User:Jzhdylb/Voluntary childlessness

China
In China, the conflict between women's work and family is a contributing factor to the nation's low fertility rate. In the 1990s, the Chinese government reformed higher education in order to increase access, whereupon significantly more young people, a slight majority of whom being women, have received a university degree. Consequently, many young women are now more likely to be gainfully employed and financially secure. Traditional views on gender roles dictate that women be responsible for housework and childcare, regardless of their employment status.When there is a tense relationship between women's internal expectations and external women's rights and opportunities, the results are reflected in a decrease in women's willingness to have children. Workplace discrimination against women (with families) is commonplace; for example, an employer might be more skeptical towards a married woman with one child, fearing she might have another (as the one-child policy was rescinded in 2016) and take more maternity leave. Consequently, there no strong incentive for young women to marry and have children. Not only women, but also men who delay or refuse to have children because of the trade-off between work and family, are also heavily considered.Some respondents felt that they could not fully engage in work at home with underage children, and that parental responsibility could neglect important work tasks and even affect promotion progress .Moreover, the cost of living, especially the cost of housing in the big cities, is a serious obstacle to marriage. The problem facing China's current social situation is that "the standard of living has improved, but the overall level is low and uneven." In recent years, Chinese society has been accompanied by rapid urbanization and rising per capita income, and the demand for housing has gradually increased.However, income disparities and inadequate policies have put enormous pressure on housing for young people. Based on the traditional Chinese concept of marriage, housing is often an important condition for marriage, especially for men.And the increase in housing pressure has led to the fatigue of young people's marriage, which in turn has affected the desire to have children.

In the past two decades, the increase of the age of first marriage and the reduction of the interval between marriage and first childbirth have been the most important characteristics of China's demographic changes. The traditional concept of marriage is no longer prevalent in China, and the younger generation's view of marriage has changed dramatically.For example, traditional Chinese marriage aims at inheritance, and can fulfill sexual needs under the premise of following social morality.Today, China's socialization is evolving, and premarital sex is no longer considered shameful and unachievable, so the meaning of marriage is more likely to be accompanied by each other.This has led to a much lower perception of the importance of marriage. Chinese Millennials are less keen on tying the knots than their predecessors as a result of cultural change; many are now skeptical of the institution of marriage. Because this is a country where having children out of wedlock is quite rare, this means that many young people are foregoing children.

The "lying flat" movement, popular among Chinese youths, also extends to the domain of marriage and child-rearing. Over half of Chinese youths aged 18 to 26 said they were uninterested in having children because of the high cost of child-rearing, according to a 2021 poll by the Communist Youth League. While the Chinese economy has improved steadily, an explosive bloom of the real-estate market post-2008 has triggered an increase in house prices disproportionate to income. This is the commonly cited reason for childlessness and "lying flat" among the Chinese youth. A normal apartment unit in Beijing (with an average area of 112 square meters), for instance, costs on average ¥7.31 million ($1.15 million), and one would need to work non-stop for at least 88.2 years at Beijing's average monthly income of ¥6906 ($1083.7) without any expenditures.

On the Internet, Chinese young people's negative attitude toward marriage and childbirth is obvious, such as "no marriage, no children will make life happier" slogans to express their low desire for marriage and childbirth.

As of 2021, the national fertility rate is about 1.5 or even lower. In the more developed regions of the country, the fertility rate has been even lower for over a decade, only slightly higher than giving birth to one child per couple, which is comparable to the world's lowest fertility rate. This has been proven to be closely related to the aging population. China's population is rapidly aging, so much so that this demographic transition far exceeds the capacity of elderly care facilities. It is expected that by the mid-21st century, more than one-third of the population will be over 60 years of age. Of whom, more than 100 million will be over the age of 80. This means that there will be fewer than two working adults per senior citizen.

South Korea
South Korea's low birth rate in recent years (2020s) is mostly due to people avoiding getting married and having children. That young people increasingly choose to remain single is influenced by a combination of not just economic factors but also cultural change. Among economic factors are the high cost of housing, the difficulty of find a job, and job insecurity. In South Korea, social housing as non-state-owned, non-profit housing accounts for a small percentage of South Korean housing.This is due to the fact that the Korean housing system is dominated by public housing.At the same time, the legal and economic infrastructure of social housing in Korean society is not perfect, which has led to the serious housing problem in Korea.As a result, many young people experience housing stress, which affects their willingness to marry and have children. In 2016, the average youth unemployment rate in South Korea was 9 to 10 percent.Unemployment can have a negative impact on mental health, and can even lead to depression, suicide, and so on.As a result, employment pressures have reduced young Koreans' hopes for marriage and childbirth.

As for cultural change, South Korean youths no longer deem marriage to be necessary, while contemporary young South Korean women are increasingly unwilling to sacrifice their own needs and aspirations in order to help their husbands to succeed in the labor market. South Korean women have a high percentage of higher education, yet they have very low graduation and employment rates.This is because the proportion of Korean women who have lost their jobs is very high.They have been married, given birth, and raise a child .At the same time, due to the lack of equal treatment in the workplace and at home, young Korean women's desire to have children continues to decline, once becoming one of the lowest fertility rates .In addition, the heavy demands of Confucian family values have also led to a tense relationship between the rigid obligations of marital life and the socioeconomic reality of young people. Because in Korea, Confucian traditions have a great and lasting influence on women's roles, deeply affecting Korean culture and society. Transitioning to a dual-income family means that young women will find it challenging to strike a balance between their responsibilities at work and at home. Married Korean women prefer to continue working and despite the new policies, there are still obstacles in achieving work-life balance. For this reason, working Korean women who choose to be mothers typically prefer to have very few children.