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The First Offensive Battle of Verdun (1ère Bataille Offensive de Verdun) was a limited French counter-offensive from 24 October to 2 November 1916. The French Second Army, supported by massed artillery and new super-heavy guns was intended to advance about 3 km on the Meuse Heights east of the river and re-capture Fort Douaumont, evicting the German 5th Army from the positions reached by the last German offensive in July.

The attack was planned by Général Philippe Pétain, commander of Groupe d'armées du Centre, Général Robert Nivelle, the new commander of the Second Army and Général Charles Mangin commander of the French troops on the east bank of the Meuse. The German 5th Army had been required to transfer guns and troops to the Somme front and suffered an artillery-ammunition shortage so acute that guns were forbidden to fire except on the orders of senior officers.

The French kept the German front line in constant turmoil by artillery bombardments day and night, to prevent the German infantry from repairing their defences. The autumn rains added to the misery of the German troops by collapsing trenches and flooding such dugouts and trenches that had not been destroyed by the French guns.

German strategy, 1916
French offensives on the Western Front in late 1914 and in 1915 failed to gain much ground and had been extremely costly in casualties. From 25 September to 6 November 1915, the French suffered "extraordinary casualties" from the German heavy artillery in the Second Battle of Champagne (the Herbstschlacht). On the Eastern Front, during the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive, from 1 May to 19 September 1915, Austro-German armies had pulverised Russian defences with large amounts of heavy artillery and sent infantry to mop up the surviving Russian troops, repeating the process each time that the Russians made a stand. General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of Oberste Heeresleitung, the German General Staff, considered that he had found a way out of the dilemma of German manpower inferiority and the growing strength of the Franco-British armies on the Western Front. Though a decisive battle may not be possible, the French could still be defeated if enough casualties could be inflicted.

Falkenhayn offered five corps from the OHL strategic reserve to the 5th Army (Wilhelm, German Crown Prince) part of the Army Group German Crown Prince around Verdun, for an offensive on the east bank of the Meuse in early February 1916. By seizing or threatening to capture Verdun, Falkenhayn anticipated that the French would commit their strategic reserve to counter-attack secure German defensive positions on high ground, supported by a powerful artillery reserve and suffer again the disproportionate casualties of the Herbstschlacht. In the north, a relief offensive by the inexperienced and ill-trained British would be another costly failure, creating the conditions for a German counter-offensive near Arras. If the French did not negotiate an end to the war, the German armies in the west (Westheer) would smash the remnants of the French armies, knock France out of the war and force the British off the Continent.

Fortified Region of Verdun
A double ring of 28 forts and smaller works (ouvrages, infantry shelters) had been built in the Fortified Region of Verdun (RFV, Région Fortifiée de Verdun) on commanding ground at least 150 m above the river valley, 2.5 – from the Verdun citadel. After the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1971, the military engineer General Séré de Rivières, planned two lines of fortresses from Belfort to Épinal and from Verdun to Toul as defensive screens and to enclose towns intended to be the bases for counter-attacks. The outer ring around Verdun, clockwise, were forts Douaumont, Vaux, Moulainville, Le Rozelier, Haudainville, Dugny, Regret and Marre; the inner ring included forts Souville, Tavannes, Belrupt and Belleville. The forts and ouvrages were on ground which commanded the intervals between, the outer ring having a circumference of 45 km. In the 1880s, many of the forts were modernised and made more resistant to artillery; Douaumont was given a sand cushion and thick, steel-reinforced concrete tops, up to 2.5 m thick, buried under 1 – of earth. The outer forts had 79 guns in shellproof turrets and more than 200 light guns and machine-guns to protect the ditches around the forts. Six forts had 155 mm guns in retractable turrets and fourteen had retractable twin 75 mm turrets.

