User:Koakhtzvigad/Anti-tank warfare

Anti-tank warfare was created by seeking technology and tactics to destroy tanks and their supporting infantry during the First World War. This focus remains at the core of its development for nearly a century. Because the tanks represent enemy's single greatest force projection capability, anti-tank warfare has been incorporated into the doctrine of every combat and combat support arm and service of national armed forces. Development of these doctrines did not mature before the Second World War largely due to uncertainty in the design, and use of the tanks which by then radically changed their design. The predominant anti-tank weapons at the start of the war were the tank-mounted and limbered anti-tank guns, and anti-tank grenades used by the infantry. Anti-tank warfare developed rapidly during the war, particularly on the Eastern Front, to include infantry and infantry support weapons, anti-tank combat engineering, towed anti-tank artillery, tank guns, ground-attack aircraft and self-propelled tank destroyers. During the war both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht developed complex combined-arms methods of combating tank-led tactical and operational offensives, including deployment of static anti-tank weapons in in-depth defensive positions, protected by anti-tank obstacles and minefields, and supported by mobile anti-tank reserves, while cooperating with ground attack aircraft.

With the transition of the Second World War to the Cold War, European countries with large tank fleets were facing the possibility that a nuclear device detonated over an area of tank concentration could significantly diminish national capability in one strike. While technology was developed to protect crews of armoured vehicles from the effects of collateral radiation, same could not be done for all their supporting arms and services on which tanks depend for continued operations. In the NATO countries little if any development took place on defining a doctrine of how to use armed forces without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In the Soviet sphere of influence the legacy doctrine of operational manoeuver was being theoretically examined to understand how the tank-led force could be used even with the threat of limited use of nuclear weapons on the European battlefield. The solution arrived at was maneuver warfare while massively increasing the number of anti-tank weapons to defeat NATO tank forces as rapidly as possible. To achieve this, the Soviet military theorists (such as Vasily Sokolovsky realised that the anti-tank weapons had to assume an offensive (rather than the traditionally defensive role of the Great Patriotic War) by becoming more mobile. This lead to the Soviet development of guided anti-tank missiles, though similar design work was performed in Western Europe and the USA.

Although it was a the French missile that was first successfully used in anti-tank combat - by the Israelis during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the impact of Soviet anti-tank missile tactics was not evident until they were first used during the 1973 attack by the Egyptian and Syrian armies on Israel. The outcome suggested that although the missiles were a threat, they could be countered through combined arms tactics. The volume of fire delivered by the missiles further convinced NATO tank designers to continue their emphasis on increased tank armour, while Soviet designers retained their emphasis on mobility of tank-led forces. The utility of the light anti-tank weapons was however recognised by both sides of the Cold War, and led to further development of both shoulder-launched and man-portable weapons used by the infantry squad, while heavier missiles were mounted on dedicated missile tank-destroyers, including dedicated anti-tank helicopters, and even heavier guided anti-tank missiles launched from aircraft. Also being developed and deployed were new varieties of artillery munitions in the form of top-attack shells, and shells that were used to saturate areas with anti-armour bomblets, while helicopters could rapidly deliver air-scaterable anti-tank mines to create a barrier to a fast-moving tank-led force. Since the end of the Cold War in 1993, the only major new threat to tanks, and other vehicles, has come from the Improvised explosive devices used by insurgents following the start of the Global War on Terror. However, while the tank remains an important part of the national combat capability, anti-tank weapons and tactics continue development to defeat it, as was shown by the 2006 operation in Lebanon. Some anti-tank weapons have also been rediscovered in their Second World War role of infantryman’s ‘artillery’ used to defeat snipers or gain entry to structures. The anti-tank rifle has also returned in its new guise of the anti-materiel rifle.

The tank threat
Anti-tank warfare evolved as a countermeasure to the threat of the tank's appearance on the battlefields of the Western Front of the First World War. The tank had been developed to negate the German system of trenches, and allow a return to manoeuver against enemy's flanks and to attack the rear with cavalry.

The use of the tank was primarily based on the assumption that once they were able to eliminate the German trench lines with their machine gun and Infantry support gun positions, the Allied infantry would follow and secure the breach, and the cavalry would exploit the breach in the trench lines by attacking into the depth of German-held territory, eventually capturing the field artillery positions and interdicting logistics and reserves being brought up from the rear areas. Naval crews initially used to operate the installed naval guns and machine guns were replaced with Army personnel who were more aware of the infantry tactics with which the tanks were intended to cooperate. However, there was no way to communicate between the tank's crew and the accompanying infantry, or between the tanks participating in combat. Radios were not yet made portable or robust enough to be mounted in a tank, although Morse Code transmitters were installed in some Mark IVs at Cambrai as messaging vehicles,. Attaching a field telephone to the rear would became a practice only during the next war. With greater use of tanks by both sides it was realised that the accompanying infantry could be forced to ground by ambush fire, thus separating them from the tanks, which would continue to advance, eventually finding themselves exposed to close-assaults by German infantry and sappers.

The early tanks were mechanically rudimentary. The 0.23 to 0.47 in armour generally prevented penetration by small arms fire and shell fragments. However, even a near miss from a field artillery or an impact from a mortar HE round easily disabled the tank, or destroyed it if the fuel tank was raptured, incinerating the tank's crew. The need for a 'male' (link to article) variant was recognised as a tactical necessity to defeat any infantry field pieces found in the trench lines which could easily disable tank track with the HE ammunition. This was achieved by mounting a QF 6 pounder Hotchkiss light 57 mm naval gun mounted in the hull barbettes. Hull and track engineering was largely dictated by the terrain - the need to cross wide trenches - although the relationship between ground pressure and soil-vehicle mechanics would not be resolved until the Second World War. Turrets were later introduced on medium and light tanks to react to ambushes during the advance.

