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1.1 Types: Chapter VI and Chapter VII
There are a range of various types of operations encompassed in peacekeeping. In Virginia Fortna’s book Does Peacekeeping Work, she distinguishes four different types of peacekeeping operations. Importantly, these types of missions and how they are conducted are heavily influenced by the mandate in which they are authorized. Three of Fortna’s four types are consent-based missions, ie. Chapter VI missions, with the fourth being a Chapter VII Mission. Chapter VI missions are consent based, therefore they require the consent of the belligerent factions involved in order to operate. Should they lose that consent, Peacekeepers would be compelled to withdrawal. Chapter VII missions, by contrast, do not require consent, though they may have it. If consent is lost at any point, Chapter VII missions would not be required to withdraw. During the Cold War peacekeeping was primarily interpositional in nature—thus being referred to as traditional peacekeeping. UN Peacekeepers were deployed in the aftermath of interstate conflict in order to serve as a buffer between belligerent factions and ensure compliance with the terms of an established peace agreement. Missions were consent-based, and more often than not observers were unarmed—such was the case with UNTSO in the Middle East and UNCIP in India and Pakistan. Others were armed—such as UNEF-I, established during the Suez Crisis. They were largely successful in this role.
 * 1) Observation Missions which consist of small contingents of military or civilian observers tasked with monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, or other conditions outlined in a ceasefire agreement. They are typically unarmed and are primarily tasked with observing and reporting on what is taking place. Thus, they do not possess the capability or mandate to intervene should either side renege on the agreement. Examples of observation missions include UNAVEM II in Angola in 1991 and MINURSO in the Western Sahara.
 * 2) Interpositional Missions, also known as traditional peacekeeping, are larger contingents of lightly armed troops meant to serve as a buffer between belligerent factions in the aftermath of a conflict. Thus, they serve as a buffer zone between the two sides and can monitor and report on the compliance of either side with regard to parameters established in a given ceasefire agreement. Examples include UNAVEM III in Angola in 1994, and MINUGUA in Guatemala in 1996.
 * 3) Multidimensional missions are carried out by military and police perssonel in which they attempt to implement robust and comprehensive settlements. Not only do they act as observers, or in an interpositional role, but they also participate in more multidimensional tasks—such as electoral supervision, police and security forces reform, institution building, economic development and more. Examples include UNTAG in Namibia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, and ONUMOZ in Mozambique.
 * 4) Peace enforcement Missions are Chapter VII missions and unlike the previous Chapter VI missions, they do not require the consent of the belligerent parties. These are multidimensional operations comprising both civilian and military personnel. The military force is substantial in size and fairly well-equipped by UN Peacekeeping standards. They are mandated to use force for purposes beyond just self-defense. Examples include ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in West Africa and Sierra Leone in 1999, as well as the NATO operations in Bosnia—IFOR and SFOR.

In the post-Cold War era, the United Nations has taken on a more nuanced, multidimensional approach to Peacekeeping. In 1992, in the aftermath of the Cold War, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put together a report detailing his ambitious concepts for the United Nations and Peacekeeping at large. The report, titled An Agenda for Peace, described a multi-faceted and interconnected set of measures he hoped would lead to effective use of the UN in its role in post-Cold War international politics. This included the use of preventative diplomacy, peace-enforcement, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

In The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations, Doyle and Sambanis summarize Boutros Boutros’ report as preventative diplomacy, confidence-building measures such as fact-finding missions, observer mandates, and the potential deployment of UN mandated forces as a preventative measure in order to diminish the potential for violence or the danger of violence occurring and thus increasing the prospect for lasting peace. Their definitions are as follows: -UN Intervention:
 * 1) Peace-enforcement, meant to act with or without the consent of the belligerents in order to ensure any treaty or cease-fire mandated by the United Nations Security Council is maintained. This is done primarily under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the forces are generally heavily armed as opposed to the unarmed, or lightly-armed personnel frequently deployed as observers.
 * 2) Peace-making, meant to compel belligerents to seek a peaceful settlement for their differences via mediation and other forms of negotiation provided by the UN under the auspices of Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
 * 3) Peace-keeping, deployment of a lightly-armed United Nations presence in the field with the consent of the belligerents involved in order to build confidence and monitor any agreements between concerned parties. Additionally, diplomats would continue to work toward comprehensive and lasting peace, or for the implementation of an agreed upon peace.
 * 4) Post-Conflict Reconstruction, intended to develop economic and social cooperation meant to mend relations between the belligerents. Social, political, and economic infrastructure would ideally prevent potential violence and conflict in the future and help to contribute to a lasting and robust peace.

