User:JimWae/Schneider

Religion in 20th Century America

 * Herbert Wallace Schneider
 * Harvard University Press
 * 1952


 * FOREWORD

There are histories of American religion and there are sociologies, psychologies, anthropologies, philosophies of American religion. This study fits into none of these standard modes of research and knowledge, though it relies on all of them. It is first of all a reminiscence. There is still a rapidly diminishing generation of Americans who can remember what religion was like at the beginning of the century, and who can compare religion then and now, not in terms of the literary remains and records to which historians usually resort, but in terms of events and ideas that are now familiar but were then strange and of events and ideas now strange that formerly were familiar. The familiar is often the most elusive, for we seldom think it worth while to tell what everyone knows; but when the familiar becomes strange, there is something to be explained as well as reported. The past fifty years have so transformed our habits, ideas, and institutions that it is peculiarly appropriate and important for us to recall the changes we have endured and to explain them as best we can. This sketch of our religious revolution cannot go far into the problems of explanation, to which the above-mentioned ologies address themselves, but it can at least report for the benefit of later generations what basic changes have come over American religion during one lifetime. A generation whose faiths and devotions begin about 1950 must necessarily have a different conception of religion from a generation for whom the mid-century represents an achievement or a failure, not a starting-point. To have witnessed and endured transformations of religion gives to religious experience a peculiar gravity and tragic perspective, which no amount of ex post facto rationalization can recover. Accordingly, our primary subject-matter in this reflective survey is religious experience itself — not the American religious traditions, not the churches as social institutions, not the currents

of philosophical theology, but the religious life. Were the religious life in America monastic, and were religious experience mystic and solitary, our account of religion might conceivably have little bearing on what is called in this series of books "American Civilization." The cultural context of religion in America is not something arbitrarily created by a particular point of view or by an editorial policy; it is intrinsic to American religion. It may be possible to isolate creeds, church governments, dogmas, saints, and sacraments from a particular civilization or even from civilization in general; and it may be possible to view life from the point of view of religion rather than religion as a kind of life, but such an abstraction does violence to American experience and culture. Here religion is intrinsic to a civilized life and to the other "humanities." Therefore, a true report of what religion is actually must present religion as one of man's enduring concerns and must exhibit its relations to his other concerns. It will not do to construct an arbitrary concept of the man to whom religion "means everything," nor will it do to assume that religion is a by-product of a particular stage of human government or production. Neither the clerical view that religion should be the dominant force in culture, nor the Marxian and Freudian hypotheses that religion represents a passing stage of culture can here be taken seriously. Whatever may be the political or economic role of a particular church or doctrine, whatever may be the boasts of religious professionals and confessionals, no religion is either above or below its cultural environment; it is an intrinsic element in that environment, as constitutive as any, and as much in need of civilization as any. Were I engaged in a theological discussion, I might make this point more polemically by insisting that God is man's god in essence, not by accident. But I prefer to make a more empirical observation and to report what seems a commonplace, namely, that religion as it exists is not self-contained, but lives in a complex of human institutions, interests, and ideals, which are an essential element of its own life even if religion despise or dominate them. Our task in this portraiture of twentieth-century American religion is to focus our attention on what is essential to the religious life. There are many incidental consequences of faith, many secular functions of churches, many contributions of religion to the

arts, and these may be important aspects of American culture; but they are nevertheless incidental to our subject. For we are primarily concerned to tell what has happened to religion itself, rather than to estimate its value for other aspects of American life. There is a theological doctrine, much preached but always betrayed, which asserts that the inner or essential life of religion is eternal, timeless, changeless. Our aim is to get as close to this inner core of religion as possible and to show how it changes from generation to generation. Were the religious life as stable, iconic, and self-contained as preachers often represent it to be, there would be little point in preaching, and no point in trying to understand it culturally. But the facts, the religious facts, so evidently refute this dogma, that it would be idle to argue the point dialectically. Let the facts of religious change now speak for themselves.

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1 RELIGION IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 3

2 INSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RELIGION 21

3 MORAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RELIGION 60

4 INTELLECTUAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RELIGION 115

5 TRENDS IN PUBLIC WORSHIP AND RELIGIOUS ART 145

6 VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE SINCE WILLIAM JAMES 173

NOTES 209

APPENDIX 223

INDEX 239

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publishing results of research projects as well as the more conventional religious literature.

9. Religious lobbies have been established by the larger churches, and some inter-faith bodies have paid lobbies which function as powerful pressure groups.

10. Inter-faith and international organizations have been established to defend religions against secularism and to promote their common interests.