In 1903, Douaumont was equipped with a new concrete bunker, the Casemate de Bourges, with two 75 mm field guns to cover the south-western approach and the defensive works along the ridge to ouvrage de Froideterre. From 1903 to 1913, more guns in four retractable, rotating, steel turrets were added for all-round defence and two smaller versions, at the north-eastern and north-western corners of the fort, housed twin Hotchkiss machine-guns. On the east side of the fort, an armoured turret with a 155 mm short-barrelled gun faced north and north-east; another housed twin 75 mm guns at the north end to cover the intervals between the forts. A defensive complex had been created comprising the village, fort, six ouvrages, five shelters, six concrete batteries, an underground infantry shelter, two ammunition depots and several concrete infantry trenches. The artillery in the RFV comprised c. 1,000 guns with 250 in reserve; the forts and ouvrages were linked by telephone and telegraph, a narrow-gauge railway system and a road network; on mobilisation, the RFV had a garrison of 66,000 men and rations for six months.

21 February – May 1916
Unternehmen Gericht (Operation Judgement), the German offensive at Verdun, began on 21 February after a weather delay, during which the French increased the garrison of the Verdun front from five divisions to eight. The 5th Army had 1,400 guns to bombarded French positions, preparing the way for infantry advances in the manner of the Gorlice–Tarnow offensive. German troops moved into devastated French positions but found that woods had reduced the effect of the bombardment and intact French defences had to be fought for. German troops advanced after artillery preparations for the next few days and captured Fort Douaumont almost unopposed on 25 February. The 5th Army advance then slowed because of determined French infantry counter-attacks, supported by massed artillery-fire from the west side of the river. Having reached their initial objectives on 27 February the German offensive paused after an advance of 3 km on a 3 km front and causing 24,000 French casualties by 26 February. The Germans had suffered 25,000 casualties and had failed to capture the final objective, a line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont, to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes on the Meuse Heights.

The 5th Army tried to eliminate the French artillery-fire from the west bank by attacking on that side of the river on 6 March and in mutually-costly fighting, the German attack made slow progress. French artillery inflicted many casualties and infantry counter-attacks forced the Germans to hold back most of their infantry for local counter-attacks. On 14 March the 5th Army captured part of Le Mort Homme. On 20 March, the Germans attacked again and after taking their first objective were held by French artillery-fire and counter-attacks. By 30 March, the French still held Côte 304 and the attackers had suffered another 20,000 casualties; the French defenders were only overcome in May. German attacks were being made against determined and well-supplied French defenders, in fortified positions on higher ground, supported by artillery which bombarded German infantry and their links with the rear, the original German intention. When German troops managed to hold captured ground against counter-attacks, the French guns caused many casualties between attacks with constant bombardments.

Falkenhayn had failed cheaply to inflict casualties and undermine French morale and had to keep going, which was much more costly to the German infantry than defeating counter-attacks from defensive positions on high ground. German bombardments had stripped the land of cover and French artillery caused many German casualties, the 5th Army suffering a similar rate of attrition as the French. By the end of April, much of the German strategic reserve had been sent to Verdun and suffered similar casualties. The French army had been severely damaged but had by no means incurred the 525,000 casualties against 250,000 German casualties that Falkenhayn thought; the French had reduced the German offensive to a stalemate. The shock of the Brusilov Offensive (4 June – 20 September) seemed to have abated by June but the Battle of the Somme (1 July – 18 November), the expected relief offensive near Arras, put the German armies under unprecedented strain for the rest of the year, despite the diversion of two of the three French armies, intended to make the main effort on the Somme, to Verdun.

German Air Service
Just before the beginning of the offensive at Verdun, the Imperial German Air Service (Die Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches) began to form independent Kampfeinsitzer Kommanden (KEK, Combat Single-seat Commands) with two to four Fokker or Pfalz monoplanes (Eindeckers) as an air guard service (Luftwachtdienst) to specialise in operations against Allied aircraft. At Verdun, the 5th Army had 168 operational aircraft but only 21 were Eindeckers, based at Avillers, Jametz and Cunel, not all of which were in KEKs. The Eindeckers tried to create an aerial barrier (Luftsperre) against French aircraft but it proved futile with so few fighters and frequent patrols wore out the Eindecker rotary engines. On 11 March, Oswald Boelcke, commander of the new Fliegerabteilung Sivry (Flying Detachment Sivry) with six Eindeckers, arranged for an observation post to telephone when a French aircraft was spotted. A pilot flew from Sivry 11 km behind the front line, to intercept the aircraft, in place of wasteful standing patrols. The change conserved fuel and lubricants, reduced pilot fatigue and proved much more effective in countering French reconnaissance aircraft.

