User:Jthompson00

The folks at the 581st ARCW Association have done a great job in creating the history of these units. My edits to this page have been an attempt to add detail concerning some lesser known facts regarding the CIA connection to the 581st, details concerning the downing of Stardust Four Zero, and the capability of the Soviet military who were aiding the Chinese at this time. I should note that Stardust Four Zero Co-pilot Wallace (Wally) Brown recalled that he doesn't know why most sources cite his plane as a RB-29, instead of a stripped down version of a typical B-29. To his knowledge, Stardust Four Zero never engaged in recon activities, or had the capability to do so because it lacked the sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment.

Retired MSgt Yancy Mailes formerly of Mountain Home AFB in Idaho has recently published a history on Mountain Home AFB, as well as contributing to the history of the 581st while it was stationed there. To read a detailed history of why the Air Force formed the ARCW, Col. Michael Haas' book, "Apollo Warriors, United States Air Force Special Ops During the Cold War" (1997) is an excellent read, as well as his later book, "In The Devil's Shadow," which contains updated information on this mission. I believe that the initial mission of Stardust Four Zero, shot down Jan 12, 1953, is one of the most interesting accounts of the Korean War and one that is still shrouded in mystique and missing much of the facts, both from the Russian/Chinese and the American point-of-view. Given the connection of the ARCW units to the CIA, and with the crews trained in special black ops, its no wonder that stories abound that Communist spies were transmitting intel on ARCW activities and missions. Its been speculated that intel was obtained/given to the Chinese prior to the fateful mission of Stardust Four Zero regarding the presence of the 581st Wing Commander (Colonel John Arnold) who went on this mission. Also, given that the operations chief from the 91st SRW (Major Bill Baumer), who was a last minute addition to the crew because the crew's instructor-pilot had become ill which kept the plane on the tarmac for over 3 hours, the significance of this mission to the Chinese must have (or could have) increased one hundred fold. Wally Brown remembers that within hours of their landing on Korean soil, the early morning Manila newspapers highlighted the crash, quoting Hong Kong newspapers as their source. This story was complete with the names, personal details and assignment to the 581st ARCW. Whether the Communists already had this information, or obtained it from the crew shortly after their capture remains a mystery.

Two nagging questions that haven't been explained very well are: (1) did the Chinese-Russians really ambush Stardust Four Zero based on the intelligence they were receiving from their spies at Clark AFB or in Japan (or were the Russians already on alert for any aircraft flying near the Yalu River area because they were defending the bridges, as these routes were an important supply route for the Chinese and North Koreans), and (2) is there any truth to the Chinese claim that Stardust Four Zero was actually flying in Chinese territory at the time it was engaged by the MiGs, or could the crew be the victim of "beacon meaconing?" During my discussions with Wally Brown, who remembers that their pre-flight crew briefing stated they should not expect any radar-guided AAA and searchlights, and should not expect any MiG activity at night because there had been no reported incidents, I now believe that this crew, and possibly other B-29 crews were not given the updated intel that they should have received about the Soviet threat that was known. Cookie Sewell, a Korean War historian and expert on Soviet-Chinese air service history, has noted in his Korean War research on radar use by both sides that there was U.S. evidence that the Soviets had night-equipped MiGs, radar-controlled searchlights, and AAA and that this was in use in late 1952. A report contained in Alfred Price's Vol 2 (Appendix G) of "The History of US Electronic Warfare," titled: "Far East Air Forces History of Electronic Countermeasures During the Korean Conflict June 1950 to July 1953," dated 3 May 1954, declassified on 28 June 1974, outlines what the US knew about Soviet-Chinese radar capability. The report strongly recommends that US bombers continue to use countermeasures whenever flying on Yalu River missions. Toward the end of 1952, the Soviets were using the new P-20 Token microwave radar and installed it at the Chinese town of Antung, just north of the Yalu River, near where the MiGs engaged Stardust Four Zero. This greatly improved the ground intercept capability of the Soviet MiGs, but not the Chinese jets, as the Soviets kept the best equipped MiGs for themselves. As Cookie denotes, FEAF had fought with NSA for downgrading classified info regarding Soviet and Chinese AAA and radar capability in the Yalu area from TOP SECRET compartmented data to SECRET to brief crews, so there may have been a failure by the air staff to pass this information on to the air crews. Whether or not the Chinese knew specifics of this mission may or may not have been significant in retrospect, since an argument can be made that the Soviets would have attacked any plane flying near the Yalu River, since this was a heavily defended area and they were protecting the vital bridge across the Yalu River. The Soviets also rewarded fighter pilots when they scored kills, so there would have been no hesitation for multiple MiGs to intercept a lone, unarmed bomber. So, why was Stardust Four Zero allowed to fly without any jamming capability or countermeasures, in light of what the US Air Force (and FEAF) knew to be a problem around the Yalu River area? Good question.

