User:Js80ubc/Gilat Levy/Bibliography

Gilat Levy
Gilat Levy is a Jewish female economist, researcher and council member. She has been a Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics since 2008 specializing in Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy and Law & Economics. Levy is a full-time professor teaching Graduate courses focusing on Public Policy and also teaching Undergraduate courses in Mathematical Economics and Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Levy previously held the role of Deputy-Head for teaching at the Economics department at the London School of Economics from 2013-2016. Currently, she is an active member of the Graduate Admissions committee at the London School of Economics. Furthermore, Levy is currently a Joint Managing Editor for the renowned Economic Journal. She is also a council member for the European Economic Association. Her main field of study is Business and Administration.

Education
She began studying economics at the Tel Aviv University where she attained her BA in Economics in 1992. Levy continued her studies at Princeton University where she earned her Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Degree in Economics in 1999.

Career
Gilat Levy previously worked as a Lecturer at Tel Aviv University at the Berglas School of Economics. She also held a role at the University of Princeton as a Visiting Fellow prior to her arrival at the London School of Economics. She arrived at London School of Economics in 2008 as a full-time professor.

"The Politics of Public Provision of Education. Quarterly Journal of Economics" (2005)
Gilat Levy discusses how public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution. Levy analyzes a two dimensional model of political decision making with endogenous political parties. After looking at the two dimensional model, findings showed that whether public education arises in equilibrium even when income redistribution is feasible, it correlates negatively on the cohort size of the young individuals. Furthermore, when the young are a minority in the population then there is a high level of per capita public provision of education in contrast to when the young are the majority, then income redistribution crowds out public provision of education. Levy discusses how the young are considered a minority then the poor segment of the young forms a winning coalition with the rich. Levy states that this coalition provides public education. Therefore, when the old are a minority, it is the old poor who form a coalition with the rich and this coalition provides income transfers. Moreover, since the rich are always represented in the winning coalition, the poor do not fully dispossess the rich. These results show that the lower and upper class are more likely to be equally educated when the young are a minority. Levy demonstrates that income inequality may have different effects on tax rates and public provision of education.

"Careerist judges and the appeals process" (2005)
Gilat Levy authored this review on how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations and previous relevant information from previous decisions. Levy claims that judges are more concerned with their reputation and try to signal to evaluators that they can enforce the law adequately. She states that the monitoring dimensions for the evaluator of the judges ability are endogenous as a result of the probability of an appeal depending on the judge's decision. Her findings suggests that judges with career concerns have a tendency to be creative, and to display inefficient decision making by contradicting previous decisions.

"Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation and Voting Rules" (2005)
In this paper, Levy reviews transparency and voting rules by focusing on decision making in committees while reviewing the effect of transparency of the decision making process in committees on the decisions that are eventually made. She focuses on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. Her findings showed that when the decision making process becomes transparent and individual votes are observed, this effect disappears and such committeesare more likely to accept reforms. She also found that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. The review shows that the transparency of the decision making process has important developments when committee members have career concerns. In particular, "transparent" committees tend to vote more often for the decision that is disadvantaged by institutional biases, such as the voting rule, or by public opinion biases, such as the prior. Moreover, the analysis illustrates that optimal committee design needs to take into account not only the transparency of the process but also the voting rule.

"It takes two: an explanation of democratic peace" (2004)
Levy and co-author Ronny Razin provide an in-depth insight of the democratic peace hypothesis. They review the observation that democracies never fight each other. In their model, they show that two democracies create the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. In their two stage model, they model the strategic interactions between decision makers in two countries. Their findings show a new explanation to the democratic peace phenomenon. They identify peaceful resolutions with high level of concessions. They find that the democratic peace is an aspect that acts as a consequence to both institutional features and strategic considerations that arise when each country knows that it faces a democracy. Levy and Razin, show that peaceful resolution of conflicts, for most parameters, that the two countries involved in a conflict would be democracies. It is not a trait or a norm of a democracy, and it is not a direct result of the institutions of a democratic country, but the democratic peace is a consequence of both institutional features and strategic considerations that arise when each country knows that it faces a democracy.

Blog posts and press citations
Gilat Levy is currently a Joint Managing Editor for the Economic Journal. She has been part of the board of editors for the American Economic Review. She was an Associate Editor for Theoretical Economics. She was also previously apart of the Editorial Board for the Review of Economic Studies.

Awards
ESRC has awarded Gilat Levy with several research awards towards her work. Furthermore, she also received research grants from the European Research Council (ERC).

This is where you will compile the bibliography for your Wikipedia assignment. Please refer to the following resources for help:


 * Adding citations
 * Evaluating articles and sources