User:Jnestorius/U.S. state citizenship

State citizenship or domestic citizenship is citizenship of an individual U.S. state, as distinct from U.S. or federal citizenship. The U.S. Constitution distinguishes between the two as a consequence of the federal nature of the republic it defines. A U.S. citizen who is resident in a particular state is automatically a citizen of that state, under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In principle, states can extend citizenship to non-residents and non-U.S. citizens. In practice, some states' constitutions and laws do not explicitly refer to state citizenship but rather to state residents who are U.S. citizens. Others refer to "state citizens" but also e.g. "town citizens", suggesting a synonym of "resident [U.S. citizen]". Some state codes refer to "rights of citizenship" lost by felons and perhaps restored later.

Citizenship may entail rights ("privileges and immunities") and duties. Those enumerated in the U.S. Constitution (in particular in the Bill of Rights) apply to all U.S. citizens. The Tenth Amendment reserves unenumerated powers to the states, allowing each state to regulate the rights and duties associated with its own citizenship. This is qualified by the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, which prevents a state from treating citizens of other states in a discriminatory manner. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the legal rights that are associated with federal citizenship, but the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873 established that it did not protect those that pertain to state citizenship.

The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868, since when the established view has been that U.S. citizenship is primary and state citizenship secondary. Prior to this the relationship was unclear; Dred Scott v. Sandford in 1858 held that U.S. citizenship was derived from state citizenship in 1789 but that acquiring state citizenship thereafter was possible but did not imply U.S. citizenship. "The distinctive privileges that go with state citizenship are also very limited today [in 1955]."

Daniel Farber and John Muench:
 * Before the war, the states were primarily responsible for meeting the basic needs of American citizens, while the national government had little impact on the daily lives of most Americans
 * Before the Civil War, American citizenship was an ill-defined and largely insignificant concept. For most purposes, state citizenship was far more significant. The Civil War changed all that by establishing that a citizen's primary allegiance was to the federal government. [...] After the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment, citizenship would mean more than the right to an American passport when traveling abroad. Instead, American citizenship would be linked to the possession of fundamental rights, protected against violation by any level of government within the United States.

A person may in theory be a citizen of a state without being a U.S. citizen. The New York Is Home Act was a 2014 bill in the state legislature seeking to extend New York state citizenship to some illegal immigrants. (The bill in fact would have added a definition of "New York State Citizenship" to the state code, not merely amended an existing definition; there is no existing definition.) In contrast, California proposals have been described as giving resident illegal immigrants "de facto citizenship" rather than an explicitly defined state citizenship. In 2011, legislators introduced bills in several states proposing to deny state citizenship to those born to illegal-immigrant parents; the bills were token gestures of opposition to birthright citizenship and incompatible with the Citizenship Clause.


 * Incorporation of the Bill of Rights — beginning in the 1920s, a series of United States Supreme Court decisions interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to "incorporate" most portions of the Bill of Rights, making these portions, for the first time, enforceable against the state governments.
 * Diversity jurisdiction — federal courts can hear some cases between a state government and a citizen of another state.
 * Tribal sovereignty in the United States a special case.
 * After the 1924 federal act, Connecticut did not clarify the status of the Eastern Pequot until a 1973 act explicitly granted them state citizenship.

Citizenship applies only to individuals — natural persons as opposed to other legal persons. In general, a corporate persons's "state of incorporation" is analogous to an individual's state of residence.

Citizenship in the American Constitution 1973
Alexander M. Bickel, Yale Law School, Citizenship in the American Constitution 1973:
 * p.376: In addition, the [14th Amd] definition clarified what Miller [in 1873] thought was a previously open but hardly world-shaking question: whether a person born, not in a state, but in a territory or in the District of Columbia, who was therefore not a citizen of any state, could be a citizen of the United States. He could be. The fourteenth amendment made sure there would be no limbo.
 * p.380: Over the years, as one or another wave of xenophobia or unemployment swept the country, state statutes were enacted excluding noncitizens [I think non-USCit, rather than non-stateCit] from various callings, employments and activities: optometrist, dentist, doctor, nurse, architect, teacher, lawyer, policeman, engineer, corporate officer, real estate broker, public accountant, mortician, physiotherapist, pharmacist, peddler, pool or gambling-hall operator, all or some government employment or public works employment, hunting and receiving public charity. It is to be questioned how rigorously such statutes have ever been enforced.