-Non-UN Intervention:

-Conceptual Distinctions: International Policing, Humanitarian Intervention, Observing, Polling Protection, Military Intervention under the auspices of peacekeeping by non-UN forces

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) are civilian personnel that carry out non-violent, non-interventionist and impartial set of tactics in order to protect civilians in conflict zones from violence in addition to supporting additional efforts to build a lasting peace. While the term UCP is not entirely ubiquitous amongst non-governmental agencies (NGOs) in the field: many utilize similar techniques and desire shared outcomes for peace; such as accompaniment, presence, rumor control, community security meetings, the securing of safe passage, and monitoring.

2.1 Brief History
United Nations Peacekeeping started in 1948 when the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of UN unarmed military observers to the Middle East in order to monitor the armistice agreement that was signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War. This operation was called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and is still in operation today. With the passage of resolution 73 (1949) by the Security Council in August of 1949, UNTSO was given the task of fulfilling four Armistice Agreements between the state of Israel and the Arab states which had participated in the war. Thus, UNTSO’s operations were spread through five states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.

In the wake of independence in India and Pakistan in August 1947 and the subsequent bloodshed that followed the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) in January 1948 in order to create the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), with the purpose of mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the fighting related to it. This operation was non-interventionist in nature and was additionally tasked with supervision of a ceasefire signed by Pakistan and India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. With the passage of the Karachi agreement in July of 1949, UNCIP would supervise a ceasefire line that would be mutually overseen by UN unarmed military observers and local commanders from each side in the dispute. UNCIP’s mission in the region continues to this day, now under the operational title of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

Since then, sixty-nine peacekeeping operations have been authorized and have deployed to various countries all over the world. The great majority of these operations have begun in the post-Cold War world. Between 1988 and 1998 thirty-five UN operations had been established and deployed. This signified a substantial increase when compared with the periods between 1948 and 1978; which saw the creation and deployment of only thirteen UN Peacekeeping operations and zero between 1978 and 1988.

Armed intervention first came in the form of UN involvement in the wake of the Suez Crisis in 1956. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF-1), which existed from November 1956 to June 1967 was essentially the first ever United Nations peacekeeping force. It was given the mandate of ensuring the cessation of hostilities between Egypt, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel in addition to overseeing the withdrawal of French, Israeli and British troops from Egyptian territory. Upon completion of said withdrawal, UNEF would serve as a buffer force between Egyptian and Israeli forces in order to supervise conditions of the ceasefire and contribute to a lasting peace.

Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), was deployed in 1960. This operation involved upwards of 20,000 military personnel at its peak, and resulted in the death of 250 UN personnel, including then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. ONUC was meant to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces in the Congo, who had reinserted themselves after Congolese independence in the wake of a revolt carried out by the Force Publique (FP), in order to protect Belgian citizens and economic interests. ONUC was also tasked with establishing and maintaining law and order (helping to end the FP revolt and ethnic violence) as well as provide technical assistance and training to Congolese security forces. An additional function was added to ONUC’s mission, in which the force was tasked with maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo —resulting from the secession of the mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai. The UN forces there, somewhat controversially, more or less became an arm of the Congolese government at the time and helped to forcefully end the secession of both provinces.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the UN created multiple short-term missions all over the world including the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), in conjunction with more long-term operations such as the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

A dramatic increase in the United Nation’s agenda came about with the end of the Cold War. State sovereignty, heretofore seen as inviolable, became more subjective. Between 1990 and 1993, the UN Security Council adopted a stance which allowed for a keenly invasive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII. This allowed for a substantial expansion of international intervention under the auspices of peace enforcement and paved the way for military intervention in what could be described as a state’s internal affairs—such as a civil war. What had once been the deployment of small, armed or unarmed military observers meant to monitor and ensure ceasefire agreements after interstate conflicts had become highly elaborate, multidimensional, multilateral, multifunctional forces which could include armed, or unarmed observers, police personnel, economists, legal experts, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, electoral observers, communication and public information experts, and other civilian trainers, mentors and technocrats meant to educate local personnel on important matters that could potentially solve underlying issues related to the conflict and build the foundations for a lasting peace. These developments came about as a result of the shifting nature of conflict in the post-Cold War world. No longer was interstate conflict the most common; it had been replaced by intrastate conflict. As a result, the United Nations members states have attempted to keep pace and the continued transformation of UN Peacekeeping Forces from traditional first generation operations, to the newer and more robust second and third generation operations, reflect the evolving nature of political violence in the contemporary world.

