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The Elected President as an Intra-branch Check on the Executive
The elected presidencyPresident of Singapore represents an indigenisation of the Westminster model and is cast as a check against the powers enjoyed by the parliamentary executive, adding to the overall scheme of checks and balances in the doctrine of separation of powers. Nonetheless, the institution has a limited range of functions and is essentially reactive in nature, such that it cannot be seen to be an alternative locus of political power.

History and evolution of the Office of the President
Before 1991, the President was elected by Parliament for a four year term, and the office of the President discharged the ceremonial functions and exercised the formal legal powers associated with the head of state within a parliamentary system based on the Westminster model.

The transformation of the office of the presidency to an elective one in 1991 effectively split the executive branch of government, creating an institution based on an intra-branch scheme of checks and balances. The Elected President in Singapore thus possesses substantial powers in certain matters, but remains a titular chief executive in many others. In this sense, he is different from the typical elected chief executive in countries such as the United States and the Philippines.

How the president serves as an intra-branch check
The elected presidency has the power to block attempts by the government to draw down past reserves it did not accumulate, to approve changes to key appointments, and to exercise oversight over the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and decisions of the Executive under the Internal Security Act and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. The aim is not unlawful executive actions, but lawful actions against national interests.

Its impetus lies in the government perception that there were “inadequate checks in our present parliamentary system of government” as a political party with a parliamentary majority, even of one seat, “can do practically anything it wishes, provided it acts lawfully” in matters pertaining to financial assets and key civil service appointments. It was also thought that it would be prudent to institute a check “while honest men are still in charge”.

While the objective of protecting against fiscal mismanagement was agreed on, the method of doing so was disputed, with opposition politicians arguing that the parliamentary system would have sufficient checks if it were allowed to operate and flourish.

Efficacy of the president as an intra-branch check
To be an effective check, the elected president must be sufficiently independent and adequately empowered to change or at least block harmful or unsound government policies.

The independence of the elected president
The president cannot hold any other constitutional office; if he is a Member of Parliament, his seat is to be vacated. This requirement does not apply to someone exercising the powers of the presidency in the event of temporary disability or vacancy. The president is also required to resign from membership in any political party, reflecting the depoliticisation of an elective office. To ensure that the president’s watchdog function is unhampered by executive intimidation, the office is maintained out of the Civil List which shall not be diminished during the Elected President’s term. The Elected President is also immune from civil suits for acts done in his official capacity.

Powers of the elected president
The Elected President also shall have access to Cabinet papers and may request information concerning the reserves of the Government, statutory board or government company, and the relevant Minister, or officer of the statutory board or government company is under a duty to provide such information. The president may also “veto” certain executive decisions pertaining primarily to three areas: fiscal management, ensuring meritocracy in a corruption free civil service, and as a guardian over civil liberties where judicial review has been ousted.

The Elected President, however, does not have the “final say” over certain decisions for instance, in the appointment of members of statutory board, in Article 22A, as Parliament may activate an override mechanism with respect to the presidential “veto”, to break an impasse. The original rationale was the override mechanism should only apply to matters falling within parliamentary purview, such as supply bills. Any disputes in respect of the budgets of statutory boards and government companies would be resolved between the President and executive through fresh submissions of budgets or new nominees for appointments.

In the interests of fine-tuning the Elected Presidency provisions, with the agreement of the Elected President, Prime Minister Goh in 1996 moved an Amendment Bill designed to extend the override mechanism to appointments to key civil service appointments, and the boards of key statutory boards and Fifth Schedule government companies. The desire to extend the override mechanism was to cater to situations where disagreement over appointments between the Executive and President were “one of judgment, rather than a black and white case of an unfit candidate”. If all the Government could do was to put up a fresh nominee, the fear was that “we may well end up with an inferior candidate” and it was preferable to have that override mechanism to break the impasse. The President may, pursuant to Article 100 check the power of the executive in attempting to circumvent or curtail the President’s power by referring to a tribunal to consider the effect of such a bill on any provision of the constitution. However, the President lacks power to refer a question to the tribunal if the cabinet does not assent.

Evaluation of the efficacy of the president
As observed by notable academics, the override mechanism shows that the Elected President is no obstacle to a government which continues to enjoy untrammelled power so long as it controls a clear two-thirds parliamentary majority which is able to amend the Constitution at will. The weaker the Government is, the stronger the presidential check is, and the stronger the Government, the weaker the presidential blocking mechanism.

The Presidential Council of Minority Rights as an Intra-branch Check on the Legislature
As mentioned earlier, Singapore has a unicameral legislature and does not follow the division of legislative authority between an upper, and a lower house, unlike some other jurisdictions.

Nevertheless, the establishment of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, as provided for in the Constitution, could be seen as a quasi- Second Chamber as suggested by academics, as it plays a role in legislative review, highlighting Bills containing differentiating measures, guarding the interests of racial and religious minorities. The general function of the Presidential Council of Minority Rights is to consider and report on matters affecting persons of any racial or religious community in Singapore which Parliament refers to it, not being a roving body. It is also a particular function of the Presidential Council of Minority Rights to draw attention to any Bill or subsidiary legislation which might possibly contain “differentiating measures”. Article 68 of the Constitutions defines “differentiating measures” as: "“…any measure which is, or is likely in it practical application to be disadvantageous to 	persons of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of 	other such communities, either directly by prejudicing persons of that community or 	indirectly by giving advantage to persons of another community.”"

If a “differentiating measure” is found, the Presidential Council of Minority Rights can make an adverse report to the Speaker who will present the bill to Parliament for Amendment. The check exists in Art 78(6)(a) that provides that such a Bill cannot be presented to the President for assent unless the Speaker certifies that it is free of “differentiating measures”.

However, Parliament can easily circumvent this as notwithstanding an adverse report, the Bill can be presented to the President if two-thirds of Parliament endorses a motion for Bill presentation. The Presidential Council of Minority Rights’ powers of legislative revision are further attenuated by Art 78(7) which designates certain types of Bills as falling without the ambit of Presidential Council of Minority Rights scrutiny. Thus the Presidential Council of Minority Rights could be said to be a weak institution that lacks coercive power.