Why Recent Attacks On Birthright Citizenship Are Unfounded 2011
Issue Brief No. 5 Elizabeth Wydra Born Under the Constitution: Why Recent Attacks On Birthright Citizenship Are Unfounded March 31, 2011 p.16
 * As a threshold matter, the States lack the power to define citizenship. The 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause was added to the Constitution after the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, and it unquestionably places the question of citizenship out of the hands of the States.  The Citizenship Clause declares that children born within the jurisdiction of the United States are citizens of the United States “and of the State wherein they reside.”  It violates the letter and the spirit of the 14th Amendment for state legislators to try to sneak their way around the constitutional guarantee of citizenship by adding a distinct level of state citizenship that does not comport with the Citizenship Clause

IRS
[https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-07-22.pdf Rev. Rul. 2007-22]
 * [p.7] "The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes simultaneous state and federal citizenship. Therefore, an individual cannot reject citizenship in the United States in favor of state citizenship, or otherwise claim not to be a citizen of the United States for the purpose of avoiding federal tax liability. "
 * [p.5]
 * "Claims that individuals are not citizens of the United States but are solely citizens of a sovereign state and not subject to federal taxation have been uniformly rejected by the courts. "
 * See
 * United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875) (“The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State. . . .”);
 * In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873) (A man “must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union”).

David Sanchez v. John Kerry, et al
Supreme Court Briefs 2015 15-1395 July 2016 BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION pp.9-10 Before the Fourteenth Amendment, some judges concluded that States had a role in determining who qualified as a citizen of the United States because national citizenship was entirely derivative of state citizenship—that is, “that no man was a citizen of the United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the Union.” SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). The Fourteenth Amendment definitively rejected that view by declaring that “[a]ll persons born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, Cl. 1. After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, citizenship depends on birth “in the United States”—not birth in, or citizenship of, a State. Accordingly, as this Court long ago explained, “[i]t is quite clear * * * that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74; see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 677-678 (1898).

Certiorari denied

The Continuing Presence of Dred Scott (1984)

 * p.59: Sadat could be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of one of the several states. The Seventh Circuit cited Dred Scott for the proposition that there is a dichotomy between state and national citizenship, and it followed precedent in saying that Sadat was not, according to law, a citizen of any state. 9 The problem is supposed to be linked to the language of the fourteenth amendment, which states that citizens of the United States are citizens "of the State wherein they reside." 20 This is interpreted as stating a federal rule about the prerequisites of state citizenship: one must reside in a state to be a citizen of it, a prerequisite that Sadat failed to meet.
 * p.62: such cases as Hammerstein v. Lyne, 25 which is one of the eight cases relied upon by Sadat v. Mertes, cite the Slaughterhouse Cases for the proposition that national and state citizenship are two separate things; 26 Sadat v. Mertes cites Dred Scott for the same proposition; 27 and so one can sum this up by saying the Sadat case recognizes a clear continuity, on a question of citizenship, between Dred Scott and the Slaughterhouse Cases