French Air Service
On 1 February 1916, the French Aéronautique Militaire had 135 fighter aircraft of which only 90 were efficient Nieuport 11s (the Nieuport Bébé). At Verdun the air commander, Colonel Paul du Peuty, had sixty aircraft, two squadrons (escadrilles) being equipped with the Bébé. When the German offensive began on 21 February, the French immediately reinforced the area with more squadrons and experienced pilots from quiet fronts. In less than a week, six Bébé escadrilles were operating over Verdun; to improve their co-ordination, theescadrilles were formed into a Hunting Group (Groupement de Chasse) led by Commandant Charles de Rose.

The French used the fighters in teams, like the KEKs, separate from other aircraft types. Offensive patrols by half-escadrilles and escadrilles flew 3 to 4 mi beyond the German lines to attack the Eindeckers, allowing French reconnaissance machines to work unhindered. With so few French aircraft available, some German aircraft could still operate and the French fighter escadrilles synchronised their sorties with those of corps reconnaissance and artillery-observation aircraft. In the small area of the Verdun salient, this tactic meant that French fighters were always close to other French aircraft; longer-range French sorties were provided with close escorts.

Fort Douaumont, 22–24 May
In May, Général Robert Nivelle took command of the Second Army when Général Philippe Pétain moved to the command of Groupe d'armées du Centre (GAC, Central Army Group). General Charles Mangin, commander of the 5th Division in the 3e Corps d'Armée, [III Corps, Général de Division Léonce Lebrun]) was ordered to recapture Fort Douaumont and planned an attack on a 3 km front. Mangin asked for more troops but this was refused, because of the forthcoming offensive on the Somme. The attack was limited to the 5th Division and the 71st Brigade with a division in reserve, three balloon companies for artillery-observation and a fighter wing (Groupe de Chasse). The objectives were reduced to an advance of 500 m on a 1150 m front to Morchée Trench, Bonnet d'Evèque (Bishop's Bonnet), Fontaine Trench, Fort Douaumont, a machine-gun turret and Hongrois (Hungarian) Trench.

The II Battalion, 129th Infantry Regiment (5th Division) was to attack from the south, the 6th Company moving around the eastern side of the fort. The I Battalion was to move along the west side of the fort to the north end, take Fontaine Trench and link with the 6th Company. Two battalions of the 74th Infantry Regiment were to advance along the east and south-eastern sides of the fort and capture the machine-gun turret on the ridge to the east. Flank support was arranged with neighbouring regiments and diversions organised; 12 km of trenches were dug, many depots built and stores accumulated but progress was slow. French troops taken prisoner on 13 May disclosed the plan to the Germans, who subjected the area to more artillery harassing fire, adding to the French delays.

The French preliminary bombardment by four super-heavy 370 mm mortars and 300 heavy guns, began on 17 May and by 21 May, the German garrison of Douaumont was under great strain. French heavy shells smashed holes in the walls; concrete dust, exhaust fumes from an electricity generator and the stench of disinterred corpses polluted the air. Water ran short but until 20 May the fort was operational, reports going back and reinforcements moving forward until the afternoon, when the Bourges Casemate was isolated and the wireless station in the north-western machine-gun turret burned down.

The French bombardment obliterated many German defensive positions and the survivors sheltered in shell-holes and dips in the ground. The front line was cut off and food and water ran out by 22 May; Infantry Regiment 52 at Thiaumont Farm, to the west of Fort Douaumont was reduced to 37 men and German counter-barrages inflicted similar losses on French troops. In the morning, French Nieuports shot down six out of eight observation balloons with the new Le Prieur rocket for the loss of a Nieuport 16; other aircraft attacked the 5th Army headquarters at Stenay. The German artillery reply increased and twenty minutes before zero hour, a bombardment reduced the companies of the 129th Infantry Regiment to about 45 men each.

