User:Laurenkearns98/sandbox

Concept of the Enemy Alien
The concept of “enemy alien” — an individual who resides in one country but has stronger or weaker national bonds to a different country, which the country of residence is at war with — is not new. Afrikaaner were sent to concentration camps by the British during the Boer Wars, the French deported citizens of German heritage during the First World War, and it happened all over the world during the Second World War (Friedman article 2). In the US this idea was legalized through the Alien Enemies Act, the main provisions of which allowed the state to arrest, detain, and deport nationals of the countries that the US was at war with (Congress hearing 26). American-Japanese are the most well-known national group to have experienced such treatment, with the destiny of German nationals in both US and Latin America being often overlooked.

American Influence in Latin America
During the Second World War, fifteen Latin American governments participated in US-initiated programs of deporting 4000 Germans to internment camps in the United States (Friedman 1). To have such extensive extra-territorial outreach, the US had to have a major influence in Latin America, which has often been justified by catastrophizing the situation and referring to the danger of Nazi penetration as bigger than it actually was. Additionally, the US government strongly believed that Latin American governments were not capable of handling dangerous Nazi influences, and therefore started to force Washington guidance on them (Friedman book 3). Latin American governments responded to these exaggerations and meddling with outrage. When in September 1941 Roosevelt claimed that a secret airfield has been discovered in Columbia which would be used by Nazis to attack the Panama canal, the Colombian Senate unanimously voted that the claim was untrue - the only German-associated area in the region were German-owned rice fields (Friedman book 1).

Notably, the deportation program took place during the time of the US’ “Good Neighbor Policy,” which was meant to halt US intervention in Latin American affairs (Friedman 3). This policy was first announced by President Roosevelt in 1933, and has been remembered for its success (Friedman 1), overlooking the interventionism-based civilian deportations that occurred during the time period of this policy (Friedman 1), which ultimately served to worsen relations between the US and Latin America by violating the policy that was meant to improve them (Friedman 6).

Anti German Sentiments
The US government crafted anti-German policies before and during the war in both the US and Latin America.

In the US:
The census taken before the war revealed that there were 4.9 million foreigners living in the US, which was 1 million more than what the government has estimated. Around three hundred thousand were German citizens, six hundred Italians, and ninety thousand Japanese. Once the war broke out that meant that every fifth foreigner was also a hostile foreigner and therefore a potential threat to US security (Krammer 583).

The US government responded to that concern by introducing a  program that oversaw the arrests and forceful deportations of so-called “Enemy Aliens” (Krammer 581). The combination of “wartime panic” and “long-held ethnic and racial prejudices” resulted in the arrest of more than thirty thousand  US residents of German, Japanese or Italian nationality (Congress hearing 26). German individuals in the US were arrested or at least closely monitored if they carelessly expressed their support of Nazis or if they were reported on by jealous neighbours and business rivals (Krammer 583). Thousands were watched by the FBI (Friedman book 2).

In Latin America:
The US government was even more concerned about Germans in Latin America than in the US - possible German domination of Latin America was perceived as among the most prominent of threats to US security. These fears culminated just before and during the war, with the US government regarding Germans with suspicion and hostility. There were two main concerns: first, the possibility of German Nazis conspiring to destabilize Latin America, and second, economic success of German nationals.

Anti-German policies in Latin America were rooted partly in existence of Auslandsorganisation  (Foreign Organization), established in 1933 by Nazi Party. Its main purpose was to recruit Germans abroad. The success was very limited; only 5-8% of German population supported the Nazi Party. But due to their extensive and vocal propaganda, there was a perception of Germans supporting Hitler (Friedman 3). Nazi spies had a similar effect — despite being unhelpful with German war efforts, they gave an impression that Nazis had a grip on Latin societies, when that was actually not so (Friedman book 2). Many Germans were, however, members of Nazi party. That by no means translated into loyalty to the ideology or to Berlin, even though the US government seemed to believe so (Friedman 10). Most joined the party decades before, mainly for economic benefits, and were not aware of what it meant to be a Nazi in 1941. Fears persisted, as the German community was large (more than one million and a half of ethnic Germans) and unassimilated (Friedman book 2).

Germans were economically well-situated in Latin America and were prominent rivals to Americans, causing the anti-German atmosphere. Enlistment and deportation effectively removed the German competitors (Friedman 6). According to oral testimonies of deportees, only the wealthy Germans were sent to internment camps and expropriated (Friedman 8).

Due to mentioned concerns about Germans living in the Latin America and Caribbean, the US government extended the Internment Program beyond US borders. The Foreign Service, more specifically ambassadors with help of local governments, identified individuals who were nationals of Axis powers, assessed the threat they posed, and then possibly expropriated them and/or deported them to US.

Inadequate American Intelligence
American intelligence on Latin America was very poor and inaccurate, thus overstating the threat of ethnic Germans in Latin American, motivating the deportation and internment. Pre-war American intelligence gathering in Latin America was an ad-hoc and uncoordinated affair. It was dependent on embassy cables, report by G-2 (Army intelligence), ONI (Naval intelligence), and civilian volunteers. (59 Friedman) Latin America was shunned by talented officers as backwater and “prejudicial to their promotions”, therefore, intelligence staff posted Latin America were often from the bottom of the barrel. (59-60 Friedman) For example, Colonel Carl Strong, the military attaché in Bogota, warned of a German attack on Colombia “via Dakar and Nepal,” demonstrating his ignorance of Latin American geography. (60 Friedman)

Intelligence work in Latin America became a priority as Nazi Germany advanced across Western Europe. In June 1940, the FBI was charged was monitoring Latin America by President Roosevelt. (60 Friedman) The ~700 FBI agents poured into Latin America were not much more competent. (Becker 308) Agent Donald Charles Bird of the FBI was given two weeks of Spanish lessons before being sent to Brazil, a Portuguese speaking country. (62 Friedman) These intelligence officers often overstated the level of German influence in Latin America and grossly exaggerated the threat of ethnic Germans as a potential fifth column. (315 Becker) One such example was the FBI’s portrayal of the 12,000 ethnic Germans in Bolivia as an imminent threat, ignoring the fact that 8,500 of them were Jewish refugees. (62 Friedman)

British Disinformation
To further skewer American assessment of the situation in Latin America, British Security Co-ordination (BSC), an arm of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), fabricated many “evidences” of Nazi aggressions and infiltrations in Latin America to induce the US to join the war. (58 Friedman) These hoaxes and fabrications were in many cases readily accepted by American intelligence as truth. For example, in June 1940, the BSC forged a letter to implicate Major Elias Belmonte, former Bolivian military attaché to Berlin, in a German-sponsored coup plot in Bolivia. (58 Friedman) The letter and the alleged coup attempt became proof for German subversion in Latin America and was circulated by the FBI. (58 Friedman) On 27 October 1941, President Roosevelt dramatically announced,

I have in my possession a secret map, made in Germany by Hitler's government - by planners of the new world order. [...] It is a map of South America and a part of Central America as Hitler proposes to reorganize it. (167 Bratzel)

This map, printed in German, indicates plans to conquer South America and partition it into five satellite states. This map was also a fabrication by the BSC. (58 Friedman)

Overstated Threat
The combination of inadequate American intelligence and abundant British disinformation convinced American policy-makers that the ethnic German population in Latin American constituted a threat to Latin America, and consequently, the United States. Lieutenant Jules Dubois, chief of the Intelligence Branch of the US Army in Panama declared,

“With their sights trained on Latin America, the Axis Powers began to groom puppets and sympathetic groups in every republic to seize the reigns [sic] of their governments’ machinery […] There were approximately three million Axis nationals residing in Latin American then, each of whom could have been made available to form part of a militant striking force capable of implementing the plans of the Axis at the appropriate time” (47 Friedman)

American Demand on Latin America for deportation
Convinced that ethnic Germans were a threat, the United States elected to use internment and deportation to neutralise such threat following their entry into war. Because of the perceived incompetence and possible German infiltration of Latin American governments, local internment was deemed insufficient of a solution. (105 Friedman) Panama, which was tightly controlled by the US, carried out mass arrests of Japanese, German, and Italian nationals immediately after the attack on Peral Harbour. (108 Friedman) After the mass arrest, US Ambassador Wilson requested the Panamanian government to send the internees to the US, citing the logistical difficulties of housing and feeding the internees in Panama. (109 Friedman) On 20 January 1942, the US State Department instructed its missions in Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti to obtain an agreement to send “all dangerous aliens” to the US for internment. (113 Friedman) In neutral Columbia, US Ambassador Braden urged for the expulsion of Germans even before US entry to the war. (113 Friedman)