The mere listing of such institutions indicates how complicated and "vested" religious interests have become, and how antiquated is the notion that religion is practiced in solitude. Private devotion is, of course, still carried on, but even the most personal piety is now apt to be stimulated by the concerted efforts of skilled and organized religious workers. In the three decades 1920-1950 almost twice as many Catholic Societies of all kinds were founded than during the preceding three decades, and the statistics for Protestant and Jewish organizations tell a similar story. Of "joining" there seems to be only a beginning.


 * The Public Status of Religious Institutions

During the Enlightenment, when the American principles governing the relations between state and church were formulated, religion was commonly conceived as being private. The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 made a characteristic distinction between religion, which is "the duty we owe to our Creator," and morality, "the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other." Here the adjective "Christian" may have been a mere slip or a careless use of a common expression. In any case the distinction that was then basic in theory was between duties toward God which must be exercised freely by each individual "according to the dictates of conscience" and civil or mutual duties (not necessarily Christian) of tolerance or "forbearance." As late as 1931 Chief Justice Hughes appealed to this distinction in the case of conscientious objectors (United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 633). He wrote: "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." What he had in mind, as the context makes clear, is

"duty to a moral power higher than the state," but like the Catholic theorists, he assumes that any duty which transcends political duty is not based on human relations. This individualistic interpretation of religious conscience or transcendent duty has gradually been broken down, so that today there is a wider recognition on the part of both secular and religious leaders of the social responsibility of religion. Whether one agrees with the radicals that this social responsibility is of the very essence of religion, or whether one merely recognizes the power of religion in maintaining public morality, there is a general realization that religion is an important, if not basic element in the structure of our culture. Thomas Jefferson begins the famous passage in which he spoke of the "wall of separation" with the clause, "Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship." And he ends with the clause, "convinced man has no natural right in opposition to his social duties." The contemporary defense of natural rights and natural law would be much more defensible if, like Jefferson's, it were based on the assumption that no natural right can be in opposition to social duty. A church may be free from government control, but it is never free from social obligations. Hence, no matter how strong the "wall of separation between church and state" may be built, responsible citizens and democratic governments have a manifest duty not to be "neutral" toward religion, nor "benevolent" toward any kind of religion whatsoever, nor hostile to all religions, but critically concerned for the humaneness and nobility of the various faiths which exercise public functions even though they are legally "private." There is a National Laymen's Committee headed by Charles E. Wilson called "Religion in American Life" whose objective is: "To emphasize the importance of all religious institutions as the foundation of American life and to urge all Americans to attend and support the church or synagogue of their individual choice." Such an agency might well add to its concerns a careful study of how well various religious bodies actually provide "the foundation of American life."

For purposes of taxation, religious bodies are classed as non-

profit-making and are exempt on that score, but for other purposes they are commonly referred to as among the "benevolent and charitable" organizations. In general, the Federal Amendment prohibiting a religious establishment, though it may be interpreted broadly as implying the "separation" of church and state, does not imply that the state takes no cognizance of the activities and values of organized religion. The difficulties in defining precisely the historical relations between churches and the United States were examined by E. B. Greene in his Religion and the State in America (1941); and since then the debate concerning what these relations ought to be has become an acute public issue. Professor Greene showed clearly that the separation has never been complete and that the actual relations depend more on the shifting of sympathies than on precise legal theory. A monumental examination of this whole question has been achieved by Dr. Anson Phelps Stokes in his three volumes of Church and State in the United States. These volumes exhibit in great detail the truth of Green's conclusions.

In 1900 there was comparatively little interest in this question. The issue became of general public concern during the presidential campaign of Alfred E. Smith in 1928, and his much publicized personal "creed" was taken as a formulation of the "liberal" Catholic position. (See Exhibit III.) His statement against "interference" was prompted by Catholic pressure to intervene in behalf of the Mexican churches which were being persecuted.

During the last two decades there have been numerous court decisions which attempt to define the meaning of "separation." Since there has been an increasing need on the part of all institutions, and especially of nonprofit-making institutions, for more or less government support, the churches realize that their radical independence may be in jeopardy. Most churches feel that they can no longer compete with the state in getting the people's money. The church would now be more than content with tithes (10 per cent of member's income), whereas the state would now not dream of getting along on so little. This situation is in itself of considerable historical and moral interest, for time was, even in this country, when the state envied the churches'

ability to raise money. Partly as a matter of economic need, partly as a matter of moral principle, the churches (and especially the Roman Catholic Church) have demanded a modification of the traditional idea of separation of church and state.