First World War
The tank, when it appeared on the Western Front in 1917, was a total surprise to the German troops, though not to the German General Staff who rejected similar designs before the war. The French Army Staff was highly critical with the British Army's early fielding of the Mark I vehicles in small numbers because the French trials showed the armoured vehicles to be highly unreliable. They judged that large numbers had to be employed to sustain an offensive despite losses to mechanical failure or vehicles being foundered in intractable no man's land terrain. These losses, coupled with those from enemy artillery fire, would later amount to as high as 70% of the starters during some operations. Deploying small numbers of tanks would therefore cause the Allies to loose the element of surprise, allowing Germans to develop countermeasures.

Anti-tank weapons
Because the German Army was the only force in need of anti-tank weapons, it was they that had to develop a viable technology to combat the tank. These technologies took three ammunition approaches: use of grenades by infantrymen, including the Geballte Ladung ("Bunched Charge") of several stick grenades bound together by pioneers; early attempts at the small-caliber anti-tank rifles like the 13mm Mauser bolt-action; and 3.7 cm TaK Rheinmetall in starrer Räder-­lafette 1916 anti-tank gun on a light carriage which could destroy a tank using large-caliber armour piercing ammunition issued in 1917 to special commands; and the existing 77 mm field guns (such as the 7.7 cm FK 16) of the infantry division's artillery regiment were also eventually issued with special armour piercing (AP) ammunition.

Anti-tank tactics
With the appearance of Allied tanks the German Army were quick to introduce new anti-tank defense detachments within the pioneer battalions of the infantry divisions. These were initially issued 1.3 cm calibre long barrel rifles firing solid shot. However these suffered from fouling after 2-3 rounds and had a recoil that was unsustainable by the mechanism or the rifleman. Stick grenades were used to destroy the tracks by individual pioneers, however this required for accompanying machine-gunners to first separate the supporting Allied infantry line from the tanks, which proved difficult. Another tactic was to lure the tank beyond the German trench-line, re-establishing it just as the Allied infantry approached. The tank would then be engaged by the divisional 7,7 cm guns brought forward, that would try to disable the tracks with ordinary HE shells (and later AP ammunition). If the crews of the disabled tanks refused to surrender, they were engaged with flamethrowers, or a mortar would be fired on the stricken vehicle until a direct hit was achieved on the top surface, usually resulting in an internal fire. Finally, anti-tank obstacles were prepared on the likely approaches by deepening and widening existing ground cratering, the precursors of the anti-tank trench. In early 1917 the 3.7cm TaK from Rheinmetall was rushed to the frontline, and proved effective in destroying the tanks despite limited elevation and traverse.

Development between the World wars
Lack of consensus on the design and use of the tank after the First World War also influenced A LACK OF anti-tank countermeasures development. However, because Germany was restricted in its military capability, and there were no other challenges to France and Britain, very little development took place in anti-tank warfare until the 1930s.

The Interwar period was dominated by the strategic thinking with fortified borders at its core. These would include obstacles that consisted of natural features such as ditches, streams and urban areas, or constructed obstacles such as anti-tank ditches, minefields, dragon's teeth, or log barriers. The pinnacle of this strategic thinking was considered to be the Maginot Line which replaced infantry-filled trenches with artillery-filled bunkers, including casemates housing 37 or 47 mm anti-tank guns, and steel turrets armed with a pair of machine guns and a 25mm anti-tank gun, although Germany was forbidden to produce tanks. The construction was partially based on the Allied experience with the Hindenburg Line which was breached with tank support during the battles of Cambrai and St. Quentin Canal, although German Command was more impressed by the surprise achieved by the Canadian troops at the Battle of the Canal du Nord. This would come to influence their planning in 1940.

Improved artillery was seen as the quickest solution to anti-tank defense, and one of the earliest post-war anti-tank gun designs was the 25 mm Hotchkiss model from France. It was intended to replace a Atelier de Puteaux 37mm weapon designed in 1916 to destroy machine gun positions. Rheinmetall commenced design of a 37 mm anti-tank gun in 1924 and the first guns were produced in 1928 as 3.7 cm Pak L/45, later adopted in Wehrmacht service as 3.7 cm Pak 36. It made an appearance during the Spanish Civil War, as did the Bofors 37 mm developed in Sweden, and used by many early Second World War combatants. The British Army accepted for service the (40 mm) Ordnance QF 2 pounder which was developed as a tank gun. The Soviet Red Army after the Russian Civil War also begun a search for an anti-tank gun with a French Hotchkiss 37 mm L.33 tank gun, but soon upgraded this to a higher velocity L.45 Model 1935 while also making a copy of the German 3.7 cm PaK 35. However, the Red Army was almost immediately taught a lesson about anti-tank warfare when a tank battalion sent to aid the Spanish Communists in the Spanish Civil War was almost entirely destroyed in an engagement.

At this time the predominant ammunition used against tanks was the armour piercing kinetic energy shell that defeated armour by direct pressure, spiking or punching through it. During the late 1930s shaped charge ammunition was experimented with that used chemical energy for armour penetration. More difficult to manufacture, its advantage was in that on impact it would create a high-velocity jet of molten metal which created tremendously high pressures, hydrodynamically deforming the armour. The depth of the penetration, though proportional to the length of the jet and the square root of its density, is also dependent on the strength of the armour. With the development of this new ammunition begun more advanced research into steel manufacturing, and development of spaced armour that would cause "jet waver" by detonating prematurely or at the wrong angle to the surface of the main armour.

The only significant attempt to experiment in the use of tanks in the late 1920s was that of the British Army's Experimental Mechanized Force that would influence future development of tanks, armoured troops and entire armies of both its future enemies and allies in the next war.

In Spain the anti-tank defense of the Nationalists was organised by the Wehrmacht officers, and the anti-tank guns were incorporated into a system of obstacles that were constructed with the intent to stop an attack by tanks by slowing it down, separating them from supporting infantry (advancing on foot) with machine-gun and mortar fire, and forcing tanks to conduct deliberate head-on assaults with engineer support, or seek a less-defended area to attack. Minefields laid with purpose-designed mines were used for the first time, destroying tank tracks, and forcing combat engineers to clear them on foot. Delay meant that Nationalist field artillery could engage the lightly armoured Soviet tanks. This meant a change in Republican operational and eventually strategic planning, and a more protracted combat operations, with more casualties at a greater cost.

The only change to the German anti-tank tactics of the First World War was that now an effective anti-tank weapon was available to support the defending infantry. However, the Soviet tanks armed with 45 mm guns easily destroyed the German light tanks.

Ironically, in the early 1930s until the Spanish War, German officers were conducting secret testing of a new way of employing tanks, infantry and artillery offensively in the Soviet Union with the cooperation of the Red Army. In Germany these developments would eventually culminate in tactics that would later come to be known as Blitzkrieg, while in the Soviet Union they would form the core of the deep battle operational doctrine. The successful test of the later would be during the Battles of Khalkhin Gol although the Red Army would founder on the Mannerheim Line in 1940, largely due to the purge in the Officer Corps, claiming many of the senior proponents of the new doctrine. Anti-tank artillery would be included in mobile tank-led Wehrmacht and Red Army units due to the possibility of encountering enemy tanks in a meeting engagement.

The new doctrines of using the tank, were divided into infantry and cavalry schools of thought. The former regarded the tank as a mobile artillery system to be used for infantry support. This suggested that the infantry needed to be armed with integral anti-tank weapons. The later advocated use of tanks in the traditional cavalry way of high tempo attacks intended to outflank the enemy infantry and sever its communication lines. This approach suggested that the tank would be the best anti-tank system, and only limited anti-tank troops were required to accompany them. For this reason the late 30s tank configurations came in a great diversity, ranging from light tankettes and 'cavalry tanks' to multi-turreted heavy tanks resembling bunkers, all of which had to be considered in training by the anti-tank artillery troops. The development of these doctrines was the most significant influence on the rapid development in anti-tank technology and tactics in the Second World War.

Second World War
replace with a proper military field engineering article Two aspects of how the Second World War commenced helped to delay development of anti-tank warfare: resignation and surprise. After Poland was attacked, its allies in the West were resigned to its defeat by a numerically superior Wehrmacht. The little information that was brought out about the conduct of combat during that campaign did nothing to convince either France, Britain or the USSR of the need for improved anti-tank technology and tactics. The reliance on the Maginot Line, and the subsequent surprise of the German offensive left no time to develop existing capabilities and tactics in the West. The Red Army however was fortunate in having several excellent designs for anti-tank warfare that were either in final stages of development for production, or had been rejected earlier as unnecessary and could now be rushed into production. The relative ease with which the older models of Red Army's tank fleet were destroyed by German anti-tank weapons, using tactics already seen in Spain, once and for all focused Stavka attention on anti-tank warfare as Soviet armies were repeatedly encircled by panzer-led strategic pincer manoeuvers. wklinks here Of the three iconic Soviet weapons of the Second World War, two were made exclusively for anti-tank warfare, the T-34 and the Ilyushin Il-2.(add noter re Katyusha) As a countermeasure to the first, the Germans used the deadly 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37/41 gun in both ground and self-propelled versions although the 7.5cm ATG was effective to a degree. The Il-2 Shturmovik, itself dubbed the 'flying tank', was one of the most manufactured aircraft in history. The war also saw the creation and almost immediate abandonment of the self-propelled tank destroyer which would be replaced post war by the anti tank guided missile.

Anti-tank air tactics
As tanks were rarely used in conflicts between the two World Wars, no specific aircraft or tactics were developed to combat them from the air. One solution adopted by almost all European air forces was to use bomb loads for conventional bombers that were composed from small bombs allowing a higher density during bombing. This created a greater chance of causing a direct impact on the thinner top armour of the tank while also having the ability to damage track and wheels through proximity detonation. The first aircraft capable of engaging tanks were the Junkers Ju-87 "Stuka" using dive bombing to place the bomb close to the target. Some French and German fighters fitted with 20 mm cannon were also able to engage thinner top armour surfaces of the tanks early in the war. The Stuka was also given cannons for anti-armour role though it was obsolete by 1942, and was joined by the Henschel Hs 129 that mounted a 3 cm cannon, while the Red Army Air Force fielded the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 armed with a 23 mm cannon and unguided rockets, but armoured to enable the pilots to approach German tanks at very low altitude, ignoring small arms, machine-gun and even small anti-aircraft cannon fire that usually provided tanks with protection against the bombers. The RAF mounted two 40mm cannon on the Hawker Hurricane (as the Mk. IID) to give it more firepower against tanks which saw service in North Africa in 1942 and the Hawker Typhoon was given HE rockets though these were more effective against other ground vehicles. From March 1943 the Red Army Air Force produced the more agile Yakovlev Yak-9T (37mm cannon) and K (45mm cannon) bomber interceptor also used for ground attack.

