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Prematurity (Ripeness)
General Rule

The leading Singapore case on the threshold issue of prematurity is Wong Keng Leong Rayney v Law Society of Singapore (2006). Prematurity as an English administrative law concept was one of “relatively recent origins as the remedy-based approach of the common law has impended its coherent evolution”. The High Court judge in Rayney, VK Rajah J (as he then was), stated that a premature application for judicial review is one made before the actual decision-making process of the tribunal at first instance has been completed. He elaborated on the nature of a premature application by endorsing Jack Beatson’s view that
 * “an application is in danger of being premature if it will deprive a relevant administrative body of the opportunity of applying its expertise to the question at hand, whether that question requires fact- finding, the exercise of discretion or even, although this is more controversial, a conclusion of law.”

An application commonly found to be premature is one that challenges “interlocutory decisions, particularly those concerning the disclosure or use of evidence or other procedural matters, made during the course of a decision-making process.” The principle applies equally to disciplinary hearings.

With regards to such applications, Rajah J adopted the general approach in English courts that:
 * [I]t is only in the most exceptional circumstances that the court will grant judicial review of a decision taken during the course of a hearing, by a body amenable to the court’s supervisory jurisdiction, before that hearing has been concluded..

Policy reasons for the general rule

In Rayney (2006), VK Rajah J (as he then was), accepted the three policy reasons given by McCulloch J in Ex parte Mordens Ltd (1991). The three reasons for the general rule against hearing premature applications are as follows :


 * First, there will be delay. An already lengthy administrative process would be prolonged if it is continually stalled by adjournments in order for the applicant to seek recourse to judicial review. The delay would be further compounded if there is an appeal against the reviewing court’s decision. Such delay "will almost inevitably seriously interfere with the [administrative process] and very likely give rise to a risk to injustice."
 * Second, granting judicial review for premature applications could cause the relationship between the applicant and the administrative decision-maker to deteriorate. This may affect the administrative hearing adversely once the judicial review process is over because the administrative decision-maker resumes being “above and between the parties, rather than alongside one and against the other”.
 * Thirdly, judicial review may turn out to be unnecessary. This is because the party aggrieved by a preliminary decision of the administrative decision-maker may nevertheless be satisfied by the final outcome. For instance, a decision which was initially thought to be wrong or likely to have a material influence on the outcome may, in the final analysis, turn out to be have been correct or immaterial to the ultimate outcome. In such cases, there would be a waste of judicial resources and time.

Rajah J added an additional reason to the effect that if the inferior tribunal’s final determination is unsatisfactory, this raises the question “whether the applicant can still seek redress for the grievance before a superior court. The issue is almost invariably one of timing and not of irretrievable damage to an applicant.”