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THE OAU & THE AU: A COMPERATIVE ANALYSIS

BACKGROUND

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25th May, 1963 in Addis Ababa, on signature of the OAU Charter by representatives of 32 governments. A further 21 states gradually joined over the years, with South Africa becoming the 53rd member on 23 May, 1994.

The OAU aimed at promoting the unity and solidarity of African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; promote international co-operation, giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and co-ordinate and harmonize members’ political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defense policies.

From May, 1994 with the entry into force of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), the OAU operated on the basis of these two legal instruments. For this reason the OAU was officially referred to as the OAU/AEC. At inception, the OAU had the following institutions: The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

By 1979, it had become evident and accepted, when the Committee on the Review of the Charter was established that a need existed to amend the OAU Charter in order to streamline the Organization to gear it more accurately for the challenges of a changing world. The frustration of African leaders in the OAU was clearly recognized in the need for progress in the Cairo Declaration at the 29th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Cairo which stated, among other things, that:

“Despite the fundamental changes that have taken place in the post independence 	era and more particularly since the end of the Cold War, there is still the need for 	establishing a close link between development, democracy, security and stability in 	the years ahead as the most ideal formula for fulfilling the legitimate aspirations of 	the peoples of Africa to a decent life, progress and social justice. This formula will 	enable us to solve gradually the acute socio-economic and political problems facing 	the African continent. It will also 	serve as a proper framework for the preservation 	of the diverse nature of our nations and societies and further enhancement of the 	fraternal ties that exist between our states”.

However, despite numerous meetings, the Charter Review Committee did not manage to formulate substantive amendments. The result of this was threefold:

• The Charter was "amended" by being augmented through ad hoc decisions of Summit such as the Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, etc;

• A growing realization that the need for greater efficiency of the Organization required urgent action; and

• The need to integrate the political activities of the OAU with the economic and developmental issues as articulated in the Abuja Treaty.

Consequently, an Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September, 1999 called for the establishment of an African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of the Abuja Treaty. Following this, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU on 11 July, 2000. The Union would then evolve from the OAU and the AEC into one unified institution, the AU.

The coming to fruition of the African Union (AU) effectively, ‘closed the shop’ on the Organization of African Unity. Incidentally, this momentous development came a little over a century since the first ever Pan-African Conference was held in London. This development generated much excitement among African analysts, albeit with some cautious predispositions regarding the future of the new Union. These reservations derived from the problem of who controls the development agenda of African states, which had been a matter for concern over the decades. At independence, nearly all the states of Africa and their leaders were in no position to undertake meaningful progress because they were too engrossed in the struggle for survival and the need to cope with the many problems threatening their countries and power.

However, against the realities of the international division of labor, many leaders of African states were quite aware that on their own, individual countries would not make any reasonable economic headway in a world that discriminated overtly against them. Consequently, since 1960 many attempts had been made to channel African aspirations towards a greater political unity based on a programme of freedom, equity, and justice. Against many odds, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had emerged with high hopes of tackling Africa’s problems.

The search for progress in a competitive and progressive world indicated clearly to some African leaders that the course of the OAU would be tortuous and the search for development strategies would multiply. Thereafter, the continent was subjected to waves of regional integration initiatives. Bearing in mind the challenges of globalization, the conviction on the part of several analysts was that the only choice for Africa’s salvation lay in a more comprehensive continental union. The emergence of the African Union thus came out of a litany of initiatives dating over decades. It is this shift of the union to new realities that is the subject of this paper. The paper explores the institutional, political, economic and legal distinction between the OAU and its successor, the AU.

THE OAU & THE AU: A COMPERATIVE ANALYSIS

In general, the African Union objectives are more comprehensive than those of the OAU. The objectives of the African Union were geared towards achieving greater unity and solidarity between African countries and the peoples of Africa, defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States, accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples, encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promote peace, security, and stability on the continent and promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance, among others.

The adoption of expanded objectives in the Constitutive Act was seen as the first step in an ongoing process to widen, streamline and rationalize the existing organizational framework of the continent to make it relevant to the demands of the 21st century and to achieve the ultimate goal of complete African unity. The African Union would build on the successes of the OAU, which, since its inception, had developed into the political and economic fulcrum of Africa.