Field artillery against tanks
Field artillery were often the first ground combat arm to engage detected concentration of troops that included tanks through airborne artillery observers, either in assembly areas (for refueling and rearming), during approach marches to the combat zone, or as the tank unit was forming up for the attack. Conventional artillery shells were very effective against the tank's thinner top AND SIDE armour if fired in appropriate density while the tanks were concentrated, enabling direct hits by a sufficiently powerful shell. Even a non-penetrating shell could still disable a tank through dynamic shock, internal armour shattering or simply overturning the tank. More importantly the tanks could be disabled due to damage to tracks and wheels, and their supporting vehicles and personnel could be destroyed damaged and killed, reducing unit's ability to fight in the longer term. Because tanks were usually accompanied by infantry mounted on trucks or half-tracked vehicles that lacked overhead armour, field artillery that fired a mix of ground and air-burst ammunition was likely to inflict heavy casualties on the infantry as well. Field guns such as the Ordnance QF 25 pounder were provided with armour-piercing shot for direct engagement of enemy tanks.

Anti-tank guns


Anti-tank guns are guns designed to destroy tanks and other armored vehicles from defensive positions. This is because they are a countermeasure to the offensive-by-design tank system. In order to penetrate vehicle armor they fire smaller caliber shells from longer-barreled weapons to achieve higher muzzle velocity than field artillery weapons, many of which are howitzers. The higher velocity, flatter trajectory ballistics provide terminal kinetic energy to penetrate the armour at a given range. Any field artillery cannon with barrel length 15 to 25 times longer than its caliber was able to also fire anti-tank ammunition, such as the Soviet A-19.

Prior to World War II few anti-tank guns had (or needed) calibers larger than 50 mm. Examples of guns in this class include the German 37 mm, US 37 mm, French 25 mm and 47 mm guns, British QF 2-pounder (40 mm), and Soviet 45 mm. All of these light weapons could penetrate the thin armour found on most pre-war and early war tanks in production before 1940.

At the start of World War II many of these weapons were still being used along with a newer generation of guns based on that closely resembled their WWI counterparts. After the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks were encountered by German troops these guns were recognised as ineffective against sloped armour, with the German lightweight 37 mm gun quickly nicknamed the "tank door knocker", for revealing its presence without penetrating the armour.

Germany quickly introduced more powerful anti-tank guns, some which had been in the early stages of development prior to the war. By late 1942 the Germans had an excellent 50-mm high-velocity design, while they faced the QF 6-pounder introduced in the North African Campaign by the British Army, and later adopted by the US Army. By 1943 Wehrmacht was forced to adopt still larger caliber on the Eastern Front, the 75 mm and the famous 88 mm guns due to the appearance of Red Army's heavy tanks. The Red Army used a variety of 45 mm, 57 mm, and 100 mm guns, as well as deploying general-purpose 76.2 mm and 122-mm guns in the anti-tank role. For the Invasion of Normandy the British QF 17 pounder, whose design had begun before the 6 pounder entered service, was produced that proved to be a highly effective anti-tank gun also used as a tank and tank destroyer gun.


 * Mobile anti-tank guns

Lighter anti-tank guns retained tactical mobility by manhandling. As the guns grew in weight, they became less mobile, reducing responsiveness to tank-led manoeuvers. This gave impetus to the development of the tank destroyer design usually based on the tank hulls. These self-propelled (SP) AT guns were able to find a niche in tank tactics, sometimes replacing tanks altogether in offensive operations.

Some German-designed tank destroyers employed light French or Czech design tank chassis by installing an AT gun on a turret-less superstructure to reduce weight, increasing mobility. Most German and Soviet designs used a reduced silhouette of a tank hull to enable firing from defilade ambush positions. A US Army pre-war doctrine emphasized tank destroyers with fully rotating turrets and less armour, but mounting larger caliber guns than on the M4 Sherman tanks using 76 mm long gun on the M10 and M18 designs, and a 90 mm long gun on the M36 late in 1944. The German and Soviet solution proved to be more expedient, while the US Army generally discontinued use of open-top turreted tank destroyers in 1945.

By the end of the war the concept of the dedicated, conventional anti-tank gun was declining, ref to production stats as the German tank fleet was reduced through attrition. Late in the war recoilless 'rifle' weapons were being developed as anti-tank gun replacements. in which countries?

Anti-tank rifles
Anti-tank rifles were introduced in some armies before the Second World War to provide infantry with a stand-off weapon when confronted with a tank assault. The intention behind the capability was to preserve good morale of the infantry by being able to trust in a weapon that could defeat the tank which acquire such a fearsome reputation during the First World War and the inter-wars period. Notable examples include the Finnish Lahti L-39 (which was also used as a sniper rifle during the Winter War), the automatic Japanese Type 97 20 mm anti-tank rifle, the German Panzerbüchse 38, Panzerbüchse 39, the Polish Anti-tank rifle, model 35 and the Soviet 14.5mm PTRD and PTRS-41.

Tactical employment of the anti-tank rifle was different in the Red Army to other armies. Although by 1943 in other armies the anti-tank rifle was judged to lack combat effectiveness due to their diminished ability to penetrate the thicker armour of new tanks, the anti-tank rifle remained in Soviet use during the conflict for its place in the system of anti-tank defensive tactics.

