User:Jesperniemann/News Broadcasting and Terrorism

Introduction
Many scholars agree that one of the main purposes of terrorism is to send a message, to communicate with an audience, and to have some impact on this audience. In this day and age, with 24-hour international news broadcasters, one of the best ways of accessing a huge audience is via television. A study from 1978 concluded that television news broadcasting was the only news source for one-third of Americans, and the main news source for around two-thirds of the population. This figure has only increased since then. Likewise, “it has even been quipped that ‘CNN (a commercial station) runs ten minutes ahead of NSA’.” Thus the television medium is an incredibly important tool in the fight for and against terrorism, with both sides attempting to use news broadcasts to their advantage.

Dawson’s Field Hijacking
The first example of a terrorist event “staged” for the television media, where the hostage-takers, the PFLP, organized a press conference where reporters and television crews were allowed to interview the hostages. These scenes were then broadcast to millions across the world, and also served to “impress the five blackmailed governments to give in to at least some of the terrorists’ demands.” Eventually three of the governments did give in. The hijacked planes were subsequently blown up, and the film sequence showing this was also broadcast across the globe, providing even more free publicity for the PFLP.

Munich Massacre
The hostage-taking during the 1972 Munich Olympics was groundbreaking in terms of television coverage of a terrorist event, as it is estimated that over 800 million people watched the events unfold. It was also new for terrorists to “intrude on somebody else’s media event”. Although the terrorist event itself was unsuccessful, with all hostages and 5 of the 8 terrorists killed, millions of people were now aware of the Palestinian cause.

The Abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer
The president of the German association of entrepreneurs was kidnapped in 1977 by the Rote Armee Fraktion. Following previous hostage-takings in Germany where terrorists managed to dictate the actions of the German media (especially TV), the government imposed a news embargo that was mostly successful, with only a few of the 140 communications sent to three dozen different media outlets actually made public. Nonetheless, after being held captive for 45 days Schleyer was killed by his captors.

The Iran Hostage Crisis
The crisis lasted for 444 days, during which time television news coverage devoted to the hostage-taking varied in both number of stories and tone. At the beginning of the crisis, in November and December, the majority of the CBS Evening News leading story coverage centered on the “Golden Triangle” news beats consisting of the White House, Department of State, and the Department of Defense. As the crisis wore on, CBS Evening News sent more reports from Teheran, Iran, than from domestic sources, however the overall number of stories decreased. Likewise, as time passed the tone of the news reports began to change. Whereas at first there was only support for President Carter and his administration, as the crisis wore on the lead stories became more critical in tone, including interviews with angry family members of the hostages, concurrent with the increasing public frustration over President Carter’s handling of the situation. Whether the television news reports were the cause of this or merely an effect of it is difficult to determine. There exist claims that the crisis was a major factor in President Carter’s subsequent defeat in the 1980 Presidential Election, perhaps another example of television broadcasting’s ability to influence public policy and politics.

September 11th 2001
The attacks on September 11th are claimed to be “the most documented event in history”, and the “terror spectacle took over [American] TV programming for the next three days without commercial break[s]”. Likewise, numerous media companies broadcast news coverage from their news channels on the other channels they owned, be they sports or music or entertainment-based channels. The planners behind the attacks, some allege, were very aware of the necessity of news broadcasters covering the event, ensuring that one of the two aircraft that took off almost simultaneously from Boston was delayed, such that “every television camera in New York” would be capturing the events as the second plane crashed into the North Tower. The number of terrorism-related stories on the three major American networks (CBS, NBC, ABC) over a 12-month period went from 178 before September 11th to 1345 afterwards. Research done by advertising agencies shortly after 9/11 appeared to show that viewers were “becoming increasingly cynical about the news media”, with many “unhappy with the slick TV presentation of the New York disaster”. “What was already an overwhelmingly powerful news event was made to appear like the Olympics of terror to many viewers, with flashy graphics and instant replays.”

Effects on Viewers
It is difficult to measure or even determine all the effects terrorism-related news stories have on the public. However, research conducted by US-based think tank RAND showed that in 1989, 14 percent of Americans feared that they would be the victims of skyjackings or blown up by a bomb on board a plane. The actual probability of a skyjacking occurring is 0.001 per cent (or 1 in every 100,000 people.) Although television may affect how much people fear terrorism, research conducted seems to show that it does not affect their views on terrorism.

Contagion Theory
News broadcasters are often criticized for broadcasting news regarding terrorism and terrorist acts. The supporters of what is known as the Contagion Theory argue that the media: Contagion theorists also maintain that terrorists are often portrayed in a sympathetic manner by the media, and that news coverage increases support for the terrorists. Critics of the Contagion theory argue that studies and research have not proven any “cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism,” and likewise they argue public awareness of a terrorist group is not the same as public support or legitimacy. Critics also claim that studies of news broadcasting show that the press often neglects to present the plight of the terrorists, preferring to focus on sensational aspects rather than explanations, and therefore do not actually help the terrorists. Some researchers state that the desire to gain media attention leads to an escalation effect rather than a contagion effect.
 * Provide terrorists with exposure to the public
 * Legitamise the terrorists’ cause
 * Supply information about tactics and strategies to other terrorists

Controlling News Broadcasts on Terrorism
It can be difficult to control or prevent the media from reporting on terror, for there are few methods that governments can use to control the media, and even fewer that are effective. One option is to create voluntary agreements with the media, where certain limits and rules are imposed. This is often problematic, however, for it is difficult to get every news broadcaster to accept or join an agreement, especially when the market is very competitive (and it is all-important to have the next big news story.) Instead, censorship could be imposed (or “involuntary agreements”), prohibiting news broadcasts regarding terror. The primary problem of this is that it hinders freedom of speech, considered a fundamental democratic right in many countries, and denies the public their “right to know”. Likewise, it would be very difficult to enforce such censorship laws outside of the given country.

Economist Bruno S. Frey has suggested an alternative anti-terrorist media policy, which attempts to “diffuse media attention” and thereby decrease the benefits to terrorists of having their terrorist act broadcast on television. The basic principle is that the “government must see to it that no particular terrorists group is able to monopolise media attention”, either by supplying no information as to which terrorist group is responsible, or by suggesting that any number of terrorist groups could be responsible. Thus, the hope is that the terrorists do not gain as much publicity as they would have wished for, reducing the incentive to commit terrorist acts. However, this strategy only works if indeed the terrorists wish to gain publicity for their cause, and it works best with clandestine terrorist acts (where the identity of the terrorists is uncertain or unknown.) Likewise, this strategy somewhat limits the right of the public to be properly informed about public events, and also does not credit the government for any eventual decline in terrorism caused by the adoption of this strategy.