This substantial upswing in UN intervention initially took place between 1989 and 1994. In this time, the UN Security Council authorized twenty new operations and the total number of peacekeepers increased from 11,000 to 75,000. The rapid establishment of missions included the UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). These missions were tasked with the implementation of complex peace agreements, stabilization of precarious security situations in order to limit continued violence, train and re-organize local military and police forces, and oversee the election of new government with the intent to build democratic institutions.

While these early deployments saw success, by the mid-90s political violence and intrastate conflict had outpaced the UN’s ability to intervene and mitigate the bloodshed. This was reflected with the UN’s poor performance in the former Yugoslavia which came in the form of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda’s (UNAMIR) inability to prevent the Rwandan genocide, as well as the subsequent collapse of the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Somalia after the events which took place during Operation Gothic Serpent in Mogadishu in October of 1993.

In each case the UN was unable to prevent violence between warring parties. Indeed, there was a total breakdown of previously constructed peace agreements and the UN Operations in each country failed to prevent belligerents there from reneging. As a result, the UN Security Council began to limit the creation of new peacekeeping operations and began to look inward in order to determine the root causes for the UN’s failures in these areas. These included comprehensive inquiries in to the UN actions and failures during the Rwandan genocide, a comprehensive assessment on the Srebrenica massacre, and the events which contributed to the collapse of UNOSOM II in Somalia.

Nevertheless, new UN operations were authorized in the latter years of the 1990s—many in the former Republic of Yugoslavia— including the UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG), the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).

5.1 Causal Mechanisms of Peacekeeping:
While much has been written about Peacekeeping and what Peacekeepers do, very little empirical research has taken place in order to identify the manner in which Peacekeepers can have an impact in a post-conflict environment. Columbia University Professor, Virginia Fortna attempts to lay out four causal reasons in which peacekeepers have an opportunity to lay the groundwork for a lasting peace. Fortna's four causal reasons: Fortna argues that peacekeepers have a positive impact on the peace process, despite often being sent to places where peace is most difficult to achieve. Peacekeeping is often looked at by detractors as ineffective, or unnecessary. Peace prevails when belligerents already have a vested interest in sustaining peace and therefore it could be argued that Peacekeepers play only a minor role in creating a strong foundation for enduring peace. Yet these causal reasons illustrate the important roles that Peacekeepers play in ensuring that peace lasts, especially when contrasted against situations in which belligerents are left to their own devices. These causal reasons thus illustrate the need for Peacekeeping and lay a foundation for the manner in which Peacekeeping operations can have a substantive impact on the post-conflict environment.
 * 1) Change the incentive of recent belligerents, making peace more desirable or war more costly.
 * 2) Reduce the uncertainty and fear that drives security dilemma spirals.
 * 3) Prevent or control accidents or the actions of rogue groups that might otherwise escalate back to war.
 * 4) Prevent political abuse by one side (generally the government) that might cause actors losing the peace to take up arms anew.

In order to change the incentives for war and make peace more appealing the UN can provide a military force by way of an enforcement mandate which provides deterrence to would-be spoilers. They can monitor the situation making the potential for surprise attack by one of the belligerents less likely to occur or by making it more difficult to carry out such an attack. A lightly-armed observer mission can also serve as an early-warning force or “tripwire” for the aforementioned enforcement mission. Aid and recognition provided to the belligerents by the international community should be made conditional and based on compliance with objectives laid out in the negotiating process. And lastly, peace dividends should be provided in the forms of jobs, public works and other benefits.

To reduce uncertainty and fear the UN Peacekeeping force can monitor the aforementioned compliance, facilitate communication between belligerents in order to ease security dilemma concerns thus reassuring belligerents that the other side will not renege, and allow for belligerents to signal their legitimate intentions for peace to the other side. That is to say, provide a meaningful pathway for communication between both sides to make their intentions known and credible.

