User:Jzdollar/Enver Pasha

On 30 July 1921, with the Turkish War of Independence in full swing, Enver decided to return to Anatolia. His motivation for doing so was due to his involvement in a conspiracy to overthrow the Turkish government and replace it with a government under his own rule, hoping to attack and wipe out both the invading Greek army and Turkish government with the support of the Soviet Union. He was able to arrange such a plot based on his popularity with those alienated by Kemal, namely pan-islamists and (Fischer, 236 )Fischer attests that Enver’s relationship with the communists was one of convenience. At a conference in Baku

[Enver] protested that he "hated and cursed German imperialism and the German imperialists as much as he did British imperialism and the British imperialists." He was a friend of the Soviet republic, and of the Soviet idea, he said; he favored the revolution and would fight in the interests of oppressed peoples. (233)

Motivated by a revanchist desire to avenge the humiliation of an Entente victory, Enver was willing to collaborate with virtually anyone. Enver’s faith in the Soviets elevating him into power vanished when on March 16th, 1921, the Soviet-Anatolian treaty was signed. He then announced that he wished to visit the Caucasus

These plans however were foiled by the unexpected Turkish victory at Sakarya over the Greeks, prompting the Soviets to end the scheme. After the plot was dissolved, the Soviets hatched another plot to remove Enver from Anatolia as he was a threat to Soviet-Turkish relations. The Soviets staged a rebellion in Batum, under the guise of a Caucasian nationalist rebellion. It caused Enver to panic and flee to Moscow.Receiving a warm welcome.(Sonyel, 52)  In November 1921 he was sent by Lenin to Bukhara in the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic to help suppress the Basmachi Revolt against the local pro-Moscow Bolshevik regime. Before he left, a secretary of Chicherin revealed to Enver the truth about the rebellion, including details about the arrangement between Chicherin and Mustafa Kemal to remove Enver from the local political scene. Convinced he had been duped, Enver designed to retaliate and was further motivated by Haji Sami Koushjoubashi, who would later die attempting to assassinate Kemal, convincing Enver that there were great political opportunities to be exploited in Central Asia. He arrived there in Bukhara, October 24th 1921. Sent to negotiate with the Basmachi on the behalf of the Soviets, he Instead, under the cover of a hunting trip, made secret contacts with some of the rebellion's leaders and, along with a small number of followers, defected to the Basmachi side. But not before being captured by a local chief who robbed him and his companions, imprisoned them for months, and had them tortured until finally releasing them (ibid 54-55) His aim was to unite the numerous Basmachi groups under his own command and mount a co-ordinated offensive against the Bolsheviks in order to realise his pan-Turkic dreams. (54)However, his personality and penchant for assigning himself titles interfered with his efforts. In his first written public proclamation to the local people he called himself the “Commander-in-Chief of all the Mujahideen”. Enver wrote a letter to the former Emir of Bukhara Alim Khan requesting to use his authority to further the revolution and was denied as Alim believed Enver to have ulterior motives. In April of 1922, a congress of anti-Bolshevik organizations offered leadership of the insurgent armies to Enver under a number of unspecified conditions, a position which he accepted. (54-56)

The Soviets were utterly shocked at Enver’s betrayal and were notified by Enver himself of his plans and motivations along with an ultimatum demanding independence for Turkestan or he would unite the muslims of Central Asia in a mission to actualize his demand. The Soviets were willing to come to the negotiating table offering the revolting parties internal independence within the union. They were flatly rejected. (ibid. 56)

In the meanwhile Enver had managed to capture a number of towns and even mounted an, albeit failed, attack on Bukhara. The Soviets blamed the British for Enver’s success as he was receiving arms and munitions from the Emir of Afghanistan. In the same month Enver was appointed leader of the armed forces he attempted to reach out to the Bolsheviks for a settlement but he was snubbed. Regardless, Enver was prepared to finally commit what forces he had gathered into battle. With 20,000 to 30,000 troops he advanced from Baisun towards Shirabad, with the goal of capturing Termez, a Bolshevik stronghold. By June 1st, Enver had arrived and quickly captured the Bolshevik trenches On June 8th Termez was captured and then quickly abandoned following a reinforcement of the Bolshevik army. For 12 days the fighting would continue and any Bolshevik troops outside the stronghold were either captured or massacred. Shirabad would be captured by Enver soon after and the Bolshevik government elected to flee to Moscow in defeat. Finding Enver to be a difficult foe, the Bolsheviks planned to reform the exiled government and give concessions to the Muslims to pacify the rebellion, alongside deploying greater forces. Though Enver had been rather successful, he was in a bad spot as the Bolsheviks were cutting off his sources of supply from Afghanistan, through intimidation, and he was dangerously short of ammunition. In the face of a sweeping attack by the Bolsheviks he had no choice but to retreat South to Doshambai (56-59)

On July 9th Enver advanced towards Baisun and was soundly defeated by the Bolshevik army. He was also flanked by an army approaching from Termez which took 6,000 of his soldiers prisoner. The battle was a complete disaster and Enver fled for Afghanistan, failing to ever reach it. Enver was killed in action in August of that same year. Several accounts of how Enver met his end. According to the “Turkish” legendary version of his death, which may or may not be accurate, his death coincided with the first day of the Id-Ul-Azha. Enver heard shots east of him, in the direction of Dere-i Hakiyan and Chegan hill, the Russians had ambushed him. Knowing this was likely the end of him, he mounted his horse, sword drawn, and with his party of 25, charged straight into gunfire and was killed along with his entire retinue. Afterwards the Russians stripped the corpses to their bloody underwear and left them to the elements. Local villagers then reburied the squadron honorably.

Another, less glorious, version of events was told by reports from British intelligence. The Russians had offered amnesty to Enver and his party if he would come to Kulab, which he did. Entering the local mosque, he found himself betrayed as the Russians threw bombs on him from above killing him and a great number of those who came with him.

Yet another account of events, coming from the newspapers in Afghanistan, told another heroic, even spiritual, story. Enver, two days before his death, had a vision of his impending martyrdom which prompted him to dismiss his forces. When he was participating in the Id feast, he was ambushed and killed, despite resisting bravely.

Another fourth postulation was that Enver was ambushed and killed while convening a meeting of the most important khans and sheikhs in the area, hoping to pass his command down temporarily. He was giving his farewell to those collected, hoping to return but was instead killed with all who were found. (Fischer, 239)

FISCHER, LOUIS. “THE END OF ENVER PASHA.” The Virginia Quarterly Review, vol. 6, no. 2, 1930, pp. 232–39. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26433568. Accessed 6 Mar. 2023.

Middle Eastern Studies, Jan., 1990, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1990), pp. 52-64 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd