User:JudeFawley/sandbox

The refinery

 * This is worded a bit confusingly, maybe go with "Pan American merged with Standard Oil of Indiana in 1954 to form Amoco" or something similar.
 * ✅. Added new inline citation to fully support this statement, as it was not 100% clear from the previous source.
 * shouldn't this be "BP was"?
 * given that the previous paragraph mentions multiple mergers, maybe do "At the time of the 1999 merger"
 * given that the previous paragraph mentions multiple mergers, maybe do "At the time of the 1999 merger"

Safety and maintenance record

 * given what else is written in this section, it seems like this was known at the time as well.
 * ✅. The idea is that poor plant conditions were made public after the accident, although they were known inside BP well before it. For clarity, I changed to the simpler.
 * I'd spend a paragraph or two going over past incidents in more detail than is done here. Another on the cutbacks on spending and their results. Then maybe two more on audits. Currently there's way too many small paragraphs and this section feels disjointed (for a start, merge paragraphs 3 and 4).
 * I have merged paragraphs 3 and 4. Also, the section now starts with past accidents, then shifts to maintenance expenditure cuts and finally touches on the audits.
 * Regarding previous accidents, I have added a significant event occurred in 1979 and expanded on the 23 fatalities occurred.
 * There is now only one paragraph aggregating all audits, plus a final paragraph on the diffusion the audit results among BP higher management.

The ISOM plant

 * would reword -- maybe like "Excess hydrocarbon vapors and liquids were sent to vessel F-20, a blowdown stack."
 * Changed it to . I think it is important to leave the "vent and relief" to give context (for example, drained liquids did not go to the blowdown stack).

Unit turnarounds and use of portable buildings

 * would go with something more like "Portable buildings and trailers were often installed for use as offices during construction and maintenance."
 * "agreed" with who?
 * Basically "internally agreed", as in, among different departments and vouchsafed by risk assessment. I have changed it to, I hope it is more clear.
 * clarify what this means?
 * I have changed it to . I hope this clarifies.
 * I have changed it to . I hope this clarifies.



Circumstances of the accident

 * With the first paragraph... is this general procedural info? If so, probably belongs somewhere else, and if not, probably should include details on when this was happening.
 * It is procedural. The pre-start-up safety review should have happened before the start-up commenced, but it did not. This is one of the findings of the investigations and as such has been highlighted also somewhere else in the article. I have therefore shortened the text and included it at the beginning of the following section /* Early Morning */ :
 * Second paragraph also seems kinda out of place.
 * It contained information that, having transpired after the investigations, is repeated elsewhere in the article. Indeed, I think the paragraph was redundant, so I deleted it.

Early morning

 * this is talking about the indicator that would be read to see if it's 99%, right? should be clarified.
 * It is indeed that transmitter. I have reworded
 * is there a reason why this failed?
 * The proximate cause is unknown (I have just double-checked the investigation report to make sure I had not missed any info here). Instrument failures do happen and should be prevented or timely diagnosed by periodic maintenance/inspection/function test/calibration. These were not carried out, which is the real problem in the context of this accident and the widespread lack of safety oversight at the refinery. Lack of maintenance oversight on safety critical systems is highlighted elsewhere in the article (investigation reports and lessons learned in process safety).
 * When did the start-up process start and when was the alarm sounded and ignored? Would be nice to know if this happened before or after 5am.
 * At 3:09 am. I have added it in the text (and cited the page in the CSB report that supports this).
 * when were they supposed to arrive and when did they arrive?
 * Changed to
 * this might be better to include as a footnote.
 * ✅ (although slightly changed to, a bit more nuanced and consistent with the source supporting the statement).

Late morning

 * Maybe rephrase slightly:
 * the article only previously mentions the reading was "less than 100%", so this phrasing is a bit confusing. Also I'm maybe just missing something but if 93% would only be ~9 feet, then wouldn't 67 feet be way over 100%? The details of how this reading works could be clarified.
 * The level transmitter, by definition, could only read up to 100% of its range, which was from 5 feet (0%) to 9 feet (100%), as stated in the /* Early morning */ section. Anything above 9 feet would have read as 100% (i.e. 9 feet), regardless of how much liquid there actually was in the column (basically, under no circumstances should the liquid have been above the 9 feet mark; that is why by design there was no way of measuring levels above 9 feet: should you be above 9 feet, just make sure to empty the tower until you are safely below 9 feet). However, as stated in the /* Early morning */ section, this transmitter had not been calibrated and its readings were not reliable; this is why it never reached 100%. Because of this, and the concurrent failure of the redundant level switch (which should have sounded an alarm at 99% of the same 9 feet range), the operator thought there was liquid only at the bottom of the column, while in fact the whole column was becoming flooded. I have changed the wording as follows: I hope it is clearer.
 * The level transmitter, by definition, could only read up to 100% of its range, which was from 5 feet (0%) to 9 feet (100%), as stated in the /* Early morning */ section. Anything above 9 feet would have read as 100% (i.e. 9 feet), regardless of how much liquid there actually was in the column (basically, under no circumstances should the liquid have been above the 9 feet mark; that is why by design there was no way of measuring levels above 9 feet: should you be above 9 feet, just make sure to empty the tower until you are safely below 9 feet). However, as stated in the /* Early morning */ section, this transmitter had not been calibrated and its readings were not reliable; this is why it never reached 100%. Because of this, and the concurrent failure of the redundant level switch (which should have sounded an alarm at 99% of the same 9 feet range), the operator thought there was liquid only at the bottom of the column, while in fact the whole column was becoming flooded. I have changed the wording as follows: I hope it is clearer.