Latin American Response to American Demand
The Latin American countries were generally receptive to American demands. Their motivation varied between American influence, promise of military and economic aid, domestic anti-German sentiments, and the opportunity to seize the land and property of the Germans. (54 Bicknell) Panama, which was tightly controlled by the US, agreed to send the “more dangerous” internees to the US on 13 January 1942. (109 Friedman) Little opposition arose in the Latin American countries that have declared war on Germany. Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti all agreed to deport “dangerous enemy aliens” by mid-February 1942, while Cuba compromised with interning selected Germans in the isolated Isle of Pines (now Isla de la Juventud). (113 Friedman) Columbia initially refused American demands, citing national sovereignty and constitutional rights. (113 Friedman) She relented in November 1943 after she was promised military aid under Land-Lease from the US. (114 Friedman) Together with Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, they agreed to send selected Germans to the US under the promise that the deportees will be repatriated to Germany rather than interned in the US. (115 Friedman)

Selection of Deportees
The selection of deportees was arbitrary and inaccurate in picking out potentially dangerous Germans. The selection was conducted by both by local governments and by American instructions. In total, 4,058 Germans were deported to the US. (408 Becker) ‘The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals’ was created by the US in June 1941, which named potentially dangerous Axis nationals for economic sanctions. (331 Becker) The list became the basis for deportation in many Latin American countries. Many more ethnic Germans in Latin American were also selected for deportation. Outspoken Nazi Party members, such as Otto Krogmann, leader of the Nazi Party in Costa Rica and brother of Carl Vincent Krogmann, Nazi politician and mayor of Hamburg, were quickly arrested and deported. (111 Friedman)

However, many other ethnic Germans were also detained and deported with scant evidence. Carl Specht, a labour organiser for Indian rubber trappers in Columbia was deported without evidence. (114 Friedman) Post-war investigators noted that he “incurred the enmity of some of the American rubber interest” (114 Friedman) After deportation to the US, he volunteered to join the US Army. (114 Friedman) Wilhelm Wiedermann, tractor driver and naturalised Costa Rican citizen, was also deported after being reported by the US military attaché Lt. Col. E. Andino. (112 Friedman) Andino was later dubbed “one of the most unreliable intelligence officers in the employ of the United States Government” by post-war investigator. (112 Friedman) In Panama, out of the 1000+ ethnic Germans interned, the “most dangerous” 150 of them along with their 97 family members were deported to the US. (108, 110 Friedman) 30 of them were Jewish refugees, five of which have spent time in concentration camps before moving to Panama, while 37 members of the local Nazi Party were allowed to stay. (110 Friedman) The Justice Department concluded in 1943 that selection of internees and deportations were conducted “without inquiry as to the loyalty or the danger of the particular alien.” (111 Friedman)

Legal Basis of internment
Before their forced arrival to America, the deportees were deliberately not issued any visas. In violation to the immigration law, the deportees from Latin America were seen as a criminal and treated as illegal immigrants due to their “illegal entry.” With the cooperation of Latin American governments, the deportees were wrongly accused of potential national security threats without any substantive evidence. Their alleged crime resulted in the imprisonment of the deportees and set the legal ground for the Latin American internment, which was operated by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Although US Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of compensating those who interned with $20,000 reparation after the end of World War II, the interned Latin Americans were omitted from the reparation because "’they do not have US citizenship or US permanent residency’, according to an official at the US Office of Redress Administration” and the identity of "illegal aliens" they had when they landed in US.

Conditions of the internment camps
The internment camp was mostly built in barracks. The housing condition was poor and sometimes a family group had to stay in a single room shack. The condition of the camps varied depending on the locations and group size. The Kennedy Alien Detention Camp, the largest camp out of all, was mainly for single men and accommodated as many as 2,000 internees; Camp at Seagoville was designed for single women and childless couples; families with children were assigned to Crystal City. Some camps consisted of conventional facilities such as schools, libraries, entertainment areas and medical care. Conditions in the beginning was not good due to hasty construction as they believed that the internees would be quickly repatriated (143 Friedman).

The treatment internees experienced in the camps was later criticized by the public and was regarded as a massive violation to human rights. Deportees were ordered to strip naked in public and sprayed with insecticide. Consistent watching from the guards prevented internees from having basic freedom and privacy. The surveillance system set by INS spread horseback patrol, guard towers, a fence, and an electrical alarm around the camps to prevent internees from escaping. While describing the condition of the camp, one of the Japanese internees, Mine Okubo, says “The camps represented a prison. No freedom, no privacy, no ‘America’” (Japanese Internment In The US, n.d.). Although the camps provided three meals a day, the food was served in small portion and lacked adequate nutrition as they mostly only consisted of bread and potatoes. According to a doctor worked in a camp, he described that “there is no milk for anyone over 5 years of age… No meat at all until the 12th day when very small portions were served… Anyone doing heavy or outdoor work states they are not getting nearly enough to eat and they are hungry all the time, this includes the doctors” (Mickey, 2010). Libia Yamamoto, a former Japanese of Latin American descent internee, described the poor nutrition problems many faced as starvation and malnutrition were not uncommon.