At 11:50 a.m. on 22 May, the French attacked on a 1 km front held by the German 5th Division. On the left the 36th Infantry Regiment quickly captured Morchée Trench and Bonnet-d'Evèque but suffered many casualties and could advance no further. The flank guard on the right was pinned down, except for one company, which disappeared. In Bois Caillette, a battalion of the 74th Infantry Regiment was unable to leave its trenches; the other battalion managed to reach its objectives at an ammunition depot, shelter DV1 at the edge of Bois Caillette and the machine-gun turret east of the fort, where the battalion found its flanks unsupported. Despite German small-arms fire, the 129th Infantry Regiment reached the fort in a few minutes and managed to enter through the west and south sides. By nightfall, about half of the fort had been recaptured and next day the 34th Division was sent to reinforce the troops in the fort. The German 5th Division repulsed the reinforcement attempts and German reserves managed to cut off the French troops in the fort and force them to surrender, taking 1,000 prisoners. In three days, the French had suffered 5,640 casualties from the 12,000 men involved in the operation; the 5th Division suffered 4,500 casualties.

Second Army

 * Doughty

During August and September, Mangin conducted many small attacks on the right bank, principally in the vicinity of Fleury, that had been captured by the Germans in July and early August, Fleury being re-captured on 18 August. On 3 September, synchronised with attacks on the Somme, the French attacked again on both sides of Fleury, gained several hundred yards, defeated German counter-attacks from 4 to 5 September and attacked again on 6 September. More French attacks followed on 9 and 13 September to the east of Fleury and then from 15 to 17 September. The attacks were made by one or two battalions, which seized small parcels of ground and suffered few casualties; the worst French loss occurred in the Tavannes railway tunnel where 475 troops killed by a fire from 4 to 5 September. A much bigger attack at Verdun was needed to coincide with another offensive on the Somme. On 13 September, Joffre emphasised to Nivelle and Mangin that the Verdun front should remain active and they supported his plan for a more ambitious effort.

Pétain, the commander of Groupe d'armées du Centre (GAC) since May, pressed for more fresh divisions and suggested an "offensive of great energy" by three divisions, with three more in support on a 5 km, a plan which prised fresh troops and artillery from Joffre. Pétain and Nivelle replaced seven depleted divisions in the Second Army, brought in more artillery and made arrangements for the use of creeping barrages, to be "hugged" by advancing infantry, to make artillery-fire more effective. Experience on the Somme and tests behind the lines found that the infantry could follow a creeping barrage 50 m behind. It was decided that the infantry should follow the barrage at a 75 m interval, the barrage advancing in 50 m increments every two minutes. Heavy artillery barrages would move at the same pace 150 m in front of the field artillery barrage and move in 500 – bounds. Infantry platoons were reorganised into squads of riflemen, grenade-throwers and machine-gunners; artillery firepower was to pave the way for infantry, rather than them having to fight their way forward.

Mangin was appointed commander of all French forces on the east (right) bank of the Meuse and planned to attack with III Corps. Mangin planned the detailed aspects of the operation but Nivelle and Pétain examined the details and approved them. Mangin intended a short advance to capture ground of tactical value but Nivelle and Pétain had him devise a more ambitious plan. On 9 October, Mangin said that Group DE was to capture ground beyond Douaumont, which required an advance of more than 2 km, rather than the recent 100 m pushes. The 38th, 133rd and 74th divisions trained for the attack at Stainville near Bar-le-Duc on a replica of the attack front, with a full-sized outline of Fort Douaumont. French army intelligence reported that the Germans had transferred troops from Verdun but not from around Fleury and predicted that the attack would meet determined resistance. The weather forced the French to postpone the offensive from early October.