The most outspoken formulation of a changing policy came from the manifesto on Nov. 20, 1948, of the American Roman Catholic bishops, in which they suggested as a working formula "the cooperation of church and state," as follows:


 * To one who knows something of history and law, the meaning of the First Amendment is clear enough from its own words: "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion or forbidding the free exercise thereof." ...
 * Under the First Amendment, the federal government could not extend this type of preferential treatment [establishment] to one religion as against another, nor could it compel or forbid any state to do so. If this practical policy be described by the loose metaphor "a wall of separation between Church and State," that term must be understood in a definite and typically American sense. It would be an utter distortion of American history and law to make that practical policy involve the indifference to religion and the exclusion of cooperation between religion and government implied in the term "separation of Church and State" as it has become the shibboleth of doctrinaire secularism.
 * Within the past two years secularism has scored unprecedented victories in its opposition to governmental encouragement of religious and moral training, even where no preferential treatment of one religion over another was involved. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted an entirely novel and ominously extensive interpretation of the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment.
 * This interpretation would bar any cooperation between government and organized religion which would aid religion, even where no discrimination between religious bodies is in question. ...
 * We feel with deep conviction that for the sake of both good citizenship and religion there should be a reaffirmation of our original American tradition of free cooperation between government and religious bodies — cooperation involving no special privilege to any group and no restriction on the religious liberty of any citizen. We solemnly disclaim any intent or desire to alter this prudent and fair American policy of government in dealing with the delicate problems that have their source in the divided religious allegiance of our citizens. ...
 * We stand ready to cooperate in fairness and charity with all who believe in God and are devoted to freedom under God to avert the


 * impending danger of a judicial "establishment of secularism" that would ban God from public life. For secularism is threatening the religious foundations of our national life and preparing the way for the advent of the omnipotent State.3

Much depends on how this doctrine of "coöperation" will be applied. The intent of the bishops seems to have been to distinguish the American "pluralistic" moral structure from the Spanish concept of "Catholic unity," and to adapt Catholic doctrine to democratic government. However, in their statement on the education of children made public by the Administrative Board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Nov. 18, 1950, the bishops applied the theory of coöperation in an ambiguous way. They pay their respects to the doctrine of dual citizenship in "two worlds," but then expound the doctrine that only religion can be an "integrating force" — giving the child a "complete and rational meaning for his existence," that the child must be "either God-centered or self-centered," and that therefore all education, especially sex education, must be kept in a "religious and moral context," so that "the child will see . . . the controlling purpose of his life, which is service to God." The development of the doctrine of coöperation thus seems clearly to involve the subordination of secular to religious morals and the subordination of public schools to the "natural rights" of the parent-church combination in matters spiritual.

The clearest and most democratic Catholic exposition has been made by the distinguished theologian, Father John Courtney Murray, who in a noteworthy essay came to the following conclusions:


 * History and experience have brought the Church to ever more perfect respect for the autonomy of the state (as a form of respect for an essential element in the "whole man") and consequently to ever more purely spiritual assertions of her power in the temporal order. Moreover, in proportion as these assertions of a power have become more spiritual they have become more universal and searching, reaching all the institutions of human life, to conform them in their idea and operation to the exigencies of the Christian conscience. With seeming paradox, the withdrawal of the Church from a certain identification with the state in the medieval respublica and (in a different way) with the confessional state has not meant a withdrawal from


 * society, but rather a more profound immanence, so to speak, in society, as the spiritual principle of its direction to both the temporal and the eternal ends of the human person. ... In other words, the question is whether the concept of libertas ecclesiastica by intrinsic exigence requires political embodiment in the concept of "the religion of the state", with the "logical and juridical consequences" that have historically followed from that concept. Surely the answer must be no.4

To this statement might well be added the observation of a recognized legal scholar:


 * The mutual obligations of Church and State remain what they always were — cooperation for the improvement of human society. This obligation of the Church to society, however, must be performed in the spirit which informed the words of St. Paul: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." It is as a divine organization, confident in its mission and proclaiming the gospel of charity to the people of this country and to the people of the world, that the church will perform its obligation to society and thereby to the State.5