“Many people were starving and her family had to pull out weeds from the ground just to feed themselves, and her 5-month-old baby died from malnutrition” (Testimony of Libia Yamamoto, 2009)

Voluntary work was encouraged to earn additional income and amenities, but the working conditions was labor-focused and unpleasant. Grace Shimizu, daughter of a Japanese Peruvian internee detained in the Canal Zone camp, shared a story of the labour work process of another internee:

“''One humid day the internees, many of whom were elderly, were told to dig a pit. He thought he was digging his own grave. When they were told to fill the pit with buckets of human waste from the guards' latrines, then the older men were so tired that they could not run fast enough to please the guards, they were poked and shoved by guards with bayonets''” (Testimony of Grace Shimizu, 2009)

In comparison to other camps, the camp in Crystal City had the best conditions. Adequate meals were distributed with one bottle of milk for each couple and each child per day. Japanese internees beautified the camp with gardening and landscaping; education was provided in English, German, Japanese, and Spanish; a swimming pool was built for the kids, large families have their own house with kitchens, bathrooms, running water, and ice boxes (147 Friedman). Karl-Albrecht Engel, one of the internees from the camp, reported in a letter to the German government:

“''We grew tan and swelled up like doughnuts from the good meal. Three hot meals a day, starting with eggs and sausages in the morning and ending with oysters or meat and potatoes for dinner. The canteen sold three kinds of beer''” (142 Friedman).

Ecuador
In July of 1941 the American government began compiling blacklists primarily consisting of Axis nationals claimed to be “certain persons deemed to be, or to have been acting or purporting to act, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of, or under the direction of, or under the jurisdiction of, or on behalf of, or in collaboration with Germany or Italy or a national thereof” (Becker 310). By April of 1942 deportation began, with around 4656 individuals eventually being sent to the US, and throughout the war 2242 were returned to axis powers while the majority remained in America, most of the remained being of German descent (Becker 312). The question of what to do with these detainees became a complicated issue as US officials never made promises that Axis nationals could return to Latin America, and many of their countries of original made claims that they had never relinquished jurisdiction over the deportees in the first place (Becker 316). From Ecuadorian perspectives America acted in a “dictatorial” fashion, pressuring Ecuador to expel residents with little reason other than loose ties to Germany (Becker 316).

As the war ended some of those sent to internment camps in the US requested permission to return back to Ecuador (Becker 317). The new Ecuadorian Minister for Foreign Relations, Camilo Ponce, agreed to bring the majority of those who requested to return back, saying “the majority of them, if not all, are individuals who have lived most of their lives in this country and did not leave of their own free will” (Becker 316). Still, many Ecuadorian deportees were still in America or Europe, and through the post-war period efforts were made to bring those stuck in internments camps back to their homes. In 1945 Ecuadorian Ambassador, Galo Plaza, petitioned the secretary of state for return of axis nationals still in internment camps in the US, noting the justification for deporting these residents was “to prevent them from engaging in subversive activities against the security of the American republics,” but now that threat had passed (Becker 316).

In 1946 the US State Department asked Ecuador and other home countries if they wanted control over the fates of the remaining deportees, and some months later those remaining in internment camps were allowed to return (Becker 316). Some US officials adamantly desired deporting the remaining detainings to Axis powers such that Nazi threats would be far removed, but in the end Ecuadorian residents were able to largely return home(Becker 317).

Cuba and Peru
In a joint effort officials from Washington ordered consulates in Havana and Lima to draw up blacklists of some 4000 German and 2000 Japanese citizens and residents to be deported to internment camps throughout the Southern United States. Of the individuals of German descent, approximately two-thirds would be sent to Germany in exchange for American detainees from 1942 until 1945, many of these being Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution (Friedman, 2). Many of the deportees who would be sent to Axis powers never returned.

For the deportees interned in America efforts to return to Cuba and Peru were often improbable at best. Beginning in 1940 the American government took to blacklisting companies and individuals with German ties from these, and most, Latin American countries. The stated rationale was to deny funding to local Nazi sympathizing factions, however the reality was that these American policies made it increasingly difficult for any German detainee to return to their family and home (Friedman 6). A nice side effect, for Washington, was of course the fact that in many cases these German companies were their greatest competitors in the region, so these blacklists effectively created American monopolies in certain industries (Friedman 6).

