failure to grow and evolve during the conflict, unlike Tito, and describes him as a man "generally out of his depth". Walter R. Roberts points out that Mihailović was defeated by his "basically static" policy of gambling all in the faith of an Allied victory, which caused the Chetniks' original aim to defeat the Axis to wither away, as they drifted into a policy of accomodation with the invaders in the face of the communist menace.

Due to the efforts of Major Richard L. Felman and his friends, President Harry S. Truman, on the recommendation of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, posthumously awarded Mihailović the Legion of Merit for the rescue of American airmen by the Chetniks. For the first time in history, this high award and the story of the rescue was classified secret by the State Department so as not to offend the Yugoslav government.


 * "General Dragoljub Mihailovich distinguished himself in an outstanding manner as Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslavian Army Forces and later as Minister of War by organizing and leading important resistance forces against the enemy which occupied Yugoslavia, from December 1941 to December 1944. Through the undaunted efforts of his troops, many United States airmen were rescued and returned safely to friendly control. General Mihailovich and his forces, although lacking adequate supplies, and fighting under extreme hardships, contributed materially to the Allied cause, and were instrumental in obtaining a final Allied victory." (March 29, 1948, Harry S. Truman)

Almost sixty years after his death, on 29 March, 2005, Draža Mihailović's daughter, Gordana, was presented with the posthumous decoration by president George W. Bush. The decision was controversial in Croatia : Zoran Pusic, head of the Civil Committee for Human Rights, protested against the decision and claimed that Mihailović was "directly responsible" for the war crimes committed by the Chetniks.

Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French Forces during World War II and later president of France, considered Mihailović a "pure hero" and blamed Tito for "murdering" him. Despite France having friendly relations with SFR Yugoslavia, including during his presidency, de Gaulle himself consistently refused to visit the country or to meet Tito in person.

In Tito's Yugoslavia, Mihailović was considered a traitor and a collaborator by official history. With the end of Federal Yugoslavia and the renewal of nationalisms, several serbian nationalist groups have been aknowledging Mihailović's legacy by calling themselves "Chetniks". During the Yugoslav wars, Serb paramilitaries often self-identified and were referred to as such. Vojislav Šešelj's Serbian Radical Party formed the White Eagles, which were identified as Chetniks. Vuk Drašković's Serbian Renewal Movement was closely associated with the Serbian Guard, which was also associated with Chetniks and monarchism. Reunions of Chetnik survivors and nostalgics and of Mihailović admirers have been held in Serbia. Mihailović's name and legacy remain controversial in Ex-Yugoslavia and are generally associated with Serbian nationalism.

In the late 2000s, efforts were made to locate Mihailović's grave.

Photos

 * Photo gallery
 * 100th Anniversary of Chetnik Movement

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