User:LauraTilsley/sandbox

AN ESSAY ON THE BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN by MIDN Laura Jane Tilsley ‘The consequence of limiting for some time our operational activities, not for the serious moral effect of the losses, as the British believed, but because the operation revealed our inferiority in effective aero-naval cooperation and the backwardness of our night battle technology’ Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino Background 1.	The battle of Cape Matapan was fought from 27 March 1941 to 29March 1941, the engagement was a crucial part of World War II. The battle of Cape Matapan was a humiliating defeat for the Italian navy and gave the Royal navy control of the eastern Mediterranean up until the fall of Crete in June. 2.	The British Fleet was commanded by, Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, and comprised of one aircraft carrier, three battleships, seven light cruisers and seventeen destroyers. The Italian fleet was commanded by, Vice Admiral Angelo Iachino, and comprised of one battleship, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and seventeen destroyers (ThoughtCo, 2017). Aim 3.	The aim of this essay is to provide evidence in ways to which the Royal Australian Navy has been moulded into the Navy it is today, due to significant events in our history and prior engagements. It will also explore The Battle of Cape Matapan, focusing on the technical and doctrinal developments made through World War II. Scope 4.	The scope of this essay is to discuss the effects The Battle of Cape Matapan had on the Italian Navy and their subsequent conduct of war in the maritime environment. It will also examine the different strategies utilised by both the Italian Navy and the British Navy, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses that came from these strategic tactics in conjunction with the different leadership styles displayed during the engagement. The Establishment of the Royal Australian Navy 5.	The Royal Navy played a significant role in ensuring that the Royal Australian Navy was firm in the establishment. The history between the two forces goes back to 1901 during the formation of the Commonwealth Naval Forces after the amalgamation of the six different colonial navies (Grey 1999, p. 32-34). The commonwealth administration urged the Royal Navy to continue providing security on the blue water until a stronger Australian navy would be formed. The move was championed by among other influential leaders, the Prime Minister Alfred Deakin. King George V finally made a significant step by appending his signature, approving the formation of the Royal Australian Navy in July 1911, with the ships getting the prefix HMAS that stood for His Majesty’s Australian Ship (Ranft 2002, p. 67-73) 6.	When there were hostility issues in 1914, the Australian Forces operated under the Royal navy from where they got to learn new skills necessary to wage future war against their enemies. The Australian fleet at this time comprised of six destroyers, a battle cruiser, two submarines and various ancillary craft. All these items were acquired from the Royal Navy; the Royal Navy was determined to see the Royal Australian Navy had a strong fleet and a known presence. Besides, the Royal Navy was always willing to give financial support to the Australian forces like the loan they acquired in 1925 for surveying duties of the HMAS Moresby (Holloway 1995, p. 285-305). 7.	The good relationship between the two forces was an assurance of a victory when facing common enemies over shared interests. The Royal Navy would, for example, require the help of its allies in the Battle of Matapan during World War II where the Italian forces suffered mass causalities.