Such attempts to reconcile a legal separation between state and church with a moral coöperation between religion and society raise old problems in new perspectives. What is peculiar to recent developments is the practical urgency of the issues involved. For behind the theoretical formulations lie several important legal decisions and group conflicts, all of which tended to weaken the position of the few remaining militant atheists or freethinkers and of the many anticlericals, who consistently opposed such tendencies as violating the "free church in a free state" principle. The great majority of presumably religious Americans allowed these encroachments on the strict "neutrality" of the state to accumulate with relatively little concern or with ineffective opposition. There were always minor complaints arising from the introduction of religious materials in the public schools: Jews protested at being taught Christmas carols, Catholics protested against the use of the King James version of the Bible, atheists protested against the use of prayers in legislatures and the presence of sectarian religious workers and teachers on state university campuses. But such problems were of long standing. The

new problems were created directly or indirectly by the world wars. Both President Wilson and President Roosevelt did not hesitate to include religious appeals and sentiments in their public utterances and documents during wartime. The use of such phrases as "this nation under God" was intended to give a general religious solemnity to the struggles and to suggest officially that "in God we trust." Though such sentiments were received cordially by most citizens, they served to stir up the wrath of the dwindling band of radical secularists who objected even to chaplains in the military service.

The appointment in 1939 of Myron Taylor to the Vatican as the personal representative of President Roosevelt and later of President Truman was accepted by the general public as a measure of military expediency and for military intelligence. But the leading Protestant organizations launched vigorous protests on the suspicion that this move might be an entering wedge for establishing regular diplomatic relations. The attempt by President Truman in 1951 to make a similar appointment of General Mark Clark supported these suspicions and led to a prompt, vigorous, organized opposition by Protestants and others.

Similarly Catholic pressure toward establishing normal diplomatic relations with Generalissimo Franco's Spain caused widespread resentment among Protestants and secular liberals. But the most serious issues arose over new educational policies. During the 1930's and 1940's there was an increasing concern over the spread of juvenile delinquency and of criminals acts by children in high schools. The National Council of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, and other interdenominational bodies suggested that one reason for the alarming immorality was the absence of religious education, and on this supposition there was a widespread appeal for the support of religious education in the interest of public morals. The spread of "religious illiteracy" was commonly regarded as a public menace, and various remedies were discussed which might provide the desired religious sanction for public morals without increasing sectarianism. Thus there arose a belief in the public need for religion in general, which particular faiths were prompt to exploit. Added to this circumstance was the fact that indirectly, by Federal Government

scholarships to veterans, many struggling church colleges had been helped through the financial crisis of the war years; and several states had passed legislation permitting the use of public funds to aid religious schools.

It is difficult to generalize with confidence while the debate on these issues is still raging (1952), but it seems to be generally recognized today that the problem of religious freedom has shifted its focus considerably since 1900. There seems to be relatively less agitation for freedom from religion on the part of atheists, freethinkers and radical secularists; at least, this hostile attitude toward organized religion as such gets less of a hearing today than a century ago, or even a half-century ago. But if religious bodies continue to misrepresent "secularism" not only as immoral but as itself an "established religion," they will undoubtedly arouse again the organized enmity of those nonreligious citizens who had imagined that organized religion would become enlightened enough to tolerate unorganized irreligion. Otherwise there seems to be a general acceptance of the principle of freedom for religion, with the exception of a minority of American Catholic theorists, who still defend persecution of "false" religions in principle, though they do not advocate it in practice. But there is a genuine concern for freedom in religion; that is, for cultivating a spirit of mutual respect and coöperation among the two hundred independent religious bodies that exist in the United States, whose traditions make them divisive, if not hostile forces. In other words, the church-state problem is not solved by a negative public policy of "hands off religion," but by building the kind of intellectual and moral environment in which the free exercise of religion is of constructive and positive value for public life. The reconciliation of the spirit of freedom with the spirit of religious devotion or commitment has become a serious problem of public morality. Neither state nor church can now be indifferent to each other's moral structures.6


 * Institutions of Religious Education

Various programs for promoting religious education have raised, in addition to educational problems, the basic issues of church-state relations both morally and legally. One was the bid

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thought has progressed further than among Christians. The Reconstructionist Movement which the Society for the Advancement of Judaism has promoted combines the historical, philosophical, and social aspects of Judaism in a remarkable and radical way. But being specifically a theory of Jewish civilization and national aspirations, it is not directly applicable to a more universal theology, except as an illustration of method; and, besides, the rabbis are far from agreed as to how far this kind of reconstruction can be carried without being destructive.