5th Army
Opposite the French divisions were the German 34th, 54th, 9th and 33rd Reserve Division with the 10th Division and 5th Division in reserve. Officers said that morale in the 5th Army had never been so low; the men were exhausted, having already fought on the Somme or been kept at Verdun for too long; the VII Reserve Corps (General der Infanterie Hans von Zwehl) having fought at Verdun since February. The German infantry was outnumbered and its supporting artillery was worn out and prone to dropping short, made worse by the French policy of constant artillery harassment, which prevented the Germans from improving their defences. Rain followed by freezes and thaws led trenches to cave in as often as the French artillery. Days of constant rain and freezing nights added to the demoralisation of the German troops and caused a stream of casualties. Cases occurred of men eating putrid horseflesh to get into hospital and in September the number of desertions led General der Infanterie Ewald von Lochow, the commander of the III Corps, to order that cowardice be punished mercilessly. The 13th Reserve Division held the German front in Bois d'Haudraumont to the north-west, the 25th Reserve Division held the line north of the Ouvrage de Thiaumont and the 54th Reserve Division held the ground between the ouvrage and Fleury-devant-Douaumont (Fleury). The 9th Division held the front midway between Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux and Vaux was defended by the 33rd Reserve Division and the 50th Division.
 * Petain 1930
 * Horne 1978
 * Holstein 2010

Plan
In early October, Pétain and Nivelle planned an operation to recapture of Fort Douaumont and Fort Vaux, General Charles Mangin, the commander on the right bank of the Meuse in charge of the attack. The Second Army received two 400 mm guns to go with its 370 mm and other heavy and super-heavy guns to keep a constant fire on the German defences. The French artillery had 300 field guns and 300 heavy guns, against 200 German batteries with 800 guns. The 38th Division (Général de Division Arthur Guyot de Salins) was to attack Fort Douaumont, the 133rd Division (Général de Division Fénelon F. G. Passaga) the interval between the forts and the 74th Division (Général de brigade Charles de Lardemelle) Fort Vaux.
 * Petain 1930

Mangin was selected to command the attack, Nivelle to organise the detailed planning and Pétain the size and timing of the offensive, restraining Nivelle and Mangin from attacking before enough artillery had been collected. Pétain managed to assemble more than 650 guns, half being heavy and persuaded Joffre to allocate two new super-heavy 400 mm Schneider-Creusot railway guns, with longer range and greater penetration than any artillery yet used at Verdun, against an estimated 450–500 German guns opposite. In September and October, French trains delivered 15000 LT of ammunition. The front of attack was wider than that of the German effort on 23 June, with Fort Douaumont the objective of an attack by three divisions with three in support and two in reserve. Nivelle planned a creeping barrage 70 yd in front of the foremost infantry leading them forward at a rate of 100 yd in four minutes. A heavy artillery barrage would fall 150 yd ahead of the field artillery barrage. There would be no tell-tale lifting of a standing barrage to alert the defenders; the artillery–infantry plan depended on an unprecedented standard of liaison and Nivelle had telephone lines buried 6 ft deep. Mangin planned to attack on a front from Bois d'Haudraumont, north-west of Fort Douaumont to the Fond (depression) de Beaupré, south-east of Fort Vaux. The 74th Division was to attack Fort Vaux on the right (south-east) flank, in the centre, the 133rd Division was to capture high ground above Fleury and then take the German fortifications of Bois Caillette, Ravine Fausse-Côte and a machine-gun turret to the east of Fort Douaumont. On the left (north-west) flank the 38th Division was to capture Fort Douaumont and Douaumont village.
 * Horne 1978
 * Holstein 2010

French preparations
On 21 October more than 700 guns of the Second Army artillery began the preliminary bombardment, two 270 mm, two 280 mm, a 370 mm and two 400 mm guns bombarding Douaumont. From 20 to 27 October, the French artillery fired 855,264 shells including 532,926 rounds of 75 mm, 272 shells of 370 mm and 101 of the super-heavy 400 mm rounds.
 * Doughty

24 October
At about 7:00 a.m. Captain Prollius and a party of about twenty signallers and message runners from a German artillery unit entered Douaumont and found it deserted. The fire in the engineer depot was still burning but had abated and movement was still possible using the cellar; Prollius sent for reinforcements. Outside the fort German infantry occupied waterlogged trenches under the French bombardment ****except for a battalion which realised that the French had withdrawn from their front trenches to avoid drop-shorts from the French guns. The Germans lurked forward and used the vacant trenches to shelter from the bombardment****
 * Horne

