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Dk v Crowley, [2002 2 IR 744 ] was an Irish Supreme Court case in which the court clarified that subsection 1, 2 and 4 of the Domestic Violence Act, 1996 was invalid in a manner and to the extent that it was repugnant to Articles 38.1, 40.3, 41.1, and 50.1 of the Irish Constitution.

Background
D.K. (the applicant) got married to L.K. (the second notice party) in May 1991, and the couple had a child, a girl aged six years. The applicant also adopted a son from the wife's previous relationship, The second notice party, claiming that the applicant had become physically and verbally abusive, sought and obtained an ex interim barring order (the order) against him on 6 November 1998, pursuant to the provisions of the 1996 Act. The order was intended to continue being in force until the hearing of the second notice party's for a barring order, which which had been scheduled form 3 February 1999 almost three months later. Consequently, the applicant claimed that section 4(4) of the 1996 Act violated the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Articles 38.1, 40.3, 41.1, and 50.1.

In addition. the applicant was granted leave to apply for review via certiorari in respect of the order. The matter came for hearing before High Court judge, Kelly J. In a judgment delivered on 2nd June 2000, the learned judge refused to grant the applicant the reliefs he had sought, arguing that the applicant had had failed to proceed with the application on the date fixed for hearing (the 23rd November 1998). As a result, Kelly J concluded that the application lacked merit, hence did not warrant the reliefs sought. Unsatisfied with the ruling, the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Holding of the Supreme Court
Keane J, delivering the unanimous decision of the five-bench judge noted that the failure by the subsections (1), (3), and (4) of the 1996 Act to "prprescribe a fixed period of relatively short duration during which" the order could continue to remain in force. It thus deprived the applicant of the protection of the principle of audi alteram partem in a manner and to the extent that was was not only disproportionate but also unreasonable and unnecessary. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and suspended the order of the lower court. The court held that the provisions of the 1996 Act were unconstitutional to the extent that they permitted a court to grant a perpetual ex parte barring order, thus depriving the affected person(s) (the applicant in the present case) the right to be heard in their case.

Subsequent developments
The significant subsequent development of the Supreme Court decision in the DK case was the enactment of the Domestic Violence (Amendment) Act of 2002, whose section 1 amended section 4 of the 1996 Act. The Supreme Court in DK case held that there was a need to limit the period during which an ex parte interim baring order could remain in force. Section 1 of the 2002 Act now sets the period at eight days.

Background
The application to appear as an amicus curiae (“amicus”) was made on behalf of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the UNHCR), in the appeal case of Hi v Minister for Justice. Neither Hi (“applicant) nor the Minister of Justice (“the respondent”) opposed the application for amicus. Having considering the submissions made for the UNHCR, therefore, as it the first case that the Irish courts had witnessed, the court acceded to the applicant for amicus on condition that the UNHCR would bear its costs of appearance in the case.

In the HI case, the applicant sought three fundamental reliefs. The first relief was that the court should order a certiorari to quash the respondent’s refusal to grant the applicant a declaration of refugee status. Secondly, the applicant sought the court’s declaration that sections 16 and 17(1) of the Refugee Act, 1996 (as amended) (“the 1996 Act”) were unconstitutional. Lastly, it was the applicant’s wish that the court issue an order to extend the duration for applying for leave for judicial review. In an order issued on the 5th November 2002, the application for judicial review was refused by the High Court. However, the Court noted that its decision raised a matter of exceptional public interest. . Consequently, it advised that an appeal be made to the Supreme Court. The applicant thus proceeded to the Supreme Court based on the High Court's advice.

Holding of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was required to determine the question as to whether the refugee appeal tribunal acted intra vires by factoring the possibility of the applicant relocating within his country when determining the applicant’s refugee status within the meaning of section 2 of the 1996 Act. The affidavit by the UNHCR’s representative in Ireland – Papia Poutz Phiri – provided the basis upon which the application in the Hi case was lodged. The affidavit affirmed that the UNHCR was the universal supervisory organ responsible for refugee protection, pursuant to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (“the 1951 Convention” or “the Geneva Convention”). Notably, the responent averred that Article 35 of the 1951 Convention required states to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of its mandate, including supervising the applications of the Geneva Convention. The responent further averred that the UNHCR’s amicus intervention would provide an appropriate mechanism for assisting the court to better interpret and apply the provisions of the 1951 Convention.

Citing examples where the UNHCR had intervened in previous cases in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Canada, the respondent submitted that the UNHCR stood a better position in assisting the Court to make a better determination in the present case. The Court relied on the definition of an amicus curiae provided in the United States Tobacco Company v Minister for Consumer Affairs and Others. In the United States Tobacco case, the Federal Court of Australia, citing the Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, defined an amicus curiae as " a friend of the court, or a person who calls the court’s attention to some decision or point of law, which may have been overlooked." In Ireland, the Supreme Court cited the decision in Brady v. Cavan Co. Council in which the Supreme Court of Ireland granted the Attorney General leave to appear in that case as an amicus. In addition, it was the Court’s opinion that the application for amicus curiae in the present case fell within its jurisdiction.

In an unanimous decision of the Supreme Court,, delivered by Keane C.J. on behalf of McGuinness J. and Fennelly J., the Court held that the present case gave rise to an issue of public law and that the court's judgment may affect the public other than those before the court. Accordingly, the Court held that the UNHCR could make insightful written and/or oral submissions which could benefit the Court in reaching a better decision. The court clarified that for the application for leave to appear as an amicus to succeed, the court must be satisfied that the written submissions by the party seeking an amicus appearance would be of assistance to the court in determining the matter before it.

Subsequent developments
Ireland lacks statutory provisions for the appointment of an amicus curiae, except in the case of the Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC), pursuant to section 8 of the Human Rights Act 2000. Currently, there is no evidence of explicit subsequent approval of the Supreme Court of Ireland's decision in Hi v Minister for Justice.