Prevention and control of potential accidents that may derail the peace process can be achieved by the peacekeeping force by deterring rogue groups. Belligerent forces are often undisciplined without a strong central source of command and control, therefore while a peace is being negotiated there is potential for a rogue group on one side to renege and spoil the peace process. UN forces can serve to prevent this. Additionally, the UN force can serve as a moderator and make communication easy between both parties and bring in political moderates from either side. By providing law and order UN peacekeeping forces can temporarily replace a state’s security forces and prevent a bias overreaction to an alleged violation by one side which could in turn result in escalation and a renewal in the violence.

Prevention of political abuse can be achieved through the reformation of institutions associated with the government. Training and monitoring the security forces (e.g. army or police) help to make them an unbiased protector of the people rather than a weapon of suppression for the ruling government. Hopefully this training can bring trust by the people for the security establishment. UN forces can also run and monitor elections in order to ensure a fair process. In other cases, the UN may provide a neutral interim government to administer the country during a transitional period wherein the associated government institutions are being retrained, reformed or better developed. Lastly, military groups such as armed rebels can be encouraged to put down their weapons and transformed into political organizations using appropriate non-violent means to mete out their grievances and compete in the election cycle. This is especially important as many of these groups serve as the chief opposition to a given government, but lack the means or know-how to operate effectively as political organizations.

Different peacekeeping missions take place as a result of different causal mechanisms. More military deterrence and enforcement are meant for those missions operating under the auspices of Chapter VII, while Chapter VI missions are meant to serve more as monitoring forces and interpositional operation meant to target and prevent potential political abuse—these are primarily multidimensional mission and are heavily involved in the post-conflict political situation.

6.1 Allegations of Abuse
Since the 1990s, UN Peacekeepers have been the subject of numerous accusations of abuse ranging from rape and sexual assault, to pedophilia and human trafficking. Complaints have arised from Cambodia, East Timor and West Africa. In Bosnia-Herzegovina prostitution associated with trafficked women sky-rocketed and often operated just beyond the gates of U.N. compounds. David Lamb, a regional human rights officer in Bosnia from 2000 to 2001 claimed “The sex slave trade in Bosnia largely exists because of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. Without the peacekeeping presence, there would have been little or no forced prostitution in Bosnia.” In addition, hearing held by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2002 found that members of SFOR were frequenting Bosnian brothels and engaging in sex with trafficked women and underage girls.

An investigation by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, then Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations, in 2006 resulted in a comprehensive report which detailed some of this abuse in detail— particularly that which occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sexual exploitation frequently came in the form of prostitution, wherein some money (an average of $1-$3 per encounter) was exchanged for sex. In other instances food, or jobs were utilized to ply women for sex. Other young women reported of “rape disguised as prostitution”, whereabouts Peacekeepers would rape them and were then given some money or food in order to make the act seem consensual. Between May and September of 2004, there were seventy-two allegations of sexual exploitation—68 against military and 4 against civilian personnel. By the end of 2004 there would be a total of 105 allegations. The majority of these allegations were in regards to sex with person under the age of 18 years (45 percent) and sex with adult prostitutes (31 percent). Rape and sexual assault made up approximately 13 and 5 percent respectively, with the remaining 6 percent of allegations relating to other forms of sexual exploitation. Most of the allegations were against peacekeepers from Pakistan, Uruguay, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, and Nepal.

In July of 2007 the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) confined an entire contingent of 734 Moroccans in the Ivory Coast in the wake of allegations that some had sexual abused underage girls. In the following years, there were 80 investigations carried out by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). In 2013, allegations were leveled on personnel from France, Gabon, and Burundi operating in the Central African Republic. These include accusations of sexual abuse and exploitation of at least 108 from Kemo Prefecture and that the vast majority of the cases involved minors. In 2016, more allegations of abuse were levelled on Peacekeepers operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern province of North Kivu. Tanzania and the UN opened a joint inquiry into the alleged abuse, which involved Tanzanian troops. There have been 18 reports of sexual abuse, eight of which involved minors. Sixteen Tanzanian soldiers, a Malawian and a South African are implicated in the accusations. The UN reported in March of 2016 that there was a large increase in allegations; which involved troops from twenty one countries. Most of the allegations involved troops from African countries including: Cameroon, Congo, Tanzania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo.

6.2 Flaws in Contemporary Conflict Resolution Models
Concepts in conflict resolution were developed in Europe and North America and therefore reflect western intellectual traditions with regards to the subject. It is often thought that these methods and theories have applicability all over the world. However, conflicts have often been resolved within social, religious and cultural groups that possess vastly different methods from those proposed by western intellectuals in the field.

