User:LaHaga462/Herbicidal Warfare

Herbicidal Warfare, International Treaties, and Legality

The basis for determining the legality of herbicide's use in warfare traces back to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which sought to prohibit the wartime use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices," and also prohibited "bacteriological warfare," as well. In practice there has been a great deal of controversy in the past as to if and how the 1925 Geneva Protocol applied to the use of herbicides as a means of war. The 1925 Geneva Protocol predated most chemical herbicides and was created in the wake of World War One in response to the extensive use of chemical weapons by belligerents in said conflict.

International attention to the matter came about primarily during the Vietnam War and the United States' usage of chemical herbicides as part of Operation Ranch Hand. A formal complaint was lodged in the United Nations by Hungary in 1966 where they claimed that food and drinking water were being poisoned by toxic herbicides. A United Nations General Assembly resolution was passed 80-3, with around 30 abstentions, which effectively broadened the definition of chemical warfare to include the use of herbicides. However, there is debate as to the jurisdiction of the General Assembly to make such claims and set rules like that. Notably, the United States did not ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol until 1975; four years after the cessation of herbicide use in the Vietnam War and two years after American military forces had left the country. An executive order on 8 April, 1975 by then president Gerald R. Ford stating that the United States would refrain from first use of chemical herbicides in warfare with the exception of base perimeter defense or if preceded by a specific order from the president to do so.

In 1976, the United Nations adopted Resolution 31/72 which formed the basis for the Environmental Modification Convention which largely bans herbicidal warfare and what are considered to be "environmental modification techniques". This document went to Geneva for signature in 1977 and entered into force in 1978.

In 2005 the Agent Orange case, Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (The Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, et al. v. Dow Chemical Company, et al), was brought before the American legal system. The plaintiffs, mostly Vietnamese victims of the effects of Agent Orange and other herbicides, were seeking compensation for the damages to their land and health as a result of the United State's actions on the grounds that they were in violation of international law. The defendants won in the 2005 case and the ruling was upheld in an appeals court in 2008. The argument of the United States was multifaceted. The defense brought up how the United States was not a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and was therefore not obliged to follow it regardless how it applied to herbicides. The defense also stated the United States was not under the jurisdiction of any UN General Assembly resolution, they were only subject to rulings by the Security Council. The defense also argued that the usage of herbicides in Vietnam would not be considered chemical warfare because the effects of toxicity were a secondary effect and not a primary one; they were not deliberately trying to poison people.

Angolan War of Independence

See Also: Angolan War of Independence

Starting in 1970, Portugal was accused of using aerially sprayed herbicides in the Angolan War of Independence against anti-colonial independence forces. Further, Portugal was also accused of using herbicides in Mozambique as well as Guinea-Bissau. While the Portuguese used herbicides as a general defoliant, unlike the US in Vietnam the Portuguese primarily and specifically targeted crop production in rebel held area. There are also reports of herbicide being used in tandem with napalm attacks on rebel held villages. The specific herbicides they were accused of using were: 2, 4-D (2, 4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acid), 2, 4, 5-T (2, 4, 5 trichlorophenoxyacetic acid), Cocadylic acid, and Picloram. The effects of these herbicides were felt by the local population rather quickly where hundreds where presumed to have died from direct toxic effects. MPLA leader Agostinho Neto appealed to the United Nations to condemn the Portuguese actions and it was featured the New York Times. While the overall details of Portuguese herbicide use in their colonial conflicts are much more convoluted than American herbicide use in Vietnam as the Portuguese denied their use, the Portuguese commander of forces in Angola, General Joaquim Pinheiro, acknowledged to the New York Times in 1974 that herbicides were indeed deployed in Angola although General Pinheiro refused to elaborate. Furthermore, a South African mercenary admitted that he was ordered to mix barrels labeled of herbicides labeled "DOW Chemical"; the South Africans being involved in the conflict and using herbicides themselves in Rhodesia. In 1973, hearings in the US House of Representatives on "Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues" featured the Department of Defense admitting that they sold helicopters and fixed wing aircraft capable of spraying herbicides to Portugal. It was also revealed that herbicide exports from the US to Portugal had more than quadrupled from 1969 to 1971.

The War on Drugs: Mexico, Central and South America

See Also: Operation Condor, Plan Colombia

During Operation Condor in Mexico, the Mexican government along with the DEA began the use of areal sprayed herbicides beginning in 1976. Two herbicides were used in the areal campaign, 2.4-D acid and paraquat for poppies and cannabis respectively. Notably, some growers still harvested their cannabis crops despite them being sprayed and cannabis with traces of the herbicide began to turn up in the US drug market. Shortly thereafter, a public health advisory was released alerting consumers of cannabis that they may be encountering product laced with the toxic chemical paraquat. As part of the Mexican program, almost $70 Million from the United States government was provided in the forms of aircraft, herbicides, technical assistance, and so on.

Beginning in 1994, and continuing under Plan Colombia, aerial fumigation was a critical part of joint US-Colombian antidrug and counterinsurgency efforts. This campaign was called Program for the Eradication of Illicit Crops by Areal Asperation with Herbicide Glyphosate (PECIG). Targeted crops were coca, opium, and cannabis plants grown by criminal drug cartels and guerilla groups such as The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). While suspended by the Colombian government on 29 May, 2015, the aerial fumigation did not actually cease until October of that year. The herbicide used in this was Glyphosate manufactured by Monsanto. In addition, the Glyphosate was also mixed with Polyethoxylated Talco Amino and Cosmo Flux 411F to aid Glyphosate's application in a tropical environment. With PECIG, in excess of of 1.8 million hectares of suspect illicit drug production were sprayed. Countless farmers of varying means were erroneously sprayed as part of PECIG. At the bequest of the United States, the Colombian government set up a claims system in order to address the grievances of farmers who lost their licit crops. Claims were handled by the Complaint Direction of the Anti Narcotics Police (DIRAN). Claimants must do the following two things within 30 business days of the event: They must prove that they did not then or now have illicit crops growing on their land. They must also prove that it was indeed PECIG flights that cause the damage. Proving the second part can be difficult as detailed GPS coordinates must be ascertained which line up with flight paths and intelligence maps held by the authorities. Detailed GPS coordinates is often challenging as many effected areas are location of active fighting between armed groups. If a claim is rejected, the clamant has five business days to appeal their claims often having to travel to the capital in person which is both costly in time and money but also dangerous. Notably, livestock lost as part of PECIG flights are non-eligible as part of claims as the physical evidence is long rotted by the time claims can be processed. If a claim goes through the first phase of the investigation, DIRAN will send an on the ground team to investigate claims, assess damage, and also prove the absence of illicit crops. While claimants are very limited as to their windows of opportunity, the investigatory period has no time limit. Critically, many rural and isolated communities only learned of the claims system via radio broadcast long after their window had expired. While there have been at least 17,600 claims filed due to negligent spraying under PECIG, 96% of all claims nationwide were rejected.