Sadat v. Mertes (1980)
Sadat v. Mertes Feb 19, 1980 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980) at 1180:
 * 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) creates the federal courts' jurisdiction over actions between "citizens of different States."
 * For a natural person to fall within the provision he must be both
 * (1) a citizen of the United States and
 * (2) a citizen of a particular state.
 * See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-06, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857); Delaware, L. W. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 250 F. 554, 557 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 508, 38 S.Ct. 427, 62 L.Ed. 1241 (1918).
 * It is not disputed here that the plaintiff having been naturalized in 1973 is a citizen of the United States. What is contested is whether in 1976 when his complaint was filed he was a citizen of one of the United States.
 * The issue is crucial to the plaintiff's claim of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because settled precedent establishes that a citizen of the United States who is not also a citizen of one of the United States may not maintain suit under that section.
 * Meyers v. Smith, 460 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1978); Kaufman Broad, Inc. v. Gootrad, 397 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 580, 588-90 (M.D.Fla. 1973); Hernandez v. Lucas, 254 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.Tex. 1966); Clapp v. Stearns Co., 229 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); McClanahan v. Galloway, 127 F. Supp. 929 (N.D.Cal. 1955); Alla v. Kornfeld, 84 F. Supp. 823 (N.D.Ill. 1949); Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 F. 165 (W.D.Mo. 1912).
 * Although this doctrine excluding Americans domiciled abroad from the federal courts has been questioned, the plaintiff does not directly attack it here and we see no reason for upsetting settled law now.
 * See
 * Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 9-10 (1968) (suggesting that Americans abroad might reasonably be deemed foreign subjects);
 * Comment, 19 Wn. Lee L.Rev. 78, 84-86 (1962) (proposing that a person's domicile and therefore his state citizenship should be deemed to continue until citizenship is established in another of the United States or until American citizenship is abandoned).
 * State citizenship for the purpose of the state diversity provision is equated with domicile. The standards for determining domicile in this context are found by resort to federal common law.
 * Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973); Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873, 874 (4th Cir. 1968).
 * To establish a domicile of choice a person generally must be physically present at the location and intend to make that place his home for the time at least.

The contentious point is "State citizenship for the purpose of the state diversity provision is equated with domicile"; what if a state has extended citizenship to some nonresident? It makes sense that if a USCit has StateCit of multiple states, the USC should be allowed to determine which state applies for a given purpose; but if a USCit has only one StateCit, and is nonresident of that state, then can the USC ignore that? If it offers no definition of "State citizen" then presumably the Constitutional meaning of the term (as determined by "federal common law") would be the valid one; but the USC could override that meaning by providing an explicit definition of its own; in which case we need to distinguish
 * 1) "state citizen" [as meant in the Constitution]
 * 2) "state citizen" [as meant in 28 U.S.C. § 1332]
 * 3) * But link to § 1332 above shows no definition of state citizen for natural persons, only for legal persons (§ 1332(e)).
 * 4) * Contrast 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e): (e) The word “States”, as used in this section, includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

USC
I presume "nonresident of such State [3]" refers back to "any State [1] court" not "any citizen of a State [2]"; the opposite would be a nice assumption that there can be nonresident State citizens, but alas it's an implausible reading.
 * 28 U.S. Code § 1442(b) A personal action commenced in any State [1] court by an alien against any citizen of a State [2] who is, or at the time the alleged action accrued was, a civil officer of the United States and is a nonresident of such State [3], wherein jurisdiction is obtained by the State court by personal service of process, may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division in which the defendant was served with process.

I see use of "citizen of a State", rather than "citizen of such State" or "citizen of the United States"; thus means largely "citizen of the US and resident in a state", but perhaps not necessarily if state adds to citizenship eligibility
 * 28 U.S. Code § 4103 In addition to removal allowed under section 1441, any action brought in a State domestic court to enforce a foreign judgment for defamation in which—
 * (1) any plaintiff is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;
 * (2) any plaintiff is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
 * (3) any plaintiff is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or citizen or subject of a foreign state,
 * may be removed by any defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending without regard to the amount in controversy between the parties.

Abandonment of right of U.S. residence
From Relinquishment of United States nationality
 * Though it might be possible that an alien could be a citizen of a U.S. state without obtaining or even being eligible for U.S. citizenship, state citizenship cannot provide any rights to enter or remain in the United States. Pseudo-legal arguments about U.S. citizenship by members of the sovereign citizen movement, such as that a person can declare himself a "free-born citizen of a state" rather than a U.S. citizen and then continue to reside in the U.S. without being subject to federal law, have been found frivolous by courts. Courts have also addressed other assertions of residual rights to U.S. residence by ex-citizens on the basis of sub-national citizenship at least twice in recent years.
 * [...]
 * In the mid-1990s, a number of Puerto Rican independence supporters, including Alberto Lozada Colón and Juan Mari Brás, renounced U.S. citizenship at U.S. embassies in nearby countries and then returned to Puerto Rico almost immediately while they were waiting to receive CLNs. In 1998, the State Department formally refused to issue a CLN to Lozada Colón, stating that his continued assertion of the right to reside in the United States without obtaining a visa demonstrated his lack of intent to relinquish United States citizenship. Lozada Colón petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the State Department to issue his CLN, arguing that he could relinquish U.S. citizenship while keeping Puerto Rican citizenship and thus the right to return to his homeland of Puerto Rico. Judge Stanley Sporkin rejected the argument that a non-U.S. citizen had the right to enter Puerto Rico, noting that Puerto Rico was part of the United States for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and so aliens required documentation from the U.S. government in order to enter and reside there. Sporkin further ruled that the court was not an appropriate venue to decide the political question of whether Puerto Rican citizenship could stand separately from U.S. citizenship. Following the ruling, the State Department also revoked Mari Brás' CLN.
 * [more detail at Puerto Rican citizenship]