Explosion

 * this is ironic/amusing but not sure it's relevant in this location. Might be better somewhere else? Maybe in the second-to-last paragraph of this section.
 * ✅I have moved it to an explanatory footnote appended towards the end of this section.
 * why?
 * The CSB report is not conclusive not very clear on this. The operator was under the impression that there was in fact flow out of the tower, because the flow transmitter was giving him a reading of about 4300 bpd. In other words, he thought the level control valve was open, although at a low opening range of perhaps a few percent of its capacity, when in fact it was fully closed and the actual flowrate was 0 bpd. This is mentioned in the /* Early morning */ section. My interpretation is that at some point before 12:42 the operator must have thought that the outflow had to be increased from what he thought was about 4300 bpd to a higher output, perhaps because he was seeing the level increasing from, say 93% to close to 99% (although obviously we know that the level transmitter data were completely wrong; but the operator believed them). Bear in mind that this is my interpretation, likely to be correct but not actually spelled out in the investigation report. Because of this, I am reluctant to change the text because it would basically amount to original research.
 * "subsequent" is redundant here.
 * ✅, deleted "subsequent".

Emergency response

 * Maybe worth mentioning the primary fire department that responded here?
 * From all the sources I have found, it was a mutual aid service set up by the chemical and refining plants of Texas City. I have spelled out the name of this mutual aid (IMAS) in the text now.

Investigation reports

 * Mogford report looks good.
 * Noted
 * Guessing the Stanley report wasn't available publicly? If so the section looks fine.
 * Indeed I could not find it anywhere... but now I accidentally stumbled upon a copy! See here: https://web.archive.org/web/20081207143706/http://images.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/05/blast/stanleyreport.pdf. I have added a citation to this document. I have also reviewed it and expanded (although not extensively) the Stanley report section.
 * "BP Group" is inconsistently capitalized.
 * any updates on this?
 * None that I can find, except for Parus (for whom see explanatory note appended to the sentence you quote). However, I think the main point here is to highlight that two years after the facts BP had not yet taken action against these high profile executives. I think the sentence can stand as it is.
 * has a cn tag and no source.
 * Yes, that statement predates my article re-hauling. I cannot find a source for this. Since this statement reflects an action taken by BP after the report was issued, and not any content of the Baker report itself, I have deleted the statement altogether.
 * Maybe better to summarize Merritt's quote? That's quite long.
 * using a parenthetical here would be consistent with the rest of the article
 * this isn't clear/proper grammar
 * Changed to (see www.cchealth.org/health-and-safety-information/hazardous-materials). I believe ",  " is correct grammar to indicate a thing from a certain county in a certain state, or am I wrong?
 * this isn't clear/proper grammar
 * Changed to (see www.cchealth.org/health-and-safety-information/hazardous-materials). I believe ",  " is correct grammar to indicate a thing from a certain county in a certain state, or am I wrong?
 * Changed to (see www.cchealth.org/health-and-safety-information/hazardous-materials). I believe ",  " is correct grammar to indicate a thing from a certain county in a certain state, or am I wrong?

Aftermath

 * Paragraphs 2-4 here should probably be in their own subsection (para 1 appears to be mostly summarizing the settlements, prosecution, and fines, while 2-4 aren't really summarizing anything else).
 * ✅ Paragraphs 2-4 are now in own subsection titles "BP's response and fate of the refinery"
 * a secondary source would be ideal for this but not necessary.
 * It is a fair point, but I cannot find a source that lists all the hearings in one place. I would be inclined to leave this untouched.
 * The Eva Rowe section could be written a bit clearer ("she let it be known" isn't great wording), and also a source other than from a law firm for the settlement would be good.
 * ✅ ("she said" and source from Houston Chronicle used).
 * presumably this was eventually settled, right?
 * I am sure it was, because not settling would have meant a criminal trial, of which there was none (this is not about the public criminal prosecution for violation of the Clean Air Act). However, I really cannot find sources about this last settlement. I will leave the sentence as is for the moment, but if you have any suggestions to improve it please let me know.

Impact on process safety

 * is not really encyclopedic tone
 * ✅ Changed to

TV documentaries

 * Looks good.
 * Noted.

Lead

 * Maybe also mention cost of settlements?
 * Should probably say "relief valve" instead of "overpressure protection".
 * Would suggest summarizing the "Aftermath" and "Impact on process safety sections" outside of just the first paragraph.
 * ✅ Added one more paragraph: I hope this is good.
 * Would suggest summarizing the "Aftermath" and "Impact on process safety sections" outside of just the first paragraph.
 * ✅ Added one more paragraph: I hope this is good.

Images

 * Suggest linking the CEO names in the collage image.
 * Licenses look good.
 * Noted
 * Noted