Infantry anti-tank weapons
The development of light, man-portable, anti-tank weapons increased during the Second World War. Most were based on the Munroe effect which led to the development of the high explosive shaped charge. These weapons were called high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT). The destructive effect was reliant entirely on the kinetic energy of the explosion,rather than the ballistic speed of the round on the damage inflicted to the armour. The effect was also concentrated, and could penetrate more armour for a given amount of explosives. The first HEAT rounds were rifle grenades, but better delivery systems were soon introduced: the British PIAT was propelled by an explosive charge combined with a powerful spring, the US Bazooka and the German Panzerschreck used rockets; and the German Panzerfaust was a small recoilless gun. The HEAT warhead was retroactively used to give more power to smaller calibre weapons such as in the conversion of the otherwise limited German 37 mm PaK guns to fire a large shell (that fitted over the barrel rather than down in it) to a greater range than the Panzerschreck could manage.

After the war, research on infantry anti-tank weapons continued, with most designers focused on two primary goals; first, an anti-tank weapon that could defeat more heavily-armored postwar tanks and fighting vehicles, and second, a weapon lightweight and portable enough for infantry use.

Mines and other explosives



 * Hawkins mine
 * The Wehrmacht employed the Goliath tracked mine, an unmanned demolition vehicle
 * The Soviet Union employed anti-tank dogs during World War II, with very limited success; as a counterpart to the German Goliath the Teletank was used as a remote-controlled unmanned tank
 * The Japanese forces employed suicide attacks with pole-mounted anti-tank mines dubbed Lunge Mines during late World War II

Grenades
There were many types and kinds of anti-tank grenades. These ranged from hollow charge designs (e.g., the British No. 68 AT Grenade), to ones that simply contained a lot of explosive (the British No. 73 Grenade). To increase their effectiveness, some grenades were designed so that they adhered to the tank either through an adhesive (sticky bomb) or with a magnet. The Germans used a magnetic grenade ("Hafthohlladung 3") to ensure that the shaped charge would fire at the optimal 90° angle to the armour.

There was also a special type of grenade called the Nebelhandgranaten or Blendkörper ("smoke hand grenades"), which was supposed to be smashed over an air vent and fill the tank with smoke, widely used by both sides in World War II. Molotov cocktails also saw much use, especially in the Winter War, early tanks being very vulnerable to them, but later tanks required a well-thrown bottle directly over the engine compartment to have any effect at all.

Second World War anti-tank tactics
Anti-tank tactics developed rapidly during the war, but along different paths in different armies based on the threats they faced, and the technologies they were able to produce. Very little development took place in UK because weapons available in 1940 were judged adequate for engaging Italian and German tanks during most of the North African Campaign. Its experience therefore failed to influence US Army's anti-tank doctrine prior to 1944. From 1941 German anti-tank tactics developed rapidly as a result of being surprised by the previously unknown Soviet tank designs, forcing introduction of new technologies, and new tactics. The Red Army was also faced with a new challenge in anti-tank warfare after loosing most of its tank fleet and a considerable part of its anti-tank capable cannons.

Anti-tank tactics during the war ware largely integrated with the offensive or defensive posture of the troops being supported, usually infantry. Much of anti-tank tactics depend on the range effectiveness of various weapons and weapon systems available. These are divided as follows:
 * Operational range over the horizon (20-40 kms range) - bomber aircraft and long range artillery
 * Tactical staging areas (7-20 kms range) - ground attack aircraft and field artillery including MRLs
 * Tactical zone forming-up area and rear combat zone (2-7 kms range) - heavy anti-tank guns and mortars
 * Tactical forward combat zone (1-2kms range) - anti-tank guns and tanks deployed in defense
 * Engagement distance (200 mtrs - 1km range) - mines and anti-tank rifles
 * Close combat distance (25-200 mtrs range) - infantry anti-tank weapons

Although ground-to-air cooperation was not yet systematic in any army of the period, but given sufficient warning, ground attack aircraft could support ground troops even during an enemy attack in an attempt to interdict the enemy units before they come into tactical combat zone. Various bomb loads can be used depending on what the tank unit is engaged in at the time, or who its accompanying troops are. This is an indirect form of anti-tank warfare where the tanks are denied the opportunity to even reach combat.

Field artillery was particularly effective in firing against tank formations because although they were rarely able to destroy a tank by direct penetration, they would severely crater the area preventing the tanks from movement, and therefore causing them to become nearly stationary targets for the ground attack aircraft, or disrupting the enemy schedule and allowing own troops more time to prepare their defense.

Anti-tank defense proper was, by 1942, was designed in First World War fashion with several prepared trench lines incorporating anti-tank weapons of different capability. Depending on terrain and available Line-of-Sight the longer-ranged guns could begin to fire on approaching tanks from as far as 2 kilometers away, which was also the range at which German Panther and Tiger tank gunners were trained to fire. Anti-tank guns were usually deployed to cover terrain more suitable for tanks, and were protected by minefields laid at about 500 meters to 1 kilometer from their positions by combat engineers. In the Red Army the anti-tank rifle units would be positioned throughout the forward trench line, and would engage the lighter tanks and any other vehicles, such as infantry half-tracks, int he attempt to separate them from the tanks. The anti-tank guns deployed further back would often hold their fire until enemy tanks were within the most effective range for their ammunition. Where there were insufficient anti-tank weapons, engineers would construct anti-tank obstacles such as "dragon's teeth".