"Resident or citizen"
New York Consolidated Laws VAT 253

Service of such summons also may be made
 * The Laws Of New York Consolidated Laws: Title 2: Department Of Motor Vehicles; Article 3: Exemption Of Non-Resident Owners And Operators; Section 253: Service of summons on non-residents
 * by mailing a copy thereof to the secretary of state at his office in the city of Albany,
 * or by personally delivering a copy thereof to one of his regularly established offices, with a fee of ten dollars,
 * and by delivering a duplicate copy thereof with the complaint annexed thereto,
 * to the defendant personally without the state by
 * a resident or citizen of the state of New York
 * or a sheriff, under-sheriff, deputy-sheriff or constable of the county or other political subdivision in which the personal service is made,
 * or an officer authorized by the laws of this state, to take acknowledgements of deeds to be recorded in this state,
 * or an attorney and/or counselor at law, solicitor, advocate or barrister duly qualified to practice in the state or country where such service is made,
 * or by a United States marshall or deputy United States marshall.

has hits for:
 * Laws; WV, IL, MD, MO, AL, OH, DE, MS, GA, ND
 * Depositions: FL, NE, NJ, IN, TN, CT, IW, GA, HI, CA, OK, NC, VA, WA

Aaron Burr
Aaron Burr was VP residing in DC at the time of the Burr–Hamilton duel. But still a NY citizen: Indictment for fighting a duel &c New York, August 14, 1804 That the said Aaron Burr afterwards to wit on the said Eleventh day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and four at the said eighth ward of the City of New York in the County of New York aforesaid did request and invite the said Alexander Hamilton to meet him the said Aaron Burr with intent to fight a Duel with him the said Alexander Hamilton he the said Aaron Burr then and still being a Citizen of the State of New York

ArtIII.S2.C1.4.7 Controversies Between Citizens of Different States
ArtIII.S2.C1.4.7 Controversies Between Citizens of Different States For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, state citizenship is determined by the concept of domicile 13 rather than of mere residence. 14 That is, while the Court's definition has varied throughout the cases, 15 a person is a citizen of the state in which he has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment and to which he intends to return whenever he is absent from it. 16 Acts may disclose intention more clearly and decisively than declarations. 17 One may change his domicile in an instant by taking up residence in the new place and by intending to remain there indefinitely and one may obtain the benefit of diversity jurisdiction by so changing for that reason alone, 18 provided the change is more than a temporary expedient. 19
 * Citizenship of Natural Persons:

If the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states, diversity jurisdiction exists regardless of the state in which suit is brought. 20 Chief Justice Marshall early established that in multiparty litigation, there must be complete diversity, that is, that no party on one side could be a citizen of any state of which any party on the other side was a citizen. 21 It has now apparently been decided that this requirement flows from the statute on diversity rather than from the constitutional grant and that therefore minimal diversity is sufficient. 22 The Court has also placed some issues beyond litigation in federal courts in diversity cases, apparently solely on policy grounds. 23

..."State of incorporation" remained the guiding rule for determining the place of corporate citizenship until Congress amended the jurisdictional statute in 1958. Concern over growing dockets and companies incorporating in states of convenience then led to a dual citizenship rule whereby "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business."
 * Citizenship of Corporations:

...Unincorporated associations, such as partnerships, joint stock companies, labor unions, governing boards of institutions, and the like, do not enjoy the same privilege as a corporation; the actual citizenship of each of its members must be considered in determining whether diversity exists.