Indeed, even as many African leaders were on the occasion of the creation of the OAU bent on preservation of their countries’ sovereignty and independence, some already knew that broader continental organization was the only way to create a centre stage to fast track collective African development. Kwame Nkrumah for instance, had set the stage a long time ago but the other African actors were acting out other scripts which they could not discard. He had been clear in his own mind:

“We can’t afford to place our needs, our development, our security, to the gait of 	camels and donkeys. We cannot afford not to cut down the overgrown bush of 	outmoded attitudes that obstructs our path to the modern open road of the widest 	and earlier achievement of economic independence and the raising up of the lives of 	our people to the highest level”.

Further, Article 4 the Constitutive Act of the AU lists 16 principles which contain an ambitious wish list, including, for example, the establishment of a common defense policy and the “right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of the Union in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. Ofcourse, this was not part of the OAU Charter in which Member States were hell bent on non-intervention and the preservation of self independence and sovereignty.

But as Michael Mulikita rightly observes, the Act makes no reference to the UNSC, which is the primary transnational organ for dealing with the type of emergencies referred to in Article 4(h) of the Act. But more worrisome and in the classic manner of state-centric organizations, Article 4(g) effectively nullifies Article 4(h) by affirming “non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another”. Hence, as Mulikita concludes, under the non-interference clause, a regime guilty of the type of gross human rights violations outlined in Article 3 (on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People Rights) and Article 4(h) can legally obstruct Union intervention. This confirms the old habits, the old fears and the old traits since the 1960s.

It is recalled that in the OAU Charter, Article 3(2) on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states led to serious drawbacks and had negative implications for the activities of the organization for several decades. In this the period, ruthless, corrupt and unaccountable leaders emerged across the continent, without African states or leaders confronting them. Along with other factors, it led OAU to degenerate into what the Kenyan statesman, Oginga Odinga, called “a Trade Union of African Heads”.

Institutionally; the Constitutive Act of the AU created a supranational type of executive body that could promote integration and sustainable human development more effectively than the OAU. The Act expanded the former institutions of the OAU and created new ones as well. The principal organs were listed as: the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Special Technical Committees, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, and the Financial Institutions.

Subsequently, Article 5 of the Act was amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2003 to introduce the Peace and Security Council modeled on the workings of the UN Security Council. Under Article 9 of the Protocol, the Peace and Security Council was created as a standing decision-making organ of the Union for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

Ofcourse, the creation of these organs and institutions was aimed at furthering the new role of the Union in African integration. It was also intended to project the union as a people centered organization providing for example for the Pan African Parliament and institutions that directly deal with improvement of peoples’ lives in terms of promotion of basic human rights, justice, fairness and prosperity.

On the economic front, the AU, convinced of the need to accelerate the implementation of the Abuja Treaty, and in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and well as more rigorously face the challenges of globalization, created a number of economic institutions and committees. For instance, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union was created. Further, a number of Specialized Technical Committees meant to fast track African economic development were also created. These include: the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters, the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs, the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters, the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment, the Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism and the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources. The Act also created Financial Institutions including: the African Central bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank.

However, the Constitutive Act presupposes a high degree of social and political integration of member states. It remains unclear whether a union modeled along the example of European integration can be successfully established in Africa. This is all the more problematic in the sense that intra-African trade, notwithstanding the existence of sub-regional economic arrangements such as ECOWAS, SADC, EAC and COMESA, has persistently remained below the five percent (5%) mark calculated as a fraction of the continent’s total external trade. The overlapping membership of several regional groupings with duplicating mandates and structures leading to inadequate financing of the integration process, poses a serious threat to continental union.

Legally, save for the difference in the constitutive instruments of the unions, there seems to be little difference between the OAU and the AU. Perhaps the most outstanding difference is the creation by the Constitutive Act of the AU of the African Court of Justice. The African Court of Justice was originally intended to be the “principal judicial organ of the Union” [Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, Article 2.2] with authority to rule on disputes over interpretation of AU treaties. A protocol to set up the Court of Justice was adopted in 2003, and entered into force in 2009. It was, however, superseded by a protocol creating the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which incorporated the already established African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and have two chambers — one for general legal matters and one for rulings on the human rights treaties. The merger protocol was adopted in 2008. The united Court will be based in Arusha, Tanzania.