At dawn there was a thick mist which led the German infantry to infer that there would be no attack but then heard the French bugle call for the charge,

"Il y a de la goutte à boire là haut... (There's something to drink up there)"

the fog worked to the advantage of the French who had been so well rehearsed at Bar-le-Duc that they could navigate by compass. The ruins of Fleury and the Ouvrage de Thiaumont fell at the first rush and the German artillery took twelve minutes to open fire, by when the foremost French infantry were overrunning the first position. Troops of the 38th Division rushed down the Ravin de la Dame and captured a battalion commander and his staff. The going was so bad that the French dumped their packs which soon dotted the ground, to move faster and by-passed German strongpoints, leaving them to be engaged by the waves following up. The French found that the German infantry were unusually willing to surrender; a French listening post eavesdropping on German signals picked up a message that the sender was the last man, the rest having run away. Some men taken prisoner claimed to ha not eaten for five or six days.

The Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (RICM), which was equipped for close-quarters fighting, managed to keep pace with the creeping barrage but appeared to have strayed off course in the fog. There was a sudden break in the fog and Douaumont became visible further ahead to the right; the RICM sappers and skirmishers found their way into the fort. The French found pockets of resistance, which they overcame by attacking from all directions with flame-thrower and hand grenade teams; Prollius, four officers and the last 24 men surrendered. At fort Souville, Mangin had watched the French infantry disappear in the murk and around noon began to receive partial and contradictory information from prisoners, wounded and runners. Pilots of the Aéronautique Militaire took extraordinary risks by descending into the fog, which cost twenty aircraft lost through flying into the ground or being hit by shell splinters. It was not until the afternoon that the French flyers brought back reliable information; General Passaga received a map fragment with the new front line level with and to the right of Fort Douaumont; the message read,

"La Gauloise 16 heures 30. Vive la France."

The fog eventually lifted and observers at Fort Souville saw three RICM troops on the roof of Douaumont in the sun. After four days in their jumping-off positions the French infantry advanced over a wasteland
 * Mason

"...this diluted clay, greasy as butter...so much stirred and lashed by shells that it had become a great efflorescence of scum, with the consistency of soap lather and that appearance of a vast surface of boiling milk which characterises a raging sea."

- Capitaine Gillet.

and struggled forward, trying to keep up with the creeping barrage and overrunning wrecked German trenches, with little German resistance, many German troops choosing to surrender. The Germans inside Douaumont lacked ammunition and could not prevent the French from occupying the fort. The attacking troops were in their jumping-off positions by 6:00 a.m. with the usual items and ammunition the men carried two gas masks, a pack each for iron rations, meat and chocolate and hand grenades, a water bottle filled with water, one with wine, a blanket, entrenching tool and two sandbags. Fog rose at dawn but Mangin decided to continue as planned because the morale of the defenders had deteriorated, their field fortifications had been destroyed and the forts were partly demolished. The infantry went over the top at 11:40 a.m. and the officers navigating by compass did not need to see the creeping barrage. The French artillery bombardment resumed from the front line to the final objective, German guns were deluged with gas shell and more super-heavy shells were fired on Fort Douaumont.
 * Holstein

25 October – 2 November
Captain Prollius and thirty men re-occupied part of Douaumont but after a determined struggle were overcome. A French attack on Fort Vaux failed and the heavy and super-heavy howitzers were used to bombard the fort for the next week. On 2 November a 220 mm shell hit set off a huge explosion in the fort. French signallers reported that a German wireless message revealed that the fort was being abandoned and that night a French party entered unopposed.
 * Mason
 * Doughty

Analysis
In the 1978 edition of The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916, Alistair Horne wrote that on 24 October, the French infantry had advanced 3 km, recapturing in a day ground that the 5th Army had taken 4½ months to occupy. The French creeping barrage proved a great success and German casualties exceeded those of the French; had the German offensives of 23 June or 11 July been as effective they would have reached Verdun. French censors held back an announcement of the capture of Fort Douaumont until certain that it had not been recaptured, a German counter-attack already being made during the afternoon of 24 October. The Germans made no more counter-attacks after the "half-hearted" defence of the fort but this did not detract from the greatest French victory since the First Battle of the Marne in 1914. For the German army the loss of Douaumont was a severe blow "like losing a fragment of the Fatherland". Paul von Hindenburg wrote that
 * Horne

"On this occasion the enemy hoisted us with our own petard. We could only hope that in the coming year he would not repeat the experiment on a greater scale and with equal success."