Additionally, as Cookie notes, the Soviets were highly annoyed by what we today call "meaconing" -- i.e. either jamming or false replication of ground navigation beacons to cause an enemy aircraft to lose its way or hit the wrong target. Cookie has pondered whether Stardust Four Zero was a victim of this jamming such that the Soviets may have tried meaconing Stardust 40 by going after its SHORAN navigation beacon receivers and actually suckered the plane to fly over Antung without the crew being aware that the beacons may not have indicated their true position. Since that was very touchy material 52 years ago, one can see why nobody would want to talk about it. Col. Haas states that he vaguely remembered someone in the Navy who was monitoring the radar signatures that night recalling that there was a lone plane north of the border (Yalu River) at the time of this incident. While this may be feasible, both the pilot (Wally Brown) and the instructor pilot (Maj William Baumer) firmly believe they bailed out over (and landed in) North Korea, along with the wreckage, which could be seen in the distance burning. Further, recent Soviet documents translated and declassified which were provided to the US government during efforts in the late 1990s to locate the three Stardust Four Zero MIAs appeared to be "edited" or redacted after the original report had been written concerning the location of where the plane was flying. This appears to support the crew's claim that they were really flying within North Korean airspace.

As if that wasn't enough, the surviving crew were being held in a prison outside of Peking along with two captured CIA agents, Richard Fecteau and John Downey, who have since become famous. Their "stars" have been added to the lobby of the CIA Headquarters Building in Langley Va and unveiled in a non-public, employee only gathering. Associated Press Military Correspondent Robert (Bob) Burns has done much to bring their story to the public. At one point, the crew and the two CIA operatives were brought briefly together (at the time of the trial). The political ramifications of trying to secure release of Fecteau and Downey at the same time of the Stardust crew went to the highest levels of the US Government, including Eisenhower and his cabinet, the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, Sec. of State John Foster Dulles,  and numerous senators and congressmen. These behind the scenes discussions and communications with the Chinese, some of which are still classified, make for interesting reading. In a formerly classified Joint Chiefs of Staff memo, dated Nov 26, 1954, addressed to Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from Millard C. Young, Brig. General, USAF, Chief, the Air Force reasoned that the Chinese were using the POWs to force negotiations at the highest level, continue propaganda in the attempt to discredit and weaken the CIA, link the US to Chiang Kai Shek and discredit both in Asia, obtain entry into the U.N., and develop justification for overt military acts in the future. If memory serves me right, the CIA wanted to move forward with freeing their own two agents without first thinking (or perhaps caring) what would be the impact on the Stardust crew. But, fortunately, calmer minds prevailed and the US Govt maintained to their Chinese counterparts that the crew and the two agents were not linked or connected in any way (of course, this wasn't completely true). There was good reason to be cautious because it was feared that the fate of the USAF POWs would more or less be treated the same as CIA spies, an action that most certainly would cause a significant delay in their release, if at all. What is even more interesting is that Col. Haas acknowledges in his book, "In The Devil's Shadow," that Chou En-Lai himself knew of the CIA connection, at least in part from the POW "debriefings." It didn't matter that the two groups of POWs were not directly connected. It was enough for the Chinese to wage political bashing of the United States in front of the U.N.

Lastly, the whereabouts of the three missing in action (MIA) crew members of Stardust Four Zero is still somewhat of a mystery. The MIAs are Van Voorhis, Henry D. Weese, and Alvin D. Hart (tail gunner). Col. Arnold had remembered that he thought he saw Hart before he bailed out and that Hart appeared mortally wounded. Most (but not all) of the surviving crew believe the three MIAs died during bailout or went down with the wreckage. Some of the captured crew thought they saw one or two of the MIAs in the Peking prison. But, this is hard to collaborate given the conditions, the isolation and solitary confinement of the crew, and mental brutality that the guards were imposing on the POWs at the time. It is also likely that the Soviets visited the prison, although they probably did not come in contact with the POWs or the captured CIA agents. Some of the crew's artifacts ended up in their hands. Recently, like the efforts that located the remains of pilot Robert Snoddy, who was with Fecteau and Downey, there is evidence to suggest that the remains of the three MIAs may be found in unmarked graves in China where they were buried in 1953. DNA testing was scheduled to be performed but may have been delayed due to the scheduling of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Hopefully, efforts will resume after the Games are concluded.

John W. Thompson, IV