User:KYPark/1974

Donald Campbell

 * Evolutionary Epistemology
 * In: The philosophy of Karl R. Popper, ed. by P. A. Schilpp, LaSalle, IL: Open Court, pp. 412-463


 * Karl Popper (1972) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach
 * Karl Popper (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
 * evolutionary epistemology

Vinton Cerf

 * Specification of Internet Transmission Control Program
 * Network Working Group Request for Comments: 675 (December 1974) NIC: 2 INWG: 72 (with Yogen Dalal and Carl Sunshine)


 * Internet, TCP, Network Information Centre (NIC) at SRI
 * ``The term "Internet" was adopted in the first RFC published on the TCP protocol (RFC 675: Internet Transmission Control Program, December 1974). It was around the time when ARPANET was interlinked with NSFNet, that the term Internet came into more general use, with "an internet" meaning any network using TCP/IP. "The Internet" came to mean a global and large network using TCP/IP. Previously "internet" and "internetwork" had been used interchangeably, and "internet protocol" had been used to refer to other networking systems such as Xerox Network Services.`` -- History of Internet
 * ``The Internet Protocol Suite resulted from work done by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the early 1970s. After building the pioneering ARPANET in 1969, DARPA started work on a number of other data transmission technologies. In 1972, Robert E. Kahn was hired at the DARPA Information Processing Technology Office, where he worked on both satellite packet networks and ground-based radio packet networks, and recognized the value of being able to communicate across them. In the spring of 1973, Vinton Cerf, the developer of the existing ARPANET Network Control Program (NCP) protocol, joined Kahn to work on open-architecture interconnection models with the goal of designing the next protocol generation for the ARPANET.  By the summer of 1973, Kahn and Cerf had worked out a fundamental reformulation, where the differences between network protocols were hidden by using a common internetwork protocol, and, instead of the network being responsible for reliability, as in the ARPANET, the hosts became responsible. Cerf credits Hubert Zimmerman and Louis Pouzin, designer of the CYCLADES network, with important influences on this design.  [...] [...]  The idea was worked out in more detailed form by Cerf's networking research group at Stanford (SRI) in the 1973–74 period, resulting in the first TCP specification  (The early networking work at Xerox PARC, which produced the PARC Universal Packet protocol suite, much of which existed around the same period of time (i.e. contemporaneous), was also a significant technical influence; people moved between the two).  DARPA then contracted with BBN Technologies (originally Bolt, Beranek and Newman), Stanford University, and the University College London to develop operational versions of the protocol on different hardware platforms. Four versions were developed: TCP v1, TCP v2, a split into TCP v3 and IP v3 in the spring of 1978, and then stability with TCP/IP v4 &mdash; the standard protocol still in use on the Internet today.  In 1975, a two-network TCP/IP communications test was performed between Stanford and University College London (UCL). In November, 1977, a three-network TCP/IP test was conducted between the U.S., UK, and Norway.  Between 1978 and 1983, several other TCP/IP prototypes were developed at multiple research centers. A full switchover to TCP/IP on the ARPANET took place January 1, 1983. `` -- TCP/IP or Internet Protocol Suite

Lauri Karttunen

 * Presupposition and Linguistic Context
 * Theoretical Linguistics, 1: 3-44.


 * According to a pragmatic view, the presuppositions of a sentence determine the class of contexts in which the sentence could be felicitously uttered. Complex sentences present a difficult problem in this framwork. No simple "projection method" had been found by which we could compute their presuppositions from those of their constituent clauses. This paper presents a way to eliminate the projection problem. A recursive definition of "satisfaction of presuppositions" is proposed that makes it unnecessary to have any explicit method for assigning presuppositions to compound sentences. A theory of presuppositions becomes a theory of constraints to successive contexts in a fully explicit discourse.

What I present here is a sequel to a couple of my earlier studies on presuppositions. The first one is the paper "Presuppositions of Compound Sentences" (Karttunen 1973a), the other is called "Remarks on Presuppositions" (Karttunen 1973b). I won't review these papers here, but I will start by giving some idea of the background for the present paper.