6.3 Cultural Concerns Related to Contemporary Peacekeeping
There is a notable intermingling of varied cultures when it comes to Peacekeeping. From the vast number of troops, police and personnel that are brought together from various contributing countries to the often-times challenging ethnic regions which Peacekeeping forces are often deployed. Because of these varied cultures, complicated cultural interactions take place which not only effect mission effectiveness, but can also lead to friction with the population the peacekeepers are meant to be assisting.

In most cases prior to 1988, specific countries often provided peacekeepers. At that point, only twenty six countries had sent personnel to participate in peacekeeping deployments. Today, that number has risen to more than eighty. This results in an extremely heterogeneous group. Thus, UN Peacekeeping deployments must not only contend with language complications, but also myriad cultural and social differences that can create operational difficulties that are hard to overcome. These difference can create problems with regard to interactions (whether personal or between institutions/units), misunderstandings, inadvertent offensive behavior and prejudices that may be associated with a particular contingent from a given country.

In terms of operations, effectiveness can be hindered by the varying tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the military or police personnel that are a part of a given deployment. Because UN forces are cobbled together from so many different sources, there is a discrepancy in capabilities, training, equipment, standards and procedures. Moreover, substantial differences exist in the form of command and control between contributing members personnel. In addition, some nations may not wish to be subordinated to another, complicating unity of command. This can lead to deep-seated divisions between contingents within the UN force that results in a lack of mutual support between units in the field. This can be demonstrated in the experiences of UN Peacekeeping forces deployed to East Timor, where the Australians engaged in a robust operation that maximizes force protection in contrast to a pro-active heart and minds approach utilized by Great Britain's Ghurka personnel.

Maintaining the consent of the peacekept is an important facet of modern peacekeeping. Notably in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, fundamental principles of retaining that consent was ignored on the grounds of a humanitarian intervention-- reflecting the nature of an Article VII intervention. Yet in order to stress and maintain the legitimacy of an intervention it is important that the UN's forces continue to enjoy the consent of the population and government of the country to which they were deployed. This means making the peacekept feel a part of the process in addition to important cultural knowledge of the area in which peacekeepers are operating, in order to reduce friction and provide for a successful operation.

Little study on the interaction of cultures that exist within the a peacekeeping force and the population within which they operate. However, in 1976 Galtun and Hveem studied Norwegian personnel who participated in UNEF-1 (in Gaza) and ONUC (Congo). They posited that knowledge of the culture and an understanding of the inhabitants in a given country were not only necessary, but crucial for the success of the mission. They found that personnel from the Norwegian contingent wanted greater insight into the conflict and the culture in which they operated. They also wanted more robust training with regard to working with people from other countries. Yet the study revealed the the troops received very little from briefing and that the majority of the information regarding the conflict was gained through the news, reading books or speaking with other UN personnel-- rather than any established UN training program.

Similarly, a study conducted on the relations between members of UNIFIL and local population in Lebanon, carried out by Heiberg and Holst, found all but confirmed the findings. In their example, they found that the countries that were able to integrate more fully with the population and show a depth of knowledge about the local culture were more successful, while those that were ambitious, but less integrated into the local scene found themselves far removed from the individuals with which they were supposed to be engaged, and their success, or lack thereof, illustrated this. "Only the Italian contingent of some 2,200 people operated as part of the local environment and became an active element in restoring normal living conditions. Its soldiers were provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural, political and social situation of the people among whom they worked. Operating in a sector that contained approximately 600,000 inhabitants, mostly Shi'ites, the Italians carefully nurtured contact with the ordinary citizens and the political leaders in their area... While the Americans thought they were becoming involved in Lebanese politics, they entered into Lebanese culture and history with little or no understanding of the way things worked-- or didn't work... Most Americans did not understand the subtleties of short-term alliances, the length of memories and blood feuds, the strength of aln [kin] in Arab culture nor the nuances of religious differences."This illustrates the importance of understanding the significance that culture plays in the conduct of successful peacekeeping operation. However, despite the existence of a UN training manual that attempts to advise peacekeepers on necessary techniques, there is no unifying doctrine, or standardized procedure among peacekeeping contingents, which will ultimately hinder the potential for success.