ArtIV.S2.C1.1.3 Citizens of Each State
ArtIV.S2.C1.1.3 Citizens of Each State In dissent [in Dred Scott], Justice Curtis ... argued that, although Congress alone could determine what classes of aliens should be naturalized, the states retained the right to extend citizenship to classes of persons born within their borders who had not previously enjoyed citizenship and that one upon whom state citizenship was thus conferred became a citizen of the state in the full sense of the Constitution.

ArtIV.S2.C1.1.7 Taxation
ArtIV.S2.C1.1.7 Taxation The terms ‘resident’ and ‘citizen’ are not synonymous, wrote Justice Pitney,. . . but a general taxing scheme. . . if it discriminates against all non-residents, has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination those who are citizens of other States. . . . 5 Where there were no discriminations between citizens and noncitizens, a state statute taxing the business of hiring persons within the state for labor outside the state was sustained

[http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/usrep/usrep252/usrep252060/usrep252060.pdf#page=5 ''TRAVIS v. YALE & TOWNE MFG. CO.'' 252 US 60]
 * [Argument for Appellant, p.64] Distinctions are drawn between residents and non-residents, but this is regardless of citizenship-non-resident citizens of New York are treated like all other non-residents, and citizens of other sovereigns who are resident in New York are treated exactly like resident citizens.
 * [Opinion of the Court, p.79] Of course the terms "resident" and "citizen" are not synonymous, and in some cases the distinction is important (La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 470); but a general taxing scheme such as the one under consideration, if it discriminates against all non-residents, has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination those who are citizens of other States; and, if there be no reasonable ground for the diversity of treatment, it abridges the privileges and immunities to which such citizens are entitled. In Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 247; 176 U. S. 59, 67, the court held that a statute of Tennessee, declaring the terms upon which a foreign corporation might carry on business and hold property in that State, which gave to its creditors residing in Tennessee priority over all creditors residing elsewhere, without special reference to whether they were citizens or not, must be regarded as contravening the "privileges and immunities" clause
 * [my comments] Actually relates to a corporate citizen. Seems to relate to residency rather than citizenship, which would be OK under Interstate Commerce, but it invokes Fourteenth Amendment instead.

ArtI.S8.C4.1.5 Expatriation: Loss of Citizenship
ArtI.S8.C4.1.5 Expatriation: Loss of Citizenship The pre-Civil War record on the issue is so vague because there was wide disagreement on the basis of national citizenship in the first place, with some contending that national citizenship was derivative from state citizenship, which would place the power of providing for expatriation in the state legislatures, and with others contending for the primacy of national citizenship, which would place the power in Congress. 3 The citizenship basis was settled by the first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but expatriation continued to be a muddled topic.