Earlier I was concerned about two things. First, I wanted to show that there was no adequate notion of presupposition that could be defined in purely semantic terms, that is, in terms of truth conditions. What was needed was a pragmatic notion, something along the lines Stalnaker (1972) had suggested, but not a notion of the speaker's presupposition. I had in mind some definition like the one given under (1).

The main point about (1) is that presupposition is viewed a relation between sentences, or more accurately, as a relation between a surface sentence and the logical form of another. By "surface sentence" I mean expressions of a natural language as opposed to sentences of a formal language which the former are in some manner associated with. "Logical forms" are expressions of the latter kind. "Context" in (1) means a set of logical forms that describe the set of background assumptions, that is, whatever the speaker chooses to regard as being shared by him and his intended audience. According to (1), a sentence can be felicitously uttered only in contexts that entail all of its presuppositions.

Secondly, I argued that, if we look at things in a certain way, presupposition turns out to be a relative notion for compound sentences. The same sentence may have different presuppositions depending on the context in which it is uttered. [...]

Pierre-Arnoul de Marneffe

 * Holon Programming&#58; A Survey
 * University de Liege, Service D'Informatique (December, 1973)


 * Holon Programming
 * In: A. G&uuml;nther et al (eds.) International Computing Symposium 1973, Amsterdam, North-Holland (with D. Ribbens)


 * Donald Knuth (1984) "Literate Programming"
 * Arthur Koestler (1967) The Ghost in the Machine, Holon, Literate programming, WEB, TeX

Richard Montague

 * Formal Philosophy&#58; Selected Papers by Richard Montague
 * ed. by Richmond H. Thomason; Yale University Press

Thomas Nagel

 * What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
 * Philosophical Review, pp. 435-450.


 * The article's title question was originally posed by Timothy Sprigge.

Robert Pirsig

 * Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

Ralph Rader

 * Fact, Theory, and Literary Explanation
 * Critical Inquiry (December 1974) Volume 1, Number 2
 * Ralph W. Rader


 * ``We are free to get our theories where we will. As Einstein said, the emergence of a theory is like an egg laid by a chicken, "auf einmal ist es da." In practice theories are usually derived as improvements on earlier theories, as better tools are refinements of earlier, cruder ones; and they are directed explanatorily not at the facts of their own construction but at independently specifiable facts which, left unexplained by earlier theories, have therefore refuted them. A new theory should cogently and directly explain all that its predecessors explain and in addition those particular facts which they conspicuously do not explain. The ideal is to have the simplest possible premises explaining most precisely the widest possible range of problematical facts.``
 * Critical Response
 * Stanley E. Fish: "Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader"
 * Jay Schleusener: "Literary Criticism and the Philosophy of Science: Rader's 'Fact, Theory, and Literary Explanation'"
 * Ralph W. Rader: "Explaining Our Literary Understanding: A Response to Jay Schleusener and Stanley Fish"

Paul Schilpp

 * The Philosophy of Karl Popper
 * 2 vols., ed. Paul A. Schilpp
 * Open Court Press, La Salle, IL, 1974


 * One of the better contributions to the Library of Living Philosophers series. Contains Popper's intellectual autobiography, a comprehensive range of critical essays, and Popper's responses to them.
 * Donald Campbell (1974) evolutionary epistemology

Maynard Smith

 * The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts
 * Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47: 209-221


 * Cf. William D. Hamilton (1964) "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior"
 * Cf. evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) since 1973
 * Cf. Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982)
 * Cf. George R. Price

Amos Tversky

 * Judgment under Uncertainty&#58; Heuristics and Biases
 * Science 185 (September 1974): 1124-1131. (With Daniel Kahneman).


 * See also: cognitive bias, selection bias, confirmation bias, Peter Cathcart Wason, Philip Johnson-Laird, George A. Miller, Princeton University Department of Psychology, Wason selection task,  2-4-6 problem, attitude polarization, illusory correlation, psychology of reason, list of cognitive biases, Lee Ross, Mark Lepper, Jonathan Baron