 * The New Humanism

One more phase of the critique of liberalism must be mentioned to round out our account of the present intellectual situation. A minority of the liberals, their modernist wing, has concluded from the course of events that liberalism fell into disrepute because it was not liberal enough, because it made compromises all along the line: compromises with theism, with nationalism, with supernaturalism, with ecclesiastical politics, and with sectarian interests. To them the chief enemies of free religion are the flight from reason, the defense of historical creeds, the institutionalization of faith, and the lack of fraternal respect among religions. Discouraged by the revival of theology and intolerance among religious bodies, these modernists from many faiths have banded together under the banner of humanism. Though they are trying desperately not to become one more sect, and therefore are cultivating an informal fellowship among humanists of many religions, they are inevitably becoming militant and are organizing for missionary activity. Intellectually humanism has not yet achieved an orthodoxy of its own, though humanist creeds are being circulated, and a "fourth faith" is in the making. In A Humanist Manifesto, first published in 1933 but still used by the group as an anticreedal creed, the most striking affirmation is the seventh, containing the following definition of religion:


 * Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation — all that is in its degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained.

Though this statement could readily be criticized as a definition of religion, it serves admirably, as most creeds do, not to define religion in general but to exhibit the import of a particular faith. Basic to this faith is the attempt to substitute for the distinction between the sacred and the secular, the distinction between the humane and the inhumane.

There are among the humanists left-wing Unitarians who reflect the liberalism of Emerson and who like him do not wish to be confined to Christian limitations. There are materialists who are no longer "doctrinaire" materialists, but who are suspicious of theologians who use terms like "soul," "immortal," "transcendental," "God," and "Spirit"; they prefer more secular language for more secular truths. There are naturalists who are disgusted by the sophisticated use of supernaturalist symbols and myths anion- neo-radical theologians, who find no use for organized religions, but who have a "religious" concern for the life of reason. There are still a few old-fashioned rationalists, freethinkers, or professional atheists, who mourn the failure of humanitarianism as a universal religion, and who are therefore willing to call themselves religious humanists. There are many liberal spirits in the ranks of Christian churches, Judaism, Ethical Culture, and other distinctive religious bodies, who resent the exclusiveness of their organizations and join the humanist fellowship in order to bear witness to their personal, broader faith. And there are many individuals who cannot be labeled, since they do not feel at home either in any religious body or in the cold world of secular interests; nevertheless they seek some expression for their passionate desire to promote "the complete realization of human personality" and "a free and universal society." The humanist societies have succeeded in bringing these various kinds of liberals together for fellowship, instruction, publication, and promotion of their common interests. The reappearance of humanism as an independent religious movement is significant in spite of its small numbers. It gives proof through the night that modernist liberalism still lives as a positive religious faith, that the demand for religious expression exceeds the supply offered by conventional religious bodies, and that philosophers are not as hopelessly individualistic as they appear to be to more conformist

minds. Those who share the comforts of a conventional religious home are continually confronted in a free country with free religion. Though freethinkers are apt to appear as religious orphans or vagabonds to those whose intellectual lives are more comfortable and sociable, these free spirits in their wanderings and seekings produce their fair share of prophets, and usually serve the causes of enlightenment and brotherhood which no religion worthy of the name would now dare to deny, since all are ashamed when they betray them. There exists also in a form less organized and evident than the religious humanist movement a significant number of religious secularists. For them secularism represents neither irreligion nor religious indifference, but a positive concern (as near to "absolute" concern as they dare come) for certain values and institutions, which they wish to defend as sacred, if necessary, against all organized religion. They regard themselves as the champions of democracy, freedom, and science, and they often appeal to the spirit of Thomas Jefferson as their American patron saint. They are usually anticlericals and believe that it is possible to express a "common faith" to which all free spirits are loyal and which unites those whom organized religion divides.


 * How many reformers and prophets have suffered persecution and martyrdom in their efforts to do away with the cramping survivals of religious infantilism! How childish do the trappings of orthodoxy seem to the mature mind! How eagerly do the traditionalists and the fundamentalists cling to the doctrines and forms of religion which have lost their power to enlist the hearty support of modern man! Is it not high time that we unite in the endeavor to define and practice a religion of adults?" 26

Horace M. Kallen has given an able and representative expression of such religion in his Of Clericalism and Secularism in Religion.27 For how many of the approximately 30 per cent of Americans who are religiously "unaffiliated" he speaks it is difficult to say. But it is necessary to recognize that secularism or its equivalent exists as a positive faith, that it is not necessarily "Godless," though unorganized and theologically inarticulate, and that it is not religiously illiterate. It is strongly represented among the literary intelligentsia, in political circles, among social scientists,

and ex-Marxists. To have religion without benefit of clergy is indeed getting it free if not easy, but the common prejudice expressed by churchmen that such religion reflects a too "easy conscience" is in most cases without foundation. The chief difficulty that confronts the observer is knowing where to draw the line between such religion and irreligion. For, as Meyer Schapiro well says, "Religion now has its fellow-travelers." 28