In 2005, Robert Doughty wrote that though the French infantry were showered with praise the success had come through the devastating power of the French guns and that Vaux had fallen because of German troops transfers after Erich von Falkenhayn, the head of Oberste Heeresleitung (Supreme Army Command) had been sacked on 29 August. The new German commanders Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff had abandoned the Verdun offensive and diverted more forces to the Somme. The French expected a powerful German counter-attack and were concerned that their lavish expenditure of artillery ammunition could backfire but no attack came. The French conserved their resources for another big operation and from 5 November to 15 December conducted only a few minor attacks.
 * Doughty

In 2000, David Mason wrote that for the first time in the battle the French commanders agreed on an attack and the methods to be followed. Nivelle, Mangin and Pétain used elaborate planning and preparation to seize the initiative from the Germans. The biggest French attack of the battle was supported by 650 guns, several of which were new super-heavy pieces to bombard Douaumont and from September, the French commanders had massed thousands of tons of ammunition. The morale of the German defenders diminished as the certainty of a French attack and its extent became manifest and Mason quoted Arnold Zweig,
 * Mason

"The Germans had held on beyond all imagination [down to] about 70,000 men.... and now they were beginning to crack."

the number of Germans willing to desert increasing from end of summer. Ground captured over weeks was lost in days and counter-attacks were easily repulsed.

In 2014, Paul Jankowki wrote that another reason for the fairly cheap victory was tacit disobedience by French officers. On the night before the attack, Mangin ordered "Taïaut! Taïaut!" ("Swords up! Swords up") wanting the three attacking divisions to advance immediately but none did. Mangin apparently thought that the Germans were disorganised but next day when the scheduled attack began, they were found to be alert.
 * Jankowski

The French success recovered some of the Verdun defensive perimeter, encouraging Mangin and Nivelle to exploit German weakness. The staff at GQG preferred not to squander the morale benefit of the re-capture of the forts but Joffre overruled his staff and agreed to the new attack.
 * Greenhalgh

Casualties
In 1938, the historians of the Reichsarchiv wrote in the German official history, Der Weltkrieg that the German divisions most involved suffered more than 11,000 casualties, of whom 6,700 were missing. The French claimed 6,000 prisoners, fifteen guns, 51 mine throwers and 144 machine-guns. In 1978, Alistair Horne wrote that French casualties in the first and second offensive battles of Verdun amounted to 47,000 men and in 2010, Christina Holstein wrote that the French suffered 47,000 casualties from 20 to 24 October. One RICM battalion suffered 700 casualties out of the 800 men who had arrived at the Fortified Region four days earlier. In 2014, Elizabeth Greenhalgh wrote that the French took 6,000 prisoners.

Subsequent operations
Before the First Offensive Battle of Verdun (1ère Bataille Offensive de Verdun), Mangin and Nivelle had given thought to more attacks to force the Germans further back from Verdun. In early November Nivelle submitted a plan to capture the line of hills in front of the forts, to reduce their vulnerability to a German counter-attack. The Operations Bureau at GQG recommended that the proposal be rejected but Joffre wanted to maintain the pressure on the Germans and approved the scheme but with only one or two fresh divisions. The preliminary bombardment for the Second Offensive Battle of Verdun (2ième Bataille Offensive de Verdun) began on 10 December.

On 15 December four French divisions attacked northwards from Douaumont and again encountered little resistance in the German first position, which had been destroyed by the French guns. The French infantry, except for one of the left flank divisions, captured their objectives in two days, which was ascribed to the French infantry surprising the Germans by arriving so close behind the creeping barrage. On the night of 16/17 December the French dug in 2 – from Fort Douaumont and 1 km beyond Fort Vaux, leaving the Germans at least 7.5 km from Verdun.