Amdt 14

 * should update with Browse the Constitution Annotated web latest; both uptodate and softlinks to cited cases.
 * p.1840 Dred Scott v. Sandford held that "although a state could confer state citizenship upon whomever it chose, it could not make the recipient of such status a citizen of the United States."
 * p.1841 fn.13 "corporations were not within the scope of the privileges and immunities clause of state citizenship set out in Article IV"
 * p.1843 Slaughter-House: "Despite the broad language of this clause, the Court held that the privileges and immunities of state citizenship had been “left to the State governments for security and protection” and had not been placed by the clause “under the special care of the Federal government.” The only privileges that the Fourteenth Amendment protected against state encroachment were declared to be those “which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.” 18 These privileges, however, had been available to United States citizens and protected from state interference by operation of federal supremacy even prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Slaughter-House Cases, therefore, reduced the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a superfluous reiteration of a prohibition already operative against the states."
 * p.1845 fn.32 [cases where states allowed to discriminate against non-citizens]:-
 * Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (the right to become a candidate for state office is a privilege of state citizenship, not national citizenship)
 * Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (statute restricting employment on state public works to citizens of the United States, with a preference to citizens of the state)
 * Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879) (law taxing a debt owed a resident citizen by a resident of another state and secured by mortgage of land in the debtor’s state)
 * Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (statute regulating the franchise to male citizens)
 * Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (statute requiring persons coming into a state to make a declaration of intention to become citizens and residents thereof before being permitted to register as voters)
 * p.1846 fn.38 "The right of United States citizens to choose their state of residence is specifically protected by the first sentence of the 14th Amendment"
 * p.1846 "In a doctrinal shift of uncertain significance, the Court will apparently evaluate challenges to durational residency requirements, previously considered as violations of the right to travel derived from the Equal Protection Clause, as a potential violation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause."
 * p.1847 "Passage of the Reconstruction Amendments (13th, 14th, and 15th) gave the federal courts the authority to intervene when a state threatened fundamental rights of its citizens,39 and one of the most important doctrines flowing from this is the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Due Process Clause.40 Through the process of “selective incorporation,” most of the provisions of the first eight Amendments, such as free speech, freedom of religion, and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, are applied against the states as they are against the federal government."
 * pp.2221-2224 "The third ['right to travel'] is the right of a new arrival to a state, who establishes citizenship in that state, to enjoy the same rights and benefits as other state citizens. This right is most often invoked in challenges to durational residency requirements, which require that persons reside in a state for a specified period of time before taking advantage of the benefits of that state’s citizenship. ... Challenges to durational residency requirements have traditionally been made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1999, however, the Court approved a doctrinal shift, so that state laws that distinguished between their own citizens, based on how long they had been in the state, would be evaluated instead under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2084 The Court did not, however, question the continuing efficacy of the earlier cases ... Any [residency requirement] is invalid 'unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest'. [...] But this line of cases [welfare, divorce proceedings, in-state tuition, Alaska oil dividends, occupational licenses] does not apply to state residency requirements themselves, as distinguished from durational provisions,2103 and the cases do not inhibit the states when, having reasons for doing so, they bar travel by certain persons. [fn 2224: 4 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made it a misdemeanor to abandon a dependent child but a felony to commit the offense and then leave the state)]
 * p.2172 fn.1865 [In Sugarman v. Dougal] "In the course of the opinion, the Court held inapplicable the doctrine of “special public interest,” the idea that a State’s concern with the restriction of the resources of the State to the advancement and profit of its citizens is a valid basis for discrimination against out-of-state citizens and aliens generally, but it did not declare the doctrine invalid. Id. at 643–45.".
 * p.1896 "The Court’s early decisions rested on the legal fiction that the states owned the fish and wild game within their borders, and thus could reserve these possessions for use by their own citizens.308 The Court soon backed away from the ownership fiction,309 and in Hughes v. Oklahoma 310 it formally overruled prior case law, indicating that state conservation measures discriminating against out-of-state persons were to be measured under the Commerce Clause. Although a state’s “concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals” were still a “legitimate” basis for regulation, these concerns could not justify disproportionate burdens on interstate commerce.311 Subsequently, in the context of recreational rather than commercial activity, the Court reached a result more deferential to state authority, holding that access to recreational big game hunting is not within the category of rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and that consequently a state could charge out-ofstaters significantly more than in-staters for a hunting license.31"
 * p.2196 "The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for a proportionate reduction in a state’s representation in the House when it denies the franchise to its qualified male citizens"
 * p.2196 "The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for a proportionate reduction in a state’s representation in the House when it denies the franchise to its qualified male citizens"

Questions zzz

 * Is it the case that a U.S. citizen who moves to another state loses citizenship of the origin state (while gaining that of the destination state)?
 * Or can you be a citizen of multiple U.S. states at the same time?
 * The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"; what if the plaintiff is a citizen of the sued state and another state?
 * What happens when a U.S. citizen moves to a U.S. Territories? There is Puerto Rican citizenship; are there others? Defined by U.S. Congress or by local constitution, or are those the same thing?
 * Right of expatriates to vote in their country of origin:
 * US citizens living abroad enjoy full federal voting rights, regardless of how long they have lived abroad. In addition, 36 states, plus the District of Columbia, allow US citizens who have never resided in the US to vote in the respective state based on where their parent or legal guardian was last registered. However some states restrict overseas voters to vote only in federal elections (Presidential, etc) or vote only if the voters have not registered or voted in another state previously
 * Moving abroad you can still vote for President, but what if you move to a Territory? Odd if you have fewer rights.