Towed anti-tank guns were thought to be the primary means of defeating tanks. At battle of Kursk, for example, the Red Army deployed more artillery regiments than infantry regiments, and towed gun densities reached over 20 guns per kilometer of defended tactical zone. A towed gun was much cheaper than a tank, and could be concealed in a shallow position. When time allowed, dugouts with strong overhead cover could be constructed. Guns deployed on reverse slopes and in flanking positions could take a toll of attacking tanks. However, gun crews were vulnerable to artillery and mortar HE fire and enemy infantry. Their positions had to be carefully selected and, once engaged, they generally could not redeploy. Experience strongly suggested that towed AT guns were less effective than self-propelled AT weapons and took heavier casualties. Self-propelled anti-tank guns were rare at the beginning of WW2, although the Belgian Army deployed a few T.15 tank destroyers and the French army was developing several wheeled and tracked designs. The advantages of mobility and even thin armour protection were so compelling, however, that most armies were using self-propelled AT guns by mid-war. Examples of these weapons included the US M10, German Marder II, and Soviet SU-85.

Anti-tank rifles were developed in several countries during the 1930s. By the beginning of WW2, anti-tank rifle teams could knock out most tanks from a distance of about 500m, and do so with a weapon that was man-portable and easily concealed. Although the AT rifle performance was negated by the increased armour of medium and heavy tanks by 1942, they remained viable against lighter-armoured and unarmoured vehicles, and against field fortification embrasures. Due to their tactical perceptions and challenges, the British Army had abandoned the anti-tank rifle by 1942, and the the Wehrmacht by 1943, while the US Army never adopted the weapon, though the USMC used the Boys rifles in the Pacific Theatre. However, the Red Army did not abandon the anti-tank rifle due to the importance it occupied in its doctrine of anti-tank in-depth defense system deployment, first demonstrated during the defense of Moscow, and again during the Kursk battles. This became particularly true later in the war when the Red Army assumed an almost constant offensive, and anti-tank in-depth defensive deployments were used for protecting flanks of the operational breakthroughs against German tactical counterattacks. By firing on the lighter armoured infantry and support vehicles (eg artillery tractors) the anti-tank rifle units helped to separate the supporting infantry (panzergrenadiers) and artillery of the German tanks, forcing the tanks to halt at short distances from the concealed anti-tank guns, denying them manoeuver, and leaving them exposed to fire from larger anti-tank guns at an effective range for their ammunition. The PTRS-41 semi-automatic anti-tank rifles were also used for sniping since an additional tracer round enabled rapid fire adjustment by the gunner. Although optical sniper scopes were tried with the PTRS-41, the weapons proved too inaccurate at sniping distances (800m or more), and the recoil to much for good use of the scopes.

Infantry close assault
The tank is still vulnerable to infantry, especially in close country or built-up areas. Rough terrain may expose the floor armour, and high ground such as multi-story buildings may expose the top armour. Their large size and loud noise can allow enemy infantry to spot, track, and evade tanks until an opportunity presents itself for counter-attack.

Because tank crews have limited visibility from inside the tank, infantry can get close to a tank given enough concealment and if the hatches are closed. If tank crewmen unbutton for better visibility, they become vulnerable to small arms fire. An infantryman cannot be targeted by a tank's main gun when close, as it cannot depress sufficiently. Close defense weapons such as pistol ports, hull-, coaxial- and pintle-mounted machine guns gave them some protection however.

Whilst many hand-held infantry anti-tank weapons will not penetrate the front armour of a tank, they may penetrate the less heavily armoured top, rear, and sides. Damage to the tracks or running gear can inflict a mobility kill. Early WWII tanks had open vision slits which could be fired through to kill the crew. Later tanks' slits had thick glass, as well as sights and periscopes which could still be damaged with powerful small arms such as anti-tank rifles and heavy machine guns to hampering the crew. If all else fails, the hatch could also be forced open and grenades thrown inside, although later tank designs often have hatches designed to be difficult to open from the outside.

Tanks were also vulnerable to hand-placed anti-tank mines. Infantry have even immobilised tanks using a set of plates covered with leaves and dirt as dummy mines (the ruse being augmented by the crew's obscured vision). Infantry can then attack the stopped tank. This tactic was taught to the British Home Guard during World War II since they were not often provided with long-range anti-tank weapons.

In some cases in World War 2, a tactic of the some infantry was to run directly up to a tank, avoiding their main and machine guns, and pour petroleum over and into the tank and light it, sometimes blocking the exit, burning the crew alive. Used by Soviet and German infantry respectively.

In the Japanese army, the use of satchel charges and pole charges was widespread. Although the charges could knock out any allied tank, the tactic was extremely close-range, and the sappers were vulnerable to all allied weapons.

Korean War anti-tank tactics
The Korean War highlighted the difficulties that can arise with tank forces when vulnerable logistical support is combined with poor terrain. In the early stages of the war, North Korea's well-equipped tank divisions were pushed back to the Yalu River, the border with China, by superior American air power combined with artillery and infantry support. However, when the Chinese entered the war, they managed to reverse the American advances with infantry power alone. Because of the terrain and the need to keep the tanks supplied, American tanks were limited to two main roads. The Chinese merely occupied the land between the roads and harried the American supply lines and troop transports along the road. The Chinese infantry stuck to land that was impassable to tanks, such as rocky prominences and rice paddies, neutralizing the advantage of both American armoured divisions and air support.

