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The security of nuclear power plants in the United States is regulated and monitored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and implemented by the operators of nuclear power plants operating in cooperation with local law enforcement.

Design Basis Threat (DBT)
A "Design Basis Threat" (DBT) is a term in risk management that defines the "maximum credible threat" to a facility, based on a combination of the threat likelihood and the potential severity of outcome should the threat be realized, which is used as the basis for determining the level of protective measures to be employed at that facility.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines the DBT for nuclear power plants in the United States. The DBT for nuclear power plants envisages an act of radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material occurring as a result of: A Protected Area is the area surrounding a civilian nuclear power plant where specific security measures have been put in place to limit the possibility of attack or sabotage of nuclear material.
 * a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device delivered by four-wheel drive vehicle or small boat, or,
 * employee sabotage, or,
 * external attack by up to 20 persons who have military training, and who possess both automatic weapons and a four-wheel drive vehicle.

International standards
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established standards for the security of nuclear power plants that, while widely accepted, are non-binding on states.

IAEA standards recommend commercial nuclear facilities be located within a "Protected Area" into which only employees, or authorized visitors with an escort, are permitted. IAEA standards call for the Protected Area to be surrounded by a physical barrier, such as a fence or wall, to prevent unauthorized access.

Specific sections of the Protected Area may be designated "Inner Areas" and "Vital Areas" and have additional security measures and access controls imposed. Vital Areas are sections of the Protected Area containing equipment, other than nuclear material, that is critical for the normal and safe functioning of the power plant; the IAEA recommends these areas be outfitted with intrusion detection alarms. Inner Areas are sections of the Protected Area containing special nuclear material; the IAEA recommends these areas be outfitted with intrusion detection alarms, have only one point of entrance or exit, that all persons entering or exiting be subject to search, and that a "two-man rule" be enforced within the Inner Area.

United States
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) establishes and enforces mandatory minimum security standards for nuclear power plants in the United States. NRC standards generally mirror IAEA protocols, though slightly different terminology is used. The NRC requires nuclear plants to create two concentric security zones known as Exclusion Areas and Physical Protection Areas. Physical Protection Areas are analogous to the IAEA's definition of a Protected Area. The Exclusion Area surrounds the Physical Protection Area and may include public lands as well as private property not owned by the power plant's owner. Access controls are not required in an Exclusion Area and the area may be intersected by highways and other public infrastructure. Within the Exclusion Area, the power plant's owner has the legal authority to compel the evacuation or removal of individuals in the event of a security incident or meltdown. The Exclusion Area must be large enough that a person standing at its outer boundary for two hours would not be expected to receive a whole body radiation dose in excess of 25 rem should the plant suffer a fission product release.

The NRC also defines "Vital Areas" (analogous to the IAEA's definition of "Vital Areas") and "Material Access Area" (analogous to the IAEA's definition of "Inner Areas"). Vital Areas are required to be secured either by locked doors accessible by magnetic card reader, or by a security guard. Material Access Areas are required to be secured both by locked doors accessible by magnetic card reader and a security guard. In addition, Material Access Areas must have motion activated alarm systems installed and security staff are required to enforce a "two-man rule" before allowing entry.

Finally, an "Emergency Preparedness Area" encircles the Exclusion Area. The power plant operator and local authorities are required to maintain and regularly test a method for rapid notification of residents of the Emergency Preparedness Area of an actual or potential fission product release, have a NRC-approved plan in-place for evacuation of of the area (this may include public sirens, a reverse 911 system, and the Emergency Alert System), and maintain a stockpile of potassium iodide tablets of sufficient quantity to distribute to the population resident within the area. Zoning with Emergency Preparedness Areas is managed so that, while development is permitted, the population cannot substantially grow beyond its size at the point the plant was constructed.