User:KYPark/1997

Michael Arbib

 * A Brain for Planet Earth
 * World Brain Workshop, University of Calgary, June 12 (unpublished paper)


 * Cf. World Brain, Global brain

Fritjof Capra

 * The Web of Life&#58; A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems
 * New York, NY: Anchor Books

David Deutsch

 * The Fabric of Reality&#58; The Science of Parallel Universes--and Its Implications
 * London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press (with additional comments by Frank Tipler)


 * Four-strand theory of everything
 * Hugh Everett's many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics
 * Karl Popper's epistemology, especially its anti-inductivism
 * Alan Turing's theory of computation
 * Richard Dawkins's refinement of modern evolutionary synthesis

Abraham Goodman

 * Fashioning the Emerging World Brain / World Mind
 * A Workshop at the University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada Homepage (in conjuction with Ed-media)
 * References


 * Agenda
 * what the World Brain / Mind is;
 * why the one which is now partly developed needs to be beneficial, rather than deleterious, for all mankind;
 * what needs to be done to forestall the development of an undesirable organism; and
 * how groups and individuals could and should help to ensure the former and not the latter.


 * H. J. A. Goodman Papers

David Johnson

 * A Critique of the Minimalist Program
 * Linguistics and Philosophy, 20, 273-333 (with Shalom Lappin)


 * cf. Shalom Lappin (2000)
 * cf. Minimalist Program

Michael Lesk

 * Practical Digital Libraries&#58; Books, Bytes, and Bucks
 * ISBN 9781558604599.

Peter Ludlow

 * Readings in the Philosophy of Language
 * M.I.T. Press. (ed.)
 * http://books.google.com/books?id=o1jGSavwQZIC

Georges Rey

 * Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach
 * Rey attacks on the eliminativist and instrumentalist views on mental states such as beliefs and desires that we are subjectively aware of by way of introspection. He suggests that Daniel Dennett is wrong to view "beliefs" as only useful instruments by which folk psychology allows us to predict future human behaviors, and that Paul Churchland is wrong to try to eliminate "beliefs" from the science of mind by replacing them with neural network processes. He defends what he calls "mental realism", taking such mental states as "beliefs" as the basis for an algorithmic description of how human minds work. Based on Jerry Fodor's representational theory of mind, he builds his own version of a computational/representational theory of thought that tries to incorporate and extend our everyday mental experience such as beliefs, hopes, and desires.

Stonier
Tom Stonier
 * Information and Meaning: An Evolutionary Perspective
 * Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ. Amazon


 * Cited by: Bates (2005)
 * See also: 51a We are free