In the USA, the 2.36 in M9A1 bazooka rocket launcher evolved into the more powerful 3.5 in M20 "Super Bazooka", which was used to good effect against North Korean armored spearheads during the Korean War. However, the M20 proved difficult and cumbersome to portage on foot over long distances.

Cold War
In the Cold War era, HEAT became an almost universal choice outside of artillery and tank units. The British had developed the High explosive squash head (HESH) warhead as an weapon for attacking fortifications during the war, and found it surprisingly effective against tanks. Although these systems allowed infantry to take on even the largest tanks, and, like HEAT, its effectiveness was independent of range, infantry typically operated at short range. A major influence in anti-tank warfare came with the development and evolution of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGW) that could be fired by infantry operators, from ground vehicles and by aircraft. Increasing use of combined arms tactics allowed the attacking infantry to suppress the anti-tank crews effectively, meaning that they could typically get off only one or two shots before being countered or forced to move.

Aircraft
Cold War aircraft, such as the A-10 Thunderbolt II and SU-25 Frogfoot, have been specifically built for close air support, including tank destruction. They can use a variety of weaponry, including large-caliber anti-tank guns, air-to-surface missiles (i.e. AGM-65 Maverick), volleys of unguided rockets, and various bombs (unguided or laser-guided and with or without submunitions such as HEAT bomblets, an example of which would be the CBU-100 Cluster Bomb).

Helicopters
Anti-tank missiles were first used in a helicopter-borne role by the French in the late 1950s, when they mounted SS.11 wire-guided missiles on Alouette II helicopters. While, initially, there were many teething problems, the possibilities were clear, such as providing the ability to attack the more lightly armoured top of the tank.

The anti-tank helicopter armed with ATGWs (Anti-Tank Guided Weapons) or anti-tank cannons is one of the biggest threats to a modern tank. The helicopter can position itself where it is not easily seen from a tank and then attack from any quarter, exposing the weaker parts of the tank's armour. The limited visibility from a closed-down tank also makes sighting a helicopter harder.

Most helicopter-launched ATGWs have sufficient range that they can under the right conditions be fired at a range too long for the tank to retaliate with its own weapons. This may change with the Israelis fielding the Lahat missile that can be fired from the main gun of the Merkava MBT. With both anti-tank and anti-helicopter role, it does level the playing field somewhat. The Indian Arjun tank has also been modified to fire this missile. The People's Republic of China has developed 100mm gun-launched missiles based on Russian designs such as the GP2 (based on the Russian Bastion). It has been reported to have successfully engaged aerial targets, as well as being an anti-tank missile. Similar missiles are available for Chinese tanks equipped with the 105mm gun. The Russians have also displayed a similar if more advanced system in the Reflex. The system involves an automatic targeting of an aerial/land target instigated by a laser warning system.

Although putting weapons on helicopters (probably) dates back to the 1955 with the Bell 47, the first specific attack helicopter that went into mass production was the Bell AH-1 Cobra in 1966. The AH-1 was equipped with TOW missiles in 1973 for anti-tank capability.

Artillery anti-tank munitions
In the last thirty years, however, a variety of artillery projectiles have been developed specifically to attack tanks. These include laser-guided projectiles, such as the US's now-cancelled Copperhead Cannon Launched Guided Projectile (CLGP), which increases the chances of a direct hit. Some of these CLGPs (including the Copperhead) have HEAT warheads instead of common HE.

Guided and unguided scatter munitions and submunitions have also been developed: a single artillery shell containing a number of smaller munitions designed to attack a tank. A six-gun battery might be able to fire several hundred submunitions in a minute or two.

In one form, the shell bursts in the air above the tank and a number of shaped charge (HEAT) or HEDP (High Explosive Dual Purpose) bomblets or grenades rain down. Any that hit the tank have a good chance of causing damage, since they are attacking the thin top armour.

Another form scatters a number of small anti-tank mines in the tank's path, which probably will not penetrate the armour but can damage a track, leaving the tank immobile and vulnerable.

More sophisticated are submunitions with a homing capability. Once again the shell explodes above the tank position and dispenses a number of submunitions. The munitions contain some circuitry to identify tanks, such as IR or millimetre radar; when a tank is identified, a rocket propellant is fired to shoot the projectile at the tank. These munitions will often descend by parachute, to allow time for target acquisition and attack.

All of the above but the CLGP can be fired from medium (122/152/155-mm) artillery, both tube and rocket. There has also been development of large calibre (81 mm and larger) guided mortar munitions with both internal (e.g., IR or radar) or external (i.e., laser designator) guidance.

Anti-tank guided missiles
The development of the (wire) guided missile, or Anti-Tank Guided Weapon (ATGW) systems came into use in the late 1950s and 1960s that could defeat any known tank at ranges beyond that of the guns of the accompanying infantry. The United Kingdom, France, and other NATO countries were among the first to develop such weapons (e.g., the Malkara missile by the UK and Australia in 1958). The Soviet Union, and now Russia, put extensive development into these weapons; the first man-portable model to enter service was the AT-3 in 1961. The United States was one of the last, coming up with the BGM-71 TOW in 1970. For a time, it appeared that the tank was a dead end. A small team of infantry with a few missiles in a well-concealed position could take on a number of the largest and most expensive tanks. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Soviet first-generation wire-guided missiles employed by the Egyptian forces inflicted heavy casualties on Israeli tank units, causing a major crisis of confidence for tank designers.