By the end of the war those held in internment camps were either sent to the Axis powers in return for American nationals, or were given leave to return home. Of the returnees 15 were eventually interviewed on their experiences in the American internment camps (See Friedman)

Argentina
Through the 1930’s Argentina saw more pronounced Nazi sympathism than its Latin American counterparts, largely due to its 250,000 strong German speaking population and national tendencies in the embittered post WWI period (Newton 9). Yet these sympathies were largely fringe at best and the Argentinian wing of the NSDAP was scarcely influential amongst the general Argentinian populace, albeit somewhat impactful amongst more radical German Argentines. Between 1931 and 1943 as estimate of 6000-7000 people passed through the files of the Argentine branch of the NSDAP, a handful of these being Argentine citizens (Newton 9). Argentina looked to Washington as a potential menace in this sense, as it was beyond its neighbours in its Nazi sentiments, and potentially catastrophic for American holds over Latin America economies.

The American answer, therefore, was not deportation as seen with other South American countries, but rather an influx of money to Argentine politicians and businessmen whose interests served America (Newton 13). By 1945 America had succeeded in buying out Argentina’s interests and had expelled all other great powers, save Britain, from control of the country.

Aftermath
The effects of these mass deportations had long reaching consequences, not just on the nations these Germans were deported from, but on lives of other innocents around the world. In the aftermath of the mass deportations, many companies owned by German deporties in Latin America were confiscated and expropriated; this is despite US intelligence recognizing that the resulting seizures would cause grave economic harm to the nations that these businesses resided in. (Friedman 169) Additionally, upon learning about the mass deportations of Germans from Latin America, the Nazi regime retaliated on the nations cooperating with the United States by scouring German occupied territory for their citizens and forcibly interning them. (Friedman 232)

Many of those who were deported were refused to the right to return by the Latin American nations that they had resided in. In the case of many Japanese Latin Americans who were deported to the US, the government of the United States refused to give them legal status. The consequences of this action, meant that after the war most were labelled as “illegal aliens” and subsequently deported to Japan. (Subcommittee on Immigration 8)

For the Germans who forcibly deported, their status after the war had ended varied greatly. Many had already been sent to German over the course of the war, but for those who had stayed in German, some (depending the country they had been deported from) were given the opportunity to return back to Latin America. (Becker, 316) However, this return wasn’t necessarily the end of their ordeal, with many returning to find that their property and belongings had been confiscated. Additionally, these returning Germans found themselves marked and excluded from societies that the once thought of as home, as anti-immigrant and German sentiment dogged many Latin American countries as a result of the deportations. (Becker, 317)

US Congressional Investigation
In 1980, a Commission was approved by Congress as a “fact finding study” to look into the deportation of civilians to US internment camps. This commission published its report in 1983, bringing to light the US government’s actions in this period. However, this commission’s recognition of  the maltreatment of Japanese, German, and Italian Latin Americans was limited only to its appendix (B 1), and while the commission led to a formal apology (the Civil Liberties Act of 1988)  as well as a reparations bill, these were only extended to Japanese-Americans (A 2249) (B 37).

In 2007, another commission was proposed to extend this research, investigating the circumstances surrounding the deportation and internment, and to “recommend appropriate remedies,” with a greater focus on the Latin American civilians who were deported to internment camps. (A 2250) The sponsor of the bill proposing this research was Xavier Becerra. One aspect that had not previously been considered were the testimonies of surviving internees, so this was to be the focus of the new Commission, known as “H.R. 42, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Latin Americans and of Japanese Descent Act.” (B 3) However, this proposition for another commission was controversial as over two billion dollars had already spent “investigating, researching, and financially compensating individuals affected by internment policies.” (B 4) The bill for the commission was proposed to a subcommittee of Congress in 2009, overseen by Zoe Lofgren (a Congressional representative from California) and Steve King (a Congressional representative from Iowa). (B 3) Witnesses provided oral testimonies detailing the need for continued investigation of the US government’s actions in the deportation, but the commission was not approved, as the bill stalled in Congress in 2010.

Efforts for Reparations
In 1988, the United States Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which granted a formal apology and reparations to Japanese Americans interned during World War 2, with a $20,000 US payout to all survivors. However, these reparations and the subsequent apology did not pertain to those Japanese who were deported to the United States from Latin America. As a result, Carmen Mochizuki (a survivor of US internment) sued the US government on behalf of ethnic Japanese who were deported from Latin America, eventually striking a settlement with the US government that granted up to $5000 US for each individual deported. However, these funds were drawn from the existing Civil Liberties Act and quickly ran out before all those affected could access it. (Mochizuki 1-2) Despite this settlement, no formal apology has ever been issued to ethnic Japanese, Germans or Italians deported from Latin America.