8.	The Australian naval and maritime history has been essential in shaping the professional force that it is today. Lessons learned from possible weaknesses and failures are used to strengthen its functions and operations. Valuable lessons were drawn in the initial missions of protecting the Australian ports, trade and shipping routes. In an effort to protect its maritime frontiers, the Royal Australian Navy engaged in its first deadly wars, trying to capture German colonies located in the Pacific. Germany, though its light cruiser Emden tried to retaliate but was met with an asymmetrical force by the Royal Australian Navy through HMAS Sydney (Overlack 1992, p. 37-51). The battle turned out as the first successful one to be fought by the Australian forces. The events of this war and others that the army fought thereafter were crucial in strengthening its functions. The Royal Navy is still a great ally of the Australian forces and continues to provide various forms of support when called upon. Royal Navy VS Italian Navy 9.	The leadership styles between the Italian Navy and the Royal Navy have a number of differences. Leaders in the Royal Navy were more concerned about the success of the future battles and efforts were directed towards reinforcing its fighting capabilities through acquiring more pieces of machinery and personnel. As a result, the Royal Navy has been too large such that the Italian Naval cannot compete against it. The leadership has also ensured that there is sufficient training, recruitment on the basis of merit and boosting the morale. Besides, there are new modern technologies such as radar and range finding. All these achievements can be attributed to the commitment of the leaders and the form of style employed in ensuring there is high integration and a team spirit among the members. 10.	The leadership style in the Royal Navy further seems to be more committed to advancing the Blue water navy (Barnett 1991, p. 73-76). The concept implies the ability to effectively achieve its logistics and supply in many parts of the world with minimal barriers. The Italian Navy for a long time seems not to be so interested in extending the influence of the territorial boundaries. The only two navies in the world with such a strategy are the French and the United States’ forces although China is also making significant advancements. The British Technical Superiority 11.	The Royal Naval had the superiority attitude in most of the war that it wagged or supported the allies. Technical superiority was supported by other factors such as the high-tech intelligence, the development of radar detection capabilities and the high success rate in the previous battles. The spirit of success inspired other allies that fought beside the Royal Navy because of the assurance and the great possibility of continually defeating the enemies. 12.	Although the British intelligence in the Battle of Cape Matapan can be considered as outdated when compared to the modern technology, it played a significant role in ensuring that the enemy was met with a lethal and accurate force. There were evident miscalculations on the Italian side in which Iachino played a significant part. There the lack of the support from the Italian air force and no measures for the air cover at the Luftwaffe. The Italians had to quickly revert to a defensive mode in a mission had been planned to be totally offensive. Iachino would have made efforts to have the air monitored and can thus be considered as causing the confusion in which the Italian fought a one-sided form of a night battle. Besides, the decision to wade the war was not unanimously arrived at with key Italian leaders opposing the move. It was, therefore, necessary to weigh both sides of the lethal effects from the leaders opposing the war. 13.	The failure to have the radar detection technology was a clear indicator that Italy was not investing enough in research to come up with advanced technologies especially at a time when England and other countries were advancing. Such a slowed military technology growth can be attributed to the leadership styles that were employed by the leaders such as Benito Mussolini due to the poor doctrines adopted in countering and attacking enemies. Failures in Night and Joint Operations 14.	Lack of effective measures to boost the Italians night action and reinforcing joint operations played a significant role in the defeat the battle. The allied forces are reported to have detected the Squadron, an Italian ship on radar and came up with strategies to attack and closing in without being detected (Going 1942, p.307-310). The Italian ships did not incorporate the radar technology, and thus sight was the only relied upon method to detect enemies. They were therefore caught unaware and ill-prepared for action. The weakness saw three allied battleships: Barhan, Warspite, and Valiant, cause mass causalities on the Italian destroyers, Carducci and Vittorio among others. Such a great loss implied the need to retreat and re-strategize in order to be assured of a victory especially against the more stronger allied forces led by the Royal Navy. 15.	Italy was being attacked as a single entity thus minimizing the chances of winning the battle. Britain was incorporating the support of other loyal forces that it had helped to establish and strengthen like the Royal Australian Navy. Italy seemed to be relying on Germany for joint operations although Hitler was not answering the help if he had no interests to protect. A good example was the grudging assistance that the Italians got in the war with the Greece. The involvement of Germany on the Italian side was primarily driven by the presence of the British on the enemy side. Germany even offered her ally the precious fuel oil for the offensive strategies against the allied forces. As a result, Italy was left to fight alone with the assurance for help in possible joint operations. The Battle of Matapan and Subsequent Italian Conduct 16.	The Battle of Matapan was fought in 1941 as part of the Second World War fierce fights among the strong powers. The Royal Navy was led by Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham while the Italians were under Vice Admiral Angela Iachino. The British used three battleships, 17 destroyers, one aircraft and seven light cruisers while the Italians had 17 destroyers, one battleship, two light and six heavy cruisers. 17.	The battle ended up as a decisive victory in favor of the Royal Navy, giving it the control over the eastern Mediterranean. The Italians lost two destroyers, three heavy cruisers and over 2000 military men (Sadkovich 1994, p.43). More devastating, the Italian Navy had its highly valued Vittorio Veneto badly damaged. After this night engagement, Cunningham was still determined to pursue more Italians, but the situation was made dangerous with the intervention of the German Bombers. However, the strength of the Royal Navy could not be matched, and in 1943, the Italians surrendered to Cunningham (Barnett 1991, p. 74-75). 18.	The Italian Navy learned valuable lessons to avoid such a big defeat in a war at sea. For example, future engagements in such wars had to be well calculated to avoid possible annihilations if the odds were not favoring them. The decision to again venture in the Eastern Mediterranean had the odds on their side after the fall of Crete. The Italians further learned that having reliable allies was an important factor to guarantee their success in the wars they were to engage in. 19.	Although they were defeated, the intervention of Germany to fight on their side in the battle was a clear proof that to defeat the Royal Navy, a collective approach had to be taken. Besides, the Italian Navy learned the importance of coding their signals to avoid the decryption by their potential enemies who can be alerted before the war begins. Valuable lessons were also learned by the political leaders on the need to offer full support to the soldiers in the battles and coming up with policies that can strengthen nation’s relationship with other neutral or powerful states that considered Britain as a threat to their peace. Conclusion 20.

This article is an original work, written entirely by the undersigned except where otherwise acknowledged to be otherwise.

LJ Tilsley MIDN, RAN Getting Division

HMAS Creswell laura.tilsley@defence.gov.au

22 Sep 17

Bibliography

Barnett, C., 1991. Engage the enemy more closely. The RUSI Journal, 136(2), pp.73-76. Going, G.R.M., 1942. The Work of the Fleet Air Arm during the War. The RUSI Journal,87(548), pp.307-310. Grey, J., 1999. A military history of Australia. Cambridge University Press. Holloway, P.E., 1995. Leeuwin current observations on the Australian north west shelf, Mayjune 1993. Deep Sea Research Part I: Oceanographic Research Papers, 42(3), pp.285305.

Overlack, P., 1992. Australian Defence Awareness and German Naval Planning in the Pacific,1900–1914. War & Society, 10(1), pp.37-51. Ranft, B., 2002. The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy. Oxford University Press,USA. Sadkovich, J.J., 1994. The Italian Navy in World War 2. Greenwood Press. ThoughtCo. 2017. Battle of Cape Matapan in World War II, viewed 20 September 2017, 