Active protection systems such as the Russian Arena active protection system are starting to be more common, with similar systems such as the Israeli Iron Fist active protection system. The tank may be on a comeback because of active defense systems, which attack missiles in mid-air. This may allow the tank to be competitive on the battlefield once again.

Anti-tank guns
Of the world's major armies, only the Soviet Red Army retained anti-tank guns in any significant quantity, mostly in 100 mm, 115 mm, and 125 mm calibers. The 125 mm anti-tank guns are extremely bulky and massive, and require large tractors to tow them for any significant distance. This is offset by their cheapness and potentially deadly effect, particularly now that they have been upgraded with laser rangefinders and depleted uranium ammunition. However, their tactical usefulness in many types of modern, mobile warfare is still unclear: in Desert Storm for example, tanks set up in emplacements were very vulnerable and could be spotted well in advance. In an environment with more cover, for example in urban terrain, they would be harder to spot.

Anti-tank mines
Owing to greater sophistication of the tank, and engineering support available to tank units to detect and negate minefields, a considerable effort was made to develop more effective anti-tank mine technology in the effort to deny tank-led formations manoeuver space, or channel their movement into unsuitable avenues of approach.

Infantry anti-tank weapons
The search for a more suitable, longer-range delivery system took up much of the immediate post-war era. The US invested in the recoilless rifle, delivering a widely-used 75 mm design, and less common 90 mm and 106 mm designs (the latter was usually mounted rather than infantry-handled). The 106 mm formed the basis of a dedicated anti-tank vehicle, the Ontos tank, which mounted six 106 mm rifles. The Soviet Union also built recoilless rifles in various calibers intended to be used as anti-tank weapons, most commonly 73 mm, 82 mm, and 110 mm (only the 73 mm remains in service with the Russian military today, though the other two can be found all over the world due to Soviet military aid during the Cold War). The British used a 120 mm (4.7 inch) design to equip infantry units, the BAT series, which served from the 1950s until replaced by MILAN, but it was generally too heavy for infantry use and had to be towed by, or mounted on, a vehicle for maneuverability.

The Soviets developed the RPG-2 from the German Panzerfaust 150. Further development lead to the ubiquitous RPG-7. The RPG-7 is one of the most widely used Anti-tank weapon, favored most by soldiers of Irregular Militaries. The RPG-7 could fire a range of different warheads, from Thermobaric warheads to a single HEAT or Tandem-charge HEAT warheads against Explosive reactive armour equipped tanks. The RPG-7 has a long combat history, and has been used in most wars from the Vietnam war all the way to present day wars. In modern times, the RPG-7 is generally used in an Urban environment, which would enhance their effectiveness due to the close ranges involved. However, the aging RPG-7 has evolved to the even more potent RPG-29 which has proven its worth in conflicts in the Middle East, disabling or destroying Merkava IV, Challenger 2 and M1 Abrams Main battle tanks.

In the 1960s, the U.S. Army adopted the M72 LAW rocket, a lightweight, collapsible rocket launcher with the ability to penetrate moderate thicknesses of enemy armor. During Vietnam War, the weapon was used primarily against NVA and Viet Cong defensive works and emplacements, as there were few encounters against enemy armor. Overall, the LAW was regarded as a success, though its ignition system frequently suffered from misfires in the heat and humidity of Vietnamese jungles. The LAW has since been replaced by the AT4 (M136).

Cold War anti-tank tactics
Changes in the anti-tank tactics since the Second World War mostly came from the appearance of new technologies, and increased firepower of the infantry mounted on fully armoured vehicles. The most profound anti-tank technology has been the guided missile, which when coupled with a helicopter can mean that tanks can be engaged beyond ground line of sight (LOS), and at one of their most vulnerable aspect, the top armour.

Effectiveness of anti-tank weapons and tactics
The effect of anti-tank warfare is to prevent enemy tanks, and their supporting troops from manoeuvering, which is the primary capability of the tanks. In the US Army the degree of effect by an anti-tank weapon on a vehicle is referred to as either "mobility kill", "firepower kill", and "catastrophic kill". In a mobility kill (M-kill), the vehicle loses its ability to move, for example, by breaking a tank track; the target is then immobile, but may retain full use of its weapons and still be able to fight to some extent. A firepower kill (F-kill) is some loss of the vehicle's ability to fire its weapons. M-kills and F-kills may be complete or partial, the latter corresponding to reductions in a target's ability to move or fire. A catastrophic kill (K-kill) removes the tank's ability to fight completely; this may entail complete destruction of the tank or disabling the weapon system(s) or crew.

Future of anti-tank warfare
Although the future of the tank was questioned in the 1960s due to the development of the anti-tank missiles, increases in thickness and composition of armour, and other improvements in tank design meant that infantry operated systems were no longer sufficiently effective by the 1970s, and the introduction of Chobham armour by the British Army and reactive armor by the Soviet Army forced the HEAT rounds to be increased, rendering them less portable.

Weapon systems like the RPG-29 and FGM-148 Javelin use a Tandem warhead where the first warhead disables reactive armor, while the second warhead defeats the shell armour by means of a HEAT or a shaped charge.

Today the anti-tank role is filled with a variety of weapons, such as portable "top attack" artillery ammunition and missiles, larger HEAT missiles fired from ground vehicles and helicopters, a variety of high velocity autocannon, and ever-larger heavy tank guns.

One of the first lessons of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict is the effectiveness of portable rocket propelled grenades, in particular, Russian-made RPG-29, and Metis-M, Kornet and European MILAN anti-tank missiles.