User:KaiserAI/Primacy of European Union law

''Note: Preexisting text is italicized and displayed in a smaller font. All other text represents an original contribution. I significantly expanded the "Particular countries" section, incorporating information on Germany and the Netherlands.''

Particular countries
'' Depending on the constitutional tradition of member states, different solutions have been developed to adapt questions of incompatibility between State law and Union law to one another. EU law is accepted as having supremacy over the law of member states, but not all member states share the ECJ's analysis on why EU law takes precedence over state law if there is a conflict. ''

Germany
In its Solange I decision, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court articulated constitutional limits on Germany’s integration into the European Union. The Court expressed concern that Europe lacked either a “democratically legitimate parliament directly elected by general suffrage” or a “codified catalogue of fundamental rights.” Consequently, it argued that independent review was necessary to ensure that the unamendable protections of German Basic Law are upheld.

In response, the European Parliament, Council, and Commission issued a joint declaration emphasizing the “prime importance” of fundamental rights, as derived from both member states’ constitutions and the European Convention on Human Rights. Noting this development in Solange II, the German Constitutional Court held that so long as (solange) EU law had a level of protection of fundamental rights that is substantially in concurrence with the protections afforded by the German constitution, it would no longer review specific EU acts in light of that constitution.

The Solange cases engendered a “cooperative relationship” between the Federal Constitutional Court and the ECJ. This amicable rivalry greatly influenced the latter court’s jurisprudence, and has been recently reanimated in light of financial disputes in Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag.

Netherlands (New Section)
The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Dutch: Grondwet) functions as a codification of political practice rather than a normative collection of robust guarantees. As in the United Kingdom, the legislature has broad authority to define constitutional law as well as limits on the protection of rights. The Grondwet enshrines neither an absolute right to a fair trial, life, or property, and it provides few guidelines for the formation of governments. Moreover, judicial review of the constitutionality of parliamentary acts was prohibited in 1848.

Nevertheless, EU integration has been a relatively seamless process due to the Netherlands’ monist legal order, which considers international law on par with national law even absent any implementing statute. Treaty review powers have consequently expanded the authority of Dutch courts significantly, with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights serving as a de facto judicially-enforceable bill of rights. The Netherlands ensures that its judges are informed of EU law by offering relevant courses through the Training and Study Centre for the Judiciary, and by providing each court with an expert Coordinator for European Law responsible for offering guidance on practical legal applications.