There also other noticeable differences between the AU and the OAU; major among which include:-

i)	The AU is conceived as a union of peoples rather than of the leaders of 	Africa. Women were virtually absent from the former OAU, holding no 	positions of 	influence within the OAU during its 39 years of existence. 	This is a notable departure in the AU from the OAU. Indeed, Article 3 of 	the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union 	of 2003 specifically provided for as a core objective of the AU, the 	effective participation of women in decision-making, particularly in the 	political, economic and socio-cultural areas.

ii)	Under Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, there was introduced 	the idea of suspension of a Member State. Thus if any Member State 	changes government through unconstitutional means, it is thence forth be 	barred from participating in the activities of the Union. In the OAU 	Charter grounded on the idea of non-intervention, changes of government 	in Member States was considered an internal matter in which the 	Organization was disinterested. Most recently, with the changes of 	government in Egypt on July 3rd 2013, that Member State was suspended 	until it returns to constitutional order. Jackie Cilliers however, 	believes that the Act does not incorporate extensive principles for 	democratic governance, 	the definition of unconstitutional changes, or the 	measures that the AU would take in response to such developments.

CONCLUSION

Though OAU served its purpose well, it did not reflect the will, hopes and aspirations of the people of Africa according to changing times, and to help the great continent of Africa occupy its rightful place in the new world, its structure needed to be streamlined while adding some new institutions. AU has a broader scope and mandate than OAU, and a structure that has been designed keeping in mind the challenges in the 21st century. AU reflects greater transparency, openness, and a willingness to respect human rights in a manner acceptable to international community.

It has been stated that there has been a consensus that the aim of the AU would be to consolidate the gains made by the OAU in its 37 years of existence and to advance the cause of collective action in African affairs. This paper however acknowledges that against the backdrop of the OAU’s history and the general African condition, the new Union project fits into a prevailing condition which does not portend radical transformation due to internal and external constraints. New institutions and frameworks, themselves, will do little to rectify the situation described in the Yaoundé Declaration of 1996 on Africa:

“At the close of the 20th century … of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed 	the most backward in terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed, and 	the most vulnerable as far as security and stability are concerned”.

Although this paper in conclusion would rather err on the side of hope than of despair, unity may not make Africa suddenly rich but it can make it difficult for Africa to be disregarded and humiliated. Perhaps marginalization, so often decried, is what Africa needs right now. For one thing, it will help the evolution of an endogenous development agenda, an agenda that expresses the aspirations of the people and can therefore elicit their support. The AU may clearly be more than old wine in new bottles in the sense that it offers at least a new approach to Africa’s collective efforts, but, given the continued existence of old political structures which will shape political will, the Union might well be new wine in an old bottle.

However, the fundamental issue is really not that of recounting the benefits but that of developing the political will among African statesmen and their readiness to bear the costs that is required to produce and sustain an effective union. This demands equitable burden-sharing in matters affecting the continent and the administration of the Union. It also requires an appropriate institutional framework with sufficient authority and capacity for implementing decisions. The creation of the necessary democratic environment rather than mere summit diplomatic rhetoric and the involvement of civil society in order to ensure the building of integrated production capacities are indispensable requirements for a solid union.

The success of the AU would require mature African statesmanship that strikes a balance between the desires of member states to pursue their individual interests, and the political will to forgo certain aspects of national sovereignty and independence for the common good of the continent. African states, marginalized by economic globalization and under severe strains from poverty, war and other forms of degradation, cannot afford to be half-hearted in their pursuit of regional cooperation. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how they can survive on their own in a highly competitive global economy in the present world order.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1- 	The OAU Charter

2-	The Constitutive Act of the African Union

3-	Jackie Cilliers, ‘Towards the African Union’, African Security Review, vol. 	10, No., 2, 2001

4-	Konstanz Mulikita, ‘The UN Security Council and the OAU: Conflict or 	collaboration’, African Security Review, vol. II, No 1, 2002.

5- 	Adams Oshiomole, ‘Popular Participation and the African Union’, in 	Adagbo Onoja (ed.), Plying the Foreign Pitch, vol. 2, 2000- 2001, Abuja: 	Ministry of 	Foreign Affairs, 2001.

6-	Chris Brazier, ‘African United: Not Hopeless nor Helpless’, Africa Agenda, 	Vol. 3, No 4.

7-	Armstrong M. Adejo of the Department of History, Benue State University, 	Makurdi, Nigeria in his paper “From OAU to AU: New Wine in Old 	Bottles?”

8-	Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 	2003

9-	Protocol to the African Court of Justice 2003

10-	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 	Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998 11-	Protocol on the Statute of the African Court for Justice and Human Rights 	2008

12-	Wikipedia; the free encyclopedia